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The Uniform Probate Code’s New Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions

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INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Law Commission (“Commission”) approved in 2019 substantial amendments to the intestacy and class gift provisions of the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).1 We were the reporters, or principal drafters, of these amendments. In this article, we explain the amendments and how they advance likely donative intention. The article has three aims. One is to describe the 2019 revisions to the UPC. A second is to explain how the statutory changes promote the UPC’s purposes and policies. A third is to encourage bar associations and legislative committees in each state to consider adopting the 2019 UPC. We begin with some background.

The Commission promulgated the UPC in 1969.2 From time to time, the Commission revises the UPC to reflect changes in the U.S. family and to advance the UPC’s purposes and policies. The substantive core of the UPC is Article II, which contains provisions on intestacy,
wills, and rules of construction, among other topics. Article II has undergone three major revisions: in 1990, 2008, and 2019.3

The 1990 amendments to Article II had several objectives, two of which are pertinent here. The first pertinent objective was to redesign the surviving spouse’s intestate share to reflect both prevailing donative intention and the rise of blended families, meaning a family in which one or more children of one spouse are not children of the other spouse. The 1969 UPC provided that, if a decedent is survived by a spouse and one or more descendants, the intestate estate is divided between the spouse and the descendants.4 In contrast, the 1990 UPC provides that, if a decedent dies survived by a spouse and one or more descendants, the identification of intestate takers and the determination of their respective shares depend on whether the family is nonblended or blended. In a nonblended family—all the decedent’s surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and vice versa—the surviving spouse inherits the entire intestate estate.5 This result, supported by empirical evidence of donative intention,6 was new to the UPC; no prior version of the UPC authorized a surviving spouse to inherit the entire intestate estate when the decedent had surviving descendants. Also new in 1990 was the recognition that blended families are not all alike.7 The 1990 UPC divides blended families into two categories: (1) families in which the decedent’s surviving descendants are descendants of the surviving spouse but the surviving spouse has one or more additional descendants who are not descendants of the decedent and (2) families in which one or more of the decedent’s surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.8 The 1990 UPC provides that the surviving spouse’s portion of the intestate estate is larger in category 1 than in category 2 for the following reason.9 The surviving spouse has a parent-child relationship with all of the decedent’s descendants in category 1 but only with some of the decedent’s descendants in category 2. The

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4 See 1969 UPC § 2-102(3), (4) (defining the surviving spouse’s intestate share when the decedent also has “surviving issue”). Under this statute, the surviving spouse received “the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate” when the decedent is survived by issue “all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse also.” Id. § 2-102(3). The $50,000 amount was sufficiently large that it could lead to the decedent’s surviving spouse inheriting the decedent’s entire intestate estate.
6 See 2019 UPC § 2-102 cmt.
7 See 2019 UPC § 2-102(2) (containing statutory language introduced in 1990); cf. 1969 UPC § 2-102(3).
8 Compare 2019 UPC § 2-102(3), with id. § 2-102(4).
9 See the discussion of the 1990 revisions in 2019 UPC § 2-102 cmt.
decedent’s probable intention, therefore, is to give the surviving spouse more when in category 1 than category 2. These provisions of the 1990 UPC take blended family structures and empirical evidence of donative intention into account in determining the surviving spouse’s intestate share.

The second pertinent objective of the 1990 revision was to codify a system of representation called per capita at each generation.\(^\text{10}\) In contrast to the traditional system of representation known as per stirpes, which emphasizes vertical equality by dividing property into equal shares at the generation nearest to the decedent, per capita at each generation emphasizes horizontal equality by assuring that equal shares pass to descendants who are members of the same generation. The choice to have the UPC adopt the per capita at each generation system is not based on a normative judgment but on the goal of reflecting likely donative intent. Empirical evidence reveals that per capita at each generation, not per stirpes, is what most individuals prefer.\(^\text{11}\) The following example illustrates the difference between the two systems.

**Example 1.** The decedent, G, died intestate, survived only by three grandchildren, X, Y, and Z. X is the child of G’s predeceased child A. Y and Z are the children of G’s predeceased child B.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{G} \\
A \\
| \\
X \quad Y \quad Z \\
B
\end{array}
\]

Under the per stirpes system of representation, X inherits one-half of the intestate estate; Y and Z share the other half, with each receiving one-fourth of the intestate estate. Under the per capita at each generation system, the three grandchildren inherit equally; each receives one-third of the intestate estate.

The next major revision of Article II of the UPC was completed in 2008.\(^\text{12}\) One of the revision’s principal aims was to respond to the rising number of parent-child relationships created by assisted reproduction. One might think that parent-child relationships would be an appropriate topic for the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), and indeed there were

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\(^\text{11}\) See Raymond H. Young, *Meaning of “Issue” and “Descendants”*, 13 PROB. NOTES 225, 225-26 (1988), and the studies cited therein.

\(^\text{12}\) See 2019 UPC Art. II Prefatory Note (discussing the 2008 revisions).
some provisions on assisted reproduction in the 2000 UPA, amended in 2002. However, the Commission showed no interest in the decade of the 2000s in further updating the UPA. The Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts stepped into the breach in order to clarify when a parent-child relationship created by assisted reproduction is recognized for purposes of intestate succession and membership in a class gift. Among the sections added to the UPC in 2008 were the pre-2019 versions of section 2-120, regarding assisted reproduction without the assistance of a surrogacy arrangement, and section 2-121, regarding assisted reproduction with the assistance of a surrogacy arrangement.

In 2017, the Commission approved a new version of the UPA. The 2017 UPA introduces significant substantive and procedural changes to the determination of parent-child relationships. Three aspects of the 2017 UPA are of particular importance to succession law. First, the 2017 UPA makes significant revisions to the 2000/2002 version of the UPA regarding parent-child relationships created by assisted reproduction. Second, the 2017 UPA codifies the doctrine of de facto parentage. De facto parentage is a doctrine of functional parentage. The doctrine enables a court to recognize a parent-child relationship if an individual has function as a parent for a significant time such that the individual has established “a bonded and dependent relationship with the child which is parental in nature.” Third, the 2017 UPA contains an optional provision allowing a court to decide that a child has more than two parents. Alternative B of section 613(c) authorizes a court to “adjudicate a child to have more than two parents . . . if the court finds that failure to recognize more than two parents would be detrimental to the child.” With all of these changes to parentage law, the approval of the 2017 UPA created the necessity and opportunity for a revision of the UPC, which the Commission completed in 2019.

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16 See 2017 UPA Arts. VII, VIII.
17 See generally 2017 UPA § 609, cmt. (regarding the adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage).
18 2017 UPA § 609(d)(5).
19 2017 UPA § 613(c) Alternative B.
The 2019 UPC amendments make five significant changes to prior law. We list them here for reference then explain them in subsequent parts of this article. First, the 2019 UPC takes blended families into account not only with respect to the intestate share of the surviving spouse, as in the 1990 revision, but also with respect to the intestate shares of heirs other than the surviving spouse.\footnote{See 2019 UPC §§ 2-102, 2-103.} Second, the 2019 UPC incorporates the per capita at each generation system of representation throughout the intestacy provisions. Prior law favored surviving parents over descendants of deceased parents and favored surviving grandparents over descendants of deceased grandparents. In contrast, the 2019 UPC provides that surviving descendants of a deceased family member are heirs even if one or more others survive in that family member’s generation.\footnote{Id. § 2-107.} It further reflects the per capita at each generation system by ordinarily assuring that heirs in a generation closer to the decedent are favored compared to heirs in a more remote generation and that heirs in a given generation are treated equally. Third, the 2019 UPC eliminates outdated, inaccurate, or imprecise terms.\footnote{Compare PRE-2019 UPC §§ 2-103, 2-107, 2-117 to 2-119 (containing terms such as “maternal” and “paternal” grandparents, “half blood” or “whole blood” relatives, and “genetic” parents), with 2019 UPC §§ 2-103, 2-107, 2-117 to 2-119 (eliminating these terms).} Examples include old references to a decedent’s “maternal” and “paternal” grandparents, to relatives of the “half blood” or “whole blood,” and to “genetic” parents. Fourth, the 2019 UPC restructures the intestacy and class gift provisions to incorporate the innovations in the 2017 UPA, such as the codification of the doctrine of de facto parentage and the recognition that a child may have more than two parents.\footnote{2019 UPC Prefatory Note.} Fifth, the 2019 UPC largely incorporates by reference the rules in the 2017 UPA governing parent-child relationships created by assisted reproduction.\footnote{Id.}

This article divides the following discussion into four main parts. Part I explains the revision of UPC section 2-103, which governs the intestate share of heirs other than the surviving spouse. (No revision was needed to section 2-102 on the intestate share of the surviving spouse, updated in 1990.) Part II explains the 2019 amendments to the UPC’s intestacy provisions pertaining to parent-child relationships. The discussion here is divided into four sub-parts: the effect of a termination of parental rights; de facto parentage; assisted reproduction; and adoption. Part III explains the revision of UPC section 2-705, which contains rules of construction for class gifts. Part IV explains the remainder of the 2019
amendments, which are designed to improve and modernize the wording of various UPC sections. A brief conclusion follows.

I. SECTION 2-103: HEIRS OTHER THAN THE SURVIVING SPOUSE

The UPC’s core provisions on intestate succession are section 2-102 on the intestate share of the surviving spouse and section 2-103 on the intestate share of heirs other than the surviving spouse. Section 2-102 was revised in 1990 and did not need further revision in 2019. Section 2-103 underwent substantial revision in 2019. An examination of each subsection of section 2-103 is necessary to appreciate the breadth of the changes made in 2019 in the order of priority of who, other than a surviving spouse, is eligible to take as an heir of a decedent. The analysis of the question of who qualifies as an heir is completed in Part II, which describes the rules of intestate succession governing parent-child relationships under the 2019 UPC.

Subsection (a) contains definitions. The terms “deceased parent,” “deceased grandparent,” and “deceased spouse” are defined as “a parent, grandparent, or spouse who either predeceased the decedent or is deemed under this [article] to have predeceased the decedent.”25 “Surviving spouse,” “surviving descendant,” “surviving parent,” and “surviving grandparent” are defined as “a spouse, descendant, parent, or grandparent who neither predeceased the decedent nor is deemed under this [article] to have predeceased the decedent.”26 These definitions help to implement the fundamental rule that, in order to be an heir, an individual must survive the decedent by 120 hours.27 An individual who fails to survive the decedent—or is deemed to have predeceased the decedent—cannot be the decedent’s heir. The circumstances in which an individual is deemed to have predeceased the decedent include, but are not limited to, disclaimer, homicide, and termination of parental rights.28 Subsection (a), which is new to section 2-103, clarifies that an

25 Id. § 2-103(a)(1).
26 Id. § 2-103(a)(2). Section 1-201(51) defines “survive” and its derivatives such as “survives,” “survived,” “survivor,” and “surviving” but does not define “deceased.” See id. § 1-201(51).
27 Section 2-102 gives intestacy rights to the “surviving” spouse. Id. § 2-102. Section 2-103 gives intestacy rights to specified “surviving” relatives. Id. § 2-103. “Surviving” requires surviving by 120 hours. See, e.g., id. § 2-104(b)(1) (“An individual born before a decedent’s death who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased the decedent.”). Section 2-104(b)(1) applies to all individuals born before the decedent’s death, not only to the decedent’s spouse, descendant, parent, or grandparent. Id. In contrast, the definitions in section 2-103(a) are limited to the terms in section 2-103 that require definition. Id. § 2-103(a).
28 See 2019 UPC §§ 2-114(b) (termination of parental rights), 2-803(b) (homicide), 2-1106(b)(3)(c) (disclaimer).
individual deemed to have predeceased the decedent does not meet the
definition of “surviving”—hence, the individual cannot be an heir.

Subsection (b) provides a roadmap to the remaining provisions of
section 2-103. It states:

Any part of the intestate estate not passing under section 2-102
to the decedent’s surviving spouse passes to the decedent’s de-
sendants or parents as provided in subsections (c) and (d). If
there is no surviving spouse, the entire intestate estate passes
to the decedent’s descendants, parents, or other heirs as pro-
vided in subsections (c) through (j).

Subsection (b) thus states the well-established rule that section 2-103
governs the part of the decedent’s intestate estate not passing to the
decedent’s surviving spouse under section 2-102 or the entire intestate
estate if the decedent has no surviving spouse.

Subsection (c) begins a series of subsections establishing an order
of priority for heirs other than the surviving spouse. The first priority is
given to the decedent’s surviving descendants. Subsection (c) states: “If
a decedent is survived by one or more descendants, any part of the in-
testate estate not passing to the surviving spouse passes by representa-
tion to the decedent’s surviving descendants.” This is the well-
established rule that, if the decedent is survived by one or more de-
sendants, the intestate estate or part thereof not passing to the surviv-
ing spouse passes by representation to the decedent’s surviving
descendants. The following examples illustrate the operation of subsec-
tion (c).

Example 2. G, the intestate, has a surviving spouse, S, and three
surviving children, A, B, and C, who are also children of S. S has no
other children.

\[ \text{G m. S} \]

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{B} \quad \text{C} \]

Section 2-102 provides that the entire intestate estate passes to S. Noth-
ing passes under section 2-103.

Example 3. Same facts as Example 2, except that S predeceased G.

\[ \text{G m. S} \]

\[ \text{A} \quad \text{B} \quad \text{C} \]

The intestate estate passes by representation to G’s surviving children—
A, B, and C—under subsection (c). “By representation” in subsection
(c) means per capita at each generation, as defined in section 2-106(b). The result is that A, B, and C each inherit one-third of G’s intestate estate.

Subsection (d) establishes the second priority for heirs other than the surviving spouse. If a decedent is not survived by a descendant but is survived by one or more parents, subsection (d) states that any part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse is distributed according to a three-step procedure. First, the intestate estate or part is divided into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving parents and (ii) deceased parents with one or more surviving descendants, if any. Second, one share passes to each surviving parent. Third, the balance of the intestate estate or part, if any, passes by representation to the surviving descendants of the decedent’s deceased parents. The following example illustrates the operation of subsection (d).

Example 4. G, the intestate, had two parents, P1 and P2. P1 had one other child, A. P2 had two other children, B and C. G was predeceased by P2 and was survived by P1, A, B, and C.

The intestate estate is divided into two equal shares because there is one surviving parent (P1) and one deceased parent with surviving descendants (P2). One share passes to P1, who inherits one-half of G’s intestate estate. The balance passes by representation to the surviving descendants of P2, namely B and C. “By representation” in subsection (d) means per capita at each generation, as defined in section 2-106(c). The result is that B and C each inherit one-fourth of G’s intestate estate. In accordance with section 2-107, B and C inherit as G’s siblings without regard to the fact that they share only one parent with G. A does not share in G’s estate because A’s parent (P1) survived G.

