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A DECADE LATER: RE-EXAMINING THE PRESUMPTION OF BACK-TO-BACK COVER IN ENGLISH INSURANCE LAW

M. Bob Kao*

I. ABSTRACT

The aim of insurance is to spread risk.¹ Reinsurance is insurance purchased by the insurer in order to pass on the risk so it can take on additional business.² The presumption of back-to-back cover exists between the insurance contract and reinsurance contract, where the terms are deemed to be identical so that when the insurer indemnifies the policyholder, the reinsurer would in turn compensate the insurer.³ The presumption was put in doubt by the United Kingdom House of Lords in 2009, in a case where the court found that there was no back-to-back cover when the applicable law for the underlying insurance policy was unknown at the time of the conclusion of the reinsurance contract.⁴ This case created uncertainty in the market that still exists a decade later.⁵ This Article examines the possibility that the reasoning of the House of Lords, in the 2009 case, was incomplete and discusses the possibility that applying different American tort principles of liability allocation in the underlying insurance dispute could have affected the decision of the House of Lords on English insurance Law.

II. INTRODUCTION

Insurance is pervasive in the modern world.⁶ Businesses insure everything from medical costs arising out of a slip and fall on their premises, to the value of cargo they ship from one part of the globe to the other.⁷ Similarly, most individuals have health insurance, motor insurance, and travel insurance, among others. In the United States, insurance is regulated by states, with the federal government playing a more limited role.⁸ As such, regulations and laws differ across the country.⁹ On a larger level, insurance is a global

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¹ See *Insurance 101*, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, <https://www.iii.org/article/insurance-101> (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).

² See George Blazenko, *The Economics of Reinsurance*, 53 *THE J. OF RISK INS.* 258 (1986).

³ See THIAGO MOUTINHO RAMOS, *REINSURANCE CONTRACTS AND BACK TO BACK PRESUMPTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN ENGLISH AND NORWEGIAN LAW* 16 (Jan. 11, 2013), <https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/38216/masteroppgaven-pdf.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

⁴ See Özlem Gürses, *The Construction of Terms of Facultative Reinsurance Contracts: Is Wasa v Lexington the Exception or the Rule*, 73 *THE MOD. L. REV.* 119, 122-23 (2010).

⁵ See *id.* at 129-30.

⁶ See *Insurance 101*, *supra* note 1.

⁷ See *id.*

⁸ See Christopher C. French, *Dual Regulation of Insurance*, 64 *VILL. L. REV.* 25, 45 (2019).

⁹ See Susan Randall, *Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners*, 26 *FLA. ST. U. L. REV.* 625, 629 (2014) (Despite the state regulatory systems and some differences between them, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and its model laws have made the regulatory measures quite similar across jurisdictions.); see also David Schwarcz,

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industry.¹⁰ Usually, the insurance companies and policyholders are from different countries, and very often the law governing the insurance contract is English law, because London has traditionally been the center of the international insurance industry.¹¹ Therefore, certainty in the legal obligations of the parties involved in insurance under English law is vital to the growth and stability of the industry.¹² Consequently, insurance law has been interpreted in courts often and the codification of it in the Marine Insurance Act (“MIA”) 1906, serves as the model for many other jurisdictions internationally.¹³

Modern insurance contracts developed in fourteenth century Italy and spread to London in the sixteenth century.¹⁴ Initially, insurance developed as a way to spread maritime risks for sea journeys.¹⁵ The marine insurance market in London began at a coffee shop called Lloyd’s where merchants gathered to buy and sell insurance from other merchants.¹⁶ Other types of insurance such as fire and life and personal accident insurance later developed due to industrialization and the dangers of modern technology.¹⁷ Insurers also purchase insurance to reallocate the risk they assume from policyholders, also known as the insureds.¹⁸ The insurer is the reinsured in the contractual relationship with the reinsurer. The insurance contract and reinsurance contract are presumed to have back-to-back cover, meaning that they have identical terms and if the insurance has to pay the claim, the reinsurance would also have to indemnify.¹⁹

Though insurance and reinsurance cases are litigated by the courts in England, most disputes today are settled through international arbitration.²⁰ Since international commercial arbitration is confidential and the awards do not have precedential value, the opportunity for clear judicial guidance on many issues concerning the contracting and performance of insurance

Is the U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 CONN. INS. L. REV. 180 (2018) (provides an overview of the role of the NAIC in insurance regulations and its possible constitutional overreach).

¹⁰ Randall, *supra* note 9 at 664.

¹¹ See Paul Jaffe, *Modern Marine Insurance: Coverages, Current Issues, and Connection: Reform of the Insurance Law of England and Wales – Separate Laws for the Different Needs of Business and Consumers*, 87 TUL. L. REV. 1075, 1123-24 (2013).

¹² See *id.* at 1124.

¹³ See *id.* at 1077; see also Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.); see also Marine Insurance Act 1908 (N.Z.); see also Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Austl.) (All Marine Insurance Acts will *hereinafter* be referred to as “MIA” within the text of this article, but not within footnotes).

¹⁴ See JOHN BIRDS, *BIRDS’ MODERN INSURANCE LAW* 1 (2016).

¹⁵ See *id.* at 1.

¹⁶ See *id.* at 2.

¹⁷ See *id.* at 3; see also James Oldham, *Insurance Litigation Involving the Zong and Other British Slave Ships, 1780-1807*, 28 J. LEGAL HIST. 299, 300 (2007) (The slave trade played a large role in the development of marine insurance and insurance law.); see also Jane Webster, *The Zong in the Context of the Eighteenth-Century Slave Trade*, 28 J. LEGAL HIST. 285 (2007); see also Anita Rupprecht, *‘Inherent Vice’: Marine Insurance, Slave Ship Rebellion and the Law*, 57 RACE & CLASS 31 (2016); see also Tim Armstrong, *Slavery, Insurance, and Sacrifice in the Black Atlantic*, in *SEA CHANGES: HISTORICIZING THE OCEAN* 167 (Bernhard Klein & Gesa Mackenthun eds., 2003).

¹⁸ See Blazenko, *supra* note 2, at 258-59.

¹⁹ See ÖZLEM GÜRSER, *REINSURING CLAUSES* 115 (Informa Law 2014).

²⁰ See Charles F. Corcoran, III, *Reinsurance Litigation: A Primer*, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 41, 49 (1994).

policies is limited.²¹ The last reinsurance case to reach the highest court in the United Kingdom occurred before the founding of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 2009.²²

On its final day of operation, July 30, 2009, the House of Lords released its judgment in *Wasa International Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lexington Insurance Co.*²³ One of the issues in question was whether the presumption of back-to-back cover is maintained when the insurance policy and reinsurance policy have different applicable laws.²⁴ In a surprise judgment, the House of Lords distinguished the case from two precedents that appeared to have similar fact patterns where the English law applicable to the reinsurance contract was interpreted to reach the same result as the foreign law applicable to the insurance contracts due to the presumption of back-to-back cover.²⁵ Here, there was no back-to-back cover because the applicable law of the insurance contract was neither identified nor capable of being identified at the time of the conclusion of the reinsurance contract.²⁶ As there was no back-to-back cover, it was found that the reinsurer did not have to pay the insurer even though the insurer has already made a settlement with the insured in the United States to cover damages to property due to toxic pollution.²⁷ This case was obviously a significant one for the insurance industry.²⁸ It did however, generate some negative commentary as Dr. Özlem Gürses of King's College London concluded that "their Lordships' reasons for distinguishing [the two prior cases] are contradictory and unconvincing, and throw into doubt the significance of the presumption of back-to-back cover."²⁹ This Article re-examines this important case from a fresh perspective. Though their Lordships based their decision on the lack of an applicable law to the insurance contract at the time of the conclusion of the reinsurance contract, their opinions hinted that they may not have ruled the same way if the result of the subsequently identified law of Pennsylvania on the insurance contract were not so contrary from English law.³⁰ In other words, this Article suggests that although implicit, it was the need to interpret English law in such a contrary way in order to reach the same result as the interpretation under Pennsylvania law to maintain back-to-back cover that dissuaded the House of Lords from upholding the presumption.

Part I of this Article provides a brief background of the development of insurance and insurance law in England. Part II discusses the nature of reinsurance, including the different types and the presumption of back-to-back cover. Part III examines the *Wasa* judgment by the House of Lords, the industry's response to the ruling to create more certainty in the market, and the possibility that the decision was motivated not only by the lack of an identifiable law but also the divergent result between English law and Pennsylvania law.

III. BACKGROUND ON INSURANCE

²¹ See KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, *REINSURANCE ARBITRATIONS* 135 (Springer 2013).

²² See *Wasa International Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lexington Insurance Co.* [2009] UKHL 40; see also Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 §3, sch 23 (Pursuant to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the United Kingdom Supreme Court was established on October 1, 2009. The duties of the Law Lords in the House of Lords were transferred to the Supreme Court, and the Law Lords themselves became Justices of the Supreme Court).

