Southern Illinois University Law Journal
Part I of this article summarizes Regulation FD. Part II summarizes the "traditional" treatment accorded analysts by the S.E.C., private 1Ob-5 plaintiffs, and the courts, and describes two efforts in the 1990s by the Supreme Court and the Congress to remove analysts and similar ancillary players from the ever-burgeoning 1Ob-5 caseload. Part III provides a background for an evaluation of the analyst's role by discussing his duties in corporate disclosure settings and the accolades consistently received therefor. Part IV discusses the possible flaws in Regulation FD while encouraging the S.E.C. to complete the more arduous, but surely more direct, approach of defining materiality.
J. Scott Colesanti,
Bouncing the Tightrope: The S.E.C. Attacks Selective Disclosure, but Provides Little Stability for Analysts, 25 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/178