The outcome in Example 4 contrasts in two respects with the result under the pre-2019 version of section 2-103, which gives the entire intestate estate to P1. First, the 2019 revisions respond to blended families not only in section 2-102 but also in section 2-103. Second, they incorporate the per capita at each generation system of representation by recog-

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29 For a further discussion of subsection (d) when the special rules of subsection (e) apply, see infra Examples 9-12 and accompanying text.

30 For a discussion of section 2-107, having to do with the right of an heir to inherit without regard to the number of common ancestors in the same generation the heir shares with the decedent, see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
nizing a deceased parent’s descendants as heirs although a parent of the
decedent survives.

Subsection (f) establishes the third priority for heirs other than the
surviving spouse. (Descendants of the decedent’s parents and more re-
 mote heirs take only if there is no surviving spouse.) If the decedent is
not survived by a descendant or parent but is survived by one or more
descendants of a parent, subsection (f) provides that “the intestate es-
tate passes by representation to the surviving descendants of the deced-
ent’s deceased parents.” The following example illustrates the
operation of subsection (f).

Example 5. Same facts as Example 4, except that P1 and P2 prede-
ceased G and that A, B, and C survived G.

\[ \text{P1} \quad \text{P2} \]
\[ \text{A} \quad \text{G} \quad \text{B} \quad \text{C} \]

The intestate estate passes by representation to the surviving descend-
ants (A, B, and C) of G’s deceased parents (P1 and P2), “By representa-
tion” in subsection (f) means per capita at each generation, as defined in
section 2-106(d). The result is that A, B, and C each inherit one-third of
G’s intestate estate. The pre-2019 version of section 2-103 reaches the
same result.

Subsection (g) establishes the fourth priority for heirs other than the
surviving spouse. If the decedent is not survived by a descendant,
parent, or descendant of a parent but is survived by one or more grand-
parents, subsection (g) provides that the intestate estate is distributed
according to a three-step procedure. First, the intestate estate is divided
into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving grandparents and (ii)
deceased grandparents with one or more surviving descendants, if any.
Second, one share passes to each surviving grandparent. Third, the bal-
ance of the intestate estate, if any, passes by representation to the sur-
viving descendants of the decedent’s deceased grandparents.\footnote{For a
further discussion of subsection (g) when the special rules of subsection (h)
apply, see infra Examples 9-12 and accompanying text.}

Example 6. G, the intestate, was survived by only one grandparent
(GP1), GP1’s child A, and three children (B, C, and D) of predeceased
grandparents. A is the child of GP1 and the sibling of G’s parent P1. B is
the child of grandparent GP2 and the sibling of P1. C is the child of
grandparent GP3 and the sibling of G’s parent P2. D is the child of
grandparent GP4 and the sibling of P2.
G’s intestate estate is divided into four equal shares because there is one surviving grandparent (GP1) and there are three deceased grandparents (GP2, GP3, and GP4) with surviving descendants. One share passes to GP1, who inherits one-fourth of G’s intestate estate. The balance passes by representation to the surviving descendants of GP2, GP3, and GP4: namely, B, C, and D. “By representation” in subsection (g) means per capita at each generation, as defined in section 2-106(e). The result is that B, C, and D each inherit one-quarter of G’s intestate estate. A does not share in G’s estate because A’s parent (GP1) survived G.

The outcome in Example 6 contrasts with the result under the pre-2019 version of section 2-103, which gives one-half of the intestate estate to GP1 and divides the other half equally between C and D. B does not share in G’s intestate estate. Instead, GP1 inherits the half passing to P1’s parents. Under the 2019 UPC, B does share in the intestate estate. Just as the 2019 version of subsection (d) accounts for blended families when at least one parent survives, the 2019 version of subsection (g) does the same when at least one grandparent survives. The result is that B, who is not a descendant of GP1, shares in G’s intestate estate. Another difference between the pre-2019 and 2019 versions is that the distributional scheme under subsection (g) applies per capita at each generation. B, C, and D inherit equally notwithstanding that (1) B is a sibling of P1 whereas C and D are siblings of P2 and (2) G’s grandparent (GP1), who is P1’s parent, survives G.

Subsection (i) establishes the fifth priority for heirs other than the surviving spouse. If the decedent is not survived by a descendant, parent, descendant of a parent, or grandparent, subsection (i) provides that “the intestate estate passes by representation to the surviving descendants of the decedent’s deceased grandparents.” The following example illustrates the operation of subsection (i).

Example 7. G, the intestate, was survived only by A, B, and C. A is the child of G’s predeceased grandparent GP1 and is the sibling of G’s predeceased parent P1. B and C are the children of G’s predeceased grandparent GP2 and are the siblings of G’s predeceased parent P2.
The intestate estate passes by representation to the surviving descendants (A, B, and C) of G’s deceased grandparents (GP1 and GP2). “By representation” in subsection (i) means per capita at each generation, as defined in section 2-106(f). The result is that A, B, and C each inherit one-third of G’s intestate estate.

The outcome in Example 7 contrasts with the result under the pre-2019 version of section 2-103, which gives one-half of the intestate estate to A and divides the other half in equal shares between B and C. This is inconsistent with the principle of per capita at each generation because descendants who are members of the same generation do not inherit equally. By first dividing G’s estate between P1 and P2 before applying the per capita at each generation representational system, the pre-2019 version leads to the unequal treatment of A, B, and C even though they are members of the same generation. The 2019 UPC applies the principle of per capita at each generation consistently.

Subsection (j) establishes the final priority—before escheat. It applies if a decedent dies without a surviving spouse, descendant, parent, descendant of a parent, grandparent, or descendant of a grandparent. The subsection grants inheritance rights to descendants of the decedent’s deceased spouse or spouses who are not also descendants of the decedent. The term “deceased spouse” means “an individual to whom the intestate was married at the individual’s death.” The following example illustrates the operation of subsection (j).

Example 8. G, the intestate, was survived only by A and B (the children of G’s predeceased spouse S1) and by C (the child of G’s predeceased spouse S2). A, B, and C are not descendants of G.

The intestate estate passes by representation to the surviving descendants (A, B, and C) of G’s deceased spouses (S1 and S2). “By representation” in subsection (j) means per capita at each generation, as defined in

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32 See 2019 UPC § 2-105 (providing for escheat if there is no taker under the provisions of Article II).
33 Id. § 2-103 cmt. to Subsec. (j).
section 2-106(g). The result is that A, B, and C each inherit one-third of G’s intestate estate.

Subsection (j) is based on pre-2019 section 2-103(b), which was added to the UPC in 2008 to allow a decedent’s stepchild or a stepchild’s descendants to inherit. The distribution of G’s intestate estate in Example 8, however, contrasts with the result reached under the pre-2019 version. The pre-2019 version gives one-half of the intestate estate to C and divides the other half in equal shares between A and B. This distribution is inconsistent with the principle of per capita at each generation because descendants who are members of the same generation do not inherit equally. Subsection (j) avoids this result by not initially dividing a decedent’s estate by the number of predeceased spouses leaving surviving descendants but, instead, dividing the estate among the descendants of predeceased spouses by representation, meaning by per capita at each generation.

An alert reader may have noticed that we did not yet address subsections (e) and (h). Both are designed to achieve an appropriate distribution of a decedent’s intestate estate among descendants of predeceased parents (or grandparents) in situations involving families that are at least partially nonblended. Computational adjustments are necessary in two fact-patterns: (1) when a surviving parent (or grandparent) and a predeceased parent (or grandparent) have the same descendants who survive the decedent and (2) when at least one parent (or grandparent) survives the decedent and two or more parents (or grandparents) predecease the decedent leaving the same descendants who survive the decedent.

The first fact-pattern arises when a surviving parent (or grandparent) and a predeceased parent (or grandparent) have the same descendants who survive the decedent. The appropriate distribution of the decedent’s intestate estate in this situation is achieved under subsection (e)(1), having to do with deceased parents, and (h)(1), having to do with

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34 As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment that would apply the rules in subsections (e)(1) and (h)(1) when the surviving descendants of a predeceased parent (or grandparent) also are descendants of a surviving parent (or grandparent). This amendment deletes the words “and none of those surviving parents has any other surviving descendant” from subsection (e)(1) and the words “and none of those surviving grandparents has any other surviving descendant” from subsection (h)(1). As so revised, subsections (e)(1) and (h)(1) would not require a surviving parent (or grandparent) and a deceased parent (or grandparent) to have the same surviving descendants. The subsections would apply as long as the surviving descendants of a deceased parent (or grandparent) also are descendants of a surviving parent (or grandparent). On the definition of and procedure for a technical amendment to a uniform law, see Thomas P. Gallanis, Trusts and Estates: Teaching Uniform Law, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 679-80 (2014).

35 See supra note 34.
deceased grandparents. The two subsections deem the descendants to have predeceased the decedent. The following two examples illustrate the application of subsections (e)(1) and (h)(1).

*Example 9.* G, the intestate, had two parents, P1 and P2. P1 survived G; P2 predeceased G. P1 and P2 had two other children, A and B, both of whom survived G.

\[
P1 \quad P2
\]
\[
A \quad B \quad G
\]

Under subsection (d), P1 inherits all of G's intestate estate. Subsection (e)(1) assures this result by providing that the descendants of P2 (A and B) are deemed to have predeceased G because the surviving descendants of P2 are surviving descendants of P1. The pre-2019 version of section 2-103 reaches the same result on these facts based on a different rationale. It provides that P1 receives the entire estate regardless of whether P1 and P2 share surviving descendants.

*Example 10.* G, the intestate, was survived only by one grandparent, GP1, and by two children (A and B) of GP1, who are also descendants of G's predeceased grandparent GP2.

\[
GP1 \quad GP2
\]
\[
A \quad B \quad P1
\]
\[
\quad \quad G
\]

Under subsection (g), GP1 inherits all of G's intestate estate. Subsection (h)(1) assures this result by providing that the descendants of GP2 (A and B) are deemed to have predeceased G because the surviving descendants of GP2 are surviving descendants of GP1. The pre-2019 version of section 2-103 reaches the same result on these facts, based on a different rationale. It provides that GP1 inherits the entire intestate estate regardless of whether GP1 and GP2 share surviving decedents.

The second fact-pattern arises when at least one parent (or grandparent) survives the decedent and two or more parents (or grandparents) predecease the decedent leaving the same descendants who survive the decedent. The appropriate distribution of the decedent’s estate in this situation is achieved under subsection (e)(2), having to do with deceased parents, and (h)(2), having to do with deceased grandparents. The two subsections deem the deceased parents (or deceased grandparents) to be one deceased parent (or one deceased grandpar-
ent). The following two examples illustrate the application of subsections (e)(2) and (h)(2).

**Example 11.** G, the intestate, had three parents, P1, P2, and P3. P1 survived G; P2 and P3 predeceased G. P2 and P3 had two children, A and B, who survived G.

![Diagram 1](P1 → G → P2, P3)

Under subsection (d), the intestate estate is divided into two shares: one for P1 and one for the descendants (A and B) of P2 and P3, who are deemed to be one deceased parent rather than two, under subsection (e)(2). The share passing to A and B passes to them by representation. “By representation” in subsection (d) means per capita at each generation, as defined in section 2-106(c). The result is that P1 inherits one-half of G’s intestate estate and A and B each inherit one-fourth of G’s intestate estate. The pre-2019 version of section 2-103 reaches a different outcome: P1 inherits the entire intestate estate. The 2019 revisions incorporate the per capita at each generation system of representation by recognizing a deceased parent’s descendants as heirs although a parent of the decedent survives.

**Example 12.** G, the intestate, was survived only by one grandparent, GP1 (the parent of G’s predeceased parent P1) and by the children (A and B) of G’s predeceased grandparents GP2 and GP3 (the parents of G’s predeceased parent P2).

![Diagram 2](GP1 → G → GP2, GP3)

Under subsection (g), the intestate estate is divided into two shares: one for GP1 and one for the surviving descendants (A and B) of GP2 and GP3, who, in accordance with subsection (h)(2), are deemed to be one deceased grandparent rather than two. The share passing to A and B passes to them by representation. “By representation” in subsection (g) means per capita at each generation, as defined in section 2-106(e). The result is that GP1 inherits one-half of G’s intestate estate and A and B each inherit one-fourth of G’s intestate estate. The pre-2019 version of section 2-103 reaches the same result on these facts, based on a different rationale. G’s intestate estate is divided between the relatives of the decedent who are related to P1 and the relatives of the decedent who are...
related to P2. GP1 inherits one-half of G’s intestate estate and P2’s siblings (A and B) share the other half equally.

One final point about the 2019 version of section 2-103 remains to be made. It functions equally well whether the decedent has at most two parents and at most two sets of grandparents or whether, as optionally allowed by the 2017 UPA, a court determined that the decedent has more than two parents. It also functions equally well if the decedent’s parent had more than two parents. This is in sharp contrast to the pre-2019 version of section 2-103. The pre-2019 version of section 2-103(a)(2) is premised on a decedent having at most two parents: “to the decedent’s parents equally if both survive . . . .” The pre-2019 version of section 2-103(a)(4), having to do with the decedent’s grandparents and their descendants, is similarly premised: it refers to grandparents or descendants of grandparents on “both the paternal and maternal sides.” Removal of the gendered labels to reflect the modern era of same-sex parenting—e.g., to refer to grandparents or their descendants “on the one side” and “on the other side”—would not remedy the problem, which arises from the presumption that there are no more than two sides.

The accommodation of a child with more than two parents in the 2019 version of section 2-103 allows for additional revisions to the UPC. We discuss these and other innovations in Part II, which outlines how the 2019 amendments have changed the pre-2019 rules recognizing a parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession.

II. THE 2019 UPC AND PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION

The 2019 UPC incorporates the 2017 UPA’s purposes and policies underlying the formation of parent-child relationships in its substantive changes and choices of statutory language. The 2017 UPA treats all parent-child relationships alike. The 2019 UPC embraces that approach. It does not regard one manner by which an individual establishes parentage as more “conventional” or “normal” than another. The 2019 UPC, in its pursuit of furthering donative intention, does address unique succession issues that arise due to the manner by, as well as the circumstances under, which an individual establishes parentage or loses parental status.

36 Pre-2019 UPC § 2-103(a)(2) (emphasis added).
37 Id. § 2-103(a)(4) (emphasis added).
38 For an additional example, see Pre-2019 UPC § 2-103(a)(5) (addressing the fact-pattern where, as between the paternal and maternal sides, only one side has individuals who survive the decedent).
The definitions of “parent” and child” in the 2019 UPC rely on the definitions in the 2017 UPA. “Child” is now defined in UPC section 1-201(5) as “an individual of any age whose parentage is established under [cite to Uniform Parentage Act (2017)][cite to state’s parentage act][applicable state law].”39 “Parent” is now defined in UPC section 1-201(32) as “an individual who has established a parent-child relationship under [cite to Uniform Parentage Act (2017)][cite to state’s parentage act][applicable state law].”40 An accompanying legislative note explains that the first bracketed option is for states that have enacted the 2017 UPA, the second bracketed option is for states that have enacted a parentage act other than the 2017 UPA, and the third bracketed option is for states that do not have a statute governing the establishment of parent-child relationships.41 The phrase “‘applicable state law’ includes statutory, regulatory, and case law.”42 The definitions of “child” and “parent” operate throughout the 2019 UPC as legal terms of art. Only when the 2019 UPC recognizes a parent-child relationship between two individuals does a statutory provision refer to an individual as a “child” or a “parent.”

