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FINAL REPORT ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE APARTHEID CONVENTION AND OTHER
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

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Editor's Note.—Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,† the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa and the Special Committee Against Apartheid were “to undertake a study on ways and means of ensuring the implementation of international instruments such as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, including the establishment of the international jurisdiction envisaged by the said Convention.”‡ Consequently, Professor Bassiouni was appointed “Expert Consultant” to the Group, and, with the assistance of Professor Derby, prepared the following report, which was unanimously adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts for the Commission on Human Rights for the purpose of circulating the report among the member-states for their comments.¶

The report consists of two projects: (1) A Draft Convention for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court and (2) A Draft Additional Protocol on the Penal Implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. The latter, the Secretariat's Note, and the appendices are not published here; the remainder of the report is printed verbatim.

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INTRODUCTION

1. This is intended to answer the call for a “study . . . in 1980 . . . on ways and means of implementing international instruments, such as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, including the establishment of the international jurisdiction envisaged by the Convention.” G.A. Res. 34/24, ann. 1, para. 20 (26 November 1979). The report was prepared with implementation as its central consideration, and begins with an inquiry into the significance of the term “implementation” in view of the nature of the Apartheid Convention.

2. The report concludes that, in the present context, “implementation” signifies creation of an international criminal court. From this it proceeds to consider the state of international criminal law in terms of theory and practicality of operations of such a court, and with special attention to the particular nature of the crime of apartheid.

3. It is upon this foundation of relevant concerns that adoption of any instrument creating such a court, must be considered.

4. An assessment is included of the possible usefulness of such a court in combatting the crime of apartheid.

5. Finally, a summary of issues requiring attention and means of addressing such issues is provided.

6. Throughout, an effort has been made to present a range of options and to describe modalities for achieving the widest possible acceptance of implementation steps. In keeping with this goal of flexibility, particular approaches are not strongly advocated for outright adoption. Rather, it is left to the Working Group and other concerned organs to identify especially promising alternatives based on their competence. In particular, the possibility of formalizing the quest for consensus in formulating an appropriate implementation scheme is outlined in the concluding portion of the report.

7. Although Southern Africa is the chief concern of the Convention and of the Working Group, the discussion of implementation is general.
This is not out of a spirit of neutrality. On the contrary, it is out of a concern that apartheid be recognized and dealt with for what it is, regardless of where it occurs. Accordingly, general discussion ensures that implementation measures would be suitable for application in every context. That the official government policy labeled "apartheid" is not the sole concern of those combatting the crime of the same name is readily apparent from such works as the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts prepared in accordance with the Commission of Human Rights resolution 12 (XXXV) and the Economic and Social Council decision 1979/34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1365, 31 January 1980.

8. Appendices are attached that may be helpful to understanding the report, and also to provide perspective, in that apartheid is not alone among crimes against humanity, and enforcement of international criminal law is a concern shared by persons who approach the matter from different points of view.

9. Two major reports preceding the present report have been prepared by distinguished members of the Ad Hoc Working Group. One by Professor Felix Ermacora entitled "Study Concerning the question of apartheid, from the point of view of international penal law" E/CN.4/1075, 15 February 1972 and the other by Professor Brarimir Jankovic entitled Aide-Memoire U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.22/1980WP.2.

10. The two Models contained in this report are:


This Model is based on the authority of Article V of the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and permits States-Parties to add by Supplemental Agreement other international crimes which are the subject of multilateral conventions. The Draft Convention contemplates the creation of a new international legal entity, an International Penal Tribunal through a multilateral convention open to States-Parties to the Apartheid Convention and to other States.


This Model is based on the authority of Article V of the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid. It does not contemplate the potential addition of other international crimes than those listed in Article II of the Apartheid Convention. This Model does not contemplate the creation of a new international legal entity but the use of existing U.N. structures with the addition of one new structure that of an international panel of judges to adjudicate viola-
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It requires an Additional Protocol to the Apartheid Convention and is open to States-Parties of the said Apartheid Convention.

11. The idea of the establishment of an international criminal court is not a novel one as is indicated by the references in footnote 14. Particular care and attention has been given to the reports of Professors Ermacora and Jankovic referred to above in paragraph 9 and to the 1953 and 1954 International Law Commission’s project entitled “A Draft Statute of an International Criminal Jurisdiction” (see footnote 14) and the 1979-80 International Law Association’s drafts on “A Draft Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry” and “A Draft Statute for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.” Other studies relevant to this subject have also been considered (see footnote 14).

12. Parts A and B which follow hereinafter establish the basis for the two alternative models proposed in Parts C and D for an international penal enforcement system. Parts A and B describe the relationship between international criminal law and internationally protected human rights and lay the foundation for the resort to international criminal law as a means to enforce internationally protected human rights. Furthermore, they establish the legal basis and arguments for an international penal enforcement mechanism under the Apartheid Convention. In Part C the proposal is for a multilateral convention with the creation of new institutions pertaining thereto which would deal not only with the crime of apartheid but potentially with other international crimes. In Part D the proposal is for an Additional Protocol to the Apartheid Convention limiting the jurisdiction of the enforcement organs to the crime of apartheid and maximizing the use of existing institutions and instruments to implement the Additional Draft Protocol.

A. THE MANDATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION: ITS MEANING INTERPRETED IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE APARTHEID CONVENTION

1. The conduct proscribed under the Apartheid Convention is also proscribed under other, international instruments, some of which embody their own measures and mechanisms of implementation. For this reason, implementation of the Apartheid Convention requires consideration of its relationship to these other instruments in order to appreciate its distinctive objectives.

2. This consideration may begin with the duplicativeness of the Apartheid Convention as to the substantive norm it enunciates in Article II, which describes the violative conduct committed for the purpose of dominating a racial group, including murder, infliction of harm, deprivation of personal freedom or dignity, torture, imposition of harmful living conditions, segregation, prevention of development, depriva-
tion of freedoms, creation of reserves and ghettos, exploitation and persecution of those who would resist such acts. In this respect the Apartheid Convention merely describes violative conduct contained in other norms, but with a narrower scope.

3. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides in Article 2 that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour . . . national or social origin . . . ." and among the rights set forth are: freedom from servitude (Article 4); freedom from discrimination and a guarantee of equal protection of the laws (Article 7); freedom of movement and residence (Article 13); freedom of inter racial marriage (Article 16(1)); equal access to public service (Article 21(2)); choice of employment, equal pay and the right to form and join unions (Article 23); and the right to an opportunity for higher education based on merit (Article 26). Likewise, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights forbids discrimination on the basis of race, colour or origin (Article 2), and provides rights to: means of subsistance for peoples (Article 1); freedom of movement and residence (Article 12); equality before the courts (Article 14); freedom to associate and form or join unions (Article 22(1)); freedom of citizens to vote and be elected (Article 25); equal protection of the laws (Article 26); and for minority groups, cultural and developmental opportunities (Article 27). In addition, the International Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination defines and condemns racial discrimination in terms that are comprehensive (Article 1), condemns apartheid without defining it (Article 3), and particularly condemns discrimination regarding listed civil, political, economic and social rights (Article 5).

4. The obvious duplicativeness of the Apartheid Convention as to its proscription must find explanation in terms of other aspects of the instrument. Obligations of States-Parties with respect to the norms enunciated may be considered first, and may be divided for that purpose into obligations of a domestic orientation and those of an international orientation.

5. The Universal Declaration contains no express provision for domestic measures to be taken, but both the International Covenant and the Discrimination Convention do so. The former obligates States-Parties to ensure that all rights under it are protected within their territory (Article 2). The latter imposes general duties to see that its norms are respected as to discrimination (Article 2) and apartheid (Article 3), and a more emphatic duty to eliminate discrimination regarding listed rights (Article 5), plus more specific duties to oppose racist propaganda (Article 4), assure remedies for deprivations of rights under it (Article 6), and to promote racial tolerance (Article 7). In contrast, the duties under the Apartheid Convention are highly specific: States-Parties are to declare apartheid and those engaging in it as criminal (Article 1), and to take
steps to prevent, prosecute, try and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction crimes of *apartheid* (Article IV).

6. As to other international instruments, a similar pattern of obligations may be observed, though the Universal Declaration lacks such specific provisions. The International Covenant requires submission of reports on compliance (Article 40), and for States-Parties to inform other States-Parties should they derogate from that instrument’s provisions (Article 4(3)), and to respond to complaints by other States-Parties regarding compliance (Article 41). In addition, the Optional Protocol to the Covenant provides for responses to certain complaints by individuals (Article 4(2)). The Discrimination Convention also calls for reports (Article 9(1)), responses to complaints (Article 11(1) and Article 14(6)(b)), plus informing other States-Parties whether an acceptable solution to a dispute regarding compliance has been found (Article 13(2)). Under the *Apartheid* Convention, the obligations are more emphatic. Parties undertake to accept and carry out anti-*apartheid* decisions of certain international organs (Article VI), but this appears to be redundant in that such duties are already imposed in more general terms by the instruments relating to those organs. A reporting requirement is imposed (Article VII(1)), and States-Parties are to settle their disputes regarding the Convention by means of the International Court of Justice or as they may otherwise agree (Article XII). Also, in matters of extradition the States-Parties are not to regard crimes of *apartheid* as political offenses (Article XI).

7. Related to these internationally-oriented obligations are provisions for implementation machinery, which merit consideration before assessing the patterns of obligations of the various instruments. No such machinery is created under the Universal Declaration, but the International Covenant establishes a Human Rights Committee (Article 28), and assigns it the tasks of receiving, studying and transmitting reports of States-Parties (Article 40), considering and reporting on disputes (Article 41), and, when appropriate, referring such disputes to a conciliation commission (Article 42(1)). The Optional Protocol to the Covenant confers similar competence upon the Human Rights Committee with respect to individuals’ complaints (Article 4), and provides for possible reporting of the views of the Committee (Article 5). Comparable functions are assigned to a Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination under the Racial Discrimination Convention (Articles 8, 9, 11, 12(1) and 14). Under the *Apartheid* Convention, however, the function of considering reports is assigned to three members of the Commission of Human Rights designated by its chairman (Article IX), and, as already mentioned, dispute settlement is otherwise provided for. A monitoring function is provided for the Commission on Human Rights (Article X). Finally, it is provided that an accused may be tried by an international penal tribunal (Article V).
8. The above pattern of obligations and implementation mechanisms does not present a clear spectrum in terms of effectiveness. Reporting is the chief vehicle for implementation under all of the instruments having express provisions for duties of States-Parties. Obviously the Optional Protocol, which has relevance not only to the Covenant but also to the Racial Discrimination Convention, represents an enhancement of potential effectiveness in that individual complaints are capable of bringing to light problems unlikely to be dealt with by complaints of States. Notably, no provision is included in the Apartheid Convention for individuals’ complaints. Dispute resolution is treated differently under the Apartheid Convention than under the other instruments, yet all of them make it possible for disputes to be settled without compulsory process if the complainant so agrees.

9. Instead of constituting a pattern of increasing or decreasing effectiveness, the above pattern may be understood as a function of the perceived purpose of each instrument. The Universal Declaration, as an embodiment of the widest possible consensus on human rights deserving international attention, contains no express provisions regarding duties of States or creating implementation machinery. As discussed elsewhere, it amplifies terms of the Charter, which has its own effectiveness, and certain of its principles are given heightened effectiveness through more specific instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Covenant is itself an instrument of wide consensus and its provisions reflect this by shaping implementation-related measures to deal only with States-Parties, it being apparently contemplated that the Covenant should act as a vehicle for enhancing implementation of the rights provided under it within States that have already manifested acceptance of the validity of such rights. No express provision attempts to deal with States that have not manifested such acceptance, and the Optional Protocol is also limited to States manifesting acceptance. A similar treatment is provided under the Racial Discrimination Convention, although the duties under it are more detailed.

10. It is against this background that the distinctiveness of the Apartheid Convention can be appreciated. Its name is derived from the term given by South Africa to its racial policies [for reviews of such policies, see United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold Library, Apartheid: A Selective Bibliography on the Racial Policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1970-1978 (1979)], and its purpose is to oppose such policies. Accordingly, although it may be viewed as aiming in part at preventing the spread of such practices to States-Parties, its primary thrust is against the practices of a non-State-Party. Moreover, to the extent that the term apartheid is given a generic definition ostensibly applicable to practices of States other than South Africa, it must be assumed that no State indulging in such practices would also be
a State-Party to the Apartheid Convention. Accordingly, the distinctive essence of the Apartheid Convention is that it addresses the consequences for some states of conduct occurring within another state.

11. This distinctiveness is of central importance to the question of implementation, for unlike other related instruments the Apartheid Convention cannot and does not rely on cooperation of the State wherein the reported human rights violation has occurred. On the contrary, it concerns itself with cooperation of States within which no such violations have occurred. Such an orientation requires explanation in view of the general concept of nonintervention by States in the domestic affairs of other States.

12. Such an explanation may be found in the use by the Apartheid Convention of the terms “crime against humanity” (Article I), and “international criminal responsibility” (Article III), together with the general obligation to respect human rights which attaches to all members of the United Nations by virtue of the Charter (Articles LV-LVI). The precise application of such an obligation, however, is not explicitly stated, and the specificity with which such rights must be respected is defined in various instruments. The International Covenant and its Optional Protocol provide further elaboration of these rights and, for States-Parties, of the obligations regarding them. To the extent that such elaboration amounts to a statement of a general principle of international law (Art. 38, Statute of I.C.J.), it is binding upon non-States-Parties as well, but clearly this is more likely to be true with respect to a general norm rather than institutional duties such as reporting and dispute resolution. With respect to racial discrimination, even more detailed elaboration is contained in the Racial Discrimination Convention, with comparable effect.

13. As a result, the human rights instruments leading up to the Racial Discrimination Convention may be viewed on the one hand as progressively elaborating upon general principles of international law respecting treatment of races, and on the other as providing appropriate means for States-Parties to assure and enhance their compliance with these principles. The former is not dependent on express consent of particular States whereas the latter is largely dependent on such consent.

14. The Apartheid Convention has a similar duality in its nature but what must be recognized is that two such dualities are involved. In defining apartheid and indicating that persons ought not to be subjected to a general treatment, there is an elaboration of a general principle comparable in purpose to the definitional portions of related human rights instruments, but highly specific. In assigning certain obligations to States respecting such conduct, such as reporting and dispute resolution requirements, there is an elaboration of a consent-dependent
regime not greatly different from those of other, related human rights instruments.