²³ *Wasa International Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lexington Insurance Co.* [2009] UKHL 40.

²⁴ See *id.*

²⁵ See *id.*

²⁶ See *id.*

²⁷ See *id.*

²⁸ See *id.*

²⁹ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 129.

³⁰ See *Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL 40.

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A. Lloyd's of London

Starting as a coffee shop in the mid-1600s in which merchants gathered and engaged in commercial transactions, Lloyd's of London has become "a Corporation formed with statutory authority."³¹ As Lloyd's was frequented by seafarers who bought and sold insurance for ships, it became better known amongst the community which led to a booming business.³² By 1691, the coffee shop was relocated, which generated even more interest.³³ After the move, owner Edward Lloyd:

[E]mbarked on two innovative ventures, both of which would ultimately have the effect of cementing his institution as a maritime commercial powerhouse. Lloyd first began by creating a network of correspondents located in surrounding ports and abroad who could report on the movement of specific vessels and other maritime-related information. This further strengthened his establishment as a strategic nexus for admiralty-related industry. Lloyd thereafter synthesized the shipping intelligence gleaned from these correspondents into a weekly trade paper, which could then be distributed throughout the London maritime market. Accordingly, merchant businessmen reading the Lloyd News could keep abreast of nearby port information, ship schedules, and even receive periodic updates concerning maritime affairs in foreign lands.³⁴

By the early eighteenth century, Lloyd's was "considered the 'chief commercial Saleroom of London.'"³⁵ Lloyd's began to attract even more seafarers, leading to an increase of "underwriters, brokers, and insurance companies who attempted to gain a piece of the action."³⁶ The modern practice of obtaining insurance coverage at Lloyd's today has changed little since this time.³⁷ Potential insureds would approach brokers to explain the proposed coverage.³⁸ The broker would then write down the proposal and circulate the insurance document, called a slip, for insurers to sign.³⁹ At this time, however, no regulations existed and business was disorganized.⁴⁰ Today, though it is much more highly regulated, the practice of

³¹ BIRDS, *supra* note 14, at 2.

³² Jeremy A. Herschaft, *Not Your Average Coffee Shop: Lloyd's of London—A Twenty-First-Century Primer on the History, Structure, and Future of the Backbone of Marine Insurance*, 29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 169, 170 (2005).

³³ *See id.* at 170-71.

³⁴ *Id.* at 171.

³⁵ *Id.* (quoting RAYMOND FLOWER & MICHAEL WYNN JONES, *LLOYD'S OF LONDON: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY* 29 (1974)).

³⁶ *Id.* at 172.

³⁷ *See id.*

³⁸ *See id.*

³⁹ *See BIRDS, supra* note 14; *see also* Herschaft, *supra* note 32, at 172.

⁴⁰ *See id.*

obtaining insurance coverage remains practically the same.⁴¹ One major difference is that Lloyd's is now located in its own fourteen-floor building in the City of London.⁴²

B. English Law on Insurance

The laws of marine insurance, first developed as merchant law or *lex mercatoria*, were the business practices of merchants engaged in the business, much of which occurred in the early days of Lloyd's, that ultimately became the law governing the industry.⁴³ Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice during the mid-eighteenth century, was an immensely influential jurist who "applied principles derived from the law of merchant as well as more traditional common law concepts to the solution of disputes over insurance, and by the time of his retirement in 1788, the jurisdiction of the courts over insurance matters had been established."⁴⁴ The standard policy forms at Lloyd's along with the case law developed by Lord Mansfield were later codified in the MIA of 1906.⁴⁵ Consisting of 94 sections, the MIA was the basis of the marine insurance laws in other commonwealth countries.⁴⁶ Despite the title, the principles in the MIA are applicable to other forms of insurance unless specifically exempted by case law.⁴⁷ The MIA defines a marine insurance contract as "a contract whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against marine losses, that is to say, the losses incident to marine adventure."⁴⁸ The law also includes the peculiar principles of insurance law, including insurable interest,⁴⁹ utmost good faith,⁵⁰ and warranties.⁵¹ Despite being seen as essential tenets of marine insurance law, the onerous requirements governing utmost good faith and warranties were abrogated by the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 and the Insurance Act 2015.⁵² Although insurable interest is still required in English insurance law, some jurisdictions like Australia have removed it as a prerequisite.⁵³ Reinsurance is part of the MIA. Section 9 states: (1) The insurer under a contract

⁴¹ For a detailed overview of the players involved at Lloyd's and the process of placing risks, see Herschaft, *supra* note 32, at 174-81; see also ANDREW DUGUID, *ON THE BRINK: HOW A CRISIS TRANSFORMED LLOYD'S OF LONDON* (2014).

⁴² See Herschaft, *supra* note 32, at 173; see also *Lloyd's building*, INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ENGINEERS (last visited Apr. 10, 2020), <https://www.ice.org.uk/what-is-civil-engineering/what-do-civil-engineers-do/lloyds-building>.

⁴³ See generally Philip Rawlings, *Bubbles, Taxes, and Interests: Another History of Insurance Law, 1720-1825*, 36 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 799 (2016).

⁴⁴ BIRDS, *supra* note 14, at 1-2; see also Arthur C. Schreiber, *Lord Mansfield—The Father of Insurance Law*, 1960 INS. L.J. 766 (1960).

⁴⁵ See BIRDS, *supra* note 14; see also Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.).

⁴⁶ See Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.).

⁴⁷ See Sacha Patel, *The Insurance Act 2015*, STEAMSHIP MUTUAL (May 2016), <https://www.steamshipmutual.com/publications/Articles/insuranceact2015.htm>.

⁴⁸ Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), at § 1.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at §§ 4-15.

⁵⁰ *Id.* at § 27.

⁵¹ *Id.* at §§ 33-41.

⁵² See Rob Merkin & Özlem Gürses, *The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured*, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1004 (2015); see also MALCOLM CLARKE & BARIŞ SOYER (EDS.), *THE INSURANCE ACT 2015: A NEW REGIME FOR COMMERCIAL AND MARINE INSURANCE LAW* (2016).

⁵³ See Sharo Michael Atmeh, *Regulation Not Prohibition: The Comparative Case against the Insurable Interest Doctrine*, 32 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 93, 136-39 (2011). Some scholars have questioned whether the insurable interest requirement should be eliminated in English law also. See, e.g., Gary Meggitt, *Insurable Interest – The*

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of marine insurance has an insurable interest in his risk, and may re-insure in respect of it, and (2) Unless the policy otherwise provides, the original assured has no right or interest in respect of such re-insurance.⁵⁴

IV. REINSURANCE

A. What and Why?

In general, concepts in insurance law apply to reinsurance law.⁵⁵ The parties in an insurance contract are the insurer and the insured, while the parties in a reinsurance contract are the reinsurer and the reinsured.⁵⁶ The reinsured is the insurer in the underlying insurance contract.⁵⁷ The commonly accepted view today is that reinsurance is not liability insurance for the insurer, but further insurance on the subject matter of the underlying policy.⁵⁸ Therefore, the reinsurer is not automatically obliged to indemnify simply because the insurer is liable for the losses.⁵⁹ In other words, reinsurance is not liability insurance purchased by the insurer where it automatically indemnifies the insured upon being found liable.⁶⁰ This view was not universally accepted even as recently as the beginning of the 21st century, as the Court of Appeal opinion in *Wasa* found otherwise and characterized reinsurance as liability insurance.⁶¹

There are two major reasons for insurance companies to purchase reinsurance. First, it allows for the insurance of “major and often international risks which would otherwise be uninsurable.”⁶² National markets may not be able to handle the risks that international markets could.⁶³ This internationalization of insurance is also done through fronting “where the reinsurer is not permitted to conduct direct insurance business in a certain country (or state) and therefore has to find a local insurer notionally to insure the risk.”⁶⁴ Second, reinsurance “enables insurers to protect their own solvency” and expands their capacity to underwrite due to the

Doctrine that Would not Die, 35 LEGAL STUD. 280 (2015); see also Kyriaki Noussia, *Insurable Interest in Marine Insurance Contracts: Modern Commercial Needs Versus Tradition*, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 81 (2008).

⁵⁴ Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), at § 9.

⁵⁵ See Project Group on Principles of Reinsurance Contract Law (PRICL Project Group) & International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), *PRINCIPLES OF REINSURANCE CONTRACT LAW (PRICL)*, at 3 (2019), https://www.ius.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:c5e36159-2cbc-4686-83ce-1067bc4704a3/PRICL_1.0_2019.pdf.

⁵⁶ See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, *Reinsurance* (last updated Feb. 26, 2020), https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_reinsurance.htm.

⁵⁷ See *id.*

⁵⁸ See *Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL, at 33, 114.

⁵⁹ See Larry Schiffer, *If It Looks Like a Claim, and Sounds Like a Claim, Is It a Claim for Reinsurance Purposes?*, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (Jan. 2002), <https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/is-it-a-claim-for-reinsurance-purposes>.