The discussion in this Part is divided into four topics. The first is the effect on intestate succession of the termination of parental rights. The discussion then turns to the intestate succession issues arising when an individual establishes a parent-child relationship by adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage, assisted reproduction, or adoption.

A. The Effect of Termination of Parental Rights

Section 2-114(a)(1) does not allow a parent to inherit from or through a child if the parent’s parental rights were terminated. It provides: “A parent is barred from inheriting from or through a child of the parent if . . . the parent’s parental rights were terminated and the parent-child relationship was not judicially reestablished . . . .”43 Section 2-114 continues to recognize the parent-child relationship for all other purposes of intestate succession.44 Under subsection (b), “[f]or the pur-

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39 2019 UPC § 1-201(5).
40 Id. § 1-201(32).
41 Id. § 1-201 Legislative Note to Paras. (5), (32).
42 Id.
43 Id. § 2-114(a)(1). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment to delete the words “the parent-child relationship was” from this subsection.
44 See also 2019 UPC § 2-114(a)(2) (addressing the situation in which a child dies “before reaching [18] years of age and there is clear and convincing evidence that immediately before the child’s death the parental rights of the parent could have been terminated under state law . . . on the basis of nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, neglect, or other actions or inactions of the parent toward the child.”).
pose of intestate succession from or through the deceased child, a parent who is barred from inheriting under . . . [subsection (a)] is deemed to have predeceased the child.” The effect of subsection (b) is that a child’s relative who is also related to the parent can inherit from the child.45 For example, the child’s grandparent can inherit from the child. Termination of parental rights can occur for a number of reasons and under a variety of familial circumstances. For instance, termination might occur because a parent abused or neglected a child, leading to custody being awarded to a relative of the parent. Alternatively, termination might occur when a parent relinquishes parental rights to allow, under the law of a jurisdiction, a child’s stepparent to establish a parent-child relationship by adoption or adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage. Other examples demonstrating the application of section 2-114 in the context of de facto parentage and adoption can be found below. The range of possible familial situations involving a termination of parental rights makes difficult the determination of the likely intent of a decedent. Section 2-114’s response is to deny a parent whose parental rights are terminated the right to inherit from or through the child. In other respects, given the potential for continuing familial ties, section 2-114 keeps the parent-child relationship intact for purposes of intestate succession.

The 2019 amendments add subsection (c) in response to the West Virginia Supreme Court’s 2018 holding in Hall v. Hall.46 Hall held that a termination of a parent’s rights due to abuse and neglect also terminated the right of the child to inherit from the parent.47 Subsection (c) makes clear that “the termination of a parent’s parental rights to a child has no effect on the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from or through the parent.”48 Subsection (c) does not substantively change the pre-2019 UPC. It only clarifies it.

The examples that follow illustrate how section 2-114 affects the inheritance rights of a parent whose parental rights have been terminated but does not affect the inheritance rights of others. Unless otherwise stated, the examples assume, for ease of presentation, that no individual dies survived by a spouse or descendants and that each individual identified as having survived a decedent lived at least 120 hours after the decedent’s death.

Example 13. G, the intestate, died survived only by GP1 (G’s grandparent) and P1 (GP1’s child). P1’s parental rights to G were terminated while G was alive.

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45 The definition of “relative” in the 2019 UPC is in section 2-115(4). It is the same definition as in Pre-2019 UPC § 2-115(9).
47 Id. at 847.
48 2019 UPC § 2-114(c).
Under section 2-114(b), P1 is deemed to have predeceased G. GP1, as G’s grandparent, has the right to inherit from G.

Example 14. Same facts as Example 13, except that P1 and GP1 died intestate in that order survived only by G. Under section 2-114(c), G, as P1’s child, has the right to inherit from P1 and, as GP1’s grandchild, the right to inherit from GP1.

Example 15. Same facts as Example 13, except that G died survived by G’s child, C, who died intestate survived only by P1 and GP1.

Under section 2-114(b), P1 is deemed to have predeceased G, which in turn means that P1 is deemed to have predeceased C. GP1, however, does not have the right to inherit from C because GP1 is C’s great-grandparent and is not an eligible heir under section 2-103. C’s intestate estate escheats to the state in accordance with section 2-105.

The discussions below concerning de facto parentage and adoption have more to say about the effect of a termination of parental rights and the operation of section 2-114.49 For now, we turn to de facto parentage.

B. Parentage by Adjudication of a Claim of De Facto Parentage

Most states by statute or case law recognize a doctrine that extends some or all parental rights to an individual who has performed functions customarily associated with parenting.50 The 2017 UPA treats an adjudication of de facto parentage as a “new means by which an individual can establish a parent-child relationship.”51 Section 609 of the 2017 UPA, in

49 See infra Parts II.B, II.D.
50 See 2017 UPA Prefatory Note, § 609 cmt. (both describing the similarities and differences among the states regarding the equitable doctrines, referred to variously as de facto parentage, in loco parentis, or the psychological parent doctrine).
51 Id. § 609 cmt.
an effort to “provide greater clarity to the parties and affected child,” sets forth procedures to establish a parent-child relationship based on an adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage. These 2017 UPA provisions promote the efficient application of succession law by requiring that a proceeding to adjudicate a claim of de facto parentage commence while both “the child” and the “individual who claims to be a de facto parent” are alive. The UPA also requires that the proceeding commence “before the child attains 18 years of age.”

The 2019 UPC incorporates the de facto parentage doctrine into the rules of intestate succession. Three UPC sections are pertinent here.

Section 2-115 contains a definition of “de facto parent.” A de facto parent is “an individual who is adjudicated on the basis of de facto parentage under [cite to Uniform Parentage Act (2017)][cite to state’s parentage act][applicable state law] to be a parent of a child.”

Section 2-118 recognizes a parent-child relationship between an individual and the individual’s de facto parent. It states in pertinent part: “A parent-child relationship exists between an individual and the individual’s de facto parent.”

Section 2-119 addresses the effect of de facto parentage on parent-child relationships in existence before the adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage. A defined term is important here. Section 2-119(a)(1) defines a “parent before the adjudication” to mean “an individual who is a parent of a child (A) immediately before another individual is adjudicated a de facto parent of the child; or (B) immediately before dying, or being deemed . . . to have died, and before another individual is adju-

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52 Id.; see also id. § 609(e) (providing that, if in an adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage, a court determines that (1) the individual claiming de facto parentage has met the statutory requirements to establish parentage and (2) there is more than one other individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child, then the court must adjudicate parentage under UPA section 613); id. § 613(a) (setting forth factors for adjudicating “parentage in the best interest of the child”). Alternative B of 2017 UPA § 613(c) authorizes a court to “adjudicate a child to have more than two parents . . . if the court finds that failure to recognize more than two parents would be detrimental to the child.”

53 Id. § 609(a), (b).

54 Id. § 609(b)(1). Although state law other than the 2017 UPA does not necessarily require that an individual claiming to be a de facto parent must do so before the child of the de facto parent reaches adulthood, the criteria to qualify as a de facto parent appears to presume that the de facto parent has built a parent-child relationship while the child of the de facto parent was a minor. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 19-A § 1891(3) (2021).


56 Id. § 2-115(3). For an explanation of the bracketed options, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.

57 Id. § 2-118(b).
dicated a de facto parent of the child.”58 The definition of “parent before the adjudication” includes a parent without regard to the manner by which that parent acquired parental status.

Section 2-119(c) provides that, unless provided otherwise by court order, “an adjudication that an individual is a child of a de facto parent does not affect a parent-child relationship between the child and an individual who was the child’s parent before the adjudication.”59 The continuing recognition of parent-child relationships established before an adjudication of de facto parentage reflects the de facto parentage doctrine under which a finding of de facto parentage adds, rather than replaces, a parent.60

The following examples demonstrate the application of the 2019 versions of sections 2-118 and 2-119 with respect to de facto parentage. The interaction between section 2-119(c) and section 2-114, having to do with a parent who is not allowed to inherit from or through a child if the parental rights were terminated, also is discussed in these examples. Unless otherwise stated, the examples assume, for ease of presentation, that no individual dies survived by a spouse or descendants and that each individual identified as having survived a decedent lived at least 120 hours after the decedent’s death.

Example 16. A and B were married. At the time of their marriage, A had a child, X, and B had a child, Y. With A’s consent, B commenced a proceeding on the basis of de facto parentage to be adjudicated a parent of X. The court adjudicated B to be a parent of X and did not terminate A’s parental rights. A, B, and A’s only surviving parent, P, subsequently died intestate in that order, survived only by X and Y.

58 Id. § 2-119(a)(1). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, technical amendments to this definition. The amendments add “for purposes of intestate succession” to subsection (a)(1), thereby clarifying that an individual whose parentage is no longer recognized as a result of a previous adoption is not considered a “parent before the adjudication.” See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the opening clause of section 2-119(b)). The amendments also delete, as unnecessary, the reference to “deemed” death in subparagraph (B).

59 2019 UPC § 2-119(c). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment to this subsection. The amendment deletes the exception for a court order for the following reason: regardless of a court order, a parent-child relationship established by de facto parentage should not disturb, for succession purposes, prior parent-child relationships.

60 See 2017 UPA § 2-609(d)(6) (requiring an individual claiming de facto parentage to demonstrate “by clear-and-convincing evidence that . . . another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and dependent relationship” with the child).
X remains A’s child under section 2-119(c) and has the right to inherit from A. (A and B have a blended family and, therefore, in accordance with sections 2-102(3) and 2-103(b) and (c), B is not A’s sole heir.) X is B’s child under section 2-118(b) and has the right to inherit from B. Because X remains A’s child (P’s grandchild) under section 2-119(c), X has the right to inherit from P.

**Example 17.** Same facts as Example 16 except that Y and X died intestate in that order after the death of A and B, and only P survived X. Under section 2-118(b), X has the right to inherit from Y because, as B’s child, X is Y’s sibling. Under section 2-119(c), P has the right to inherit from X because P remains X’s grandparent.

**Example 18.** Same facts as Example 16 except that A’s parental rights to X were terminated, and X predeceased P. Under sections 2-114(c) and 2-119(c), X remains A’s child and has the right to inherit from A. Under section 2-118(b), X is B’s child and has the right to inherit from B. When X dies, for the purpose of determining X’s heirs, section 2-114(b) does not apply because A predeceased X. Under section 2-119(c), P remains X’s grandparent and has the right to inherit from X.

**Example 19.** A and B were married and had a child, X. When X was four years old, A and B divorced, and B married C. When X was twelve years old, C commenced, with the consent of A and B, a proceeding to establish a claim of de facto parentage of X. When the court adjudicated C to be a parent of X, the court did not terminate A’s or B’s parental rights. Later, X died intestate, survived only by A, B, and C.

Under sections 2-118(b) and 2-119(c), A, B, and C are parents of X, and each has the right to inherit from X.

The 2019 UPC’s recognition of de facto parentage assures that the UPC’s rules on the formation of parent-child relationships reflect the innovations of the 2017 UPA and other state law developments. Together, the two uniform laws have the potential to influence the future development of the de facto parentage doctrine.
C. Parentage by Assisted Reproduction

We now turn to parent-child relationships established by assisted reproduction. Unlike de facto parentage, parentage by assisted reproduction was treated extensively in the pre-2019 UPC. The promulgation of the 2017 UPA enabled a simplification of the UPC. For the most part, but not entirely, the 2019 UPC incorporates by reference the provisions on assisted reproduction of the 2017 UPA. In the discussion below, we examine both that incorporation and the circumstances in which the UPC makes an exception to the rules found in the 2017 UPA in order to further an intestate decedent’s likely donative intention. We also note that the 2019 UPC is careful in its language to ensure that a parent-child relationship established by assisted reproduction is treated no differently than a parent-child relationship established in another manner. In keeping with the core principles of the 2017 UPA, the 2019 UPC treats all parent-child relationships equally for purposes of the law of succession.

The two principal UPC sections addressing parent-child relationships established through assisted reproduction are section 2-120, on assisted reproduction without the assistance of a surrogacy arrangement, and section 2-121, on assisted reproduction with the assistance of a surrogacy arrangement. These sections first appeared in the 2008 UPC. At the time, the Commission showed no interest in updating the UPA’s provisions on assisted reproduction. Instead, it promulgated UPC sections 2-120 and 2-121 to address the succession-law consequences of assisted reproduction. Sections 2-120 and 2-121 were lengthy. The approval of the 2017 UPA, which contains comprehensive provisions on parentage by assisted reproduction, enables the UPC mostly to incorporate by reference the 2017 UPA provisions.

1. Assisted Reproduction without a Surrogacy Arrangement

As amended in 2019, section 2-120 provides: “Except as otherwise provided under Section 2-121, parentage of an individual conceived by assisted reproduction is determined under [cite to Uniform Parentage Act (2017) Article 7 other than Section 708(b)(2)][cite to equivalent provisions of state’s parentage act][applicable state law].”

The one 2017 UPA provision inappropriate for section 2-120 to incorporate into the rules of intestate succession is section 708(b)(2). If a pregnancy, resulting in the birth of an individual, starts after the death of an intended parent, section 708(b)(2) does not recognize a parent-child relationship between the intended parent and the individual unless

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61 2019 UPC § 2-120. For an explanation of the bracketed options, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
either the pregnancy starts or birth occurs within certain prescribed time limits measured from the intended parent’s death. Section 708(b)(2) requires that “either (A) the embryo is in utero not later than [36] months after the individual’s [intended parent’s] death; or (B) the child is born not later than [45] months after the individual’s [intended parent’s] death.”62 These time limits may be familiar to the reader. The pre-2019 version of UPC section 2-120(k) adopts a similar rule.63 Time limits keyed to the intended parent’s death are fine for purposes of intestate succession when the intended parent is the decedent, but they are too restrictive to apply for all purposes.