15. However, there is a significant departure from prior instruments of similar vein in the pronouncements of criminality and the provisions dealing with consequences of this criminalization. With the exception of genocide and excluding the laws of war, no violations enunciated in other human rights instruments have been described as criminal. Even racial discrimination is not described within the Racial Discrimination Convention as amounting to a crime. This terminology is applied exclusively to apartheid. Accordingly, the specific conduct described in the Apartheid Convention's proscription is not merely a more detailed treatment of a human rights violation but also a seminal description of a new international crime. As to its impact on non-States-Parties, consonance of the conventional language with general principles of international law is crucial, for to the extent such consonance exists, the concept would be applicable to non-States-Parties, otherwise it would not be.

16. Moreover, the same is true with respect to the duties of States to criminalize, prosecute and punish such conduct. This is in stark contrast to the consequences of reporting and dispute-resolution measures. The difference lies in the fact that particular consequences attach to international crimes under general principles of international law and customary international law, concerning duties of States in preventing and punishing international crimes.

17. Thus, just as the mere describing of certain conduct as violating international law does not make it so, as a general principle of international law, so also describing certain conduct as criminal under international law does not ipso facto make it an international crime. Likewise, stating that certain action ought to be taken by States with respect to certain conduct does not ipso facto establish a general rule of international law, but if the conduct in question is actually an international crime, then certain obligations of States flow from that.

18. In sum, if the various human rights instruments touching upon racial matters are viewed simply as consensual arrangements among States-Parties, the Apartheid Convention appears duplicative though some of its provisions are not themselves repetitious. However, when these instruments are considered as declarations regarding general rules of international law, the distinctive role of the Apartheid Convention becomes clearer. It strives to define the international crime of apartheid and to express the consequences for States of that crime, while at the same time extending particular attention and protective measures to that matter in a manner similar to that done under other human rights instruments.

19. As a human rights instrument, the Apartheid Convention is as well implemented and as well founded and drafted as kindred human
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rights instruments. It is as a declaration of international criminal law that the Apartheid Convention merits special attention.

20. The particular legal questions relating to mode of implementation are addressed and assessed below. It is useful, however, to first consider certain general matters.

21. First, it must be noted that the Apartheid Convention does not by its terms attempt to class apartheid as a mere crime of extra-territorial effect, suitable for independent action by individual States or concerted action by groups of States. Rather, it treats apartheid as a “crime against humanity,” and one entailing “international criminal responsibility.” Accordingly, although various states may feel the harmful effects of the crime, it is to be punished in the name of or on behalf of the world community. This suggests in itself that a uniform standard should be applied.

22. Second, although the Apartheid Convention is designed to be declaratory as to the acts constituting the international crime of apartheid, it may in that respect be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive or both, in that the actual crime’s existence and character are dependent in part on the convention and in part on other conventions. As a result, the definition given in Article II of the Apartheid Convention may be viewed as conventionally binding upon States-Parties, but as to States that are not Parties its binding quality depends on its correspondence to other conventions or on a general rule of international law. Accordingly, enforcement by States-Parties under the Apartheid Convention, in keeping with the terms of that convention, may also be justifiable under other conventions and under other general principles of international law. This is not to say that actions under the convention would not be otherwise justifiable.

23. Third, the search for appropriate means of implementation for this aspect of the Apartheid Convention is, if not easy, narrowly drawn. By its very nature implementation of criminal law is by criminal processes, and although significant variations in such processes exist in different legal systems, the general nature of such processes is similar.

24. The distinctive character of criminal processes may be appreciated not only by their particular form but also by their distinctive purposes. Criminal law does not merely specify proper or improper forms of behavior, a function of other law generally. Rather, it identifies behavior in response to which particular measures are to be imposed not in the name of or on behalf of someone disadvantaged by that conduct, but rather in the name of and on behalf of the community and its need for protection. Such measures are commonly termed “penal” or “punitive” in order to indicate that they are not designed merely to remedy past harm of a remediable type. On the contrary, they are directed at the future in the sense of generally deterring future conduct of that kind, by incapacitating the offender or by affecting the offender’s will or
inclination to engage in such conduct. Only in the sense of retribution do such measures have a remedial aspect, and this is aimed at vindicating the victim’s and the community’s sense of justice. [See, e.g., M.C. Bassioumi, Substantive Criminal Law 73-103 (1978).]

25. Because of the purpose of criminal processes, initiation and conduct of such processes must be entrusted to institutions and persons qualified to act on behalf of the relevant community. The appropriate motivation for initiation and direction of such process is concern for justice.

26. A second consequence of the purposes of criminal process is that an orderly and reliable method for establishing facts must be utilized. The broad outlines of such methods include both general investigation and consideration of allegations against and for the accused—thus the importance of gathering evidence with particular care in utilizing the most reliable sources. It should be noted that, although instruments with an affirmative, human rights protection function, have involved some investigative activity, the procedures followed have not been as orderly and reliable as would be required for punitive purposes. [See, e.g., Franck and Fairley, “Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact-finding by International Agencies,” 74 A.J.I.L. 308 (1980).]

27. A third consequence is that criminal norms and penalties must be specified in detail. This is because of the need to preserve fairness and justice. The principles of legality embodied in the maxims nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege are universally recognized, but not entirely fulfilled in the Apartheid Convention. Conduct cannot be fairly punished when the community has not clearly expressed its intention that such conduct be avoided.

28. The foregoing demonstrates that a mandate to implement the Apartheid Convention constitutes a mandate to create more than the mechanisms necessary to set in motion a new criminal process. Indeed, bringing international criminal law to bear on this wrongful conduct has been an enduring consideration of those involved in anti-apartheid activities. [See, e.g., Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts, “Study concerning the question of apartheid from the point of view of the international penal law,” U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1075, 15 February 1972.] The central institution in such a process is a court, but related institutions may also be appropriate in order to assist the functioning of the court. The tasks that require treatment in order for such a court to operate merit separate attention.

29. The ultimate implementation goal of the Apartheid Convention may obviously be served by such an approach in that the goals of criminal process are prevention and suppression of specific conduct. The extent to which criminal process on an international scale can secure in practice such goals also merits separate consideration.
30. Once such an institutional framework is established it can be used for other international crimes.

B. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONSIDERATIONS

I. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLES TO INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3086, 28 GAOR (No. 50), U.N. Doc. A/9233/Add.1. 30 November 1973, (hereinafter referred to as Apartheid Convention), is an harmonious part of the global scheme of international protection of human rights. As such it must be considered in light of other relevant Conventions and interpreted in pari materia therewith. To the extent that these other relevant Conventions are specifically embodied in the language and spirit of the Apartheid Convention and in particular Article II thereof, they are to that extent incorporated therein.

2. These relevant conventions fall into two categories: 1) Conventions which are declaratory of certain specific human rights deemed protected by the international law of human rights; and 2) Conventions which require signatories to criminalize certain violations of human rights in their national laws, to prosecute the violators or alternatively to extradite persons accused or found guilty thereof to a requesting state. Some of these Conventions specifically declare the conduct in question to be a “crime under international law” while others do not state it specifically; the object and outcome remain, however, the same.

3. The Conventions included in the first category, which contain declaratory principles on the protection of specific human rights, do not, however, deem their violations to be crimes under international law nor do they contemplate criminalization of the conduct in question under the national laws of the signatory states. However, they are nonetheless relevant in the historical process in that, as the embodiment of a worldwide consensus of certain minimum standards, these prescriptions may evolve into proscriptions which may become the object of enforcement measures including their criminalization under international law, or the imposition under international law of a duty to prosecute or extradite the violators of these protected rights. This has been the case with respect to many international instruments aimed at the protection of human rights which evolved from declaratory principles to specific international proscriptions having a penal character (see Appendix 1).

4. The principal Conventions in this category which, because they refer to a prohibition or protection against “racial discrimination” are relevant to the interpretation and implementation of the Apartheid Convention, are:¹
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The Convention on Refugees (and The Protocol to the Convention)

Each of these Conventions specifically refers to the protection of individuals against racial discrimination and is relevant in whole or in part to the Apartheid Convention, and more particularly to the meaning of Article II, of the said Convention and the other provisions which implement it. (In addition other Conventions of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies such as the ILO and UNESCO, which also include provisions against “racial discrimination” and its consequent practices, could be deemed included in this category.)

5. The significance of these Conventions lies first in that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be deemed under the International Court of Justice in its 1970 “Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia”2 as incorporated in the meaning of Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.3 Thus if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is deemed to be the further expression of the words “Human Rights” of Article 55, and Article 56 of the Charter states that the protection of “human rights” under Article 55 is “self-executing,” consequently the protections afforded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are applicable to the U.N. member-States and binding upon them.

6. To the extent that the conventions deemed relevant and listed in Paragraph 4 above interpret the specific rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights they may, by incorporation, be considered binding on all U.N. member-States and not only on their signatory States. Such a binding effect would not derive from each convention qua, but from the fact that it gives specific meaning to specific rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which under the interpretation given in Paragraph 5 incorporates the said Universal Declaration in the meaning of Article 55 of the U.N. Charter and that Article 56 thereof requires the member-States to enforce the protection of these human rights.

7. Insofar as the Apartheid Convention prohibits conduct predicated on “racial discrimination” which is specifically stated and defined in the Declaration and Conventions listed in Paragraph 4, it can be said that the Apartheid Convention incorporates in its meaning of the prohibited conduct stated in Article II thereof the provisions of these other Conventions to the extent they are applicable.
8. *Mutatis mutandi*, to the extent that the *Apartheid* Convention criminalizes certain extreme forms of “racial discrimination” as defined and prohibited by the *Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination*, and that these two conventions give meaning to the protection against “racial discrimination” which is guaranteed by the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and, which Declaration is applicable to U.N. member-States through Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter and discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6, it could be argued that by incorporation of the relevant provisions of these *Conventions* in the Declaration that U.N. member-States are obligated under the Charter not to engage in the practices of “Apartheid” as defined in Article II of the *Apartheid* Convention. In any event, the obligation exists under general principles of international law.

9. The second category of relevant Conventions, namely those which either declare given conduct as “a crime under international law,” or which declare that the conduct in question should be criminalized under the national criminal laws of the signatory-States and thus embody the maxim *aut dedere aut judicare* are:

i. The Nuremberg Principles

ii. Crimes Against Humanity

iii. The Genocide Convention

iv. The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto

v. The Slavery Conventions

vi. The Convention of the Nonapplicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

vii. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages

In addition one Convention should be prospectively added:

viii. The Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Torture

10. The relevance of these Conventions is first that Article I of the *Apartheid* Convention declares the conduct defined in Article II thereof as “a crime against humanity” and thus incorporates by reference *Crimes Against Humanity* which derive their meaning from the Nuremberg Principles. In addition the conduct prohibited by Article II of the *Apartheid* Convention includes *inter alia* conduct deemed a “crime under international law,” and conduct regarding which an international duty to prosecute or extradite exists under the provisions of the Conventions listed in Paragraph 9. Thus Article II incorporated to the extent applicable some of the provisions stated in these conventions and is to be interpreted in light of the meaning of these other Conventions which prohibit the same conduct. The difference between the
prohibition of Article II and the prohibition stated in these other Conventions is that the Apartheid Convention prohibition refers to specific conduct done in furtherance of a policy of "racial discrimination" while the other Conventions with the exception of the Genocide Convention do not limit their prohibitions and violations to that particular purpose.

11. Article II of the Apartheid Convention includes a number of specific prohibitions and violations thereof deemed criminal under "international law" which, as discussed above, incorporate the meaning of other specific protections and prohibitions contained in some relevant Conventions listed in Paragraph 4, whose binding effect on U.N. member-States is discussed in Paragraphs 5, 6, and 8, and on the signatories of the Conventions listed in Paragraph 9.

12. Insofar as Article IV of the Apartheid Convention requires States-Parties to "prosecute" and "punish" the violators of Article II of the said Convention, and, Article V contemplates the enforcement of these violations by means of an "international penal tribunal," and, Article IX requires States-Parties to "extradite" perpetrators of such violations, it is therefore necessary in order to satisfy the principle of legality in criminal law, *nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege* which is a "general principle of international law recognized by civilized nations," a source of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, that Article II be given more specificity in order to avoid vagueness, ambiguity and incorporation by reference or analogy of other relevant treaty provisions deemed incorporated within the meaning of Article II of the Apartheid Convention.

II. Institutional Setting: Progress Toward Creation of an International Criminal Court

1. Article V of the Apartheid Convention contemplates the creation of an "international penal tribunal" to enforce the violations of Article II of the said Convention. Thus the legislative authority for the creation of an International Criminal Court is clearly established.

2. The only precedents save for an isolated historical instance are the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes Tribunal which were *ad hoc* international criminal courts. There are no other examples of such Tribunals in contemporary history.

3. In 1951 the United Nations by Resolution 7 GAOR Supp. II, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1953) presented a Draft Statute of an International Criminal Jurisdiction prepared by a committee of experts and in 1953 in 9 GAOR Supp. 12 U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954) a second draft was presented to the General Assembly based on the works of another committee of experts. Both Drafts were tabled and no further action was taken by the U.N. on these two projects.
4. The principal reasons for this action could be summarized as follows:

i. There existed no codification of international crimes; in particular “Aggression” had not been defined and those other customary and conventional crimes were insufficiently defined with few exceptions;

ii. The proposed international criminal jurisdiction contemplated the exercise of its jurisdiction over all international crimes, including those as of then deemed insufficiently defined;

iii. A “General Part” dealing with principles of responsibility and other matters usually included in a “General Part” of the criminal codes or laws of most legal systems had not been elaborated and what was proposed by the two U.N. Committees of Experts who prepared the 1951 and 1953 Drafts did not obtain sufficient consensus;

iv. The absence of an international criminal code containing both a “General Part” and a “Special Part” (the crimes) violated the generally accepted principle nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege; and

v. The two Drafts required an amendment to the U.N. Charter, which was impractical.

5. In 1972 a Special Report was prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts of the Commission (Commission on Human Rights) Resolution 8 (XXVII), entitled “Study Concerning the Question of Apartheid from the Point of View of International Penal Law” E. CN. 4/1075, 15 February 1972, which sets forth the basis for the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction under the authority of Article V of the Apartheid Convention. No action was taken on that Report and no further implementation of Article V of the Apartheid Convention has been proposed until recently.

III. Apartheid as an International Crime: Special Issues on Responsibility

1. Based on Article III of the Apartheid Convention and in accordance with resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights and the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Southern Africa, the basic principle of responsibility adopted is that of direct individual responsibility. However, this basis of responsibility is much too narrow under Article III and under international criminal law.

2. Insofar as the Apartheid Convention declares that the conduct proscribed in Article II constitutes a “crime under international law” the principle of responsibility thereunder should conform to established norms which are:

i. Direct responsibility for individual conduct;

ii. Command responsibility for acts of subordinates;
iii. Individual responsibility for failure to act;
iv. Responsibility of corporate entities;
v. State responsibility;
vi. The nonapplicability of the defense of superior orders (if a moral choice existed).18

3. While International Criminal Law contemplates only the punishment of individuals, the responsibility of corporate entities and that of the State can be deemed to be a quasi-criminal responsibility for which fines and punitive damages are the appropriate remedies.