⁶⁰ See *id.*

⁶¹ See Robert Merkin, *Commercial Certainty in the Reinsurance Market*, 126 L. Q. REV. 1, 24-30 (Mar. 2010).

⁶² JOHN LOWRY, PHILIP RAWLINGS & ROBERT MERKIN, *INSURANCE LAW: DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES* (3rd ed. Hart Publishing 2011) 501.

⁶³ See generally Gerry Dickinson, *The Economic Role of the Insurance Sector in the Risk Transfer - Capital Market Nexus*, 23 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE. ISSUES AND PRACTICE 89, 519-29 (Oct. 1998).

⁶⁴ COLIN EDELMAN QC, ANDREW BURNS, DAVID CRAIG AND AKASH NAWBATT, *THE LAW OF REINSURANCE* § 1.15 (Oxford Press 2d ed. 2013) (eBook).

increased capital.⁶⁵ This allows for the insurer to “insure a volume, type or size of risk that it would not be able to cover in the absence of reinsurance.”⁶⁶

B. Types of Reinsurance

There are various types of reinsurance.⁶⁷ Typically, reinsurance can be differentiated in two ways: (1) by the way the contracts are concluded between the reinsurer and insurer; and (2) by the substance of the reinsurance contract and the coverage that the reinsurer provides to the insurer.⁶⁸ The focus of this Article is on proportional facultative reinsurance, as only this type of reinsurance is presumed to have back-to-back cover with the underlying insurance contract. It is important to discuss the different categories of reinsurance before examining the incorporation of incorporation of the insurance contract terms into the reinsurance contract and the presumption of back-to-back cover.

i. Facultative and Treaty Reinsurance

Reinsurance can further be categorized into two types: facultative reinsurance or treaty reinsurance.⁶⁹ For facultative reinsurance, each risk is individually bargained for and both parties, the reinsurer and insurer, can decide whether to enter into the reinsurance contract.⁷⁰ There is no obligation for either party to enter into the contract.⁷¹ Facultative reinsurance involves high administrative costs and time since each individual risk needs to be considered and analyzed.⁷² However, once the contract is concluded, there is usually no “administrative oversight by the reinsurer” as it is delegated to the insurer.⁷³ Thus, the insurer is often required to maintain a certain percentage of the risk so that the reinsurer can be confident that the insurer has the financial incentive to competently administer the claims.⁷⁴ Facultative reinsurance may involve a high degree of uncertainty for the insurer because “in its most traditional form (i.e. where insurance is effected first and reinsurance is then sought) [...] an insurer can take on a risk and then discover that he cannot obtain any reinsurance.”⁷⁵ Nevertheless, this concern can be addressed as “[i]n many cases reinsurance is arranged, at least in principle, before insurance is affected.”⁷⁶

By contrast, in the case of treaty reinsurance, there is an ongoing agreement between the two parties whereby the reinsurer is required to accept the risk if it falls within the category

⁶⁵ LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 501.

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ See The Independent Financial Portal: Financial Web, *7 Types of Reinsurance*, <https://www.finweb.com/insurance/7-types-of-reinsurance.html> (last visited April 9, 2020).

⁶⁸ *Id.* (referencing different types of reinsurance).

⁶⁹ See Sean Ross, *Facultative vs. Treaty Reinsurance: What's the Difference?*, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/081716/facultative-vs-treaty-reinsurance-differences-and-examples.asp>.

⁷⁰ See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.41.

⁷¹ *See id.*

⁷² *See id.*

⁷³ JOHN S. DIACONIS & DOUGLAS W. HAMMOND, *REINSURANCE LAW*, at § 1:4.1 (Kelliann Kavanagh ed. 2011).

⁷⁴ See GRAYDON S. STARING, *LAW OF REINSURANCE* §2.2 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1993) (2020).

⁷⁵ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.42.

⁷⁶ *Id.* at para. 1.44.

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already agreed to in the contract.⁷⁷ Individual risks are not further bargained for or assessed by the reinsurer.⁷⁸ The premiums are also contracted for in advance.⁷⁹ This method of reinsurance ensures “certainty of reinsurance cover simultaneously with the direct insurance being placed,”⁸⁰ addressing a potential shortcoming of facultative reinsurance.⁸¹ A less common form of treaty reinsurance is non-obligatory reinsurance, where “the reinsured has the right to decide whether to proffer a risk for acceptance, and the reinsurers have the right to refuse any particular risk.”⁸² The treaty here is less a binding obligation and more of an agreed machinery for the presentation of proposals by the reinsured.”⁸³

There is a third, hybrid form of reinsurance called facultative/obligatory or open cover reinsurance where “the reinsured retains a choice as to what risks he will cede and the reinsurer binds himself to take whatever is ceded.”⁸⁴ Any risk ceded must still fall within the treaty.⁸⁵ This type of reinsurance “is unfavorable to reinsurers as they are more or less at the mercy of the reinsured who may decide to offload poor business on the reinsurers.”⁸⁶ This type of reinsurance allows the reassured “to put onto his reinsurer the least attractive pieces of qualifying business in his book, while keeping what he considers to be the best business for himself.”⁸⁷ This type of reinsurance is considered a hybrid because “the arrangements are facultative so far as the reinsured is concerned because he retains the choice as to whether or not to cede. So far as the reinsurer is concerned, the arrangement is obligatory, like a treaty.”⁸⁸

ii. *Proportional and Non-Proportional Reinsurance*

Reinsurance can also be divided into proportional and non-proportional reinsurance, both of which could be facultative or treaty.⁸⁹ These two categories describe the structure of the coverage as opposed to the facultative-treaty distinction, which is how the reinsurance contracts are concluded. In proportional reinsurance, “the reinsurer has an interest in all the insurer’s losses as it will pay the proportion of such losses that he has agreed to reinsure.”⁹⁰ In the most simplistic terms, the reinsured pays the reinsurer a percentage of the premium it receives from the underlying policyholder, and the reinsurer then becomes liable for the same percentage of the loss.⁹¹ Under a treaty arrangement, proportional reinsurance can be divided

⁷⁷ *See id.*

⁷⁸ *See id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.* at para 1.50; *see also* Diaconis & Hammond, *supra* note 73, at §1:4.2.

⁸⁰ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.50.

⁸¹ *See* Ross, *supra* note 69.

⁸² LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 504.

⁸³ *Id.*

⁸⁴ JOHN BIRDS, ANDREW LONGMORE, EVAN JAMES MACGILLIVRAY, DAVID OWEN, MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW 1040 (11th ed. 2008).

⁸⁵ *See* EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para 1.50.

⁸⁶ LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 504 (citing Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd. V. Johnson & Higgins (1998) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 565).

⁸⁷ Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd. v. Johnson & Higgins Ltd. [2001] UKHL 51, [26].

⁸⁸ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.71.

⁸⁹ *See id.* at para 1.42, 1.51.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at para 1.34.

⁹¹ *See* DIACONIS & HAMMOND, *supra* note 73, at § 1:5.1.

into quota share and surplus business.⁹² Quota share reinsurance “involves the cession by the reinsured of a fixed proportion of business within the scope of the reinsurance contract to the reinsurer.”⁹³ Under this arrangement, the “insurer and reinsurer are obliged to cede and accept a fixed share of each and every risk within the scope of the treaty.”⁹⁴ Surplus business reinsurance, on the other hand, “involves cession by the reinsured to the reinsurer of a surplus of business over that for which he is prepared to accept liability.”⁹⁵ The insurer’s retention, called a line and quantified as a monetary sum, is decided by the insurer depending on the specifics of each risk.⁹⁶ If the loss is not greater than the line, the insurer retains the whole risk.⁹⁷ If the loss is greater than the line, however, “that part over the retention is ceded to the surplus share treaty reinsurer(s) as a multiple of the sum retained by the insurer,” and the reinsurer must indemnify.⁹⁸

Non-proportional reinsurance is where the “liability of the insurer is capped at a certain level (the deductible). Within that retained layer the insurer will remain liable for all losses. The reinsurer will be liable for sums that exceed the deductible.”⁹⁹ Non-proportional treaty reinsurance, more commonly used than the non-proportional facultative reinsurance, can be divided into excess of loss reinsurance and stop loss business. The former “requires that the ceding insurer pay all loss, but [requires] that the reinsurer indemnifies loss above a predetermined retention, up to predetermined limit of liability.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, if the loss does not reach the predetermined baseline, the reinsurer is not obligated to indemnify since the “reinsurer only becomes involved in a loss when it exceeds the insured’s deductible.”¹⁰¹ In stop loss reinsurance, “the reinsurer becomes liable when the reinsured’s aggregated losses exceed an agreed level.”¹⁰²

C. Focus on Proportional Facultative Reinsurance

Proportional facultative reinsurance is the focus of this Article, as the presumption of back-to-back cover is only applicable to this type of reinsurance.¹⁰³ It logically follows that the cover for reinsurance and insurance contracts would be presumed to be back-to-back as “[t]he purpose of facultative proportional reinsurance is to share the risk and premium between the reinsured and the reinsurers.”¹⁰⁴ Other types of reinsurance, however, cannot support the back-to-back cover presumption because, for example, in excess of loss reinsurance, the nature of the risk is different.¹⁰⁵ When the nature of the risk is different, and when the risk of individual policies cannot be negotiated to conform between the original insurance contract and the

⁹² See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para 1.53.