The 2019 version of the UPC furthers the likely intention of an intestate decedent without interfering unduly with the efficient administration of the intestate decedent’s estate. Section 2-104 imposes time limits for an individual to be considered a child of an intended parent only if the pregnancy resulting in the birth of the individual starts after the death of an intestate decedent. The decedent may be, but is not necessarily, the individual’s intended parent. Section 2-104 provides in pertinent part:

If the decedent dies before the start of a pregnancy by assisted reproduction resulting in the birth of an individual who lives at least 120 hours after birth, that individual is deemed to be living at the decedent’s death if [the decedent’s personal representative, not later than [6] months after the decedent’s death, received notice or had actual knowledge of an intent to use genetic material in the assisted reproduction and]:

(A) the embryo was in utero not later than [36] months after the decedent’s death; or

(B) the individual was born not later than [45] months after the decedent’s death.64

62 2017 UPA § 708(b)(2).
63 Compare 2019 UPC § 1-120(k), with 2017 UPA § 708(b)(2).
64 2019 UPC § 2-104(b)(3). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment to put the reference to “120 hours” in brackets. Data raise doubts about whether 120 hours—imported from the survivorship rule for simultaneous or near-simultaneous death—is the appropriate period to provide reasonable assurance of infant survivorship. See, e.g., Rabah Kamal et al., What Do We Know About Infant Mortality in the U.S. and Comparable Countries?, PETE RSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACK ER (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/infant-mortality-u-s-compare-countries/#item-start [https://perma.cc/829B-OF3R] (reporting that, of the infants dying in 2017 within the first year after birth, 40 percent died within 23 hours after birth, 13 percent died between one to six days after birth, 13 percent died between seven to 27 days after birth, and 34 percent died between 28 and 364 days after birth).
Although the 2019 version of section 2-104 measures the time limits from an intestate decedent’s death rather than only from the death of an intended parent, the time periods are designed to accommodate the situation in which the intended parent is the intestate decedent. The 36-month period allows for a period of grieving after the intended parent’s death, time to decide whether to go forward with a pregnancy, and the possibility that attempts to achieve a pregnancy may initially fail. The 36-month period also coincides with section 3-1006 of the UPC, under which an heir is allowed to recover property improperly distributed, or its value, from any distributee during the later of three years after the decedent’s death or one year after distribution. If the assisted-reproduction procedure is performed in a medical facility, medical records ordinarily indicate the date when the embryo is in utero. In some cases, however, the evidence may be lacking if the procedure is not performed in a medical facility. The alternative time limit of birth within 45 months provides the necessary certainty when the start of the pregnancy is indeterminate. The 45-month period is based on the 36-month period with an additional nine months tacked on to allow for a typical gestational period. The time limits are bracketed to indicate that states may want to consider other time limits that may be more consistent with their rules of probate administration. Other bracketed language in this section imposes a requirement of notice to the personal representative.

The first set of examples apply the 2019 version of sections 2-104 and 2-120 to the situation in which the intended parent of an individual died intestate. These examples illustrate that the results under the 2019 and pre-2019 versions of the UPC are identical. They also illustrate that the 2019 UPC and the 2017 UPA both conclude that a parent-child relationship exists between the intended parent and the individual.

Example 20. G and G’s spouse, S, had a child, X, by assisted reproduction. G was alive when X was born. G met the requirements in the 2017 UPA to establish a parent-child relationship with X. Later, G died intestate survived only by S, X, and a stepchild (S’s child but not G’s child). S, X, and G’s stepchild survived G by at least 120 hours. In accordance with section 2-120, which incorporates by reference the rules for parentage in the 2017 UPA, X is G’s child and has the right to inherit from G. (G and S have a blended family and, therefore, in accordance with section 2-102(3), S is not G’s sole heir.) The same result is reached under the pre-2019 version of section 2-120.

65 See 2019 UPC § 3-1006.
66 See Pre-2019 UPC §§ 2-104(a)(1) (reaching the same results as the 2019 version of section 2-104 discussed in the example), 2-120(d) (establishing a parent-child relationship between the individual and the husband of the birth mother if the “husband provided the sperm that the birth mother used during his lifetime for assisted
Example 21. Same facts as Example 20 except that G died after the start of the pregnancy and before the birth of X. After birth, X lived at least 120 hours. In accordance with section 2-120, X is G’s child. Under section 2-104(b)(2), X is deemed to be living at G’s death because X lived at least 120 hours after birth. X has the right to inherit from G. If, instead, X had failed to survive for 120 hours after birth, X would have been deemed to have predeceased G. The same results are reached under the pre-2019 version of sections 2-104(a)(2) and 2-120.67

Example 22.68 The same facts as Example 20 except that G died intestate before the start of a pregnancy. S timely notified G’s personal representative that S intended to use G’s genetic material to have a child. One year later, S used the genetic material to start a pregnancy. About nine months thereafter, S gave birth to X. X lived at least 120 hours after birth. In accordance with section 2-120, X is G’s child. X’s birth falls within the bracketed time limits of section 2-104(b)(3), which means that X is deemed to be living at G’s death and has the right to inherit from G. If, instead, X had failed to survive for 120 hours after birth, X would have been deemed to have predeceased G. The same results are reached under the pre-2019 version of section 2-120.69

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67 See id. §§ 2-104(a)(2) (reaching the same results as the 2019 version of section 2-104), 2-120(d) (establishing a parent-child relationship between the individual and the husband of the birth mother if the “husband provided the sperm that the birth mother used during his lifetime for assisted reproduction”), (f)(1) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction if the intended parent signed a record demonstrating consent to be the parent), (f)(2)(A) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction if the intended parent functioned as a parent of the individual), (h) (in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, presuming requirements of (f)(2)(A) to establish a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction are met if the birth mother is married to the intended parent).

68 This example derives from Thomas P. Gallanis, Family Property Law: Cases and Materials on Wills, Trusts, and Estates 94 (8th ed. 2020).

69 See Pre-2019 UPC §§ 2-120(f)(1) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction if the intended parent signed a record demonstrating consent to be the parent), (f)(2)(B) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction if the intended parent intended to function as a parent of the individual but was prevented from doing so because of death), (h) (in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, presuming requirements of (f)(2)(B) to establish a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction are met if the birth mother is married to the intended parent).
The second set of examples apply the 2019 version of sections 2-104 and 2-120 to the situation in which the intestate decedent is not an intended parent. Each of the examples presumes that the intended parents of a child conceived by assisted reproduction satisfied all the requirements in the 2017 UPA except the time limits in section 708(b)(2). This set of examples illustrates why the 2019 UPC’s time limits, rather than the time limits in the 2017 UPA, further the intestate decedent’s likely donative intention. The examples also illustrate that the results under the 2019 and pre-2019 versions of the UPC are sometimes, but not always, identical.

Example 23. Before A died, A deposited genetic material in a medical facility. Five years after A’s death, A’s surviving spouse used A’s genetic material to give birth to C. After C’s birth, A’s only surviving parent, P, died intestate, survived only by C. C survived P by at least 120 hours.

Under section 2-120, C is a child of A and a grandchild of P. C has the right to inherit from P because, in accordance with section 2-104(b)(1), C was born before P’s death and survived P by at least 120 hours. The pre-2019 UPC reaches the same result. The 2017 UPA reaches a different conclusion: the length of time between A’s death and the start of the

by assisted reproduction if the intended parent signed a record demonstrating consent to be the parent). (f)(2)(C) (establishing a parent-child relationship if the individual other than the birth mother “intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, if that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence”), (k) (providing that, if a parent-child relationship otherwise exists in accordance with section 2-120 and a pregnancy starts after the death of the intended parent resulting in the birth of an individual who survives at least 120 hours, the pre-2019 version of section 2-104(a)(2) applies to treat the individual as living at the death of the intended parent only so long as the pregnancy started “not later than 36 months after the” intended parent’s death or the individual is born “not later than 45 months after the” intended parent’s death). 70 See id. §§ 2-104(a)(1) (reaching the same results as the 2019 version of section 2-104 discussed in the example), 2-120(f)(1) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction if the intended parent signed a record demonstrating consent to be the parent), (f)(2)(C) (establishing a parent-child relationship if the individual other than the birth mother “intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child” and “that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence”). Pre-2019 UPC section 2-120(k) with its time limitations is inapplicable to the facts of Example 23 because it applies only when the intended parent is the intestate decedent.
pregnancy resulting in C’s birth means that section 708(b)(2) concludes that C is not A’s child and, therefore, not P’s grandchild. This conclusion is inconsistent with the law of succession, which strives to further an intestate decedent’s likely donative intention.

Example 24. Same facts as Example 23 except that A’s spouse again used A’s genetic material and, two months after P’s death, gave birth to E, who lived at least 120 hours after birth.

Under section 2-120, E is a child of A and a grandchild of P. E has the right to inherit from P because, in accordance with section 2-104(b)(2), P died during the gestational period that resulted in the birth of E, who lived at least 120 hours after birth. The same result is reached under the pre-2019 UPC.71 The 2017 UPA reaches a different conclusion: the length of time between A’s death and the start of the pregnancy resulting in E’s birth means that section 708(b)(2) concludes that E is not A’s child and, therefore, not P’s grandchild. This conclusion is inconsistent with the law of succession, which strives to further an intestate decedent’s likely donative intention.

Example 25. Before A died, A deposited genetic material in a medical facility. Five years after A’s death, A’s parent P died intestate survived only by P’s grandchild, X, who is the child of A’s predeceased sibling. A’s surviving spouse timely notified P’s personal representative of an intention to use A’s genetic material to have a child. Fifteen months after P’s death, A’s surviving spouse used the genetic material to start a pregnancy. About twenty-four months after P’s death, A’s surviving spouse gave birth to C, who lived at least 120 hours after birth.

71 See id. §§ 2-104(a)(2) (reaching the same results as the 2019 version of section 2-104 discussed in the example), 2-120(f)(1) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent other than the birth mother and the individual who was born by assisted reproduction if the intended parent signed a record demonstrating consent to be the parent), (f)(2)(C) (establishing a parent-child relationship if the individual other than the birth mother “intended to be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child” and “that intent is established by clear and convincing evidence”). Pre-2019 UPC section 2-120(k) with its time limitations is inapplicable to the facts of Example 24 because it applies only when the intended parent is the intestate decedent.
Under section 2-120, C is A’s child and P’s grandchild. C has the right to inherit from P because, in accordance with section 2-104(b)(3), C satisfied the conditions to be deemed to be living at P’s death: P died before the start of the pregnancy resulting in C’s birth, A’s surviving spouse timely notified P’s personal representative of an intent to use genetic material in assisted reproduction, the time-limits in section 2-104(b)(3) measured from P’s death were satisfied, and C lived at least 120 hours after birth. The pre-2019 UPC does not have a counterpart to section 2-104(b)(3), with the result that the common law applies. C is not an heir of P because C is not alive at P’s death. The 2017 UPA, because of the length of time between A’s death and the start of the pregnancy resulting in C’s birth, concludes, in accordance with section 708(b)(2), that C is not A’s child and, therefore, not P’s grandchild. The results under the pre-2019 UPC and the 2017 UPA are inconsistent with the intestate decedent’s likely donative intention.

These three examples make clear why section 2-120 does not incorporate section 708(b)(2) of the UPA. The 2019 UPC, without unduly interfering with the efficient administration of the decedent’s estate, furthers the likely donative intention of an intestate decedent by allowing an individual born as a result of assisted reproduction to qualify as an heir as long as the individual is born (1) before the decedent’s death, (2) as a result of a pregnancy starting before the decedent’s death, or (3) if certain time limits are met, as a result of a pregnancy starting after the decedent’s death.

2. Assisted Reproduction with the Assistance of a Surrogacy Arrangement

The other principal UPC section on parent-child relationships established through assisted reproduction is section 2-121, which has to do with assisted reproduction with the assistance of a surrogate. As amended in 2019, section 2-121 provides: “Parentage of an individual conceived by assisted reproduction and born to a gestational or genetic surrogate is determined under [cite to Uniform Parentage Act (2017) Article 8 other than sections 810(b)(2) and 817(b)(2)] [cite to equivalent provisions of state’s parentage act] [applicable state law].” If a preg-
nancy resulting in the birth of an individual starts after the death of an intended parent, sections 810(b)(2) (having to do with a gestational surrogacy arrangement) and 817(b)(2) (having to do with a genetic surrogacy arrangement) do not recognize a parent-child relationship between the intended parent and the individual unless either the pregnancy starts or birth occurs within prescribed time limits measured as of the intended parent’s death. The time limits are the same as the those discussed supra in Part II.C.1, having to do with assisted reproduction undertaken without the assistance of a surrogate.

For the same reasons set forth in Part II.C.1, the UPA’s time limits keyed exclusively to the intended parent’s death are too restrictive for purposes of intestate succession. In contrast, sections 2-104 and 2-121 of the 2019 UPC impose time limits for an individual to be considered a child of an intended parent only if the pregnancy starts after the death of the intestate decedent. This can be illustrated readily. If the facts in Examples 23 through 25 stay the same except that assisted reproduction occurs with the assistance of a surrogacy arrangement, neither the analyses nor the results change. The only difference is that the relevant UPC section is section 2-121 instead of section 2-120. As was true in Part II.C.1 supra, the pre-2019 version of sections 2-104 and 2-121 would reach identical results to the 2019 version of the UPC except when a pregnancy by assisted reproduction starts after the death of an intestate decedent who is not an intended parent.

D. Parentage by Adoption

Two sections of the 2019 UPC address the intestate succession consequences of adoption. One is section 2-118(a), regarding parent-child relationships established by adoption. The other is section 2-119, regarding the effect of adoption on parent-child relationships existing before the adoption.

Section 2-118(a) recognizes, for purposes of intestate succession, a parent-child relationship established by adoption. It states: “A parent-child relationship exists between an adoptee and the adoptee’s adoptive parent”73 or parents. This is substantially the same language as in the pre-2019 version of section 2-118(a).74 The 2019 version of section 2-118 simplified the pre-2019 UPC version by eliminating the provisions—for-
mer subsections (b) and (c)—dealing with situations in which death occurs during the adoption process.\textsuperscript{75}

The pre-2019 and 2019 versions of section 2-119 address, for purposes of intestate succession, the effect of adoption on parent-child relationships in existence before the adoption. The 2019 amendments to section 2-119 eliminate the outdated and restrictive term “genetic parent,”\textsuperscript{76} replacing it with “parent before the adoption.” This term of art is defined in section 2-119(a)(2) to mean “an individual who is a parent of a child: (A) immediately before another individual adopts the child; or (B) immediately before dying, or being deemed . . . to have died, and before another individual adopts the child.”\textsuperscript{77} This definition treats each parent before the adoption the same without regard to the manner by which the parent-child relationship was established. The 2019 version makes three further consequential changes. First, it recognizes a parent-child relationship between an adoptee and a parent before the adoption if a court order or law other than the UPC so provides.\textsuperscript{78} Second, it allows a parent before the adoption to inherit from and through an adoptee when a parent-child relationship between an adoptee and a parent before the adoption continues to be recognized.\textsuperscript{79} Third, it adjusts language to accommodate the possibility that an adoptee has more than two parents.\textsuperscript{80}

The opening clause of subsection (b) provides a general rule that a parent-child relationship does not exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s parent before the adoption.\textsuperscript{81} This nonrecognition means that (1) an adoptee and the adoptee’s descendants cannot inherit from or through a parent before the adoption and (2) a parent before the adop-

\textsuperscript{75} See, e.g., \textit{id.} § 2-118(b)(1) (having to do with “an individual who is in the process of being adopted by a married couple when one of the spouses dies”), (b)(2) (having to do with “a child of a genetic parent who is in the process of being adopted by a genetic parent’s spouse when the spouse dies”), (c) (extending the rule found in subsection (b)(2) when a child had been conceived by assisted reproduction).