4. The principle of State responsibility for wrongful conduct should also apply,19 and the appropriate remedies would be remedial legislative and administrative action, reparation and damages.

IV. Some Considerations on the Potential Impact of Creating an International Penal System to Prevent and Punish the Crime of Apartheid

The prevention of apartheid can be accomplished through the processes of international criminal law only to the extent that the threat of punishment deters such conduct, the corollary of which is that actual imposition of punishment can be accomplished in order to achieve specific deterrence through retribution, incapacitation, and finally rehabilitation. Accordingly, effectiveness of any penal measures depends on the machinery implementing the system and its prompt and certain operation. In that respect an international penal system is no different from a national penal system.20

A. Individuals in States with apartheid as policy

Present threat of punishment

1. It may be assumed that no State with apartheid as an official policy would adhere to a Draft Convention and Protocol as proposed herein (Parts C and D), and therefore no such State would be bound by its express terms. As a result, the existence of such an Instrument would in itself have no effect on the amenability of persons within such a State to an international criminal process. Such States would refuse to comply with requests and orders of an international enforcement system and such refusal would leave matters as they were before the instrument came into existence. However, any individual who had committed crimes of apartheid would find it necessary as a matter of prudence to refrain from going into the territory of any State who is a party to the Draft Convention (Part C) and the Protocol (Part D). The same deterrence applies to other States with which States-Parties to the Draft Convention and Protocol have extradition relations and could secure the surrender to them of such a person.21
2. Accordingly, the chief impact of the Draft Convention and Protocol would be to limit offenders' freedom of travel, which is a small but perceptible punishment. The greater the number of States-Parties to the Draft Convention and Protocol, and the stronger the expectation that that individual's acts were known to the machinery under the Draft Convention and Protocol, the greater the impact of the restrictions and limitations.

3. Individuals may also be tried in absentia, as is theoretically possible under the Draft Convention and Protocol and that would have the same if not a greater deterrent effect on the mobility of such persons beyond their State's boundaries. Another consideration which has negative implications on the preservation of world order is the possibility that such persons found guilty may be targeted for violence or death by liberation movements or terrorist organizations or even by individuals. Such a result might serve as a deterrent, but no legal system would tolerate much less advocate enforcement of its judgments by lawless action, all authorities concurring that such conduct undermines the integrity of the legal system as an instrument of justice and the stability of world order.

4. Expectation of investigation and prosecution and actual commencement of an investigation for prosecution is also a deterrent, but it could also be relied upon by lawless persons or organizations as pretexts for violence.

5. Stigmatization resulting from investigation, prosecution or conviction would also be an effective remedy, particularly where worldwide publicity attaches to the fact. But such factors are contrary to all theories of rehabilitation and resocialization.

Future threat of punishment

6. The greatest threat to individuals residing in States with apartheid as policy would be in the future. Policies of States are subject to change, and in the case of apartheid the policy is most kindly described as a doomed anachronism. However, offenders may view their efforts as postponing the inevitable so that they may reap the benefits of the exploitation aspects of apartheid as long as possible before fleeing the State. The absence of a jurisdictional basis for other States to prosecute them may leave such offenders with the impression that they cannot be punished outside of their State, and it should be noted that the Apartheid Convention itself merely requires States-Parties to punish offenders according to their own rules of jurisdiction. Thus, the absence of any mechanism for exercise of international jurisdiction is a serious problem.

7. Extradition limits the possibility of evading punishment, but offenders may be optimistic about finding themselves in a State that will not hold them for extradition. Unfortunately that optimism may
not be without basis. Many States would regard *apartheid* as a political offense and would refuse to extradite an offender to the State wherein the crimes were committed if the government were changed. Moreover, even States-Parties to the *Apartheid* Convention, which are obligated not to regard *apartheid* as a political offense, might lack a legal basis to hold such an offender until a treaty of extradition was arranged with that offender’s former State, so that during the period of government change many offenders would be able to pass through even such States.

8. Under the Draft Convention and Protocol, however, the list of places for even the most temporary asylum would shrink in relationship to the number of States-Parties to that Statute and the multiplier effect of their extradition relations with other non-States-Parties. Thus, the choice of an ultimate place of asylum might be severely limited.

9. States who may be reluctant to enforce the provisions of the *Apartheid* Convention in their national system, may find it more politically convenient and acceptable to do so by recognizing an international penal jurisdiction.

B. Individuals in Other States

1. In States not having an official policy of *apartheid* but which may be occasionally instituted may consider acts of *apartheid* either as individual perpetrators, illegal government activities, or as possible future government policy. If that State is a party to the Draft Convention and Protocol, complaints to the Procuracy could result in their conduct’s being brought to the attention of appropriate government officials or other officials, and that would be an effective deterrent to such activities.

With respect to non-States-Parties, the Draft Convention and Protocol permits the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and punishment of such acts irrespective of where they are committed. Thus a certain deterrent effect can be expected.

2. The independence and impartiality of the Draft Convention and Protocol machinery and particularly the Court are an inducement to States whether parties or non-parties to assist in the effective functioning of these organs, particularly where states can foresee, as in the case of the Draft Convention, the possible expansion of the jurisdictions of its organs to other international crimes, which is a prospect frequently hoped for by a number of responsible personalities in many states.

C. Threat of punishment to States

1. Historically, penalties for a State’s wrongful conduct can be imposed only by virtue of military domination or the coerced consent of the affected State. However, the United Nations has augured a new era and such sanctions are now within the exclusive province of the Security Council.
2. At issue here is not the resort to the Security Council for sanctions whether economic or military because that is defined by the law of the United Nations Charter. What is at issue is the concept of fines or reparations as a measure of punitive damages against States who engage in internationally established wrongful conduct.\(^2\)

3. The economic impact of such fines could have an impact on the international trade of such a State and be the most effective deterrent against what is basically a crime of State-Policy, even though it is carried out by individuals.

4. Finally, the effect of condemnation in world public opinion, and the potential diplomatic isolation of such a State would also have serious deterrent implications.

D. Transnational corporations

1. Surprisingly, perhaps, one of the most promising areas for deterring apartheid may be in connection with transnational corporations (TNCs). Because TNCs may have property in the territory of States-Parties to the Draft Convention and Protocol, the threat of fines to be levied against such property may be a very real and effective deterrent. In the face of such a threat, TNCs could be forced to choose between dealing with States with a policy of apartheid and States-Parties to the Draft Convention and Protocol.

2. One major qualification must be stated, however. Further elaboration is required before any process against TNCs could be attempted to distinguish between corporate policy that in fact aids apartheid and employees who may or may not be part of that decision-making process, and corporate policy that in fact defeats apartheid.

E. Other Considerations

1. The creation of an international penal system as proposed in the Draft Convention and Protocol, while largely dependent for their effectiveness on the cooperation and support of States-Parties, will nonetheless create a momentum of its own. World public opinion would be affected by the very establishment of any of these two alternative systems, and it would certainly be shaped by its activities. Ultimately it is not international instruments or institutions which significantly alter state or individual conduct, though they contribute to it, but it is the change in individual and social values which produces the desired result. One has only to consider that slavery has been almost eradicated not by the force of international enforcement machinery but by the cumulative impact of measures including international instruments which brought the change in social values that was the direct cause for its quasi-eradication.\(^3\)

2. It should also be noted that States-Parties to the Apartheid
Convention are bound to use their national legal system to investigate, prosecute and punish the crime of *apartheid* irrespective of whether there is an international penal enforcement machinery. That duty would still continue to exist even if an international penal system is established.\(^\text{24}\)


5. For "Crimes Against Humanity" see the "Nuremberg Principles" *supra* note 4, Principle VI (C). For a historical-legal analysis of "Crimes Against Humanity" see Bassiouni, "International Law and the Holocaust" 9 Calif. West. Int'l L.J. 201 (1979).


8. See *supra* note 1, but also other conventions on the subject listed in M. C. Bassiouni, *International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code* (1980), at "A list of the Principal International Instruments" p. xiii, under "Slavery and Slave-Related Practices" that lists 25 international instruments. Appendix 2; see also

9. *Supra* note 1; see also 37 *Revue Internationale de Droit Penal* Vol. 3-4 devoted to that subject.


11. See the U.N. "Declaration on the protection of all persons from being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" Res. 3453 (XXX), 9 December 1975. The "Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Torture" introduced by the Association Internationale de Droit Penal before the Sub-Commission on The Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4 NGO/213, 1 February 1978, and 48 *Revue Internationale de Droit Penal* No. 3-4 (1977) devoted to that subject. The Draft Articles before the Commission’s Working Group are the official Swedish Draft E/CN.4/1285 (which is quite similar to the AIDP Draft) and Comments thereon are in E/CN.4/1314.

12. Prof. A. Schwartzenberger reported that in 1474 one Peter Von Hagenbush was prosecuted by an international tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire for war crimes in Breisach, Germany, "The Breisach War Crime Trial of 1474" *The Manchester Guardian* Sept. 27, 1946, see also de Berrante, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne* Vol. IX (1837). Another precedent could also be that of the trial in Naples of Couradin Von Hohenstofen for initiating an "unjust war" in 1268, though the composition of the tribunal was not international, see Bierzaneck, "The Prosecution of War Crimes" in Bassiouni and Nanda, *supra* note 4, p. 559, 560. Another possible precedent is the decision of the "Allies" at the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle of 1810 to detain Napoleon Bonaparte on the Island of Elba for waging unjust wars. See Bellot, "The Detention of Napoleon Bonaparte" 39 *Temple L. Rev.* 170 (1923).


16. See Bassiouni supra note 8 at pp. 10-19.


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citing landmark decisions of the P.C.I.J. and I.C.J. as well as arbitral decisions. See also M. Whiteman, A Digest of International Law, Vols. 1 and 8 (1968); A. Verdross, Völkerrecht (5th ed. 1964); G. Balladore-Pallieri, Diritto Internazionale Publico (8th ed. 1983); C. Rousseau, Principes Generaux de Droit International Public (1953); F. Guggenheim, Traite de Droit International Public (1953); H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952); L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); G. Schwarzenberg, International Law (3rd ed. 1957); J. Personnaz, La Reparation du Prejudice en Droit International Public (1939); C. Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law (1928); C. de Visscher, La Responsabilité des États (1924); D. Anzilotti, Teoria Generale della Responsabilità della Stato nel Diritto Internazionale (1902), reprinted in D. Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internazionale (1928); K. Strupp, Handbuch des Völkerrechts—Das völkerrechtliche Delikt, Vol. 3 (1920); C. Vattel, Le Droit des Gens (1887).


22. See supra note 19.


C. Draft Convention on the Establishment of an International Penal Tribunal for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and Other International Crimes

First Part: Nature of the Tribunal and its Organs and Powers

Article I—Purposes

An International Penal Tribunal is hereby established for the specific purpose of enforcing the penal provisions of the International Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of the crime of Apartheid, and any other international crime as the States-Parties may wish to include within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by Supplemental Agreement.
Article II—Nature of the Tribunal

The Tribunal shall be a permanent body, occupying facilities and performing its chief functions at the Palace of Justice in the Hague, and utilizing as its official languages those of the United Nations.

Article III—Organs of the Tribunal

1. The Tribunal shall consist of the following organs:
   a. The Court;
   b. The Procuracy;
   c. The Secretariat; and
   d. The Standing Committee of States-Parties to the Statute of the International Penal Tribunal.

2. The functions and competence of the above organs shall be as described in the Third Part of this Convention.

Article IV—Jurisdiction

1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over "grave breaches" of Article II of the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid to wit: murder; torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest and detention; and,

2. Any other act or conduct deemed an international crime by virtue of a multilateral convention in force which declares that act or conduct to be an international crime or which requires its contracting parties to criminalize it under their national laws and to prosecute or extradite its perpetrators, provided that any party hereto who wishes the Tribunal to exercise such jurisdiction does so by virtue of a Supplemental Agreement to this Convention.

3. The Tribunal shall have universal jurisdiction with respect to the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and punishment of persons and legal entities accused or found guilty of those crimes which are within its jurisdiction.

Article V—Competence

1. The Tribunal shall be competent to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and punish any person or legal entity accused or guilty of:
   a. A "grave breach" of Article II of the International Convention of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid as defined in Article IV, 1; and,
   b. Any other international crime as defined in Article IV, 2 of this Convention and subject to any specific provisions of a Supplemental Agreement making a crime subject to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

2. The Tribunal shall, subject to the provisions of the present Con-
vention, exercise its competence in accordance with international law whose sources are stated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

3. The Competence of the Organs of the Tribunal shall be interpreted and exercised in light of the purposes of the Tribunal as set forth in this Convention.

Article VI—Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall Exercise Its Jurisdiction

The Tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction over natural persons and legal entities as defined in Article XX.

Article VII—Sanctions

1. The Court as an organ of the Tribunal shall upon entering a finding of guilty and in accordance with Article XXIV and standards set forth in this Convention have the power to impose the following sanctions:
   a. Deprivation of liberty or any lesser measures of control where the person found guilty is a natural person; and,
   b. Fines to be levied against a natural person or legal entity; and
   c. Injunctions against natural persons or legal entities restricting them from engaging in certain conduct or activities.

2. Sanctions shall be established by the rules of the Court and shall be published before their entry into effect. Such sanctions shall be equivalent to those penalties existing in the major criminal systems of the world for the same type of offense.

Second Part: The Penal Processes of the Tribunal

Article VIII—Initiation of Process

1. No criminal process shall be initiated unless a complaint is communicated to the Procuracy or originated within the Procuracy.

2. The Investigative Division of the Procuracy shall determine whether such complaints are “manifestly unfounded” or not, and that determination shall be reported immediately to the source of the communication, if any.

3. No complaint by a State-Party to the present Convention or an Organ of the United Nations shall be deemed “manifestly unfounded.” Other States and Inter-governmental Organizations whose complaints are determined to be “manifestly unfounded” may appeal such determinations to the Court pursuant to Article XII of this Convention.

4. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, the Procuracy may either take no further action on “manifestly unfounded” complaints or may continue further investigation.
5. Communications determined “not manifestly unfounded” shall be transferred together with the record of investigation to the Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy, which shall immediately inform the accused and assume responsibility for development of the case.

6. When a case is ready for prosecution, the Procurator shall submit it to an appropriate Chamber of the Court pursuant to Article IX of this Convention, or to the Standing Committee pursuant to Article XVII of this Convention, or to both, but if a case based on a complaint submitted by a State-Party to this Convention or by an Organ of the United Nations has not been presented to the Court within one year of submission to the Standing Committee the source of the complaint may request the Court to examine the case and act pursuant to Article IX of this Convention.