⁹³ BIRDS ET AL., *supra* note 84, at 1039.

⁹⁴ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para 1.54.

⁹⁵ BIRDS ET AL., *supra* note 84, at 1039.

⁹⁶ See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.56.

⁹⁷ See *id.*

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ *Id.* at para. 1.61.

¹⁰⁰ DIACONIS & HAMMOND, *supra* note 73, at § 1:5.2.

¹⁰¹ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.62.

¹⁰² BIRDS ET AL., *supra* note 84, at 1039.

¹⁰³ See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 1.43-1.48.

¹⁰⁴ GÜRSER, *supra* note 19, at 47.

¹⁰⁵ See Rob Merkin, *The Rome I Regulation and Reinsurance*, 5 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 69, 78 (2009).

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reinsurance contract, “it is not apt to apply the presumption.”¹⁰⁶ Professor Merkin said it well, stating:

The presumption has no part to play in respect of non-proportional reinsurance, where the reinsurers assess the risk for themselves, charge a premium that does not have an automatic relationship to the insurance premium and accept a risk based not on percentages but rather in absolute terms over and above the reinsured’s financial retention.¹⁰⁷ For these reasons, the discussion to follow in the remainder of this Article will be exclusively devoted to a deeper examination of proportional facultative reinsurance.

i. Incorporation of Terms

The terms in a proportional facultative reinsurance contract typically incorporate the terms of the original insurance contract.¹⁰⁸ Incorporation is the practice of transposing all of the material terms and conditions from the underlying insurance contract into the reinsurance contract, often identically.¹⁰⁹ Although incorporation is not mandatory for the presumption of back-to-back cover, it is the easiest and most practical way to ensure the existence of the basic condition of the presumption.¹¹⁰ Generally, incorporation is accomplished through the use of a blanket clause or “by appending to the direct policy a cover page which states that reinsurance is as same terms ‘as original.’”¹¹¹ The majority view holds that such a general incorporation clause effectively “incorporates the terms of the insurance contract into the reinsurance.”¹¹² Although incorporation is generally undertaken “to achieve an identical standard of liability on the two contracts,”¹¹³ there are nonetheless limitations of and exceptions to this general principle.

Indeed, the main problem is rooted in the “fundamental tension...between the undoubted principle that insurance and reinsurance are separate contracts and the further principle that the reinsurance is designed to provide matching cover.”¹¹⁴ Incorporation of the underlying insurance into the reinsurance contract can be achieved by (1) an explicit provision or (2) “a warranty by the reinsured that the terms and conditions of the insurance and the reinsurance are the same.”¹¹⁵ Although incorporation is not mandatory for the presumption back-to-back cover, it leaves less room for contract drafting and interpretation ambiguity when the two contracts to have identical terms.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless:

¹⁰⁶ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64 at para. 3.28.

¹⁰⁷ Merkin, *supra* note 105, at 78 (internal references omitted).

¹⁰⁸ *See id.* at 73, 79.

¹⁰⁹ *See* Larry Schiffer, *Reinsurance Contract Wording Revisited*, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (Dec. 2018), <https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/reinsurance-contract-wording-revisited>.

¹¹⁰ *See* Merkin, *supra* note 105, at 79; *see also* Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 119.

¹¹¹ GÜRSES, *supra* note 19, at 51.

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ BIRDS ET AL., *supra* note 84 at 1061; *see also* Lower Rhine & Wurtemberg Insurance Association v Sedgwick, [1899] 1 Q.B. 179.

¹¹⁴ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 120.

¹¹⁵ BIRDS ET AL., *supra* note 84, at 1055-56 (*citing* Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher, [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 331).

¹¹⁶ *See* Merkin, *supra* note 105, at 79.

. . . [t]here are many provisions in an underlying contract which may well be wholly inappropriate for incorporation into any contract of reinsurance. The question of whether terms have actually been incorporated, notwithstanding an apparent statement that they have, and what meaning and effect they have if incorporated, is essentially therefore a question of construction.¹¹⁷

In *HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.*, the court outlines the conditions the terms must meet to be successfully incorporated into reinsurance contract through the use of a general incorporation clause.¹¹⁸ Namely, (1) the term has to make sense with permissible manipulation; (2) the term has to relate to the subject matter; (3) the term has to be appropriate for inclusion; and (4) the term has to be consistent with express terms.¹¹⁹ In addition, unusual terms are usually not incorporated “unless the party relying on it proves that he drew the other party’s attention to it.”¹²⁰ Whether a term is unusual can be ascertained by using a reasonable person standard in the specific market.¹²¹ Given the criteria, courts have found that arbitration clauses,¹²² exclusive jurisdiction clauses,¹²³ and choice of law clauses cannot be incorporated by general incorporation clauses.¹²⁴ These clauses were found to be ancillary in nature and cannot be given any meaning in the reinsurance contract without the express consent of both parties to incorporate the terms.¹²⁵

The failure to incorporate choice of law clauses by general incorporation language is further bolstered by European law, as seen in Rome I Regulation:

A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part only of the contract.¹²⁶

A clear and unequivocal choice of law and not merely a passive general incorporation clause would be necessary to give effect to a choice of law provision in the reinsurance contract.¹²⁷ Though, as Professor Merkin pointed out, this may be moot because, “[r]einsurance agreements are generally governed by express choice-of-law clauses.”¹²⁸

¹¹⁷ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 3.39.

¹¹⁸ *HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co* [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 596 (C.A.).

¹¹⁹ See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at 3.40 (citing *HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co* [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 596); see also LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 508.

¹²⁰ See GÜRSSES, *supra* note 19, at 56-7 (citing *Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd.* [1989] QB 433 (Eng.)).

¹²¹ See *id.* at 57.

¹²² See *id.* at 64 (“An arbitration clause governs dispute resolution and is not relevant to the performance of the contract.”).

¹²³ See *id.* at 67 (“Such clauses...have nothing to do with defining the risk; thus, they are wholly inappropriate to disputes arising between the parties to the reinsurance contract.”).

¹²⁴ See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at 3.53-3.56.

¹²⁵ See LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 509.

¹²⁶ Council Regulation 593/2008 of June 17, 2008, Rome I, art. 3.1, 2008 (O.J.) (L 177) 6, 10.

¹²⁷ See Merkin, *supra* note 105, at 73-4.

¹²⁸ *Id.* at 84.

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In *Gan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd.*, a significant incorporation of choice of law case, the court declined to incorporate the choice of Taiwanese law, the applicable law in the underlying insurance, into the reinsurance company because “[a] departure from the usual course of business on the London market could only be justified if the terms of the reinsurance agreement unequivocally pointed to an intention that the proper law of the contract should be Taiwanese law.”¹²⁹ The court noted that the use of standard form clauses “found in reinsurance contracts placed on the London market pointed to an implied choice of English law.”¹³⁰ Absent a contrary express provision or intention, the practice of placing reinsurance in the London market would point to the choice of English law to settle any disputes regardless of the general incorporation clause.¹³¹ A general incorporation clause stating “as original” is not enough to conclude that the parties intended for the choice of law clause in the insurance contract to be incorporated into the reinsurance contract.¹³² The court also noted that England was the appropriate jurisdiction and English law the appropriate law because, among other reasons, the claims cooperation clauses were “standard London reinsurance market clauses designed to protect London market reinsurers,”¹³³ and they were in English.¹³⁴ In essence, “reinsurers who have had business placed with them on the London reinsurance market will have good grounds for asserting that the appropriate forum for the dispute is England.”¹³⁵

Furthermore, in *AIG Europe (UK) Ltd v. Anonymous Greek Insurance Co. of General Insurances (The Ethniki)*, the underlying insurance contract had a jurisdiction clause indicating Athens as the jurisdiction, and the reinsurance contract incorporated the terms with the words “wording as original.”¹³⁶ The court held that incorporation of the jurisdiction clause failed because “the jurisdiction clause in the underlying contract did nothing to define the risk and that, if regard were had to its terms, it was wholly inappropriate to disputes arising between insurers and reinsurers under a contract that was probably governed by English law.”¹³⁷ Courts in other cases, including, *Arig Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sasa Assicurazione Riassicurazione SPA* and *AIG Europe SA v. QBE International Insurance Ltd* have similarly held that the jurisdiction clause was not incorporated because a consensus between the parties on the clause was not indicated.¹³⁸ General incorporation favors the likelihood of reinsurance and insurance contracts being found to have back-to-back cover, but as demonstrated above, it is clearly not without exceptions.¹³⁹

¹²⁹ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 3.54.

¹³⁰ *Id.* at para 7.08.