\textsuperscript{76} See supra Introduction; infra Part IV (discussing why the 2019 UPC eliminates the term “genetic”).

\textsuperscript{77} 2019 UPC § 2-119(a)(2). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, technical amendments to this definition. The amendments add “for purposes of intestate succession” to subsection (a)(2), thereby clarifying that an individual whose parentage is no longer recognized as a result of a previous adoption is not considered a “parent before the adoption.” See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the opening clause of section 2-119(b)). The amendments also delete, as unnecessary, the reference to “deemed” death in subparagraph (B).

\textsuperscript{78} See 2019 UPC § 2-119(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Id.} § 2-119 cmt.

\textsuperscript{80} See \textit{id.} Art. II Prefatory Note (discussing the 2019 revisions).

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{See id.} § 2-119(b) (stating that “[a] parent-child relationship does not exist between an adoptee and an individual who was the adoptee’s parent before the adoption unless” one of the exceptions to this general rule is met).
tion, the parent’s parent, and the descendants of the parent’s parent—i.e., those who would have been an adoptee’s grandparents or descendants of grandparents before the adoption—cannot inherit from or through the adoptee. This rule furthers an intestate decedent’s likely donative intention in the situations in which the adoption provides an adopted child with a replacement family, sometimes referred to in the case law as “clean slate” or a “fresh start.” The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (“the Restatement”) elaborates on this theory. Subsection (b)’s general rule is, in substance, the same as in the pre-2019 version of section 2-119.

Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) provide exceptions to the “fresh start” general rule. These exceptions are designed to further the intestate decedent’s likely donative intention. If an exception applies, the parent-child relationship between the adoptee and each of the adoptee’s parents before the adoption continues to be recognized for purposes of intestate succession. This means that an adoptee and the adoptee’s descendants have the right to inherit from and through each of the parents before the adoption—plus, of course, from and through each of the adoptive parents.

The 2019 revisions to section 2-103 accommodate an individual with more than two parents. This enables the 2019 version of section 2-119(b)(1) and (2) to expand the inheritance rights of a parent before the adoption as compared to the pre-2019 UPC. Unlike the pre-2019 version of section 2-119, the 2019 version provides that, if an exception to the “fresh start” general rule applies, each parent before the adoption as well as each adoptive parent has the right to inherit from and through the adoptee. There is one caveat, however. The right of any parent to inherit from and through a child is subject to section 2-114, having to do

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82 It is possible that an adoption or an adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage occurs after a previous adoption. If, under section 2-119(b) the previous adoption resulted in the nonrecognition of a parent-child relationship, that parent should no longer be considered a “parent before the adoption” or a “parent before the adjudication.” Id. § 2-119(a), (b). Once an adoption results in the nonrecognition of a parent-child relationship under the “fresh start” general rule, that parent-child relationship does not exist for purposes of intestate succession. See id. § 2-119 cmt. to Subsec. (b).


85 See Pre-2019 UPC § 2-119(a) (stating that, subject to certain exceptions, “a parent-child relationship does not exist between an adoptee and the adoptee’s genetic parents”).

86 See 2019 UPC § 2-103 cmt. on 2019 Revisions; supra Part I; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing 2017 UPA § 613(c) Alternative B).
with the termination of parental rights.\textsuperscript{87} We illustrate these rules in the examples soon to follow.

Subsection (b)(1) keeps intact the parent-child relationship between an adoptee and a parent before the adoption if a court order or law other than the UPC so provides. This subsection was added as part of the 2019 reforms to assure that the rules for intestate succession are consistent with a court order or applicable law that continues to recognize a parent-child relationship between an adoptee and a parent before the adoption.

Example 26. A and B had a child, X. C, who has no familial relationship to A or B, adopted X. During the adoption proceeding, the court ordered that A and X shall have a legal relation of parent and child with C and shall have all the legal rights and responsibilities of that relation.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (A) at (0,0) {A -- B \quad C};
  \node (X) at (1,-1) {X};
  \draw (A) -- (X);
  \node at (0.5,-0.5) {adoption};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Under the opening clause of section 2-119(b), B no longer has a parent-child relationship with X. Under subsection (b)(1), X is A’s child for purposes of intestate succession. Under section 2-118(a), X is C’s child for purposes of intestate succession. The pre-2019 version of section 2-118(a) also treats X as the child of C. The pre-2019 version of section 2-119 does not have a counterpart to subsection (b)(1). It is possible that a court, relying on section 1-102, which directs courts to construe UPC provisions liberally and apply the UPC “to promote its underlying purposes and policies,” would allow X or a descendant of X to inherit from and through A. A court is not likely, however, to allow A to inherit from and through X, because none of the pre-2019 exceptions (section 2-119(b)–(d)) to the “fresh start” general rule of section 2-119(a) allows a parent before the adoption to inherit from or through an adoptee.

Subsection (b)(2) contains three further exceptions to the “fresh start” general rule. The purpose of these exceptions—set forth in subsections (b)(2)(A) through (C)—is to identify the circumstances when an adoptee has been, and is likely to continue to be, connected to a parent before the adoption or the family of a parent before the adop-

\textsuperscript{87} See supra Part II.A (discussing section 2-114 and how it bars inheritance by a parent whose parental rights have been terminated, while keeping the parent-child relationship intact for the purpose of the child and the child’s descendants to inherit from or through the parent and for a child’s relative who is also related to the parent to inherit from and through the child).
tion. In contrast to the pre-2019 version of these exceptions, which presumes that the adoptee has no more than two parents before the adoption, the 2019 version acknowledges the possibility of more than two parents before the adoption: if one of the exceptions applies, then all parent-child relationships between an adoptee and a parent before the adoption continue to be recognized.

The first exception in subsection (b)(2) has to do with a stepparent adopting a stepchild. When a stepparent adopts a stepchild, subsection (b)(2)(A) provides that a parent-child relationship continues to exist between the adoptee and each of the adoptee’s parents before the adoption. The following examples illustrate its effect on the determination of heirs of an intestate decedent.

Example 27. A and B were married and had two children, X and Y. A and B obtained a divorce, and B married C. C adopted X and Y. The court did not terminate the parental rights of A or B.

Under section 2-118(a), X and Y are C’s children for purposes of intestate succession. Under section 2-119(b)(2)(A), X and Y remain the children of A and B for purposes of intestate succession. The pre-2019 UPC allows X and Y and their descendants to inherit from or through A and B but does not allow A to inherit from or through X and Y.

Example 28. Same facts as Example 27 except that A’s parental rights to X and Y were terminated when C adopted X and Y. Under section 2-119(b)(2)(A), the parent-child relationships between A and X and between A and Y continue to exist for purposes of intestate succession. However, under section 2-114(a)(1) and (b), for the purpose of intestate succession from or through X, A is deemed to have predeceased X; and for the purpose of intestate succession from or through Y, A is deemed to have predeceased Y. Under sections 2-114(c) and 2-119(b)(2)(A), X and Y remain the children of A, and they and their descendants have the right to inherit from and through A. The pre-2019

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88 The term “family” rather than relative is used in the text to take account of the breadth of the exception in section 2-119(b)(2)(B). The exception continues the recognition of parent-child relationships between the adoptee and all parents before the adoption if the adoptive parent is a relative of a parent before the adoption or is a spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of a parent before the adoption.

89 2019 UPC § 2-119(b)(2)(C) (pertaining to an adoption occurring after the death of a parent before the adoption, which would reach the same result if C had adopted X and Y after B’s death). For further discussion of the exception to the “fresh start” general rule in section 2-119(b)(2)(C), see infra Examples 34-35 and accompanying text.
UPC reaches the same result on these facts. The addition in 2019 of subsection (c) to section 2-114 clarifies, but does not change, the pre-2019 result.90

Example 29. The same facts as Example 27 except that, before C’s adoption of X and Y, E adjudicated a claim of de facto parentage of X and Y, and the court held E to be their legal parent.

E meets the definition of a parent before the adoption in accordance with sections 2-118(b) and 2-119(a)(2)(A). Under section 2-119(b)(2)(A), X and Y remain the children of E as well as the children of A and B. The result under the pre-2019 version of section 2-119(b), having to do with a stepparent adoption, is unclear for two reasons. First, its language referring only to “either genetic parent” and to “the other genetic parent” does not accommodate an adoptee who has more than two parents before an adoption. Second, the pre-2019 version does not address de facto parentage. In light of the direction of section 1-102 to construe liberally and apply the UPC “to promote its underlying purposes and policies,” a court might apply the pre-2019 version of section 2-119(b) to conclude that X and Y remain E’s children for purposes of intestate succession. This construction is made more likely given that the pre-2019 version of section 2-119(e) provides that a parent who establishes a parent-child relationship under the pre-2019 version of sections 2-120 and 2-121, having to do with assisted reproduction, should be “treated as a child’s genetic parent” for the purpose of section 2-119. The pre-2019 version’s inclusiveness regarding assisted reproduction might enable a court, reasoning by an analogy between parentage by assisted reproduction and de facto parentage, to interpret “genetic parent” to include a de facto parent.

The second exception in subsection (b)(2) has to do with other intra-family adoptions. Under subsection (b)(2)(B), a child who is adopted by a relative of a parent before the adoption or by the spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of a parent before the adoption remains a child of each of the child’s parents before the adoption.91 The follow-

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90 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
91 Remarriage by a surviving spouse of a relative of a parent before the adoption should not affect the determination of whether the exception in section 2-119(b)(2)(B) applies. The policy of section 2-119(b) is to maintain parent-child relationships established before an adoption whenever the circumstances of an adoption indicate a likelihood that an adoption would not interfere with an adoptee’s ties with the family of a parent before the adoption. The adoption itself provides evidence that the surviving
ing examples illustrate its effect on the determination of heirs of an in-
testate decedent.

**Example 30.** A and B, a married couple with a four-year old child, 
X, were badly injured in an automobile accident and were no longer 
able to care for X. Thereafter, B’s sibling S adopted X. The court did not 
terminate A’s and B’s parental rights to X. A and A’s parent P then 
died intestate in that order.

![Family Diagram]

Under subsection (b)(2)(B), X remains A’s child and P’s grandchild for 
purposes of intestate succession. The pre-2019 version of section 2-
119(c) reaches the same result under these facts.

**Example 31.** Same facts as Example 30 except that X died intestate 
survived only by A, B, and S. Under section 2-118(a) and section 2-
119(b)(2)(B), A, B, and S have the right to inherit from X because X 
was a child of A, B, and S. The pre-2019 version of section 2-119(c) 
reaches a different result: it does not allow A and B to inherit from X.

**Example 32.** Same facts as Example 30 except that the parental 
rights of A and B were terminated when S adopted X. Under section 2-
119(b)(2)(B), the parent-child relationships between A and X and be-
tween B and X continue to exist. In accordance with section 2-114(c) 
and section 2-119(b)(2)(B), X remains A’s child and P’s grandchild, and 
X and X’s descendants have the right to inherit from and through A and 
P. The pre-2019 version of sections 2-114 and 2-119 reaches these re-
sults. The addition in 2019 of subsection (c) to section 2-114 clarifies, but 
does not change, the pre-2019 result.

**Example 33.** Same facts as Example 32 except that X died intestate, 
survived only by A, B, and P. Under section 2-114(a)(1) and (b), A and 
B are not allowed to inherit from or through X and are deemed to have 
predeceased X. Under section 2-119(b)(2)(B), P remains X’s grandpar-
ent and has the right to inherit from X. The pre-2019 version of section 
2-119(c) reaches a different result: it does not allow P to inherit from X. 
Even though the pre-2019 UPC recognizes the parent-child relationship

spouse, notwithstanding remarriage, has remained a member of the family of the parent 
befor the adoption. C.f. 2019 UPC § 2-711 (if a transferor makes a donative transfer to a 
“designated individual’s ‘heirs’,” providing a constructional rule that excludes the individ-
ual’s spouse from the disposition if the spouse has remarried between the death of the 
individual and the time of the distribution).
between X and A, it allows only an adoptee and an adoptee’s descend-
ants to inherit from or through a parent before the adoption.

The third and final exception in subsection (b)(2) has to do with
adoptions that occur after the death of a parent before the adoption. The pre-2019 UPC presumes that an adoptee had at most two parents
before the adoption. It makes an exception to the “fresh start” general
rule if “both” of those parents died. Subsection (b)(2)(C) in the 2019
UPC requires that only one of the adoptee’s parents before the adop-
tion die. This exception provides that the parent-child relationships be-
tween an adoptee and each parent before the adoption continue to be
recognized for purposes of intestate succession if a parent before the
adoption predeceases the adoption. The following examples illustrate its
effect on the determination of heirs of an intestate decedent.

Example 34. A and B, a married couple with a four-year old child,
X, were badly injured in an automobile accident. A subsequently died.
B, who remained seriously injured, was no longer able to care for X.
Thereafter, B’s close friend F adopted X. A’s parent P then died
intestate.

Example 35. Same facts as Example 34 except that after F adopted
X and before P died, B, F, and X died intestate in that order. At B’s
death, under section 2-119(b)(2)(C), X remains a child of B and has the
right to inherit from B. At F’s death, under section 2-118(a), X is a child

92 For purposes of 2019 UPC section 2-119(b)(2)(C), the term “death” means physi-
cal death. Section 2-119 of the 2019 UPC takes into account other provisions in Article II
of the UPC that deem an individual to have died only in the determination of whether an
individual is a “parent before the adjudication” or a “parent before the adoption.” See
2019 UPC § 2-119(a)(1)(B), (2)(B); supra note 77 (discussing a technical amendment
under consideration by the Uniform Law Commission that would clarify that “death”
means actual death, not “deemed” death).

93 See Pre-2019 UPC § 2-119(d) (referring to an adoption “after the death of both
genetic parents”).
of F and has the right to inherit from F. At X’s death, under section 2-119(b)(2)(C), P remains X’s grandparent and has the right to inherit from X. The results under the pre-2019 UPC are as follows. Pre-2019 section 2-119(d) does not apply to keep intact the parent-child relationship between B and X. Therefore, the applicable rule is the “fresh start” of pre-2019 section 2-119(a): X is not a child of B and is not allowed to inherit from B. The pre-2019 version of section 2-118(a) does allow X to inherit from F. Pre-2019 section 2-119(d) does not apply to keep the parent-child relationship intact between A and X. Therefore, the applicable rule is the “fresh start” of pre-2019 section 2-119: X is not a child of A, and, therefore, P is not allowed to inherit from X.