Article IX—Pre-Trial Process

1. The Prosecutorial Division of the Procuracy may request an appropriate Chamber of the Court pursuant to this Article of the Convention to issue orders in aid of development of a case, in particular, orders in the nature of:
   a. Arrest warrants;
   b. Subpoenas;
   c. Injunctions;
   d. Search warrants;
   e. Warrants for surrender of an accused so as to enable accused persons to be brought before the Court and to transit States without interference.

2. Requests for such orders may be granted with or without prior notice if opportunity to be heard would jeopardize the effectiveness of the requested order.

3. All such orders shall be executed pursuant to the relevant laws of the State in which they are to be executed.

4. The ultimate merits of a case shall not be considered pursuant to Article X of this Convention until the case has been submitted to an appropriate Chamber of the Court, sitting in a preliminary hearing at which the accused is represented by Counsel and the Chamber, made the following determinations:
   a. The case is reasonably founded in fact and law;
   b. No prior proceedings before the Tribunal or elsewhere bar the process in accordance with the principle *ne bis in idem* or fundamental notions of fairness; and
   c. No conditions exist that would render the adjudication unreliable or unfair.

5. The schedule of proceedings shall be established by the appropriate Chamber in consultation with the Procuracy and Counsel for
the accused with due regard to the principle of fairness to the parties and the principle of “speedy trial.”

Article X—Adjudication

1. Hearings on the ultimate merits of cases shall be conducted in public before a designated Chamber of the Court but deliberations of the Chamber shall be in camera.
2. A Chamber may at any time dismiss a case and enter appropriately motivated orders. In case of dismissal for any reason other than on the merits, the principle ne bis in idem shall not apply.
3. In all proceedings a Chamber shall give equal weight to evidence and arguments presented by the Procurator and on behalf of the accused in accordance with the principle of “equality of arms” of the parties.
4. When all evidence respecting guilt or responsibility for wrongful acts has been presented, and argued by the parties, the Chamber shall close the Hearings and retire for deliberations.
5. The decisions of the Chambers shall be publicly announced orally, in summary or entirely, accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law, or entered 30 days from date of pronouncement of the oral decision, and any judge of that Chamber may write a separate dissenting or concurring opinion.
6. A Determination of guilt shall be deemed entered when recorded by the Secretariat, which shall communicate it forthwith to the Procuracy and the accused, but no such determination shall be regarded as effective until 30 days after the date of recording at which time the deciding Chamber may no longer modify its findings.
7. Each Chamber shall consist of three judges selected by lot, and cases shall be assigned to each Chamber by lot.

Article XI—Sanctioning

1. Upon a Determination of guilt or responsibility, a separate hearing shall be held regarding sanctions to be imposed at which hearing evidence of mitigation and aggravation shall be introduced and argued by the parties.
2. At the conclusion of this hearing the Chamber shall retire for deliberation and shall issue its Determination in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as for a Determination of guilt, as set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article X.

Article XII—Appeals

1. Appeals to the Court en banc from Determinations of Chambers as to guilt or responsibility or as to sanctions may be commenced by the accused upon written notice filed with the Secretariat and...
communicated to the other party within 30 days of the date of entry of judgment or order appealed.
2. Other appeals from actions of Chambers may be taken before a final judgment is entered only if such actions are conclusive as to independent matters.
3. The Procuracy may appeal questions of law in the same manner as an accused under paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Decisions on Appeals shall be delivered in the same manner as other decisions of the Court en banc as provided in Article X, paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Convention.
5. Decisions of the Court en banc and unappealed Determinations or orders of Chambers shall be deemed final unless it is shown that:
   a. Evidence unknown at the time of the Determination or order has been discovered, which would have had a material effect on the outcome of the said Determination or order; or,
   b. The Court or Chamber was flagrantly misled as to the nature of matters affecting the outcome; or,
   c. On the face of the record the facts alleged have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt; or,
   d. The facts proved do not constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or,
   e. Other grounds for which the Court may provide by its Rules.
6.Appealed determinations may be revised or vacated or remanded for new Determination, and when vacating a Determination the Court shall specify what if any ne bis in idem effect shall be given to the prior proceedings.

Article XIII—Sanctions and Supervision
1. The Court may call upon any State-Party to execute measures imposed in respect of guilt, in accordance with the laws of the said State-Party.
2. With respect to each accused determined to be guilty, a judge of the Court shall be selected by lot as Supervisor of the sanction imposed.
3. All requests to modify sanctions shall be directed in the first instance to the Sanction Supervising judge who may submit the request to the Adjudicating Chamber for modification provided such action in no way increases the sanction or conditions imposed upon the person or legal entity found guilty.
4. Decisions of the Sanction Supervising Judges regarding modification requests may be appealed to the Chamber which imposed the sanction, but such appeals in the Chamber's discretion need not be the subject of full hearings and detailed written decisions.
5. Nothing herein precludes the Court in accordance with its Rules
to suspend its sanctions or place pre-conditions to their application in accordance with its Rules.

Third Part: Organs of the Tribunal

Article XIV—The Court

1. The Court shall consist of twelve judges, no more than two of whom shall be of the same nationality, who shall be elected by the Standing Committee of States-Parties from nominations submitted thereto.
2. Nominees for positions as judges shall be of distinguished experts in the fields of international criminal law or human rights and other jurists qualified to serve on the highest courts of their respective States who may be of any nationality or have no nationality.
3. Judges shall be elected by secret ballot and the Standing Committee of States-Parties shall strive to elect persons representing diverse backgrounds and experience with due regard to representation of the major legal and cultural systems of the world.
4. Elections shall be coordinated by the Secretariat under the supervision of the presiding officer of the Standing Committee of States-Parties and shall be held whenever one or more vacancies exist on the Court.
5. Judges shall be elected for the following terms: four judges for four-year terms, four judges for six-year terms, and four judges for eight-year terms. Judges may be re-elected for any term at that time available.
6. No judge shall perform any public function in any State.
7. Judges shall have no other occupation or business than that of judge of this Court. However, judges may engage in scholarly activity for remuneration provided such activity in no way interferes with their impartiality and appearance of impartiality.
8. A judge shall perform no function in the Tribunal with respect to any matter in which he may have had any involvement prior to his election to this Court.
9. A judge may withdraw from any matter at his discretion, or be excused by a two-thirds majority of the judges of the Court for reasons of conflict of interest.
10. Any judge who is unable or unwilling to continue to perform functions under this statute may resign. A judge may be removed for incapacity to fulfill his functions by a unanimous vote of the other judges of the Court.
11. Except with respect to judges who have been removed, judges may continue in office beyond their term until their replacements are prepared to assume the office and shall continue in office to
12. The judges of the Court shall elect a president, vice-president and such other officers as they deem appropriate. The president shall serve for a term of two years.

13. Judges of the Court shall perform their judicial functions in three capacities:
   a. Sitting with other judges as the Court en banc;
   b. Sitting in panels of three on a rotational basis in Chambers; and
   c. Sitting individually as Supervisors of sanctions.

14. The salary of judges shall be equal to that of the judges of the International Court of Justice.

15. The Court en banc shall subject to the provisions of this Convention, adopt Rules governing procedures before its Chambers and the Court en banc, and provide for establishment and rotation of Chambers.

16. The Court en banc shall announce its decisions orally in full or in summary, accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law at the time of the oral decision or within thirty days thereafter, and any judge so desiring may issue a concurring or dissenting opinion.

17. Decisions and orders of the Court en banc are effective upon certification of the written opinion by the Secretariat, which is to communicate such certified opinion to parties forthwith.

18. The Court en banc may within thirty days of the Certification enter its decisions without notice.

19. No actions taken by the Tribunal may be contested in any other forum than before the Court en banc, and in the event that any effort to do so is made, the Procurator shall be competent to appear on behalf of the Tribunal and in the name of all States-Parties of this Convention to oppose such action.

20. States-Parties agree to enforce the final judgments of the Court in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

**Article XV—The Procuracy**

1. The Procuracy shall have as its chief officer the Procurator and shall consist of an administrative division, an investigative division and a prosecutorial division, each headed by a deputy procurator, and employing appropriate staff.

2. The Procurator shall be elected by the Standing Committee of States-Parties from a list of at least three nominations submitted by members of the Standing Committee, and shall serve for a renewable term of six years, barring resignation or removal by two-
thirds vote of the judges of the Court *en banc* for incompetence, conflict of interest, or manifest disregard of the provisions of this Convention or material Rules of the Tribunal.

3. The Procurator's salary shall be the same as that of the judges.

4. The deputy procurators and all other members of the Procurator's staff shall be named and removed by the Procurator at will.

**Article XVI—The Secretariat**

1. The Secretariat shall have as its chief officer the Secretary, who shall be elected by a majority of the Court sitting *en banc* and serve for a renewable term of six years barring resignation or removal by a majority of the Court sitting *en banc* for incompetence, conflict of interest or manifest disregard of the Provisions of this Convention or material Rules of the Tribunal.

2. The Secretary's salary shall be equivalent to that of the judges.

3. The Secretariat shall employ such staff as appropriate to perform its chancery and administrative functions and such other functions as may be assigned to it by the Court that are consistent with the provisions of this Convention and the Rules of the Tribunal.

4. In particular, the Secretary shall twice each year prepare:
   a. Budget requests for each of the organs of the Tribunal; and
   b. Make and publish an annual report on the activities of each Organ of the Tribunal.

5. The Secretariat staff shall be appointed and removed by the Secretary at will.

6. An annual summary of investigations undertaken by the Procurecy shall be presented to the Secretariat for publication, but certain investigations may be omitted where secrecy is necessary, provided that a confidential report of the investigation is made to the Court and to the Standing Committee and filed separately with the Secretariat, but either the Court or the Standing Committee may order by majority vote that the report be made public.

**Article XVII—The Standing Committee**

1. The Standing Committee shall consist of one representative appointed by each State-Party.

2. The Standing Committee shall elect by majority vote a presiding officer and alternate presiding officer and such other officers as it deems appropriate.

3. The presiding officer shall convene meetings at least twice each year of at least one week duration each at the seat of the Tribunal, and call other meetings at the request of a majority vote of the Committee.

4. The Standing Committee shall have the power to perform the
functions expressly assigned to it under this Convention, plus any other functions that it determines appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Tribunal that are not inconsistent with this Convention, but in no way shall those functions impair the independence and integrity of the Court as a judicial body.

5. In particular, the Standing Committee may:
   a. Offer to mediate disputes between States-Parties relating to the functions of the Tribunal; and
   b. Encourage States to accede to the Convention; and,

6. Propose to States-Parties international instruments to enhance the functions of the Tribunal.

7. The Standing Committee may exclude from participation representatives of States-Parties that have failed to provide financial support for the Tribunal as required by this Convention or States-Parties that failed to carry out their obligations under this Convention.

8. Upon request by the Procuracy, or by a party to a case presented for adjudication to a Chamber of the Court, the Standing Committee may be seized with a mediation and conciliation petition. In that case the Standing Committee shall within 60 days decide on granting or denying the petition from which there is no appeal. In the event that the Standing Committee grants the petition, Court proceedings shall be stayed until such time as the Standing Committee concludes its mediation and conciliation efforts, but not for more than one year except by stipulation of the Parties and with the consent of the Court.

**Article XVIII—General Institutional Matters**

1. Each of the Organs of the Tribunal shall formulate and publish its own Rules in accordance with the Standards set forth in the Fourth Part to regulate its functions under this Convention, but the Rules of the Procuracy and Secretariat shall be subject to approval by a majority of the Court en banc.

2. The Procurator shall participate without a vote in formulating the Rules of the Court and of the Secretariat. The President of the Court shall participate without a vote in formulating the Rules of the Procuracy and of the Secretariat.

3. Except to the extent of the adopted Rules, procedures of the Court shall be those of the International Court of Justice and those of the Secretariat shall be as for the Registrar of the International Court of Justice.

4. Each of the Organs of the Tribunal shall cooperate with the Secretariat in formulating its budget request and such budget requests shall be presented to the Court en banc for modification or
approval, subject to adoption or rejection in their entirety by the Standing Committee.

5. The Judges, the Procurator and Deputy Procurators and their assistants and the Secretary shall be deemed officers of the Court, as well as Counsels appearing in a given case, and they shall enjoy immunity from legal processes of States with respect to the performance of their official duties.

6. No officer of the Court other than Counsel in a given case shall perform any function under this Convention without having first made a public, solemn declaration of impartiality and adherence to this Convention and the Rules of the Tribunal.

Fourth Part: Tribunal Standards

Article XIX—Standards for Rules and Procedures

1. In all proceedings of the Tribunal and in the formulation of any Rules by any of its organs, the accused shall be entitled to those fundamental human rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which for these purposes are:

   a. The presumption of innocence

   The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of criminal justice. It includes *inter alia*:
   
   1. No one may be convicted or formally declared guilty unless he has been tried according to law in a fair trial;
   2. No criminal punishment or any equivalent sanction may be imposed upon a person unless he has been proven guilty in accordance with the law;
   3. No person shall be required to prove his innocence;
   4. In case of doubt the decision must be in favor of the accused.

   b. Procedural rights ("equality of arms")

   The accused shall have substantial parity in proceedings and procedures and shall be given effective ways to challenge any and all evidence produced by the prosecution and to present evidence in defense of the accusation.

   c. Speedy trial

   Criminal proceedings shall be speedily conducted without, however, interfering with the right of the defense to adequately prepare for trial. To this effect:
   
   1. Time limitations should be established for each stage of the proceedings and should not be extended without reason by the appropriate Chamber of the Court.
   2. Complex cases involving multiple defendants or charges may be severed by the appropriate Chamber of the Court.
when it is deemed in the interest of fairness to the parties and justice to the case.

3. Administrative or disciplinary measures shall be taken against officials of the Tribunal who deliberately or by negligence violate the provisions of this Convention and the rules of this Tribunal.

d. Evidentiary questions

1. All procedures and methods for securing evidence which interfere with internationally guaranteed human rights shall be in accordance with the standards of justice set forth in this Convention and in the rules of the Tribunal.

2. The admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings must take into account the integrity of the judicial system, the rights of the defense, the interests of the victim and the interests of the world community.

3. Evidence obtained directly or indirectly by illegal means which constitute a serious violation of internationally protected human rights, violate the provisions of this Convention, and Rules of this Tribunal shall hold them inadmissible.

4. Evidence obtained by means of lesser violations shall be admissible only subject to the judicial discretion of the Court on the basis of the veracity of the evidence presented and the values and interests involved.

e. The right to remain silent

Anyone accused of a criminal violation has the right to remain silent and must be informed of this right.

f. Assistance of counsel

1. Anyone suspected of a criminal violation has the right to defend himself and to competent legal assistance of his own choosing at all stages of the proceedings.

