Connecticut Law Review
In her Afterword to Solomon's Dilemma: Exploring Parental Rights, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse asserts that I advocate judicial reliance on the notion of intent to determine parenthood in certain cases occasioned by reproductive technology. I do not, and in the paper to which Professor Woodhouse referred did not, advocate such a position. In my paper, I did analyze the implications of such reliance by a number of courts. Professor Woodhouse confused my analysis with advocacy. In so doing, Professor Woodhouse weakened the effects and potential benefits of both analysis and advocacy. Analysis does not necessarily imply advocacy, though obviously analysis can be, and often is, used in the service of advocacy, just as advocacy can become the subject of analysis. The dialectic between the two can further the purposes of each, but only as long as the distinction is clearly recognized. To underscore Professor Woodhouse's error, I shall review my analysis of judicial reliance on the notion of intent in recent cases involving reproductive technology.
Janet L. Dolgin,
Response to Professor Woodhouse, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 107
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/199