Part I’s discussion of the order of priority of heirs in section 2-103 and this discussion of parent-child relationships demonstrate how both the priority of heirs and the determinations of parental status are crucial to the UPC achieving its aim to further the likely intention of an intestate decedent. Part III builds on Part II by extending the discussion of parent-child relationships beyond the law of intestate succession to rules of construction of class gifts in donative documents. Here too, likely donative intention remains the focus. Part III concentrates on the likely intention of transferors who make donative transfers, whether during life or at death.

III. CLASS GIFTS

Part II focused on the rules of intestate succession governing parent-child relationships. In accordance with UPC section 2-705, the same rules are the starting point for the construction of class gifts that use terms of relationship to identify class members.

These rules of construction are default rules, not mandatory rules. Section 2-701, which has not changed from the pre-2019 version of the UPC, provides in pertinent part that “[i]n the absence of a finding of contrary intention, the rules of construction in this [part] control the construction of a governing instrument.”94 This makes clear that the statutory provisions in Article II, Part 7, including section 2-705, establish default rules of construction. The 2019 version of section 2-705 primarily simplifies the rules of construction found in the pre-2019 version.

Subsection (b) sets forth the core rule of construction for both the 2019 and pre-2019 versions of section 2-705. As re-worded in 2019, subsection (b) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c)

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94 2019 UPC § 2-701. Unless otherwise stated, the examples in this Part assume, for ease of presentation, that each individual identified as having survived an event, including the death of another individual, lived the amount of time required by the governing instrument or by the default rules in section 2-702.
and (d), a class gift in a governing instrument which uses a term of relationship to identify the class members is construed in accordance with the rules for intestate succession.\footnote{Id. § 2-705(b).}

A major difference between the two versions of subsection (b) is that the pre-2019 version referenced only “the rules for intestate succession regarding parent-child relationships.”\footnote{PRE-2019 UPC § 2-705(b) (emphasis added).} In contrast, the 2019 version provides that a class gift that uses a term of relationship to identify its class members is to be “construed in accordance with the rules of intestate succession.”\footnote{2019 UPC § 2-705(b) (emphasis added).} By referencing all terms of relationship, not merely parent-child relationships, the 2019 version ensures, for example, that a class gift to a grantor’s descendants “and their spouses” is presumptively construed in accordance with section 2-102, which makes no distinction between spouses based on either spouse’s gender.\footnote{See also id. § 2-802 (excluding from the definition of a “surviving spouse” an individual who is divorced from a decedent or whose marriage to the decedent has been annulled and an individual who took certain specified actions that are inconsistent with being a surviving spouse).} Section 2-705(b) also eliminates the need for the pre-2019 version of subsection (d), having to do with “half-blood relatives.” Subsection (b) of the 2019 version is sufficient to establish a rule of construction that, in accordance with the 2019 version of section 2-107, the identification of a class member—for example, in a class gift to “siblings”—is determined without regard to how many common ancestors in the same generation one class member shares with another.\footnote{For further discussion of the 2019 revision of section 2-107, see infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.}

The lengthy phrase “class gift in a governing instrument that uses a term of relationship to identify the class members” needs some further unpacking. The term “governing instrument” is defined broadly in section 1-201(18), which the 2019 amendments do not modify, to mean a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), transfer on death (TOD) deed, pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type.\footnote{2019 UPC § 1-201(18).}

Examples of class gifts using a term of relationship to identify the class members include class gifts to “spouses,” “children,” “grandchildren,”
“descendants,” “issue,” “parents,” “grandparents,” or “siblings.” If, for example, a trust instrument contains a class gift to the grantor’s “descendants,” then, in the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, section 2-705(b) directs a court to construe the class gift in accordance with the rules for intestate succession. This means that, if a parent-child relationship established by adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage, assisted reproduction, or adoption is recognized under section 2-118, 2-120, or 2-121 for the purpose of intestate succession, the parent-child relationship is recognized for the purpose of a court construing the class gift to “descendants.” The following examples further illustrate how this rule of construction relies on the rules of intestate succession to determine class members.

Example 36. G devised property to G’s “children.” G adopted X. X survived G. Under section 2-118(a), G is X’s parent for purposes of intestate succession. Therefore, in the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is included in the class gift to G’s “children.”

Example 37. G devised property to the “siblings” of G’s deceased spouse, S. S was the child of P1 and P2. S’s sibling A was also the child of P1 and P2. S’s sibling B was the child of P2 and P3. A and B survived G.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P1</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>P3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G m.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
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Under section 2-107, siblings of S are determined “without regard to how many common ancestors in the same generation” the siblings share with S for purposes of intestate succession. Therefore, in the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, A and B share equally in the class gift to S’s “siblings.”

1. Exceptions to Section 2-705(b)

The default rule in section 2-705(b) is subject to exceptions contained in subsections (c) and (d). Subsection (c) governs relatives by marriage. As re-worded in 2019, subsection (c) provides, “A class gift in a governing instrument excludes in-laws unless: (1) when the governing instrument was executed, the class was then and foreseeably would be empty; or (2) the language or circumstances otherwise establish that in-laws were intended to be included.”101 This language simplifies the pre-2019 version by not including examples of class gifts that may be intended to include relatives by marriage. It also replaces the statutory use of “relatives by marriage” with “in-laws,” which subsection (a)(5) de-
fines to include a stepchild.\textsuperscript{102} Aside from the stylistic changes, the 2019 and pre-2019 versions set forth the same rule of construction. Section 14.10 of the Restatement adopts a similar constructional rule.\textsuperscript{103}

As section 2-705(c) and the Restatement recognize, circumstances surrounding the execution of a governing instrument containing a class gift may indicate that the transferor intended a relative by marriage to be included as a member of the class. A situation in which, at the time when the transferor executed the governing instrument, the class “was then and foreseeably would be empty”—to use the words of subsection (c)(1)—indicates a transferor’s intention to include a relative by marriage as a member of the class. The following example illustrates the constructional rule of subsection (c)(1).

\textit{Example 38.} G devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income in equal shares “to my children who are living on each income payment date and, on the death of my last surviving child, to distribute the trust property to my then-living descendants, by representation, or, if none, to X-Charity.” When G executed the will just before entering an assisted living facility, G had no children. G’s spouse, S, had four children. The children lived with G and S for many years, but G had not established a parent-child relationship with any of them by adoption or an adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage. In accordance with subsection (c)(1), the presumptive construction of the class gifts is that G intended G’s stepchildren to be included in the class gift to G’s “children” and that G intended the descendants of G’s stepchildren to be included in the class gift to G’s “descendants.” The presumptive inclusion of G’s stepchildren in a class gift to G’s “children” is sufficient to create a presumptive inclusion of the descendants of G’s stepchildren in a class gift to G’s “descendants.”\textsuperscript{104} If instead, at the time G executed the will, G had living children, then, in the absence of a

\textsuperscript{102} As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment to the definition of “in-law” that would replace “a stepchild” with the more inclusive phrase “a step relative or a former step relative.”

\textsuperscript{103} See \textit{Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers} § 14.10 (Am. L. Inst. 2011).

\textsuperscript{104} See id. § 14.10 illus. 1. If the only class gift in the governing instrument had been to “descendants” rather than including both a class gift to “children” and a class gift to “descendants,” the result should be the same. See id. § 14.10 illus. 2; see also the parenthetical preceding the text \textit{supra} accompanying note 100 (describing a proposed technical amendment to the definition of “in-law”). If, instead, the class gift had been to “heirs,” the relevant UPC provision would be section 2-711, not section 2-705. Under section 2-711, a stepchild or a descendant of a stepchild could take as an heir under section 2-103(j). See 2019 UPC § 2-711 (construing “heirs” to mean “those persons, including the state, and in such shares as would succeed to the designated individual’s intestate estate under the intestate succession law of the designated individual’s domicile if the designated individual died when the disposition is to take effect in possession or enjoyment”).
finding of a contrary intention, G’s stepchildren and the descendants of G’s stepchildren would not share in the class gifts.

As indicated in subsection (c)(2), the class gift language or other circumstances surrounding the transferor’s execution of a governing instrument may establish a presumptive intention to include a relative by marriage. Section 2-701 similarly provides that the rules in section 2-705 apply “[i]n the absence of a finding of a contrary intention.” Section 14.10 of the Restatement contains an extensive discussion of this topic. The following example is intended to be illustrative.

Example 39. G devised half of G’s estate to G’s spouse, S, and half to G’s “children.” G had one child from a prior marriage. S had two children from a prior marriage. G did not establish a parent-child relationship with either of S’s children by adoption or an adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage. G’s relationship with G’s stepchildren was close and G performed parental functions with respect to them. The use of the plural “children” indicates that G intended to include G’s stepchildren in the class gift.

The second exception to section 2-705(b) is contained in section 2-705(d), which provides,

In construing a governing instrument of a transferor who is not a parent of an individual, the individual is not considered the child of the parent unless:

(1) the parent, a relative of the parent, or the spouse or surviving spouse of the parent or of a relative of the parent performed functions customarily performed by a parent before the individual reached [18] years of age; or

(2) the parent intended to perform functions under paragraph (1) but was prevented from doing so by death or another reason if the intent is proved by clear and convincing evidence.

105 2019 UPC § 2-701. Section 2-705(c)(2) makes clear that the exception in (c)(1) is not the only exception for relatives by marriage.

106 See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 14.10 cmt. c-d.

107 2019 UPC § 2-705(d). As this article goes to press, we are proposing a technical amendment, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, that would add the words “a class gift in a” so that the opening clause reads, “In construing a class gift in a governing instrument . . . .”

The breadth of the persons who are treated as members of a parent’s family under section 2-705(d)(1) indicates that remarriage, whether it occurs before or during the time a surviving spouse performs parental functions, should not disqualify the surviving spouse from being treated as a family member under this subsection. For purposes of the construction of a class gift in a governing instrument of a transferor who is not the child’s parent, the fact that a surviving spouse performed parental functions should be sufficient
The rationale for subsection (d)(1) is that a transferor who is not a parent of an individual would not want the individual to be treated as a child of the parent for purposes of determining membership in a class gift unless the parent or a member of the parent’s family had performed parental functions on behalf of the individual before the individual reached adulthood. Subsection (d)(1) makes no changes to the pre-2019 version of this constructional rule except that it eliminates the term “genetic parent” and defines parental functions in a different manner. Subsection (d)(2) was added in 2019 to establish a presumptive rule that an individual be treated as a child of a parent if clear and convincing evidence shows that the parent had intended to perform parental functions but was prevented from doing so. As part of its efforts to simplify section 2-705, the 2019 version does not include a separate provision to address adult adoptions. That issue, instead, is addressed within the more generalized language of subsection (d).

The phrase “performed functions customarily performed by a parent” is derived from the Restatement. Reporter’s Note No. 5 to section 14.5 of the Restatement lists the following parental functions:

- Custodial responsibility refers to physical custodianship and supervision of a child. It usually includes, but does not necessarily require, residential or overnight responsibility.

- Decisionmaking responsibility refers to authority for making significant life decisions on behalf of the child, including decisions about the child’s education, spiritual guidance, and health care.

- Caretaking functions are tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by others. Caretaking functions include but are not limited to all of the following:

  (a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the child’s bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the child when sick or injured, being attentive to the child’s personal hygiene needs including washing, grooming, and dressing, playing with the child and arranging for recreation, protecting the child’s physical safety, and providing transportation;

  
  evidence to conclude that the transferor likely intended to have the child included as a member of the class gift notwithstanding that the surviving spouse may have remarried. For a similar discussion regarding remarriage of a surviving spouse, see supra note 91 (continuing the recognition of a parent-child relationship between a parent before the adoption and an adoptee when the adoption is by a relative’s surviving spouse).
(b) directing the child’s various developmental needs, including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence, and maturation;

(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, assigning and supervising chores, and performing other tasks that attend to the child’s needs for behavioral control and self-restraint;

(d) arranging for the child’s education, including remedial or special services appropriate to the child’s needs and interests, communicating with teachers and counselors, and supervising homework;

(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other family members;

(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up, and home health care;

(g) providing moral and ethical guidance;

(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter, or other child-care provider or facility, including investigation of alternatives, communication with providers, and supervision of care.

Parenting functions are tasks that serve the needs of the child or the child’s residential family. Parenting functions include caretaking functions, as defined [above], and all of the following additional functions:

(a) providing economic support;

(b) participating in decisionmaking regarding the child’s welfare;

(c) maintaining or improving the family residence, including yard work, and house cleaning;

(d) doing and arranging for financial planning and organization, car repair and maintenance, food and clothing purchases, laundry and dry cleaning, and other tasks supporting the consumption and savings needs of the household;

(e) performing any other functions that are customarily performed by a parent or guardian and that are important to a child’s welfare and development.108

The following examples illustrate the operation of subsection (d).

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108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.5 Reporter’s Note 5.
Example 40. G devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G’s child A for life, and at A’s death to distribute the corpus to A’s “descendants” who survive A, by representation. A had a child X by assisted reproduction. A had met all the requirements of section 2-120 and, therefore, subsection (b) presumptively includes X as a member of the class of “descendants.” Before X reached age 18, A performed functions with respect to X that are customarily performed by a parent. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

Example 41. G devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G’s child A for life, and at A’s death to distribute the corpus to A’s “descendants” who survive A, by representation. A became pregnant without the use of assisted reproduction, resulting in the birth of a child, X. Given section 2-117, subsection (b) presumptively includes X as a member of the class of “descendants.” A did not perform, before X reached age 18, functions with respect to X that are customarily performed by a parent. A’s sibling did perform such functions with respect to X before X reached age 18. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

Example 42. Same facts as Example 41, except that X predeceased A, leaving two children who survived A. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X’s two children are members of the class of A’s “descendants” who take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

Example 43. G devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G’s child A for life, and at A’s death to distribute the corpus to A’s “descendants” who survive A, by representation. A adopted Y when Y was 25 years old. Section 2-118(a) establishes a parent-child relationship between A and Y for purposes of intestate succession and, therefore, subsection (b) presumptively includes Y as a member of the class of A’s “descendants.” A’s sibling performed parental functions with respect to Y before Y reached adulthood. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, Y is a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

Example 44. Same facts as Example 43, except that no one in A’s family, including no spouse or surviving spouse of A and no spouse or surviving spouse of a relative of A, performed parental functions with

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109 For a discussion of adult adoption, see Gallanis, supra note 68, at 101 (reporting that state law “generally permit[s] adoption of adults” but that, in the absence of a statute on point or clarifying language in the dispositive instrument, “courts have differed on whether to treat the adult as an adopted child” for purposes of a class gift).
respect to Y before Y reached adulthood. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, Y is not a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

A word is appropriate about how subsection (d) operates with respect to de facto parentage. Section 609(b)(1) of the 2017 UPA requires a proceeding to establish parentage of an individual to commence before the individual attains age 18.110 If a state has enacted the 2017 UPA, including this provision, subsection (d) assures that the parent-child relationship between an individual and the individual’s de facto parent is recognized. This means that a child of a de facto parent or a descendant of the child presumptively is treated as a member of a class gift in a governing instrument by a transferor who is not the de facto parent. If, however, a state’s applicable law allows for de facto parentage to be established after an individual has attained adulthood, subsection (d)(1) presumptively may not treat a child of a de facto parent or a descendant of the child to be a member of a class. The following examples demonstrate how the rule of construction set forth in subsection (d)(1) applies when a parent-child relationship is established through an adjudication of a claim of de facto parentage.