2. Counsel shall be appointed *ex officio* whenever the accused by reason of personal conditions is unable to assume his own defense or to provide for such defense, and in those complex or grave cases where in the best interest of justice and in the interest of the defense such counsel is deemed necessary by the Court.

3. Appointed counsel shall receive reasonable compensation from the Tribunal whenever the accused is financially unable to do so.

4. Counsel for the accused shall be allowed to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings.

5. Counsel for the accused or the accused shall be provided with all incriminating evidence available to the prosecution as well as all exculpatory evidence as soon as possible but no later than at the conclusion of the investigation or before
adjudication and in reasonable time to prepare the defense.
6. Anyone detained shall have the right to access and to communicate in private with his counsel personally and by correspondence, subject only to reasonable security measures decided by a judge of the Court.

g. Arrest and detention
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
2. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as established by this Convention and Rules of the Tribunal and only on the basis of a determination by the Court.
3. No one shall be arrested or detained without reasonable grounds to believe that he committed a criminal violation within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
4. Anyone arrested or detained shall be promptly brought before a judge of the Court and shall be informed of the charges against him; after appearance before such judicial authority he may be returned to the custody of the arresting authority but he shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court even when in the custody of a State-Party.
5. Preliminary or provisional arrest and detention shall take place only whenever necessary and as much as possible should be reduced to a minimum of cases and to the minimum of time.
6. Preliminary or provisional detention shall not be compulsory but subject to the determination of the Court and in accordance with its Rules.
7. Alternative measures to detention shall be used whenever possible and include inter alia:
   — bail
   — limitations of freedom of movement
   — imposition of other restrictions.
8. No detainee shall be subject to rehabilitative measures prior to conviction unless he freely consents thereto.
9. No administrative preventive detention shall be permissible as part of any criminal proceedings.
10. Any period of detention prior to conviction shall be credited toward the fulfillment of the sanction imposed by the Court.
11. Anyone who has been the victim of illegal or unjustified detention shall have the right to compensation.

h. Rights and interests of the victim
The rights and interests of the victim of a crime shall be protected and in particular:
1. the opportunity to participate in the criminal proceedings;
2. the right to protect his civil interests;
3. due regard shall be given in formulation of Rules of the Organs of the Tribunal to the principle of *ne bis in idem*, but a seemingly duplicative prosecution shall not be barred provided that the record in the prior proceeding is taken into account along with any prior measures in respect of guilt of the accused.
5. Maximum flexibility regarding restrictive measures should be encouraged, including use of such mechanisms as house arrest, work release and bail, and credit shall be given for any pre-conviction restrictions to an accused.
6. The Tribunal shall include all of the above in the formulation of its Rules of Practice and Procedures which shall be effective upon promulgation.
7. No proceedings before the Tribunal shall commence prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Practice and Procedures of the Court, the Procuracy and the Secretariat.


**Article XX—Definitions**

1. An international crime is any offense arising out of the Provisions of this Statute and any Supplemental Agreement thereto as defined in Article IV.
2. A state is an international legal entity defined under international law.
   a. This term is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or membership in the United Nations.
   b. This term also includes a group of states acting collectively.
3. The words “person” or “individual” for the purposes of this Convention are used interchangeably and each one of them refers to a physical human being alive.
4. For the purposes of this Convention, the words “group” and “organization” are interchangeable. A group consists of more than one person, acting in concert with respect to the performance of a particular act.
5. The term “entity” is used herein to include groups, organs of state, states or groups of states.
6. Participation in group action is a person’s conduct which directly contributes to the group’s ability to perform a given act or
which directly influences the decision of the group to perform a given act.

7. A person commits solicitation when, with the intent that an offense be committed, he instigates, commands, encourages or requests another to commit that offense.

8. A person commits conspiracy when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he agrees with another to the commission of that offense and one of the members of the conspiracy commits an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.

9. A person commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit a specific offense, he engages in unequivocal and direct conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense and which if not for a fortuitous event or misapprehension of the actor, would result in the completion of the crime.

10. A person in authority is a person who has legal authority under domestic law or a person who by virtue of the power structure of a group is deemed to be in command or has the power to command others, and to whom obedience is generally expected.

11. Omission by a state, group or organization or failure to act occurs whenever a person in authority having power to act and having knowledge of the facts requiring action fails to take reasonable measures to prevent, or terminate the commission of a crime or to apprehend, or prosecute, or punish any person who has or may have committed a crime. Omission by an individual is conscious failure to act in accordance with a pre-existing legal obligation.

12. The masculine “he” used throughout this Article refers equally to the feminine “she.”

**Article XXI—Responsibility**

1. A person is criminally responsible under this Article when he reaches the age of eighteen.

2. Direct Personal Responsibility
   a. A person who commits or attempts to commit a crime is responsible for it and criminally punishable under Article XXIV.
   b. A person who conspires with another or solicits another to commit a crime as defined is criminally responsible for it and criminally punishable.
   c. A person who commits a crime is not relieved from responsibility by the sole fact that he was acting in the capacity of Head of State, responsible government official, acting for or on behalf of a state, or pursuant to “superior orders” except where the provisions of Article XXIV, Para. 6 are applicable.

3. Responsibility for the Conduct of Others
   a. A person is responsible for the conduct of another if, before,
during or after the commission of a crime, and with the intent
to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he aids,
abets, solicits, conspires or attempts to aid another person in
the planning, perpetration or concealment of the crime, or fa-
cilitates the concealment or escape of a perpetrator.
b. A person is not responsible for the acts of others if that
individual is a victim of the crime, or when, before the com-
mission of the crime, that person terminates his efforts of par-
ticipation as described in Para. 3.a and such termination wholly
deprees others of his efforts and of their effectiveness or if
such a person gives timely warning and advice to appropriate
government authorities.
c. The vicarious responsibility for the conduct of another under
this Section is not dependent upon the conviction of a person
accused as a principal.
d. A person is responsible for the conduct of another with
respect to any crime committed in furtherance of a solicitation
or conspiracy, and for those crimes which are reasonably foresee-
able to be committed by others in furtherance of a common
criminal scheme, design or plan.

4. Collective Responsibility

a. A group or organization other than a state or an organ of
a state is collectively responsible for its acts, irrespective of the
responsibility of its members.
b. A person is responsible for crimes committed by a group
or organization, if he knew of or could reasonably foresee the
commission of such crime and remained a member thereof.

5. Responsibility of Persons in Authority

a. A person in authority in a state, group or organization is
personally responsible for the commission of a crime when such
crime is committed at his instigation, suggestion, command or
request, or if he fails to act.

6. State Responsibility

a. Conduct for Which States are Responsible
   1. A state is responsible for any crime committed on its be-
      half, behest or benefit by a person in authority, regardless
      of whether such acts are deemed lawful under its munici-
      pal law.
   2. Conduct is attributed to a state if it is performed by per-
      sons or groups acting in their official capacity, who under
      the domestic law of that state possess the authority to make
decisions for the state or any political subdivision thereof or
possess the status of organs, agencies or instrumentalities of
that state or a political subdivision thereof.
   3. Conduct outside the scope of authority of any of the en-
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entities listed in this Article is attributed to the state.
b. State Responsibility for Failure to Act
   1. Failure to act by a state in accordance with its obligation under this Code shall constitute an international offense.
   2. Any revolutionary movement which establishes a state or overthrows a government is responsible in the new state or new government to prosecute or extradite any individual within such group or any individual who has been omitted from the group for any international crime. Failure to do so shall constitute a basis for state responsibility.

Article XXII—Elements of an International Crime

1. Definition
   a. An international crime shall contain four elements: a material element, a mental element, a causal element and harm, as defined in paragraphs 2 through 5 inclusive, except when in the definition of a given crime these requirements are altered.

2. Material Element
   a. Any voluntary act or omission which constitutes part of a crime as defined in Article IV will constitute the material element.

3. Causal Element
   a. Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred, and that the result was a foreseeable consequence of such conduct.

4. Harm
   a. The element of harm shall depend upon the definition of the crime, except where no harm is needed in the definition of the crime.

5. Mental Element
   a. The mental element of an offense at the time of the commission of the material element shall consist of either intent, knowledge, or recklessness, unless the definition of the crime specifies any of these three.
   b. A person “intends” to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the law defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.
   c. A person “knows” or acts “knowingly” when he is consciously aware of the attendant circumstances of his conduct or of the substantial probability of existing facts and circumstances likely to produce a given result.
   d. A person is “reckless” or acts “recklessly” when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unreasonable risk that a likely result would be a foreseeable consequence of such conduct.

Article XXIII—Immunities

1. For purposes of this Article, no person shall enjoy any international immunity except that Head of State, Head of Government, official representative of a state having diplomatic status, employees of international organizations and the members of the families and staffs of the above enumerated persons shall be exempt and immune from the criminal process of all states other than their own and this International Criminal Tribunal, provided that in the event of the commission of a crime as defined herein, the State-Party whose national is entitled to the immunity and exemption stated herein shall undertake to investigate, prosecute and punish the allegation or crime charged.

2. Any state may waive this immunity on behalf of its nationals without prejudice to its interests in favor of any other state.

3. Any person who falls into any of the categories of Para. 1 of this Article may specifically waive that immunity with the consent of the state of which he is a national or of the international organization by which he is employed without prejudice to that state or organization.

4. A person who no longer has the privileges of the positions covered by immunity in Para. 1 of this Article may no longer benefit from said immunity except with respect to those acts committed or alleged to have been committed while that person held the position that granted immunity.

Article XXIV—Penalties

1. Punishability
   a. All crimes defined in this Article are punishable in proportion to the seriousness of the violation, to the harm threatened or caused, and to the degree of the responsibility of the individual actor in accordance with a schedule to be promulgated by Rules of the Tribunal before it exercises its jurisdiction in a given case.

2. Penalties for Individuals
   a. Penalties for persons who have been convicted of the commission of a crime shall consist of imprisonment or such alternatives to imprisonment or fines as promulgated by the International Criminal Court.

3. Penalties for a Group or Organization
   a. Penalties for crimes for which groups are collectively responsible under Article XXI, Para. 4 shall consist of fines or other sanctions established in accordance with the principle of
proportionality set forth in Paragraph 1 of this Article and as promulgated by the Rules of the Court.
b. Fines shall be collectively levied against the assets of group and individual participants and enforced by the States-Parties wherein such assets may be found.

4. Penalties for States
a. Penalties for states which are responsible for crimes shall consist of fines assessed on the basis of proportionality as set forth in Section 1 of this Article, without prejudice to the duties or reparations and civil damages.
b. Such fines shall be due from a state, provided that they do not critically impair the economic viability of the state.
c. The determination and assessment of fines against a state shall be made by the Court and the enforcement of such fines shall be by and through the United Nations.
d. The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to the rights and duties of the United Nations to impose sanctions against a state as provided for in the United Nations Charter.
e. Special Remedies
Nothing in this article shall prevent the International Criminal Court to rely on its inherent judicial power to order a state to cease and desist from a given activity which is an international crime or to order by injunctions the correction of previous violations and prevent their reoccurrence.

5. Multiple Crimes and Penalties
a. The Court may with respect to a single criminal transaction involving the commission of more than one crime all of which are related and are based on substantially the same facts impose a single penalty with discretion concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances as may be found by the Court.

6. Mitigation of Punishment
a. A person acting pursuant to superior orders may present such a claim in mitigation of punishment.
b. Subject to the defense of double jeopardy a person who was sentenced in one state for substantially the same criminal conduct and resented by the Court shall receive credit for any part of a sentence already executed.
c. The Court may take into account any mitigating fact such as imperfect or incomplete defenses stated in Article XXV.

Article XXV—Exoneration

1. Definition
a. A person shall be exonerated from responsibility arising under this Convention if in the commission of an act which con-
stitutes a crime any of the defenses stated in Paragraphs 2 through 11 inclusive is applicable.

2. Self-Defense (Individual)
   a. Self-Defense consists in the use of force against another person which may otherwise constitute a crime when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend himself or anyone else against such other person's imminent use of unlawful force, and in a manner which is reasonably proportionate to the threat or use of force.

3. Necessity
   a. A person acts under necessity when by reason of circumstances beyond his control, likely to create a private or public harm, he engages in conduct which may otherwise constitute a crime which he reasonably believes to be necessary to avoid the imminent greater harm likely to be produced by such circumstances, but not likely to produce death.

4. Coercion
   a. A person acts under coercion when he is compelled by another under an imminent threat of force or use of force directed against him or another, to engage in conduct which may otherwise constitute a crime which he would not otherwise engage in, provided that such coerced conduct does not produce a greater harm than the one likely to be suffered and is not likely to produce death.

5. Obedience to Superior Orders
   a. A person acting in obedience to superior orders shall be exonerated from responsibility for his conduct which may otherwise constitute a crime or omission unless, under the circumstances, he knew that such act would constitute a crime.

6. Refusal to Obey a Superior Order Which Constitutes a Crime
   a. No person shall be punished for refusing to obey an order of his government or his superior which if carried out, would constitute a crime.

7. Mistake of Law or Fact
   a. A mistake of law or a mistake of fact shall be a defense if it negates the mental element required by the crime charged provided that said mistake is not inconsistent with the nature of the crime or its elements.

8. Double Jeopardy
   a. The Court may not retry or resentence the same individual for the same conduct irrespective of what the crime or charge may be.
   b. In the event a person has been tried by the national courts of a State-Party he could be retried for the same conduct by the Court but he shall receive credit for a sentence rendered
by a national criminal court and executed by that state or any other state.
c. No individual who has been tried and convicted or acquitted on the merits by the Court shall be retried or resentenced by the domestic court of any State-Party.
d. Amnesty or pardon by any state shall not constitute a bar to adjudication before the Court and shall not be deemed to fall within the defense of double jeopardy.

9. Insanity
a. A person is legally insane when at the time of the conduct which constitutes a crime, he suffers from a mental disease or mental defect, resulting in his lacking substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, and such mental disease or mental defect caused the conduct constituting a crime.

10. Intoxication or Drugged Condition
a. A person is intoxicated or in a drugged condition when under the effect of alcohol or drugs at the time of the conduct which would otherwise constitute a crime he is unable to formulate the mental element required by the said crime.
b. Such a defense shall not apply to a person who engages in voluntary intoxication with the pre-existing intent to commit a crime.
c. With respect to crimes requiring the mental element of recklessness, voluntary intoxication shall not constitute a defense.

11. Renunciation
a. It shall be a defense to the crimes of attempt, conspiracy and solicitation if a person renounces or voluntarily withdraws from the commission of the said crimes before any harm occurs and if he has engaged in any individual activity by doing any of the following:
   (1) wholly deprives others from the use or benefit of his participation in the commission of the crime;
   (2) notifies law enforcement officials in time in order to prevent the occurrence or the commission of the crime.