¹³¹ *See id.* at para. 7.10, 7.13 (citing *King & Ors v. Brandywine Reinsurance Co. (UK) Ltd.* [2004] EWHC (Comm) 1033).

¹³² *See Gan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd.* [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 472 (Eng.).

¹³³ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 7.56.

¹³⁴ *See id.*

¹³⁵ *Id.* at para 7.59.

¹³⁶ *See AIG Europe (UK) Ltd v. Anonymous Greek Insurance Co. of General Insurances (The Ethniki)* [1999] Lloyd’s Rep IR 221 (Eng.).

¹³⁷ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 7.46.

¹³⁸ *AIG Europe SA v. QBE International Insurance Ltd.*, [2002] Lloyd’s Rep I.R. 22 (citing *Arig Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sasa Assicurazione Riassicurazione S.P.A.*, (unreported, Feb. 10, 1998)).

¹³⁹ *See* Larry Schiffer, *Why Reinsurance Matters, and Other Must-Know Reinsurance Concepts*, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. 8 (May 2019), <https://www.squirepattonboggis.com/~media/files/insights/publications/2019/04/why-reinsurance-matters-and-other-must-know-reinsurance-concepts/whyreinsurancemattersandothermustknowreinsuranceconcepts.pdf>.

ii. Back-to-Back Cover

1. Presumption

Because reinsurance is insurance purchased by the insurer to cover the same subject matter as the underlying insurance policy, it follows logically that the reinsurance and insurance contracts should be matching. This is a concept known as back-to-back cover, it acts to minimize circumstances in which the insurer is liable to indemnify while the reinsurer is not.¹⁴⁰ Fundamentally, insurance is about creating certainty. As Professor Malcolm Clark noted:

Policyholders want peace of mind and security: the certainty of cover against the slings and arrows of outrageous life...Insurers too want certainty—certainty about the particular risk to be insured so that they can rate it and insure it, effectively and profitably. Uncertainty, whether it concerns changes in the law or changes in the weather, is the bane of insurers.¹⁴¹

Regardless of whether there is incorporation, the principle of back-to-back cover in reinsurance, also known as concurrency in the United States, exists.¹⁴² The theory is that the reinsurance contract is identical to the insurance contract, therefore coverage of the risk is the same.¹⁴³ If the insurer is found to be liable to indemnify the risk, then the reinsurer would be liable too.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, as previously stated:

[t]he courts have held that as a matter of general principle a policy of *proportional* reinsurance should be construed so that the cover provided under the reinsurance is co-extensive with the cover contained in the primary policies issues by the reinsured; contracts of reinsurance should, in cases of doubt, accordingly be construed so as to provide back to back cover.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, as with contracts generally, reinsurance contracts are subject to contractual construction.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, “[t]he presumption of back-to-back cover is simply a rule of construction.”¹⁴⁷ It is rebuttable when the language does not match or in situations “where the risk is exceptionally large and the reinsurance terms have been the subject of individual negotiation.”¹⁴⁸ Besides, “the notion of back-to-back cover cannot operate to strike out or

¹⁴⁰ See MOUTINHO RAMOS, *supra* note 3, at 32.

¹⁴¹ MALCOLM CLARKE, *POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY* 335 (Oxford, 2005).

¹⁴² See GÜRSER, *supra* note 19, at 40.

¹⁴³ See MOUTINHO RAMOS, *supra* note 3.

¹⁴⁴ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 122.

¹⁴⁵ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para. 3.12.

¹⁴⁶ See *id.* at para 3.01; see also William Hoffman, *On the Use and Abuse of Custom and Usage in Reinsurance Contracts*, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 28 (1997) (citing Colin Edelman, *Current “Soft Targets” in Reinsurance Contract Wording*, 11 INT’L INS. L. REV. 327 (1996)).

¹⁴⁷ See GÜRSER, *supra* note 19, at 84.

¹⁴⁸ JOHN S. BUTLER & ROBERT MERKIN, *REINSURANCE LAW* B-0183 (Sweet and Maxwell, 2010) (citing Youell v. Bland Welch & Co. (No. 1) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127).

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override those express terms of the reinsurance agreement which are inconsistent with the underlying terms.”¹⁴⁹

The presumption of back-to-back cover is sensible as a business presumption and legal concept because it creates certainty and predictability.¹⁵⁰ The insurer, if found liable to indemnify the policyholder, can be confident that while it has to pay on an insurance claim, it would be able to collect compensation from the reinsurer in most situations.¹⁵¹

2. Back-to-Back Cover with Different Laws

When the laws governing the insurance and reinsurance contracts are different, it may be reasonable to question whether back-to-back still exists. This section discusses two cases, *Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher*¹⁵² and *Groupama Navigation et Transports v. Catatumbo Seguros*,¹⁵³ that examine this issue. These two cases stand “for the proposition that where insurance and reinsurance are back-to-back, and each is governed by a different applicable law, the construction of the common term provided for by the law governing the direct policy is to be applied to the reinsurance, so that the same wording gives rise to the same coverage.”¹⁵⁴

Vesta is a House of Lords case concerning damages to a fish farm in Norway caused by a storm.¹⁵⁵ The insurance contract was concluded between the Norwegian policyholder and Norwegian insurer, which subsequently purchased reinsurance on the London market.¹⁵⁶ The reinsurance contract had a general incorporation clause referencing the underlying insurance contract, and the contracts were “substantially back-to-back.”¹⁵⁷ The warranty that there would be a 24-hour guard at the fish farm in the insurance contract was thus incorporated into the reinsurance contract.¹⁵⁸ The warranty was breached in the case, which meant the reinsurer was not liable under English law regardless of the lack of a causal link between the breach of the warranty and the loss due to the storm.¹⁵⁹ However, the insurer was still liable because under Norwegian law, the breach would have had to have a causal relationship to the loss in order for the insurer to disclaim liability.¹⁶⁰ The court “held that the intention of the parties to the reinsurance must have been to provide an indemnity against the liability of the reinsured, and that accordingly the warranty in the reinsurance was to receive the same meaning as it had in Norwegian law.”¹⁶¹ Lord Templeman stated, “In my opinion, in the absence of any express

¹⁴⁹ LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 511 (citing *GE Reinsurance Corporation v. New Hampshire Insurance Co* (2004) Lloyd’s Rep IR 404; and *Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd v. Sea Insurance Co Ltd*. (1996) LRLR 265; and *Youell v. Bland Welch* (No 1) (1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127).

¹⁵⁰ See MOUTINHO RAMOS, *supra* note 3, at 16.

¹⁵¹ See *id.*

¹⁵² *Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher* [1989] EWHC (Comm) 331 (Eng.).

¹⁵³ *Groupama Navigation et Transports v. Catatumbo Ca Seguros* [1999] EWHC (Comm) 845 (Eng.).

¹⁵⁴ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 125.

¹⁵⁵ See generally *Vesta*, [1989] EWHC (Comm).

¹⁵⁶ See *id.*

¹⁵⁷ See *id.*

¹⁵⁸ See *id.*

¹⁵⁹ See Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), at § 33(3).

¹⁶⁰ See *Vesta*, [1989] EWHC (Comm), at 331.

¹⁶¹ BIRDS ET AL., *supra* note 84, at 1062.

declaration to the contrary in the reinsurance policy, a warranty must produce the same effect in each policy,”¹⁶² and therefore the reinsurer was held to be liable to indemnify even though there was a breach of the warranty. Though English law governed the reinsurance contract, the case found that the warranty was to be construed and interpreted the same way as it was under Norwegian law, the law of the insurance contract.¹⁶³

Eleven years later, *Groupama Navigation et Transports v. Catatumbo Seguros* was decided by the Court of Appeal. Similar to *Vesta*, this case concerned an insurance contract governed by Venezuelan law and a reinsurance contract governed by English law.¹⁶⁴ A warranty to maintain the class of the insured ships was stated in the insurance contract and independently stated in the reinsurance contract, in addition to a general incorporation clause incorporating the original warranty.¹⁶⁵ The warranty was breached by the insured and there was subsequently a loss caused by a storm unrelated to the breach.¹⁶⁶ Like Norwegian law, Venezuelan law requires the breach to be causative of the loss for the insurer to refuse payment.¹⁶⁷ What is exceptional about *Catatumbo* is that while:

... the reinsurance contract not only incorporated the terms of the direct policy but contained its own class warranty ... [the court] nevertheless thought that *Vesta* remained applicable: the contracts provided identical cover, the interpretation of the warranties should be identical and accordingly the express reinsurance warranty was either to be regarded as a provision displaced by the incorporated warranty, or to be construed in accordance with the direct warranty.¹⁶⁸

The court ruled again that the warranty in the reinsurance contract must be construed the exact same way as the identical term in the insurance contract, regardless of the fact that the reinsurance contract was governed by English law.¹⁶⁹ In the end, the court found that the reinsurer was liable and was required to indemnify the losses.¹⁷⁰

The opinions of the court in both *Vesta* and *Catatumbo* strove to give the same meaning to the same or equivalent wording in the respective contracts.¹⁷¹ It was a matter of “the construction of the reinsurance contract and not one of imputed choice of law.”¹⁷² Even though the choice of law may have been different, due to the fact that reinsurance contracts are almost always governed by English law while insurance contracts are commonly governed by the law of the location of the underlying policy:

... [t]here is powerful authority for the proposition that where insurance and reinsurance are back-to-back, and each is governed by a different applicable

¹⁶² *Vesta*, EWHC (Comm), at 331.