**Example 45.** G devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G’s child A for life, and at A’s death to distribute the corpus to A’s “descendants” who survive A, by representation. A established a parent-child relationship with X based on a claim of de facto parentage when X was 25 years old. Section 2-118(b) recognizes the parent-child relationship between A and X for purposes of intestate succession and, therefore, subsection (b) presumptively includes X as a member of the class of A’s “descendants.” A did not perform, before X reached age 18, functions that are customarily performed by a parent—nor did a relative of A or the spouse or surviving spouse of A or of A’s relative perform such functions before X reached age 18. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is not a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

**Example 46.** Same facts as Example 45 except that A’s sibling did perform parental functions until X reached the age of 18. In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

If a state has not enacted the 2017 UPA, including its provisions on de facto parentage, a legislative note to section 2-705 encourages states

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110 2017 UPA § 609(b)(1) (requiring the proceeding to commence “before the child attains 18 years of age”).
to consider adding the following language as a new subsection to section 2-705:

A class gift in a governing instrument of a transferor who is not the de facto parent of an individual is not construed to treat the individual as the child of the de facto parent if:

(1) the de facto parent opposed being adjudicated a parent; or

(2) the de facto parent or the individual died before the proceeding to adjudicate parentage was commenced.\(^{111}\)

In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, the suggested subsection is likely to further the intention of a transferor who is not the individual’s de facto parent. The following examples demonstrate how the rule of construction in the legislative note would apply.

**Example 47.** G devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G’s child A for life, and at A’s death to distribute the corpus to A’s “descendants” who survive A, by representation. The trust is governed by the law of a jurisdiction that did not enact the 2017 UPA but did enact the 2019 UPC including the suggested language in the legislative note to section 2-705. A married S, who had a child X. A did not adopt or commence proceedings to adjudicate a claim of de facto parentage of X. Near the time that A and S divorced and when X was 10 years of age, S commenced proceedings, which A opposed, to adjudicate A as X’s parent based on a claim of de facto parentage. A court held A to be X’s parent. Section 2-118(b) recognizes the parent-child relationship between A and X for purposes of intestate succession and, therefore, subsection (b) presumptively includes X as a member of the class of A’s “descendants.” In accordance with the suggested language in the legislative note, and in the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is not a member of the class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

**Example 48.** Same facts as Example 47 except that A and S did not divorce and the adjudication of A as X’s parent based on a claim of de facto parentage commenced after A’s death. In contrast to 2017 UPA section 609(a)(1), which would require the proceeding to commence before A’s death, the law of the jurisdiction permits the proceeding to commence after A’s death. A court held A to be X’s parent. Section 2-118(b) recognizes the parent-child relationship between A and X for purposes of intestate succession and, therefore, subsection (b) presumptively includes X as a member of the class of A’s “descendants.” In accordance with the suggested language in the legislative note, and in the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, X is not a member of the

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\(^{111}\) 2019 UPC § 2-705 Legislative Note.
class of A’s “descendants” who, if they survive A, take the corpus of G’s trust at A’s death.

2. Class-Closing Rules

In order for an individual to be a taker under a class gift that uses a term of relationship to identify the class members, the individual must both qualify as a class member under section 2-705(b), (c), and (d) and not be excluded by the rules of class closing that apply to class gifts. The class-closing rules are explained extensively in section 15.1 of the Restatement.\(^\text{112}\) The focus of the discussion here is the class-closing rules contained in section 2-705(e). Aside from adding a provision pertaining to de facto parentage and amending language to conform to other 2019 amendments and avoid outdated or imprecise terms, the 2019 version of section 2-705(e) does not change the class-closing rules found in the pre-2019 version.

Subsection (e)(1) deals with a class closing that occurs during a gestational period. The term “gestational period” is defined in subsection (a)(4) by reference to section 2-104 to mean the time between the start of a pregnancy and birth.\(^\text{113}\) Subsection (e)(1) provides: “If a particular time is during a gestational period that results in the birth of an individual who lives at least 120 hours after birth, the individual is deemed to be living at that time.”\(^\text{114}\) The following example demonstrates this well-established class-closing rule.

**Example 49.** G devised property to G’s “children.” When G executed the will, G had a child A. Subsequently, G arranged to have another child with the assistance of a surrogacy arrangement. G met the requirements in the 2017 UPA to establish a parent-child relationship\(^\text{115}\) which are incorporated by reference into section 2-121. During the pregnancy, G died, survived by A. A is included in the class gift to G’s “children” under the standard common-law class-closing rules. The surrogate subsequently gave birth to B, who lived 120 hours after birth. Under subsection (b), which presumptively includes B as a member of the class of G’s “children,” and subsection (e)(1), which establishes a class-clos-

\(^\text{112}\) Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 15.1.

\(^\text{113}\) 2019 UPC § 2-705(a)(4).

\(^\text{114}\) Id. § 2-705(e)(1). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment to put the reference to “120 hours” in brackets. For the rationale, see supra note 64.

\(^\text{115}\) Sec. e.g., 2017 UPA § 817(a) (establishing a parent-child relationship between an intended parent and a child born through assisted reproduction with the assistance of a genetic surrogacy agreement when the intended parent dies during the gestational period).
ing rule that deems B as living at G’s death, B is also included in the class gift.

Subsection (e)(3) embraces a similar class-closing rule for an individual who is in the process of being adopted. It provides that “[a]n individual who is in the process of being adopted when the class closes is treated as adopted when the class closes if the adoption is subsequently granted.”\textsuperscript{116} An individual is “in the process of being adopted” if a legal proceeding to adopt the individual had been filed before the class closed. The phrase “in the process of being adopted” is not intended to be limited to the filing of a legal proceeding, but is intended to grant flexibility to find, on a case-by-case basis, that the process commenced earlier.

Subsection (e)(4) establishes a similar presumptive rule for an individual who is in the process of being adjudicated a child of a de facto parent. It provides that “[a]n individual who is in the process of being adjudicated a child of a de facto parent when the class closes is treated as a child of the de facto parent when the class closes, if the parentage is subsequently established.”\textsuperscript{117} Subsection (e)(4) is intended to grant flexibility for a court to determine, based on the circumstances surrounding the determination of de facto parentage, when “the process of being adjudicated a child of a de facto parent” commenced.

The class-closing rule set forth in subsection (e)(2) has to do with a parent-child relationship established through assisted reproduction after the death of an individual’s intended parent. It provides:

If the start of a pregnancy resulting in the birth of an individual occurs after the death of the individual’s parent and the distribution date is the death of the parent, the individual is deemed to be living on the distribution date if [the person with the power to appoint or distribute among the class members received notice or had actual knowledge, not later than [6] months after the parent’s death, of an intent to use genetic material in assisted reproduction and] the individual lives at least 120 hours after birth, and:

(A) the embryo was in utero not later than [36] months after the deceased parent’s death; or

(B) the individual was born not later than [45] months after the deceased parent’s death.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116} 2019 UPC § 2-705(e)(3).
\textsuperscript{117} Id. § 2-705(e)(4).
\textsuperscript{118} 2019 UPC § 2-705(e)(2). As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment to put the reference to “120 hours” in brackets. For the rationale, see \textit{supra} note 64.
Similar to the pre-2019 version of this subsection, the 2019 version responds to developments in assisted reproduction that make it possible for a pregnancy to start after the death of an intended parent. As previously discussed, in accordance with the intestate succession rules of sections 2-120 and 2-121, if an intended parent satisfies all other requirements to establish a parent-child relationship except that the pregnancy starts or a birth occurs beyond the UPA’s prescribed time limits, the 2019 UPC recognizes a parent-child relationship between the intended parent and the individual if the individual lives at least 120 hours after birth.119

For purposes of the class-closing rules, subsection (e)(2) imposes time limits if the start of a pregnancy resulting in the birth of an individual occurs after the death of an intended parent and if the distribution date is the intended parent’s death. In such a case, the individual is deemed to be living on the distribution date only if: (1) the individual lives at least 120 hours after birth, and (2) either (i) the embryo was in utero no later than 36 months after the intended parent’s death or (ii) the individual was born no later than 45 months after the intended parent’s death.120 Bracketed language imposes an additional requirement that the person with the power to appoint or distribute the property receive notice or have actual knowledge within 6 months of the parent’s death of an intention to use genetic material in assisted reproduction and thereby affect class membership.121 The 2019 UPC added this bracketed language, which is not contained in the pre-2019 version. Subsection (e)(2) does not apply if the distribution date is not the intended parent’s death.

The following examples illustrate the class-closing rules when the start of a pregnancy resulting in the birth of an individual occurs after the intended parent’s death. Each example assumes that the intended parent met all the requirements to establish a parent-child relationship in accordance with section 2-120 or 2-121 and that the individual lived at least 120 hours after birth. In other words, subsection (b) presumptively includes the individual from the class, and the remaining question is whether the class-closing rule of subsection (e)(2) excludes the individual from the class gift.

Example 50. G devised “90 percent of my residuary estate to my spouse, S, if S survives me, and 10 percent of my residuary estate (or all of my residuary estate if S does not survive me) to my descendants who

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119 See supra Part II.C; see also supra note 118.
120 See 2019 UPC § 2-705(e)(2); see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning for the 36-month and 45-month time limits and why the time limits are bracketed).
121 See 2019 UPC § 2-705(e)(2).
survive me, by representation.” G left genetic material to be used by S in assisted reproduction. S gave timely notice to G’s personal representative of S’s intent to use G’s genetic material in assisted reproduction. If either (1) the embryo was in utero within 36 months after G’s death or (2) the child was born within 45 months after G’s death, then, in accordance with subsection (e)(2), the child is deemed to be living at G’s death and, as G’s child, is included in the class of G’s “descendants” who share in G’s residuary estate. Even if the time requirements were not met, a parent-child relationship would exist between G and the child under the UPC.

Example 51. G’s parent devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G for life, and at G’s death to distribute the corpus to G’s “then-living descendants, by representation.” When G’s parent died, G was married but had no children. G deposited genetic material to be used by G’s spouse, S, in assisted reproduction. S gave timely notice to the trustee of S’s intent to use G’s genetic material in assisted reproduction. If either (1) the embryo was in utero within 36 months after G’s death or (2) the child was born within 45 months after G’s death, then in accordance with subsection (e)(2), the child is deemed to be living at G’s death and, as G’s child, is included in the class of G’s “descendants” who, if they survive G, take the corpus of the trust at G’s death. Even if the time requirements were not met, a parent-child relationship would exist between G and the child under the UPC.

Example 52. Same facts as Example 51, except that when G’s parent died, G had two children, A and B. A then died, survived by A’s spouse, S. G then died, survived only by S and B. A had left genetic material to be used by S in assisted reproduction. S used the genetic material after G’s death. Even if S gave timely notice to the trustee of S’s intent to use G’s genetic material in assisted reproduction and (1) the embryo was in utero within 36 months after G’s death or (2) the child was born within 45 months after G’s death, the child is not deemed to be living at G’s death and thus is not included in the class of G’s “descendants” who take the corpus of the trust at G’s death. The reason is that subsection (e)(2) does not apply because the distribution date is G’s death, not A’s death. Even though the child is not included in this class gift, a parent-child relationship exists between A and the child under the UPC.

Subsection (e)(2) applies only if the pregnancy starts after the death of an intended parent and if the distribution date is the intended parent’s death. It does not apply if the distribution date is before or after the intended parent’s death, as illustrated in Example 52. As the discussion below explains, well-established class-closing rules—including sub-
section (e)(1), having to do with a distribution date occurring after the start of a pregnancy resulting in the birth of an individual—suffice.

A well-known case that reached the same result as is reached under section 2-705 is *In re Martin B.*122 In that case, the grantor, Martin B., executed in 1969 seven trust agreements, retaining an income interest for his lifetime. The trust agreements provided that, after the grantor’s death, the trustees were given the power to distribute principal, from time to time, to and among Martin B’s “issue” during the life of the grantor’s surviving spouse, Abigail. The trust agreements contained additional dispositive provisions, triggered by Abigail’s death, in favor of the grantor’s “issue” or “descendants,” depending on the trust document. The grantor died in 2001, predeceased by six months by his son, James, who died of Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Before dying, James deposited genetic material for use in assisted reproduction by his wife, Nancy. Nancy used the material and gave birth to a son, James Mitchell, in October 2004 and to a second son, Warren, in August 2006. The court held that the two children qualify as members of the classes of “issue” and “descendants.”123

The 2019 UPC reaches the same result. A parent-child relationship between each of the two children and James is established under section 2-120, which incorporates by reference the 2017 UPA requirements except for the time limits it imposes. Section 2-705(b) in turn presumes the children’s inclusion in the class gifts to “issue” and “descendants” because it incorporates by reference section 2-120. However, it is important to be clearer than the court was in *Martin B.* about which class gifts include James’s children. The distributions of trust principal during Abigail’s life, and then at Abigail’s death, create a series of successive postponed class gifts.124 For each distribution of trust principal, the class closes on that distribution date.125 If a child is living on a distribution date, the common-law class-closing rules provide that the child is an eligible member of the class for that distribution.126

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123 *Id.* at 210-12. The New York Estate Powers and Trusts Law overrules *Martin B.* to the extent that it limits membership in a class gift contained in a governing instrument by a transferor other than a parent to either a child born as a result of a pregnancy starting no later than 24 months after a parent’s death or a child born no later than 33 months after a parent’s death. It applies to wills of persons dying on or after September 1, 2014, to lifetime instruments executed before that date that are revocable or amendable by the transferor, and to all other lifetime instruments executed on or after September 1, 2014. The statutory provision establishes a rule of construction and not a rule of law. N.Y. Est. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.3(b)(4), (f) (McKinney 2021).
124 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 15.1 cmt. q. (AM. L. INST. 2011).
125 *Id.*
126 *Id.*
occurs during a gestational period, section 2-705(e)(1) provides that the child is an eligible member of the class for that distribution if the child lives at least 120 hours after birth. With respect to a distribution date before the start of a pregnancy resulting in the birth of a child of the intended parent, the child is not a member of the class for that distribution. Thus, for example, with respect to a distribution of trust principal on January 1, 2005, James Mitchell is an eligible member of the class but Warren is not.