Article XXVI—Statute of Limitation

1. Duration
a. No prosecution or punishment by the Court of an international crime shall be barred by a period of limitations of lesser duration than the maximum penalty ascribed to the crime in question in the laws of the state where the crime was committed.
b. The period of limitation shall commence at the time that legal proceedings under the provisions of this Convention may commence but shall not apply to any period during which a
person is escaping or evading appearance before the appropriate authorities. It is interrupted by the arrest of the accused but shall recommence *ab initio* if the accused or convicted person escapes and in no case shall it run for a period which would be longer than twice the original period of limitation. 

b. In the case of state responsibility, the period of limitation for commencing any action before the Court shall be measured with reference to the acts of those state officials whose conduct has implicated the responsibility of the state in question.

**Sixth Part: Duties of States-Parties**

**Article XXVII—General Principles**

1. States-Parties shall surrender upon request of the Court any individual where it appears that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such a person has committed an international crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

2. States-Parties shall provide the Court with all means of judicial assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to letters rogatory, service of writs, assistance in securing testimony and evidence, transmittal of records and transfer of proceedings.

3. States-Parties shall recognize the judgments of the Court and execute provisions of such judgments in accordance with their national laws.

4. In the event the Court does not have detentional facilities under its direct control, States-Parties will honor requests from the Court to execute its sentences in accordance with their own correctional systems, but subject to continuing jurisdiction of the Court over the transferred offender.

5. States-Parties may receive requests for transfers of offenders.

6. States-Parties to this Convention undertake to provide cooperation to organs of the Tribunal in accordance with the terms of this Convention and the purpose of the Tribunal, and in particular to:

   a. Provide financial support to the Tribunal in the proportion they would be assessed under contemporaneous General Assembly apportionments established in Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations, payments being due within six months of the adoption of a budget by the Standing Committee; and
   
   b. Budgetary needs of the Tribunal shall be computed after taking into account income from voluntary contributions and fines collected by the Tribunal.

**Article XXVIII—Surrender of Accused Persons**

1. States-Parties shall surrender upon a request of the Court any individual sought to appear before the Court for any proceeding arising out of the Court’s jurisdiction provided that the Court's
request shall be based on reasonable grounds to believe that the person sought has committed a violation of this Code.

2. The following acts shall not be a bar to surrender a person to the International Penal Tribunal for any acts constituting a crime:
   a. that the person sought to be surrendered claims or the state wherein he may be located claims that the act falls within the meaning of the “political offense exception”;
   b. that the individual is a national of the requested state;
   c. that the requested state otherwise imposes certain conditions or restriction to the practice of extradition to and from other states.

3. Procedures regulating such transfers shall be determined by the rules of the Court subject to the laws of the requested state.

Article XXIX—Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of Cooperation

1. The States-Parties shall provide the International Penal Tribunal with all means of judicial assistance and cooperation including but not limited to letters rogatory, service of writs, assistance in securing testimony and evidence, transmittal of records, transfer of proceedings where applicable.

2. The procedures for such judicial assistance and other forms of cooperation shall be determined by the Court’s Rules of Practice.

Article XXX—Recognition of the Judgments of the International Penal Tribunal

1. The States-Parties agree to recognize the judgments of the Court and to execute its provisions. For the purposes of double jeopardy and evidentiary matters the International Penal Tribunal shall recognize the sanctions of other States in accordance with the provisions of Article XXIV.

2. The Court’s Rules of Practice shall govern the recognition of the judgments of the Court by States-Parties and those of the other States by the Court.

Article XXXI—Transfer of Offenders and Execution of Sentences

1. In the event the International Penal Tribunal does not have detential facilities under its direct control it may request a State-Party to execute the sentence in accordance to that Party’s correctional system and in that case the Court shall continue to exercise jurisdiction over the offender including his transfer to another state or facility.

2. In the event the International Penal Tribunal has placed an offender in its own detention facilities, this person may by agreement be transferred for detention to his country of origin subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.
3. The Court’s Rules of Practice shall determine the basis and condition of the transfer of offenders and the execution of sentences.


Article XXXII—Entry Into Force

1. This Convention is open for signature to all States, including after its entry into force.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification, instruments of ratification being deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. Accession to this Convention shall be effected by deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession, and for States thereafter ratifying or acceding to this Convention, on the thirtieth day after deposit of the applicable instrument.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all signatory States of:
   a. All signatures, ratifications, accessions and reservations to this Convention; and
   b. The date of entry into force of this Convention.
6. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish, and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations and copies thereof shall be transmitted to all signatories.

Article XXXIII—Reservations

1. States may make any reservations to this Convention but shall not be deemed States-Parties for the purposes of representation in the Standing Committee if the reservation is as to a material aspect of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, competence and the effects of its judgments.
2. The Secretary-General shall keep separate count of signatories making reservations not in conformity of Paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article XXXIV—Initial Implementation Steps

1. Upon entry into force of this Convention, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall call the first meeting of the Standing Committee, and shall preside over that meeting until a presiding officer is chosen.
2. The Standing Committee shall undertake as its first order of business measures toward election of judges of the Court.
Implementing Apartheid Convention

Article XXXV—Amendments

1. This Convention may at any time be amended by a vote of three-fourths of the members of the Standing Committee, subject to ratification of such amendments by the same number of States-Parties represented in the Standing Committee.

2. Upon petition by a State-Party to the Standing Committee the jurisdiction of the Court may be expanded to include additional crimes or classes of offenders and measures in respect of guilt when this is sought by a State capable of exercising compulsory process upon the accused; and this may be on either an ad hoc or permanent basis and shall be embodied in a Supplemental Agreement between the requesting state and the presiding officers of the Standing Committee acting for and on behalf of the said Standing Committee.

Commentary to the Draft Convention on the Establishment of an International Penal Tribunal for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and Other International Crimes

General Observations

The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (hereinafter referred to as Apartheid Convention) in Article V is the only international convention which specifically contemplates an “international penal tribunal.” No other international convention, which has as its objective to criminalize a certain conduct, contains a similar requirement. In fact only the Convention on the Protection and Punishment of Genocide incidentally recognizes the eventual jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court. The introductory notes to this Study, pages 1-39, seek to retrace the history of the creation of an International Criminal Court and cite appropriate authorities. It remains, however, that the only international legislative authority for an International Penal Tribunal is the Apartheid Convention. Consequently, this Draft Convention relies on this legislative basis as its authoritative source. Thus, having secured an international legislative basis, nothing precludes the States-Parties to this Draft Convention from enlarging upon its jurisdiction by a device referred to in this Draft Convention as “Supplemental Agreement” in order to permit the International Penal Tribunal to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate and punish other conventional international crimes.

The approach though characterizable as the “Direct Enforcement Model” [See M. C. Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code (1980)] meaning the existence of an international system for the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and punishment of international crimes is nevertheless dependent upon States-Parties for substantial aspects of its functioning. Thus there is in this approach still much of the “Indirect Enforcement Model” which characterizes contemporary international criminal law in that states as-
sume certain international duties which they enforce through their national system. In that respect the enforcement mechanisms of the International Penal Tribunal rely on the “Indirect Enforcement Model.” Such an approach by necessity must not only rely on the voluntary compliance of states, but must also accept the inherent differences of national legal systems through which enforcement of the Tribunal’s functions and orders are to be channeled.

The Court and the investigative and prosecutorial functions are internationally institutionalized, as is contemplated by the 1979 International Law Association Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court and its 1978 Draft Statute For An International Commission of Criminal Inquiry. Such institutional mechanisms solve some problems, but not others due to the absence of an international legislative apparatus.

To remedy this situation a quasi-legislative body is created in the form of the “Standing Committee of States-Parties” which is given policy and administrative functions. Furthermore a rule-making power is given to the Organs of the Tribunal subject to certain “Standards” of international fairness embodied in the Draft Convention.

The administrative needs of the Court are met by a Secretariat, which also provides support to the other Organs of the Tribunal and serves as a vehicle for assuring that record-keeping and registry functions as well as other requirements essential to fairness and effectiveness are met.

In view of the conceptual framework chosen and outlined above, an appropriate organizational approach was adopted in the formulation of the sequence of the Provisions of the Draft Convention:

First Part: Nature of the Tribunal and Its Organs and Powers

Article I Purposes
Article II Nature of the Tribunal
Article III Organs of the Tribunal
Article IV Jurisdiction
Article V Competence
Article VI Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall Exercise Its Jurisdiction
Article VII Sanctions

Second Part: The Penal Processes of the Tribunal

Article VIII Initiation of Process
Article IX Pre-Trial Process
Article X Adjudication
Article XI Sanctioning
Article XII Appeals
Article XIII Sanctions and Supervision

Third Part: Organs of the Tribunal

Article XIV The Court
Article XV The Procuracy
Article XVI The Secretariat
Article XVII The Standing Committee
Article XVIII General Institutional Matters
Fourth Part: Tribunal Standards

Article XIX Standards for Rules and Procedures


Article XX Definitions
Article XXI Responsibility
Article XXII Elements of an International Crime
Article XXIII Immunities
Article XXIV Penalties
Article XXV Exoneration
Article XXVI Statute of Limitation

Sixth Part: Duties of States-Parties

Article XXVII General Principles
Article XXVIII Surrender of Accused Persons
Article XXIX Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of Cooperation
Article XXX Recognition of the Judgments of the International Penal Tribunal
Article XXXI Transfer of Offenders and Execution of Sentences


Article XXXII Entry Into Force
Article XXXIII Reservations
Article XXXIV Initial Implementation Steps
Article XXXV Amendments

FIRST PART: NATURE OF THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS AND POWERS


Article I--Purposes. Establishes an International Penal Tribunal which is to be a new international legal institution consisting of several organs discussed in Article III below. The legislative authority of the Tribunal and, of course, all of its organs is predicated on Article V of the Apartheid Convention. But this Draft Convention provides States-Parties with the opportunity to include by Supplemental Agreement, within the jurisdiction of the Court, other international crimes which are defined in Article IV, 2. See also Appendix 2, a listing of international instruments.
Article II—Nature of the Tribunal. Considers the Tribunal as a newly created institution and in order to minimize logistical problems the suggested location is the Palace of Justice in The Hague; it is already established and equipped as an international judicial body. The official languages are those of the U.N. which represent a recognized world consensus.

Article III—Organs of the Tribunal. Establishes four bodies with separate functions and purposes which are described throughout the Second Part in the allocation of their respective duties in connection with the penal processes but which are more adequately described in the Third Part though that Third Part deals more with the institutional and operational aspects of these organs. It is important at this juncture to conceptualize the inter-relationship of these organs which are with respect to the Court, the Procuracy and the Secretariat very similar to the traditional organs of the national penal systems of most countries of the world. Clearly an attempt has been made to integrate different institutional concepts which are represented by the major criminal justice systems of the world [see Bassiouni, “A Survey of Major Criminal Justice Systems of the World” in Handbook of Criminology ed. D. Glaser (1974)]. In effect, the Court as an organ of the Tribunal and its functions does not differ from its traditional role in any legal system. The distinguishing characteristics pertaining to the role of the judges and the degree of their discretion in the conduct of the proceedings are left to the formulation of the Rules of the Court which are to be promulgated as specified in Article XVIII and subject to those minimum standards of fairness embodied in international instruments for the protection of human rights which are stated in the Fourth Part.

The Procuracy is a combination of the Soviet Union and Eastern European Socialist systems [see M. C. Bassiouni and V. Savitski, The Criminal Justice System of the U.S.S.R. (1979)]; the judge of instruction in the Romanist-Civilist system [M. Ancel and Y. Marx, Les Code Penaux Europeens, three volumes (1958)] and the Common Law System's prosecutor [Archbold Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases (39th ed.) S. Mitchell ed. (1976) and Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave, J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure (1980)]. In balance there is more emphasis toward the Romanist-Civilist tradition than to the Common Law tradition since it would be more consonant with the need for effective investigation and prosecution of international crimes subject to the guarantees enunciated in the Fifth Part which are adequate to secure individual human rights protection.

The Secretariat fulfills the traditional administrative support functions as well as the functions of court registrar.

The Standing Committee is a novelty in the structural approach to the creation of new international institutions. To a large extent the Standing Committee is to the organs of the Tribunal what the General Assembly is to the United Nations. It represents the States-Parties, assists in insuring compliance with the provisions of the Convention and oversees the administrative and financial affairs of the Tribunal.

Article IV—Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited
IMPLEMENTING APARTHEID CONVENTION

to what is defined in Paragraph 1 as “grave breaches” of the Apartheid Convention. The analogy here is to the conception of grave breaches in the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the 1977 Additional Protocols thereto [For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces of the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 19 June 1977, (ICRC, August-September, 1977)]. In addition, Paragraph 2 defines those additional international crimes which may be part of the court’s jurisdiction by Supplemental Agreement and binding only upon the States-Parties entering into such an Agreement with the Standing Committee. International crimes, however, are limited to those so declared in a multilateral convention and which can be so construed by the institution of penal procedures or the obligation to prosecute or extradite. This embodies the maxim aut dedere aut judicare which characterizes international crimes (see Appendix 1).

Paragraph 3 establishes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over such crimes and, of course, over persons and entities charged with them as universal in terms of its scope and in terms of the power of the Court.

The 1953 ILC Draft does not define the crimes to be dealt with beyond the phrase “crimes generally recognized under international law,” whereas the 1979 ILA Draft incorporates by reference definitions of crimes in sixteen international conventions, but notably omitting the Apartheid Convention.

Article V—Competence. While penal theoreticians may argue the merits of a distinction between jurisdiction and competence, it is suggested that jurisdiction establishes the Tribunal’s geographic and subject-matter authority, and in personam authority, while competence determines the specific powers of the Court with respect to its jurisdiction and provides the legal framework of reference for the Tribunal’s exercise of its jurisdictional authority.

Article VI—Subjects Upon Whom the Tribunal Shall Exercise Its Jurisdiction. Though Article IV on jurisdiction refers to the Court’s authority over natural persons and legal entities, it was deemed of importance to emphasize this authority under a separate article though it may appear duplicative.

Article VII—Sanctions. Only the Court upon a finding of guilty, subject to the provisions of this Convention, the procedures and Rules which would be developed by the different Organs and the Standards of fairness set forth in the Fifth Part, can impose a sanction against a natural person or legal entity. Clearly deprivation of liberty applies to natural persons and not to legal entities but fines and injunctions apply to natural persons and legal entities. It is to be noted that there is no schedule of penalties affixed to any specific crime and that to some may raise a question of nulla poena sine lege. To avoid this problem the Convention preconizes that the Court shall enact appro-
appropriate and specific Rules on sanctions to be promulgated prior to the Tribunal's commencement of activities which would satisfy the element of notice. There is, however, the objection that such penalty will apply to persons who have committed "grave breaches" of the Apartheid Convention or violations of other international conventions made subject to the Court's jurisdiction by Supplemental Agreement (as discussed in the Commentary to Article I and IV) before the promulgation of these sanctions. In effect this would be tantamount to applying a penalty which was not promulgated at the time of the commission of a given crime. In some ways this may be deemed a violation of the principle *nulla poena sine lege* though it could be argued that if the penalty is commensurate or equivalent to the same penalty provided for in the State where the crime was committed for equivalent crimes the objection would lose much of its substance. If, however, the sanction is to be the same as that for the equivalent crime in the national legal system wherein the international crime had been committed the principle *nulla poena sine lege* would be complied with.