¹⁶³ *See id.* at 874.

¹⁶⁴ *See Catatumbo*, EWHC (Comm) 845.

¹⁶⁵ *See id.*

¹⁶⁶ *See id.*

¹⁶⁷ *See id.*

¹⁶⁸ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 125.

¹⁶⁹ *See id.*

¹⁷⁰ *See id.* at 129.

¹⁷¹ *See BIRDS ET AL.*, *supra* note 84, at 1061.

¹⁷² *Id.* at 1063.

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law, the construction of the common term provided for by the law governing the direct policy is to be applied to the reinsurance, so that the same wording gives rise to the same coverage.¹⁷³

The reasoning and rulings in the two cases were substantially the same, as the Court of Appeal in *Catatumbo* followed the precedence set by the House of Lords in *Vesta* in setting the rule regarding choice of law involving reinsurance and insurance contracts.

V. UK SUPREME COURT IN *WASA V. LEXINGTON*

A. Facts and Judgment

Despite the aforementioned cases, the presumption of back-to-back cover was called into question by *Wasa v. Lexington*, which was decided by the United Kingdom House of Lords on July 30, 2009.¹⁷⁴ In this case, the American insurer, Lexington, provided insurance coverage to an American company called Alcoa for a period of three years lasting from July 1, 1977 to July 1, 1980.¹⁷⁵ During the same time period, Lexington purchased reinsurance on the London reinsurance market from Wasa International which incorporated the terms.¹⁷⁶ The governing law of the insurance contract was not explicitly clear at the time of its conclusion, but the contract contained a Service of Suit clause that required the insurer to submit to the jurisdiction of any state in which the insured decided to commence litigation.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, with respect to the Service of Suit clause, the reinsurance contract was governed by English law.¹⁷⁸

The original insured was found liable for toxic damages, and Lexington settled with the insured after realizing it was also liable for damages outside of the three-year period under the controlling law of Pennsylvania, as determined by the Washington State Supreme Court.¹⁷⁹ The insurer was found to have joint and several liability with all other insurers throughout the 44-year period of toxic damages to the insured properties, even though it only contracted to take on the risk for ten years, and only three of those were ceded to the reinsurers.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless:

Wasa and AGF declined to reimburse Lexington on the basis that, as a matter of English law, they could only be held liable for the costs of remedying the specific portion of damage that occurred during the policy period and that the 'settlement' entered into by Lexington and [the insured]

¹⁷³ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 125.

¹⁷⁴ See *Lexington Ins. Company v. Wasa Int'l Ins. Company Limited* [2009] UKHL 40 [2008] 1 AC (HL) 33 (appeal taken from Eng.).

¹⁷⁵ See *id.* at para. 12.

¹⁷⁶ See *id.* at para. 20-1.

¹⁷⁷ See *id.* at para 19.

¹⁷⁸ See *id.* at para. 13.

¹⁷⁹ See *id.* at para. 102.

¹⁸⁰ See *id.* at para. 57. This is the same approach to compensation as followed by § 3 of the English Compensation Act of 2006. See, e.g. Compensation Act 2006, c. 3 (Eng.), <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/29/contents?view=plain>.

encompassed a settlement for damage that took place outside this three year period.¹⁸¹

The House of Lords affirmed the independence of reinsurance contracts from insurance contracts and cast great doubts onto the ideas set forth in *Vesta* and *Catatumbo* in which the reinsurance cover would follow the insurance cover.¹⁸² While Lord Mance conceded that the terms of the original insurance were fully incorporated into the reinsurance contract,¹⁸³ and “it is hard to see in the reinsurance contract in *Wasa* any contrary intention showing that the reinsurance and insurance contracts should not be interpreted in the same way,”¹⁸⁴ the resulting decision interpreted the contracts differently by using two different laws.¹⁸⁵ The key difference between this case and *Vesta* and *Catatumbo*, as noted by the opinions of the House of Lords, was that when the reinsurance contract was concluded in 1977, it was impossible to determine that Pennsylvania law would be the one governing the insurance contract, therefore the reinsurer should not be expected to follow the interpretation of PA law and indemnify under such uncertainty.¹⁸⁶ The choice of Pennsylvanian law meant that the insurer was jointly and severally liable for all the losses prior to and during the insurance coverage period, which is antithetical to English law where:

... the insurer (or reinsurer) is liable to indemnify the insured (or reinsured) in respect of loss and damage which occurs within the period of cover but will not be liable to indemnify the insured (or reinsured) in respect of loss and damage which occurs either before inception or after expiry of the risk.¹⁸⁷

The House of Lords distinguished *Wasa* from *Vesta* and *Catatumbo*, both which were cited significantly and explicitly not overruled, by focusing on ambiguity around choice of law at the time of contracting.¹⁸⁸ This distinction allowed it to find that the reinsurer was not liable because of “the principle that reinsurers could not be expected to follow the reinsured’s liability in circumstances where it was not clear which law would govern that liability,”¹⁸⁹ whereas “[i]n both *Vesta* and *Catatumbo*, it was possible at the time when the insurance and reinsurance were placed to identify the foreign law which would govern the insurance.”¹⁹⁰ The court held that “the reinsurers were entitled to rely upon the terms of their own policy despite the cover being back-to-back and the reinsurers being obliged to follow settlements.”¹⁹¹ In making this distinction, the House of Lords reaffirmed the theory that reinsurance is not liability insurance and rather:

¹⁸¹ John T. Harding, *The English Revolution: “Follow the Fortunes” After Lexington v. AGF & Wasa*, 77 DEF. COUNS. J. 328, 343 (2010).

¹⁸² See *id.* at 334.

¹⁸³ See Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 129.

¹⁸⁴ Adrian Mecz & Anthony Bailey, *Wasa v Lexington: Buyer Beware*, 1 J. BUS. L. 1, 3 (2010).

¹⁸⁵ See Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 130.

¹⁸⁶ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 126.

¹⁸⁷ *Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL at para. 74.

¹⁸⁸ See *id.* at para. 7.

¹⁸⁹ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 126; see also LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 512-13.

¹⁹⁰ *Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL, at para. 44.

¹⁹¹ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 129; see also LOWRY ET AL., *supra* note 62, at 512-13.

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[R]einsurance is a contract whereby the subject matter of the original insurance is insured by the reinsurer and it is not a contract under which the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the insurer for its liability arising under the primary insurance. The point is significant, because classifying reinsurance as a liability cover creates a direct link between the sums paid by the reinsured and the reinsurer's obligation to provide an indemnity, with the back-to-back terms of the reinsurance simply confirming that the reinsurers will pay when the reinsured has to pay.¹⁹²

Therefore, the liability for payment by the insurer does not automatically translate to liability for payment by the reinsurer. In this case, "[t]heir Lordships implicitly recognized that their ruling was uncommercial...for contracts written before the ruling in *Wasa* the market will continue to be faced with great uncertainty as to exactly what the reinsurance covers."¹⁹³ A major reason that the ruling is uncommercial is because the distinction between *Wasa* and the two prior cases are unclear and unconvincing.¹⁹⁴ In the two previous cases, the law was applied in ways that would allow coverage under foreign laws even though coverage under English law would have been denied. In this case, English law was applied and therefore the reinsurer was free from indemnity even though the insurer's liability for the losses to the policyholder was clear.¹⁹⁵

Dr. Gürses noted that "in this case the contracts had identical wordings and the insurer paid by reference to the interpretation by a court of competent jurisdiction of the original policy term which was reproduced in the reinsurance policy," the distinction made by the House of Lords was not convincing to all.¹⁹⁶ Another commentator, however, believes *Wasa* to be correct while recognizing the contradiction, stating, "[i]f the reinsurance contract is governed by a law other than the law of the insurance contract, it should be construed in accordance with that law as a separate contract, as the House of Lords firmly state that it is."¹⁹⁷

It has been pointed out that, "[b]oth *Vesta* and *Catatumbo* were cases involving warranties."¹⁹⁸ A key question is whether those cases are confined to warranties or whether they lay down a general presumption of back to back cover even in coverage cases.¹⁹⁹ Even though there is some clue, *Wasa* does not directly answer this question, as the key distinction noted by their Lordships was the uncertainty of the applicable law at the time of the contract, not warranty clauses versus other clauses.²⁰⁰

B. Industry Response

¹⁹² Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 122-23.

¹⁹³ *Id.* at 130.

¹⁹⁴ *See id.*

¹⁹⁵ *See Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL, at 20.

¹⁹⁶ Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 130.