Martin B. illustrates why the time limits in sections 708(b)(2), 810(b)(2), and 817(b)(2) of the 2017 UPA are inappropriate in the construction of class gifts. The examples that follow further demonstrate why these time limits undermine likely donative intention.

Example 53. G established a revocable trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G for life, and at G's death "to pay the income to my spouse, S, for life, then to distribute the trust principal by representation to my descendants who survive S." When G died, G and S had no children. Shortly before G's death, G preserved genetic material at a fertility clinic. After G's death, S decided to become pregnant using G's genetic material. G's child X was born five years after G's death. X survived S. At S's death, X is entitled to receive the trust principal because (1) X was living on the distribution date; (2) in accordance with section 2-120, the requirements for a parent-child relationship between G and X were satisfied except for the time limits in section 708(b)(2) of the 2017 UPA; and (3) section 2-705(b) incorporates by reference the rules for intestate succession, including section 2-120, to determine class membership. Section 2-705(b)'s rule of construction for class gifts that use a term of relationship and the common-law class-closing rules operate together to treat X as a member of the class. Section 2-705(e) has no role to play in the construction of G's class gift to "my descendants."

Example 54. G's parent devised property in trust, directing the trustee to pay the income to G for life, and at G's death authorizing the trustee to pay the income to G's "descendants from time to time living," and then, at the death of G's last surviving child, directing the trustee to distribute the trust principal by representation to G's "descendants" who survive G's last surviving child. When the grantor died, G was married but had no children. Shortly before G's death, G preserved genetic material at a fertility clinic. After G's death, G's spouse, S, gave timely notice to the trustee of S's intent to use G's genetic material in assisted

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127 2019 UPC § 2-705(e)(1); see Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 15.1 cmt. q.
128 See also supra Examples 23-25 and accompanying text (making a similar argument for pregnancies by assisted reproduction started after the death of a parent for purposes of intestate succession and the application of section 2-104).
reproduction. If the child lives 120 hours after birth and satisfies the
time-limits in section 2-705(e)(2)—either the embryo was in utero
within 36 months after G’s death or the child was born within 45 months
after G’s death—the child is treated as living at G’s death and is pre-
sumptively included in a class gift of income for which the distribution
date is G’s death. With respect to subsequent payments of income, sub-
section (e)(2) does not apply. Instead, the ordinary class-closing rules
apply. The income interest constitutes a series of successive postponed
class gifts.129 The child is a member of the class for distribution dates on
which the child is alive. If S later decides to become pregnant one or
more times using G’s genetic material resulting in the birth of another
child or children, those children would be included or excluded from the
class gift of each income payment based on ordinary class-closing rules.
The same would be true for any descendant of G born or in gestation
between G’s death and the death of G’s last surviving child. With re-
spect to the remainder interest that takes effect in possession on the
death of G’s last surviving child, the then-living descendants of G’s chil-
dren would take the trust principal. Subsection (e)(2) may apply to de-
termine membership in the class gift to “G’s descendants who survive
G’s last surviving child” if (1) timely notice is given to the trustee of an
intent to use the genetic material of G’s last surviving child, (2) G’s last
surviving child is the intended parent of an individual who is born
through assisted reproduction within the prescribed time limits, and (3)
the individual lives 120 hours after birth.

Example 55. G’s parent devised property in trust, directing the trus-
tee to pay the income to “my spouse, S, for life” and at S’s death to
distribute the trust corpus “by representation to G’s descendants who
survive S.” G, facing impending death, deposited genetic material in a
medical facility. Five years after G died, G’s surviving spouse, A, used
G’s genetic material to start a pregnancy. During the pregnancy, S died.
Three months after S’s death, A gave birth to M, who lived at least 120
hours after birth. Subsection (e)(1) provides that M is deemed to be
alive at the distribution date, which is the death of S, because the distri-
bution date occurred during the gestational period resulting in the birth
of M. The class-closing rule of (e)(1), along with the constructional rule
of subsection (b), means that M is presumptively entitled to share in the
corpus of the trust as one of G’s “descendants.”

A final point about probate and trust administration is necessary.
The use of genetic material after the death of an intended parent raises
potential difficulties for a personal representative or a trustee when
making distributions of property. The 2019 UPC amendments added

129 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 15.1
cmt. p.
section 3-703(d), which provides: “A personal representative may not be surcharged for a distribution that does not take into consideration the possibility of posthumous pregnancy unless the personal representative[, not later than [6] months after the decedent’s death,] received notice or had actual knowledge of an intent to use genetic material in assisted reproduction.” 130 Section 2-705(e)(2) includes a bracketed requirement that a child born as a result of a pregnancy starting after an intended parent’s death is included in a class gift only if timely notice is received, by a person with the power to appoint or distribute among the class members, of an intention to use genetic material in assisted reproduction or, in the alternative, if the person has actual knowledge of the intention to use genetic material in assisted reproduction. 131 The 2019 UPC, in the legislative note to section 2-705, also encourages state legislatures to consider requiring a fiduciary when notifying beneficiaries of the fiduciary’s appointment to inquire whether a beneficiary has knowledge of an intent to use genetic material in assisted reproduction and to indicate that a beneficiary who has such information must give written notice to the fiduciary within a designated time. 132

With the incorporation of the rules of succession into section 2-705(b), the rules of construction for class gifts reflect the revisions within the 2017 UPA, which assure gender neutrality in the establishment of parent-child relationships, recognize that a child may have more than two parents, codify the doctrine of de facto parentage, and clarify and improve the law as it relates to parent-child relationships established through assisted reproduction. The re-writing of section 2-705(b) also allows for the elimination of some subsections and the simplification of others.

Section 2-705’s rules of construction have special significance because of the important role in donative documents played by class gifts that use a term of relationship to identify a class member. Section 2-705’s determination of class membership establishes who presumptively shares as a devisee or beneficiary based on familial ties. In that regard, class membership, like heirship, influences the meaning of family legally and culturally.

IV. Other 2019 Amendments

This Part briefly explains the remaining 2019 UPC amendments not otherwise discussed in the preceding Parts of the article. Broadly speaking, these remaining amendments have four objectives: (1) to remove

130 2019 UPC § 3-703(d).
131 See id. § 2-705(e)(2).
132 See id. § 2-705 Legislative Note.
outdated, inaccurate, or imprecise terminology; (2) to work equally well regardless of the number of parents a child may have; (3) to improve or clarify the statutory language; and (4) to make, along with the efforts of others, the UPC gender neutral.

As discussed in earlier parts of the article, one objective of the remaining 2019 UPC amendments is to remove outdated, inaccurate, or imprecise terminology.\textsuperscript{133} For example, the pre-2019 UPC uses terms such as “blood” or “genetics” to denote familial relationships; these terms fail to include parent-child relationships established by de facto parenthood, adoption, or assisted reproduction. The pre-2019 version of section 2-107 said, “Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole blood.”\textsuperscript{134} As revised in 2019, this section provides: “An heir inherits without regard to how many common ancestors in the same generation the heir shares with the decedent.”\textsuperscript{135} The pre-2019 version of section 2-117 uses the term “genetic.” It provides that “a parent-child relationship exists between a child and the child’s genetic parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status.”\textsuperscript{136} The 2019 amendments replace this with language drawn verbatim from section 202 of the 2017 UPA: “A parent-child relationship extends equally to every child and parent, regardless of the marital status of the parent.”\textsuperscript{137} Additional instances of imprecise terminology appear in the pre-2019 UPC when it refers to an “individual” or “child” before birth. For example, the pre-2019 version of section 2-104(a)(2) refers to an “individual in gestation,”\textsuperscript{138} and the pre-2019 version of section 2-705(g)(1) refers to a “child in utero.”\textsuperscript{139} The 2019 versions of these provisions, re-lettered as 2-104(b)(2) and 2-705(e)(1) respectively, refer to “a gestational period that results in the birth of an individual.”\textsuperscript{140}

A second objective is to assure that the provisions achieve their respective goals regardless of the number of parents a child may have. For example, the pre-2019 version of section 2-113 provides that “[a]n individual who is related to the decedent through two lines of relationship is entitled only to a single share based on the relationship that

\textsuperscript{133} See, e.g., supra Introduction, Part I.

\textsuperscript{134} Pre-2019 UPC § 2-107.

\textsuperscript{135} 2019 UPC § 2-107. The substitution of the term “heir” rather than “relatives” in the 2019 version of section 2-107 also serves to clarify that this section applies only after takers of an intestate decedent’s estate are determined in accordance with section 2-103. See 2019 UPC § 2-103.

\textsuperscript{136} Pre-2019 UPC § 2-117.

\textsuperscript{137} 2019 UPC § 2-117; 2017 UPA § 202.

\textsuperscript{138} Pre-2019 UPC § 2-104(a)(2).

\textsuperscript{139} Id. § 2-705(g)(1).

\textsuperscript{140} 2019 UPC §§ 2-104(b)(2), 2-705(e)(1).
would entitle the individual to a larger share.”141 As revised in 2019, this section provides that “[a]n individual who is related to a decedent through more than one line of relationship is entitled to only a single share based on the relationship that would entitle the individual to the largest share.”142

A third objective is to improve or clarify the statutory language. Three examples will suffice. As part of the revision of section 2-113 to remove the reference to “two lines of relationship,” the following sentence was added: “The individual and the individual’s descendants are deemed to have predeceased the decedent with respect to a line of relationship resulting in a smaller share.”143 It clarifies, for the first time, the consequences under the UPC of an individual not taking under a line of relationship. A second example is section 2-106, which defines the per-capita-at-each-generation system of representation. This section was unchanged in substance but was re-written to clarify how the representational system applies to each category of heirs. A third (collective) example is the 2019 version of sections 1-201(51), 2-103(a)(1), 2-106(a)(1), and 2-119(a)(1) and (a)(2). These refer to an individual being deemed by one or more other UPC sections to have predeceased. Rather than attempting to identify those sections individually, as is sometimes done in the pre-2019 version of the UPC,144 the 2019 UPC uses the comprehensive phrase “deemed under this [article]” to have predeceased.145

The fourth and final objective of the remaining 2019 UPC amendments is to assist in making all provisions of the UPC gender neutral. As we were drafting the 2019 UPC amendments, Professor David English was leading a separate project to identify and remove gendered UPC language. Our 2019 UPC amendments assisted this project by removing gendered language from sections 2-101, 2-109, 2-201, 2-302, 2-802, 2-803, 2-804, and 3-703.

141 PRE-2019 UPC § 2-113. For a discussion of a proposed technical amendment to section 2-113, see infra note 142.
142 PRE-2019 UPC § 2-113. As this article goes to press, we are proposing, for consideration by the Uniform Law Commission, a technical amendment that would clarify section 2-113 by re-wording it to read, “An individual who is related to a decedent through more than one line of relationship is entitled to only a single share. If the shares are unequal, the individual is entitled to the largest share. The individual and the individual’s descendants are deemed to have predeceased the decedent with respect to the other line or lines of relationship.”
143 2019 UPC § 2-113.
144 See, e.g., PRE-2019 UPC § 1-201(51).
145 See 2019 UPC §§ 1-201(51), 2-103(a)(1), 2-106(a)(1), 2-119(a)(1)-(2). For a discussion of proposed technical amendments to section 2-119(a)(1) and (a)(2), see also supra notes 58 and 77 (deleting the references to “deemed” death).
CONCLUSION

Law and society inextricably link family and wealth transmission. An individual’s right to inherit from an intestate decedent depends on whether the individual has a legally recognized familial relationship to the decedent. Similarly, when a class gift in a donative document uses a term of relationship to identify the class members, an individual’s right to share in the gift depends on the legal recognition of the relationship. The enactment of the 2017 UPA therefore required a revision of the UPC.

The 2019 UPC accommodates the 2017 UPA’s innovations, including the codification of the doctrine of de facto parentage and the optional statutory provision authorizing a court to hold that a child has more than two parents. In addition, the 2019 UPC largely relies on the 2017 UPA’s revisions of the rules regarding parentage by assisted reproduction. Both the 2019 UPC and the 2017 UPA also assure the equal treatment of children born to same-sex couples. As part of that effort, the 2019 revisions use only gender-neutral language. The 2019 UPC also treats all parent-child relationships alike by avoiding any inference that one manner by which an individual establishes parentage is more “conventional” or “normal” than another. Further, it eliminates outdated or inaccurate terms, such as a “blood” relatives or a “genetic” parent. The two uniform laws together are designed to support the transformation of U.S. families.

With the 2017 UPA as an impetus for a revision, the 2019 UPC builds upon the pre-2019 UPC’s consideration of blended families in its determination of the intestate share passing to a surviving spouse. The 2019 UPC now accounts for blended families in section 2-103’s determination of intestate shares for heirs other than a surviving spouse. That advance, as well as the revisions recognizing that a decedent or a decedent’s parent could have more than two parents, led to the incorporation of the per capita at each generation system of representation throughout the section. This change assures that ordinarily (1) surviving descendants of a deceased family member in a higher generation are heirs even if a member of that higher generation survives; (2) heirs in a generation closer to the decedent are favored compared to heirs in a more remote generation; and (3) heirs in a given generation are treated equally.

The order of priority for heirs other than a surviving spouse and the determination of parental status are crucial to the UPC’s achieving its goal to advance the likely intention of an intestate decedent. Likely donative intention also is the focus of the revisions to section 2-705, having to do with rules of construction for class gifts. Instead of a focus on the probable donative intention of an intestate decedent, these revisions
concentrate on the likely intention of the individuals who make lifetime or deathtime donative transfers. Section 2-705’s rules of construction have special significance because of the important role in governing instruments of class gifts that use a term of relationship to identify the class members. Section 2-705’s determination of class membership establishes who presumptively shares as a devisee or beneficiary based on familial ties. In that regard, class membership, like heirship, influences the meaning of family legally and culturally.

This article has had three objectives. One is to describe each of the 2019 revisions to the UPC. A second is to explain how the statutory changes promote the UPC’s purposes and policies. A third is to encourage bar associations and legislative committees in each state to consider in tandem the 2017 UPA and 2019 UPC. The 2017 UPA provides the framework within which the UPC meets the wealth transfer needs of modern families. The 2019 UPC, in turn, supplements the 2017 UPA by determining inheritance rights and rules of construction based, in large part, on the UPA’s requirements for the establishment of parent-child relationships. The enactment of the 2017 UPA and the 2019 UPC, together, furthers a state’s obligation to provide clarity regarding parent-child relationships and to effectuate the lifetime and deathtime donative intent of its residents. Given the interstate mobility of state residents and their families, we encourage states across the U.S. to enact these uniform provisions.