**Second Part: The Penal Processes of the Tribunal**

**Article VIII—Initiation of Process.** The desirability of such a process has substantial support. See G.A. Res. 1187 (XII) 11 November 1957. See Report of the Secretary-General on "International Criminal Jurisdiction," U.N. GAOR (XII) 1957, Doc. A/13649; see also *U.N. Historical Survey on the Question of the International Criminal Jurisdiction* Doc. A/CN.4/7, Rev. 1 (1949). For a documentary history of the various projects for the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, see B. Ferencz, *The International Criminal Court* (1980) 2 Vols. See also, J. Stone and R. Woetzel, Toward a Feasible International Criminal Court (1970); 35 *Revue Internationale de Droit Penal* No. 1-2 (1964) devoted to that subject, and 45 *Revue Internationale de Droit Penal* No. 3-4 (1974) containing the contributions of the AIDP to V U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Geneva, September 1975 devoted to the subject of "La Creation d'une Justice Penale Internationale." The *Revue Internationale de Droit Penal* contained scholarly writings on this subject in its issues of 1928, 1935, 1945 and 1952 as well as others. The AIDP has traditionally supported the creation of an international criminal court as witnessed by the positions it has taken at its various International Congresses, and those of its distinguished members among them: Pella, Donnedieu de Vabres, Saldana, Graven, Jimenez de Asua, Setille, Cornil, Bouzat, Jescheck, Romoshkiin, Herzog, Glaser, Dautricourt, Quaintan-Ripholes Arroneau, Mueller, De Schutter, Triftterer, Lombois, Plawski, Ferencz, Oehler, Zubkowski. As Secretary-General of the AIDP this writer has consistently supported the proposition. Because of the numerous writings on the subject by the above mentioned scholars and others it would be impossible to cite them all. For three more recent initiatives resulting in the submission of a draft statute, see the International Law Association, "Draft Statute for an Interna-

The 1953 ILC Draft in Article 29 provides that the penal processes could commence only by action of a State-Party. The 1979 ILA Draft in Article 23 allows only States to approach the Commission which at its turn would present a case to the Court. The procedures presented herein differ from the 1953 ILC Draft and 1979 ILA Draft in that it concentrates the investigation and prosecution of any case with the Procuracy, but a State-Party, Organ of the U.N., Inter-Governmental Organization, Non-Governmental Organization and individual may file a complaint with the Procuracy which shall accept such communications. The Procuracy then makes an initial determination as to whether the complaint is “not manifestly unfounded” or “manifestly unfounded.” That determination is quite similar to the one made by the European Commission on Human Rights as to complaints concerning violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Procuracy is not without controls as to its discretion in that a State-Party and an organ of the U.N. are entitled to recognition of their complaints as being “not manifestly unfounded” while other States and Inter-Governmental Organizations are entitled to an appeal to the Court of a determination by the Procuracy that the complaint has been found “manifestly unfounded.” Communications and complaints by individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations are not entitled to the same status. The Procuracy’s decisions are thus reviewable in the case of certain complaints and communications and a decision holding a complaint “not manifestly unfounded” will then travel two alternate channels: (a) the possibility of mediation and conciliation through the Standing Committee; (b) adjudication before the Court. A period of one year is allowed for the conciliation process which is the same period allowed for the Procuracy’s investigation and preparation of the case. Thereafter the case may be presented to the Court at the request of the complaining State-Party or Organ of the U.N. if it is the initiator of the complaint. Otherwise that period of one year is extendable subject to the Court’s review.

Article IX—Pre-Trial Process. A non-exhaustive list of orders that may be issued by the Court in aid of the preparation of a case is specified. It is expected that the Rules of the Court will go into the details of the form, content, and other formalities pertaining to these orders. They are among the traditional powers of either a Court, or a judge of instruction, respectively, in the Common Law and Romanist-Civilist
tradition. Similar provisions may be found in the 1953 ILC Draft, Articles 40, 41, and 42 and in the 1979 ILA Draft, Articles 36 and 37. It must be noted here that the Tribunal in general and the Court in particular will in this and in other respects rely on the cooperation of the States-Parties to implement its orders. It must also be noted that where a State-Party has with a State non-Party, treaties or relations on the subject of extradition and judicial assistance and cooperation, the Courts’ orders and determinations of any sort would have an impact beyond that State-Party and thus give this Convention a multiplier effect with respect to its impact. [See e.g., V.E.H. Booth, British Extradition Law and Procedure (1980); C. Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition (1980); M.C. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public (1974); I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (1971); T. Vogler, Auslieferungsrecht und Grundgesetz (1969); Bedi, International Extradition (1968); A. Billot, Traite de l’Extradition (1874); and M. Pisani and F. Mosconi, Codice delle Convenzioni di Etradizione E Di Assistenza Giudiziaria in Materia Penale (1979).]

The observations made herein are also relevant to the Sixth Part on the Duties of States-Parties since such duties will not only extend to the carrying out of the obligations of this Convention within their own territories but also whenever possible in their relations with other States. It is clear that the carrying out and execution of all such obligations to assist the Tribunal where required by this Convention, and in particular the Sixth Part, but a State-Party is only requested to act pursuant to its relevant national laws. It must, however, be noted that a State-Party cannot enact national laws which will frustrate the carrying out of the obligations arising under this Convention.

Paragraph 4 establishes a procedure analogous to an indictment, such as was proposed in Articles 33 to 35 and 31 of the 1953 ILC and 1979 ILA Drafts, respectively, by means of a Committing Chamber in the former and Commission processes in the latter. Under the present draft, however, this process is but a step toward determination as to guilt, it being unnecessary to give it special consequences because prior procedures in the Procuracy have been given appropriate consequences and progress under the present draft after the initial Procuracy action is gradual rather than involving thresholds.

The subparagraph a determination is primarily for the sake of efficiency, as a means of detecting any errors by the Procuracy as to the suitability of the matter for further action. Subparagraph b provides an opportunity for early consideration of whether misconduct in preparation of the case may have impugned the Tribunal’s integrity in such a way to impair credibility or acceptability of its determinations, as well as for early consideration of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) problems. [See M. C. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law (1978), pp. 499-512].

Subparagraph c is particularly intended to deal with the need to consider the possibility that non-cooperation of States, particularly non-Parties, may render evidence of either incriminatory or exculpatory character unavailable, so that a fair trial of the case may be impossible. Early detection of problems of this type would not only be more ef-
ficient but also would tend to avoid unnecessary and difficult ne bis in idem questions regarding aborted proceedings.

Article X—Adjudication.

Paragraph 1 parallels Articles 39 of the 1953 ILC Draft and 35 of the 1979 ILA Draft, conforming more closely to the latter, which makes no express provision for secret sessions. This treatment appears appropriate in that any confidential evidence may be submitted in public in a form or manner that protects essential matters of confidentiality such as identity of a witness or a particular technique for obtaining evidence, and the details for such presentations may be treated in rules of the Court and Procuracy, which may be elaborated at a time when the actual needs in this regard are clearer.

Paragraph 2 describes the inherent power of courts to dismiss cases, particularly in respect of evidentiary problems. Article 38, paragraph 4, of the 1953 ILC Draft has a similar dismissal provision. No express provision is made for withdrawal of a matter, as was done in Articles 43 and 38 of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively, it being implicit in the nature of the powers of the Procuracy to determine whether to take such action.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 are self-explanatory.

It is contemplated that rules of the Court will address ne bis in idem issues. Paragraph 3, it should be noted, relates to the principle of equality of arms, which has been observed under the European Convention on Human Rights. [Applications No. 596/59 and 789/60, Franz Pataki and Johann Dunshirn vs. Austria, Report of the Commission of 28 March 1963, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights pp. 730, 734 (1963).]

Paragraph 6 is in part motivated by the availability of appeal and also the fact that Chambers, being constituted on a rotational basis, may be unavailable in their prior form for subsequent arguments. Details of the rotational constitution of Chambers are left for elaboration in Court rules.

Article XI—Sanctioning. These provisions are self-explanatory, but this Article is to be read in pari materia with Article VII and the Commentary thereto and Articles XIII and XXIV.

Article XII—Appeals.

Appeals from Chambers, Determinations and Orders, which may be done only on behalf of an accused or the Procuracy on questions of law, are permitted including post-conviction orders. This is consonant with the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning the dual level of judgment and review.

No appeal is permitted for accuseds under Articles 49 and 43 of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively. Also interlocutory appeals are permitted as practical necessity may require them.

Paragraph 5 on revision of judgments parallels Articles 52 and 45 of the ILC and ILA Drafts, respectively, but is broader in scope.

Article XIII—Sanctions and Supervision.

Paragraph 1 corresponds to Article 46 of the 1979 ILA Draft, Article 51 of the 1953 Draft having left such matters to future conventions. The
terminology “sanctions” is capable of including not only punishments of imprisonment or fines but also levies of compensation or injunctive orders, thus maintaining the possibility for such broad ranges of action.

As noted previously, the supervisory mechanism of Paragraph 2 replaces the Clemency and Parole Boards provided by the ILC and ILA Drafts, and appeal is made possible under Paragraph 3.

It should be noted that these provisions govern only the procedures relating to sanctions. Standards relating to sanctions may be elaborated further in Court rules but subject to Article XXIV.

Third Part: Organs of the Tribunal

Article XIV—The Court.

Except for mechanical differences, the terms of this Article as to selection, tenure and replacement of judges closely parallel those of Articles 4 through 12 and 15 through 20 of the 1953 ILC Draft and 3 through 9 and 12 through 15 of the 1979 ILA Draft, although the latter makes no provision for removal of judges.

This Article represents an innovation, in that the other drafts dealt with a single court organ and created a separate Clemency and Parole Board. As discussed below, the provision for separate functions of Chambers and the Court en banc permits appeals, a right called for in Article 14, Paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Rather than create a separate institution to deal with such matters as clemency and parole it was deemed more efficient to have such functions performed by individual judges, subject to possible appeals from their decisions, as discussed in connection with Article XII.

Paragraph 5 contemplates that judges will be elected with reference to specific terms. Accordingly, when a given judge is considered for re-election, any of the terms that are vacant at that time may be regarded as available for that judge.

Paragraph 7 addresses the concern that any conduct by a judge may create an appearance of impropriety, and narrowly circumscribes permitted non-Court activity.

Paragraph 11 is intended to permit judges to remain in their official capacity for the sole purpose of completing work on Court action begun prior to expiration of their terms.

Paragraph 12, it should be noted, does not bar re-election of the Court president.

Article XV—The Procuracy. The significance of the three-part division of the Procuracy is apparent in connection with budgets and reports and transfer of cases from investigative to prosecutorial divisions, as well as to the rights of the accused.

Paragraph 2, providing for joint action by the Court and Standing Committee for selection of a Procurator, appears appropriate because such an officer should be politically acceptable and States are in a superior position to become aware of suitable candidates, while the Court is in a superior position to judge legal competence and estimate
probable devotion to impartiality. Removal power is vested in the Court in the belief that deficiencies of the kind the Court would be likely to note would be the appropriate bases for dismissal.

Deputies are placed under control of the Procurator in Paragraph 4 in the interest of effective management.

**Article XVI—The Secretariat.**

Although most of the functions of the Secretariat are ministerial in character, its duties to oversee communications and prepare reports serve an inspectorate function as well. Accordingly, control over the Secretariat is vested in the Court, as a neutral body.

**Article XVII—The Standing Committee.**

The 1953 ILC Draft assumed that the Court created under it would be a part of the United Nations, and therefore any governing-body needs or political issues regarding its operations would be addressed by the political organs of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly. Under the 1979 ILA Draft, a similar assumption appears to have been made in that no treaty-type provisions are included and, although references are made to “Contracting Parties,” this term appears to mean only States that have consented to be subject to operation of the Court. Nevertheless, the Commission contemplated in the ILA Drafts would have had a somewhat political character, in that only nationals of States consenting to be subject to operations of the Commission, could have been members and the Commission’s own statute is referred to as a “Convention” in its Article 3.

The present Statute, in contrast, would be entirely conventional in character, although there are various express provisions for coordination of action with the United Nations. Accordingly, the need for an organ to deal with governance of the Tribunal and political issues relating to its activities promoted provision for a Standing Committee. It should be noted that the express functions of the Standing Committee are of a governing-body nature for the most part, and that its functions beyond these are largely unspecified. This would permit the representatives of States-Parties who constitute that organ to have wide flexibility in pursuing non-juridical matters helpful to international criminal justice. The requirement of meetings twice a year assures that the Standing Committee will be available for consultation on political questions.

One of the most significant functions of the Standing Committee may be in Article XVII, Paragraph 6 with respect to proposing action to initiate and propose new norms of international criminal law or standards for its application by the Tribunal. In view of the vagueness of existing instruments purporting to define international crimes, such proposals and adoption may be essential in order that criminal responsibility may be dealt with without violating the principle of *nulla poena sine lege*.

It should be noted that this Article does not contemplate deprivation of the status of State-Party in response to non-payment of financial support, but mere suspension.

No provision has been made for terms of representatives, it being assumed that their tenure shall be at the pleasure of the appointing State.
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Article XVIII—General Institutional Matters.

Paragraph 1 rules, it should be noted, are subject to further provisions in Article XIX. Recognition that flexibility should be provided for such Rules was expressed in Article 24 of the 1953 ILC Draft and Article 10 of the 1979 ILA Draft. Court approval of Rules for the Procuracy and Secretariat appear appropriate in view of the need to assure that such rules are fair and conform to legal requirements. Participation by the Procurator in formulation of Court Rules recognizes the desirability that such Rules interrelate properly with Procuracy procedures and capabilities.

Paragraph 2 gives the Court, a neutral body, a key role in shaping the budget of the Tribunal, but leaves a veto power with the Standing Committee, which represents the States obliged to meet the budget. Prior draft statutes did not deal in detail with budgetary approval. See 1953 ILC Article 23 and 1979 ILA Article 17.

Paragraph 5 parallels Article 14 of the 1953 ILC Draft, which has no counterpart in the 1979 ILA Draft, as to judges. Expansion to other Tribunal officers is clearly appropriate. Expansion to other parties before the Court is necessary in the interest of fairness. [See, e.g., the European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights (Council of Europe, May 1969; E.T.S. No. 69).