¹⁹⁷ PT O'NEILL & JW WOLONIECKI, *THE LAW OF REINSURANCE IN ENGLAND AND BERMUDA* 151 (3rd ed. 2010).

¹⁹⁸ BUTLER & MERKIN, *supra* note 148, at 20211.

¹⁹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰⁰ *See Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL, at para. 7.

The judgment led to uncertainty and unpredictability in the industry.²⁰¹ Since *Vesta* is still good law alongside *Wasa*, it is unclear in what circumstances is the presumption of back-to-back cover still valid.²⁰² Is it when the applicable law of the underlying insurance contract is identified or identifiable, or is it when the result of the English law interpretation is drastically different from the interpretation using most other laws in the world, such as in the case of warranties?²⁰³ Undoubtedly in the absence of further guidance, the industry had to devise measures to make the relationship between the insurer and reinsurer more certain and the reinsurance contract's coverage more predictable.

The most direct way for insurers and reinsurers to ensure that there is back-to-back cover is to be more contemplative in drafting their reinsurance contracts and to include clauses that would minimize uncertainty. In the *Wasa* Court of Appeal decision, the court "noted that more careful drafting of the reinsurance contract could avoid or minimize disputes between ceding companies and their reinsurers."²⁰⁴ First, drafters can explicitly indicate that the reinsurance contract is to be governed by the law of the direct policy, though this provision "could not consist of a Service of Suit clause...because English law does not recogni[z]e the validity of a floating choice of law clause."²⁰⁵ The practice is reflected in Lloyd's best practice recommendations. According to its guidelines, for American surplus lines and assumed reinsurance businesses, "underwriters must submit to jurisdiction in any US competent court, therefore no state's jurisdiction should be specified."²⁰⁶ However, a choice of law must be clearly made in the policy.²⁰⁷ This is clearly a marked change from prior to *Wasa*, where Lloyd's recommendation was that the reinsurer should specify a law, but the "choice of law may be in the form of a clause which specifies clearly a rule by which governing law is determined, in the case of multi-state or multi-territory risks" with a warning that "underwriters should be aware that there may be limited cases where a choice of law provision may be overridden by a court."²⁰⁸ This clause would have likely led to the lack of back-to-back cover because the law would have still been undeterminable at the time of the conclusion of the insurance contract and consequently most likely at the time of the conclusion reinsurance contract also. It is uncertain when Lloyd's stopped making the suggestion to include this clause, but it was likely a response to the ruling in *Wasa*.

A second way is that parties could include a claims cooperation clause or a claims control clause in the reinsurance contract. These clauses can be used by the reinsurer to "circumscribe the power of the reinsured to make settlements or other decisions which are binding on it."²⁰⁹ A cooperation clause gives the reinsurer the right to be involved from the time

²⁰¹ See *id.* at para. 20.

²⁰² See *id.* at para. 43.

²⁰³ See INSURANCE ACT 2015 §3, 9 Warranties and Representations. (The example of warranties is no longer applicable since the passage of Insurance Act 2015, but there may be other examples of English law being the global outlier.).

²⁰⁴ Harding, *supra* note 181, at 351.

²⁰⁵ Merkin, *supra* note 62, at 29.

²⁰⁶ *Choice of Law and Jurisdiction – Best Practice*, LLOYD'S (Apr. 25, 2016), <https://www.lloyds.com/market-resources/market-communications/regulatory-communications/regulatory-communications/regulatory-news-articles/2016/04/choice-of-law-and-juris>.

²⁰⁷ See *id.*

²⁰⁸ Iain Saville: Lloyd's Head of Business Process Reform, *Market Bulletin: LMP Slip*, LLOYD'S, <https://www.lloyds.com/~media/lloyds/archive/marketbulletin/market-bulletins/2004/y3406.pdf>.

²⁰⁹ EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at 5.07.

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of the claim in order to give its opinion during the investigative and settlement stages.²¹⁰ A control clause, on the other hand gives reinsurers full control of all aspects of claims handling.²¹¹ With the reinsurer involved from the beginning, it is most likely the case that the settlement or verdict would be approved by the reinsurer, forcing it to indemnify if the insurer is found liable. The reinsurer, therefore, once involved and subjected to the jurisdiction of the court in the insurer's jurisdiction, could not later claim to not be bound by the results.

A third approach when drafting the reinsurance agreement is:

... to agree English law for the reinsurance and to specify that all the clauses in it shall be interpreted so they are back to back with whatever the underlying insurance may be held to mean under whatever system of law a Court of competent jurisdiction may choose to apply to it."²¹²

This solution is also proposed by Professor Merkin when he suggested that "the choice of law clause could provide that the reinsurance is governed by English law but that questions of construction are governed by the law chosen to govern the direct policy."²¹³ This solution is essentially the rationale in *Vesta* and *Catatumbo* and would consequently lead to the finding of the preservation of back-to-back cover.

The difficulty in negotiating these contractual terms lies in the power imbalance between insurers and reinsurers because of the size and power of the London reinsurance industry. Indeed, the *Wasa* Court of Appeal opinion "did not suggest any practical way in the market to actually negotiate such terms."²¹⁴ Reinsurers in London prefer to enter into contracts governed by English law because it is the law that it knows best and the law that has been universally applied to reinsurance contracts given the strong presumption noted in *Gan Insurance*.²¹⁵ It is unlikely the reinsurance industry would easily consent to changing the terms of the reinsurance contract given the traditional forms and slips it has customarily used as these amendments may lead to different results and, ironically, a period of further uncertainty that may not be beneficial to reinsurers. Nevertheless, it is submitted that reinsurers should be more cognizant of the needs of its contractual partners and be more flexible in drafting insurance contracts to ensure that the needs of both parties are met.

C. Calculating Tort Liabilities

Wasa created uncertainty, and now, a decade later, the case is settled law but the resulting uncertainty remains. This section explores the possibility that *Wasa* was distinguished from prior case law because applying Pennsylvania law resulted in an interpretation that was too divergent from the interpretation of English law. Therefore, it is asserted that the case was

²¹⁰ See GÜRSER, *supra* note 19, at 231.

²¹¹ See Larry Schiffer, *Underwriting and Claims Clauses in Reinsurance Agreements*, INT'L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. (Sept. 2012), <https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/underwriting-and-claims-clauses-in-reinsurance-agreements>.

²¹² Bill Perry, *The Limitations Of "Back To Back" As a Concept In Reinsurance In English Law Following Lexington v. AGF (and Lexington v. Wasa)*, 77 DEF. COUNSEL J. 310, 326 (2010).

²¹³ Merkin, *supra* note 61, at 29.

²¹⁴ Harding, *supra* note 181, at 351.

²¹⁵ See *Gan Insurance Co. Ltd.*, Lloyd's Rep IR 472.

distinguished, not simply because Pennsylvania law was not identified at the time of the conclusion of the reinsurance contract, but its unidentified status combined with the particular outcome that led to the decision. It is submitted that had the applicable law resulted in an interpretation that only slightly varied from that of English law, the House of Lords may have found that back-to-back cover was still maintained. This assertion is supported by the fact that if it were just because there was no chosen applicable law, their Lordships would not have needed to discuss the resulting joint and several liability imposed on the insured and therefore the insurer at length.²¹⁶ It appeared that they were emphasizing that such a disparate result was so different from English law that back-to-back cover could not possibly be maintained.²¹⁷ Implicitly, they were conveying the possibility that had the results of the law of the insurance contract been more similar to the English law interpretation, they may have upheld the presumption.²¹⁸ The rest of this section discusses some other methods of calculating and allocating of liabilities among tortfeasors in American law to explore whether any of them could have resulted in the House of Lords upholding back-to-back cover in *Wasa*.²¹⁹

In a toxic tort situation like in this case, the various jurisdictions in the United States have devised at least four ways to allocate liability: (1) joint and several liability, (2) pro-rata by years, (3) pro-rata by years and limits, and (4) pro-rata by exposure.²²⁰ Joint and several liability was applied by the law of Pennsylvania and the interpretation with which the House of Lords were faced.²²¹ Joint and several liability means that the plaintiff can seek the entire compensation from any of the tortfeasors who have been found to be responsible.²²² The tortfeasor in turn has the right to pursue contribution from other parties found to be jointly and severally liable.²²³ Inexplicably, this latter point was never raised by their Lordships, which may have given the casual reader the impression that the difference in the quantum of liability between the two interpretations was much greater than it ultimately could wind up being. This method raises the question of how the court would allocate the liability between the insurers since the rationale for using joint and several liability is that it would be difficult to divide liability amongst the various insurers to compensate the insured.²²⁴ The allocation problem is merely postponed.²²⁵ This method may prove unfair for those of whom were self-insured when the damages were occurring as all the losses would be allocated between the various insurers.²²⁶

The other three ways to allocate liability are based on a pro-rata basis.²²⁷ The first type, pro-rata by years, is based on the proportion each policy was in effect in terms of the

²¹⁶ See generally *Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL 40 (discussing the joint and several liability imposed on insured and insurers).

²¹⁷ See *id.* at 43.

²¹⁸ See *id.*

²¹⁹ See *id.* at 46.

²²⁰ See generally Thomas M. Jones & Jon D. Hurwitz, *An Introduction to Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigger Cases*, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 37-49 (1999) (discussing the different allocation of liability in U.S. law).

²²¹ See *Wasa International Insurance* [2009] UKHL, at 4.

²²² See Michael G. Doherty, *Allocating Progressive Injury Liability among Successive Insurance Policies*, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 269 (1997). For a spirited defense of joint and several liability, see generally Richard W. Wright, *Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure*, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (1988).

²²³ See Doherty, *supra* note 222, at 269.

²²⁴ See *id.* at 270.

²²⁵ See *id.*

²²⁶ See *id.* at 272.

²²⁷ See *id.* at 278.

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number of years it was on risk.²²⁸ The rationale for this method of calculation is “Due to the difficulty of establishing the actual amount of loss sustained during an individual policy period... a simple calculation based on time on the risk is the most equitable and efficient means of allocating indemnification obligations.”²²⁹

The drawback of this method is that policy limits are not taken into account, resulting in a situation where, “[A] policy with very low limits of liability may be liable for the same amount as a policy with much greater limits, despite the likely disparity in the premium that the respective carriers collected from the policyholder.”²³⁰ In this situation, where the number of total years found by the Washington Supreme Court was 44 years between 1942 and 1986, Lexington would have been liable from 1974 to 1984.²³¹ Wasa would have only been responsible for three of the years as it was only the reinsurer for that time period.

Under this formulation, Wasa would have been liable for 6.8% of the damages.²³² This would be a different figure from the exact three years of liability between July 1, 1977 and July 1, 1980 the reinsurer contracted for, if it is ascertainable at all, but it would be a significantly lower amount than a joint and several liability scheme.²³³ Another calculation method is pro-rata by years and limits:

The basis of an individual insurer’s liability is the aggregate coverage it underwrote during the period in which the loss occurred. Basically, a given insurer’s liability is determined by comparing its particular exposure to the total amount of exposure assumed by all carriers of the triggered policies. This comparison yields a percentage that is then applied to the amount of loss the policyholder sustained.²³⁴

This is also called the coverage provided method.²³⁵ For example, Company X purchases insurance from Insurer A for two years with a policy limit of \$1 million. The next three years, Company X purchases insurance from Insurer B with a limit of \$2 million. The court found that the damage is \$4 million during the five years.²³⁶ The exposure for Insurer A would be \$1 million multiplied by 2, which is \$2 million, and the exposure for Insurer B would be \$2 million multiplied by 3, which is \$6 million. The total indemnity is potentially \$8 million. Under the pro-rata by years and limit formulation, Insurer A would be liable for 2/8, or 1/4 of the total damages, and Insurer B would be liable for 6/8, or 3/4 of the total damages. With damages totaling \$4 million, Insurer A would be liable for \$1 million and Insurer B would be liable for \$3 million. It would not be possible to apply this method to calculate exactly what the insurer and reinsurer would be liable for in this case without more information. However, the total

²²⁸ See Jones & Hurwitz, *supra* note 220, at 42.

²²⁹ *Id.* at 42-3.

²³⁰ *Id.* at 44.

²³¹ See Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 120-22.

²³² See *id.*

²³³ See *id.*

²³⁴ Jones & Hurwitz, *supra* note 220, at 44.

²³⁵ See Doherty, *supra* note 222, at 274.

²³⁶ See *id.*

damages would not equal the amount they would be liable in the exact time three-year time period.²³⁷

Lastly, there is a pro-ration by exposure method, which is the same as under English law.²³⁸ With that method, the court would apportion the liability based on the specific time period in which the insurer insured the risk.²³⁹ As previously noted, calculating the damages for each policy period may be difficult. If Pennsylvania law used this approach there would have been back-to-back coverage between the insurance policy and the reinsurance policy, resulting in no litigation on this issue.²⁴⁰

Conversely, what if Pennsylvania law applied the pro-ration by year's method or the pro-ration by years and limits method? The former may be result in a quantum that is close to the result calculated by the pro-ration by exposure method. If the damages were fairly uniform throughout the overall time period, then a proportion of the damages would be close to the damages in the precise time period of the policy. If the amount of damages varied drastically, the figure undoubtedly could differ by a large amount. Nonetheless, the result would be closer than the quantum calculated by pro-ration by years and limits, as this method requires knowing the limits of each insurance policy and insurers with higher limits may be liable for more than their fair share while those with lower limits would pay less than their fair proportion under the pro-ration by years or pro-ration by exposure methods.²⁴¹

The question remains, how would the House of Lords have ruled in either situation? On the one hand, the Lords' stated reasoning was that the choice of law was not identified at the time of contracting, so if the same rationale were applied, they would have similarly found there was no back-to-back cover, and the reinsurer would only be liable for compensation for losses suffered during the specific time period stated in the policy.²⁴² On the other hand, the difference in the quantum would have been much lower than that between the quantum using English law and the quantum using joint and several liability as applied by the Washington State Supreme Court.²⁴³ Even if the law were not identified, if the resulting quantum were not drastically disparate, would that be enough to rebut the presumption of back-to-back cover? Professor Merkin suggests that "it is possible to read the judgments as indicating that the ousting of the back-to-back principle on the basis of unpredictable outcome extended only to the most fundamental terms of the reinsurance, in particular the duration of coverage."²⁴⁴ Although the pro-ration by years and pro-ration by years and limits approaches are both temporally bound, they also take into account the years that are not specifically covered by the policy.²⁴⁵ This certainly makes the determination of whether this would satisfy the House of Lords much more difficult.

If the House of Lords were to maintain the principle that underlies the case, then they would have no choice but to find that there was no back-to-back cover in any of the above scenarios. Yet, this does not seem to be a commercial decision if the quantum difference is low.

²³⁷ See *id.*

²³⁸ See Jones & Hurwitz, *supra* note 220, at 47.

²³⁹ See *id.* at 47-9.

²⁴⁰ See Gürses, *supra* note 4, at 121.

²⁴¹ See *id.*

²⁴² See *id.*

²⁴³ See *Wasa International Insurance Co. Ltd.* [2009] UKHL 40.

²⁴⁴ Rob Merkin, *Insurance and Reinsurance in the Fairchild Enclave*, 36 LEGAL STUD. 302, 310 (2016).

²⁴⁵ See Jones & Hurwitz, *supra* note 220, at 43-7.

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The decision may be harder in such a case, which may hint at the possibility that although they did not state so explicitly, the drastic difference in the quantum may have been at least one consideration when they wrote their opinions. All in all, it appears that the choice of the method to allocate liabilities under American tort law may have determined, or at least some affect, on the interpretation of English reinsurance law.

VI. CONCLUSION

Insurance, including reinsurance, is an important global industry that seeks to offer a sense of security. Back-to-back cover in reinsurance is an important presumption that creates certainty and predictability in the market to protect the original policyholder and the insurer in the face of a multitude of potentially conflicting laws.²⁴⁶ The presumption had been strong and relatively straightforward under English law until the unexpected opinions in *Wasa* by the House of Lords. Though the opinions do provide some discussion as to when the presumption of back-to-back cover ceases to exist, the guidance is not clear and has been criticized for leading to confusion.²⁴⁷

This article suggests that the stated reasoning of the House of Lords may not appear to be as principled as it appeared at first glance. The bright-line rule they announced regarding the applicable law of the underlying insurance contract being unidentified may not be so clear if the difference in the quantum had not been as large between the English law interpretation and the interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania. In fact, this Article has shown that had the decision of the Washington State Supreme Court been different, the House of Lords decision may have also been different. At the very least, it may have led to a clearer judgment.

Though *Wasa* may have been a *sui generis* case, it certainly injected some uncertainty into the presumption of back-to-back cover.²⁴⁸ The industry has likely responded in its practice to ensure that back-to-back cover is maintained or clarify that coverage is not identical through more contemplative negotiations and wording in their reinsurance contracts. Disputes are undoubtedly being resolved through international arbitration, and the likelihood of another reinsurance case, let alone one whose issue turns on the presumption of back-to-back cover, reaching the Supreme Court is infinitesimally low. Nonetheless, the state of the presumption of back-to-back cover is still murky, and solidifying the presumption, however reached, should continue to be the aim of the judiciary and industry because this would only benefit the global insurance and reinsurance industry as a whole.

²⁴⁶ See EDELMAN ET AL., *supra* note 64, at para 2.29, 3.19.

²⁴⁷ Contrast, generally, *Wasa International Insurance Co. Ltd.* [2009] UKHL 40 with Jie Zhang, *Comment on the Decision of the House of Lords in Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co* [2009] UKHL 40, 5 SOUTHAMPTON STUDENT L. REV. 15, 15-8 (2015).

²⁴⁸ See *Wasa International Insurance Co Ltd v Lexington Insurance Co.* [2009] UKHL 40.