Paragraph 6's requirement of a solemn declaration parallels Article 13 of the 1953 ILC Draft and Article 11 of the 1979 ILA Draft, but is expanded to include officers of the Tribunal.]

Fourth Part: Tribunal Standards

Article XIX—Standards for Rules and Procedures. The Standards of fairness which are to be guaranteed in all proceedings before the Organs of the Tribunal and which are to be reflected in the Rules to be promulgated by the said Organs embodying those rights are contained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1980 Body of Principles on the Protection of Persons from All Forms of Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the 1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. These standards are also embodied in the resolutions of the XIIth International Congress of Penal Law held in Hamburg 1979 whose draft and explanatory notes are in 49 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal vol. 3, 1978. These provisions are particularly consonant with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Additional Protocols. [See A. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (1977), and D. Poncet, La Protection de l'Accusé par la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme (1977). See also, e.g., L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights (1973).]


**Article XX—Definitions.**

1. defines international crimes with reference to the Convention, thus permitting expansion.

2. incorporates by reference the definition of a state as recognized under international law. This approach was preferred to repetition of one of the generally accepted formulations of a definition of a state because use of such a formulation would call for definition of the terms used in it, such as the Montevideo Convention’s provision that a state has the capacity to conduct “international relations,” *Convention on Rights and Duties of States* of 26 December 1933, 165 U.N.T.S. 19; see also U.N. debates on statehood in connection with Israel and Liechtenstein at 3 U.N. SCOR, 383d Mtg., Dec. 2, 1948, No. 128 pp. 9-12; and 4 U.N. SCOR 432d Mtg., July 27, 1949, No. 35 at pp. 4-5.

For the sake of convenience, the term “state” is deemed to include groups of states acting collectively.

3. exemplifies a correlation between “person” and “individual,” and confines the meaning of those terms to exclude such entities as corporations or other so-called juridical persons.

4. and 5. begins with another correlation for the sake of convenience, with respect to the term “group” and “organization.” The definition is provided because of the use of these terms in provisions dealing with collective responsibility, which is discussed below.

6. on participation in a group action is designed for the same purpose. The model of responsibility arose out of the Nuremberg trials and Tokyo war crimes trials. [See Article 9 of the London Charter of 8 August 1945, Control Council Ordinance No. 10 of 20 December 1945; for a discussion of the basis of this responsibility and the cases decided at Nuremberg and Tokyo, see L. Friedman, *The Law of War: A Documentary History* (1972); see also Wright, *History of the U.N. War Crimes Commission* (1949).]


The definition of “solicitation” was found to be workable under civil law, as well as common law systems. On the other hand, the concept of conspiracy is not generally recognized under the civil law systems, so that inclusion of this term required a common law definition even though the requirement of an “overt act” brings such a definition close to preparatory acts in civilist-Romanist systems. [See R. Merle
and A. Vitu, Traite de Droit Criminal (1967).] It is to be noted that conspiracy and participation in a group action are separate terms with separate definitions. The concept, however, is found in the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials.

In 9. "attempt" was given a definition based on the Model Penal Code, but with modifications reflecting the concern of civil law jurists. For example, the term "preparation" has been omitted and "substantial step" has been amplified by the addition of the words "unequivocal and direct." This modification was intended to provide a meaning that would be recognized under civil law as being as limited as the meaning that these provisions would be given under common law systems. See Fletcher, op. cit.

The definitions for the terms "participation in a group action," "solicitation," "conspiracy" and "attempt" are provided in the "General Part." Such conduct in reference to the proscriptions of the "Special Part" is included in the "General Part" as opposed to the "Special Part" as is more consonant with the civil law system. [See generally R. Merle and A. Vitu, Traite de Droit Criminal (1967); P. Bouzat and J. Pinatel, Traite de Droit Penale (mise à jour 1975); H.-H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts (1975).]

10. and 11. deal with "person in authority" and "omission" and are included for the purpose of criminalizing failure of persons in authority to fulfill their legal duties arising out of any specific duty referred to in the "Special Part."

It is clear that the definitions provided reflect a certain conceptual choice and the attempt to integrate civilist-Romanist and common law principles and those principles which have emerged from the history and practice of international criminal law. [In that respect see S. Glaser, Infractions Internationale (1957) and S. Plawski, Etude des Principes Fondamentaux du Droit International Penal (1972).]

**Article XXI—Responsibility.**

The basis of responsibility or accountability follows the "Definitions" and precedes "Elements of an International Crime" because of the view that the various levels and types of accountability should be set forth first so as to define to whom and on what basis responsibility can be imputed. This approach neither fits the common law nor the civil law models. It was deemed appropriate subject to the special status of these Tribunals and the historical peculiarities of international criminal law in light of the precedents of the Leipzig War Crimes Trials, though these were subject to German laws, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials. There is no analogy to be found in the writings of scholars to that approach. This identification of criminally accountable subjects should be read in pari materia with the Provision on "Definitions."

Under 1 through 5, criminal responsibility is assigned not only to committing a crime, but also to attempting, soliciting or conspiring to commit any crime. However, because the element of harm is required unless that requirement is modified by the definition of the specific
offense, criminal responsibility for acts not constituting a “commission” are controlled by the definitions of the crime, which may have a different requirement. Other provisions relating to individual responsibility are taken from parallel provisions of national penal codes. It was noted that the provision relating to responsibility for acts of others is not intended to create a new crime, but rather to express the principle of derivative responsibility which exists in one way or another in every penal system. These provisions are more in conformity to the common law approach than to the continental approach.

The provisions regarding group responsibility were framed to serve two purposes: to make groups themselves accountable under the Article dealing with penalties, and to prevent an individual from escaping responsibility where he provided a group with continued intangible support despite its foreseeable criminal conduct as reflected in the principles of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Special provision is made for responsibility of persons in authority in order to incorporate responsibility for failure to act. This provision is based on military law and command responsibility as it is incorporated in the Four Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and in particular in the 1977 Additional Protocol Amending the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 concerning failure of superiors to control acts of subordinates and other sources of international criminal law.


These provisions are intended to cover both responsibility for failure to act and non-state entities that subsequently become states by analogy to principles of state succession in international law. [See generally D. P. O'Connell, State Succession in International Law (1967).]

Article XXII—Elements of an International Crime

This provision seeks to synthesize common law and civil law concepts as well as to take into account fundamental principles of international criminal law in providing for and defining the four essential elements of an international crime. There seems to be agreement on the need for all such elements, even though there are divergences with respect to the meaning and content of each one. Probably the most authoritative work on the subject is Stefan Glaser, Infraction Internationale (1957). In it, Glaser starts, as does this Article, with the material element, but then interjects certain legal justifications before dealing with the mental element. He concludes his work with participation and complicity. In this respect, a conceptual difficulty arises and the choice was to separate the required elements of a crime from the “responsibility,” and conditions of “Exoneration.” The approach of dividing “Responsibility,”
“Element of an International Crime,” and “Exoneration” into three different Provisions seeks to avoid doctrinal differences between common law and civil law by devising a neutral approach.

The material element satisfies both the common law and civil law systems, as does to a great extent the mental element, though it is couched in more objective terms.

In recognition of the fact that most civil law criminal codes do not specify causation as a separate element, the element of causation could be interpreted as included in the material element of a crime in civil law systems and separate for common law systems.

It was agreed that the mental element should not extend to mere negligence, but it was feared that mere exclusion of negligence would result in responsibility under civil law systems for mental states between mere negligence and recklessness. Accordingly, the decision was made to list the mental states of intent, knowledge, and recklessness with the understanding that recklessness went beyond the dolus eventualis, described under the 1976 German Penal Code as a state of mind such that the person knew that harm would result.

For common law systems, however, a separate provision on causation was added.

The fourth such element, harm, was recognized as requiring interpretation in connection with the offense in question. It was determined that provision should be made for circumstances where an offense did not require an outcome whose character would match the usual meaning of the word “harm.” Similar concern was voiced regarding the element of causation, so that it was determined to qualify the listing of elements with a clause providing that these elements may be altered by the definition of a given crime.

Article XXIII—Immunities


The text also takes into account customary principles of international law on the immunity of Heads of State and the practice of states. The nature of the immunity provided herein is, however, more narrowly circumscribed, as it is not absolute. The text obligates the Contracting Parties whose national is the subject of any immunity category contained herein to take appropriate action against such persons, but permits waiver of that jurisdiction in favor of the International Court much as do the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on Status of Forces Agreement; [see Coker, “The Status of Visiting Military Forces in Europe,” in M. C. Bassiouni and V. P. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973) Vol. II, p. 115.]

Article XXIV—Penalties

Separate provisions are made for punishment of different types of offenders, all subject to the requirement in Section 1 that punishment be proportional to seriousness of the violation and the harm threatened or caused as well as to the degree of responsibility of the actor.

The Court is directed to develop appropriate Rules before exercising its jurisdiction. It must be noted that principles of legality are not violated by these provisions because the Court should first promulgate the penalties and the criteria for their application.

Paragraph 3 recognizes the principle of the Nuremberg Tribunals that organizations as such may be punished by means of fines. [See Dinstein, infra]. This provision goes beyond continental principles.


Paragraph 5 confers discretion on the court whether to impose cumulative sentences for crimes arising from a single transaction.
Paragraph 6, dealing with mitigation, provides for the possibility that the fact that an accused was acting under orders could be considered a mitigating factor. This reflects the content of Article 8 of the London Charter of 8 August 1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. [See Y. Dinstein, The Defense of "Obedience to Superior Orders" in International Law p. 260 at 283 (1965).]

**Article XXV—Exoneration**

While the Civil Law system would view the conditions of exoneration listed in this Article as a questionable combination of principles of responsibility and legal defense, it was felt that a single provision containing all conditions which ultimately result in exoneration from responsibility, irrespective of their doctrinal or dogmatic basis should be placed together, as it gives these aspects a sense of cohesion and practical use by an international tribunal.

The self-defense provision, Paragraph 2, is based on that contained in Article IIa of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well as on the language used in the Model Penal Code. The requirement that the defender reasonably believe that forceful response is necessary is a common law requirement which is superfluous for civil law systems. On the other hand, the introduction of the requirement that the response be to an "imminent" use of unlawful force may be viewed under the common law as surplusage.

The defense of necessity is limited in Paragraph 3 to use of force not likely to produce death as a policy decision to restrain individuals.

Coercion, under Paragraph 4, was limited as a defense to situations where the threat or use of force is "imminent."

Paragraph 5 makes obedience to superior orders a defense where the person accused was not in a position to know of the criminal nature of his acts. Conversely, Paragraph 6 protects persons from prosecutions for refusing to follow orders to commit crimes.

Paragraph 7 adopts the formulation of the Model Penal Code relating to mistake of law or fact, conditioning this defense on negation of criminal intent.

Paragraph 8, on double jeopardy, simply seeks to give effect to the principle *ne bis in idem*. The fourth paragraph recognizes the competence of the International Criminal Court to overlook pardons and amnesties of other jurisdictions in order to avoid that state's resort to that practice from negotiating a person's punisability. It applies to the actual conduct involved rather than to any legal characterization of that conduct by any State.

Paragraph 9 is based on the Model Penal Code's provision on the defense of insanity. This differs from civilist systems where such a condition is deemed a pre-condition to criminal responsibility.

Paragraph 10 on the defense of intoxication springs from the same source, and excludes voluntary intoxication as a defense to crimes requiring intent.

The renunciation principles set forth in Section 11 also stem from the Model Penal Code but are in keeping with the continental approach.
This provision includes principles of justification, conditions negating criminal responsibility, excusability and procedural defenses. From a Romanist-Civilist perspective it is doctrinally challengeable on the very grounds that it encompasses too much diversity. However, its justification rests on pragmatic reasons which avoid the dogmatism that has been at the basis of so much debate between European penalists for so long.

Article XXVI—Statute of Limitation

The approach adopted measures the limitation period by the maximum potential penalty required for similar offenses under the national law of the state where the crime was committed as is the case under Penalties. It should be noted that, under this approach, where the maximum penalty is life imprisonment or death, there is no limitation period. Also, it was necessary to add Paragraph 1.3 because offenses by states are punishable only by fines under this Code. This approach was preferred notwithstanding the Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, of 9 Dec. 1968; [see also 39 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal (1968) dedicated to this topic, and the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes of 1974.] In fact, the result of this approach and that of the Conventions referred to above, is for all practical purposes the same except for minor offenses and in fact avoids the difficulties which have prevented the ratification of these treaties by a number of states.

Sixth Part: Duties of States-Parties

Article XXVII—General Principles. The basis of international enforcement and cooperation derives from the maxim aut dedere aut judicare from Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1624). It is now recognized as a general principle of international law to “prosecute or extradite”; [see Bassiouni, “International Extradition and World Public Order,” in Aktuelle Probleme des Internationalen Strafrechts (1970) pp. 10, 15 (ed. D. Oehler and P. G. Pöttz)] and it is the conceptual basis of the indirect enforcement scheme, that international criminal law has relied upon. It is embodied in international criminal law conventions. The mechanism by which the indirect enforcement scheme operates, is that a state obligates itself under an international convention to include appropriate provisions in its national laws which would make the internationally proscribed conduct a national crime. This approach is found in all international criminal law conventions establishing such a duty upon its Contracting Parties. [See e.g., the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, in their respective Articles 49-50/50-51/129-130/146-147.] It is also the case with respect to all other international criminal law conventions; see Appendix 2.

Article XXVIII—Surrender of Accused Persons. Surrender of the accused is equivalent to extradition. Because of the importance of extradition in this enforcement scheme, it is covered herein with as much

Article XXIX—Judicial Assistance and Other Forms of Cooperation.

The requested Party shall execute in the manner provided for by its law any letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by the judicial authorities of the requesting Party for the purpose of procuring evidence or transmitting objects, records or documents to be produced in evidence.


A scheme for transfer of offenders can be said to rely in part on the assumption that a given state will recognize the criminal judgment of another and of the Court. The manner in which this Article is drafted makes that assumption. [See in particular Article 6 of the 1970 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements.]


The treaty provisions are somewhat standard, except for the reservations clause which though in keeping with the Vienna Convention on treaty interpretation also takes into account the relevant aspects of the Advisory Opinion By The International Court of Justice On Reservations To The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15.

One of the conditions for this Convention’s implementation is, of course, the need for the Standing Committee to be created and to start functioning and that is why a special provision has been made to that effect.

CONCLUSION

To some this effort will seem utopian, but to us and many others it is another link in the arduous progress of the humanitarian development of the Rule of Law. It is more eloquently said in the words of George Bernard Shaw: “Some men see things as they are and ask why. I dream things that never were, and ask why not?”