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ARTICLES

THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT

Scott Burris* & Kathryn Moss**

INTRODUCTION

Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 in 1990, President George H. W. Bush described it as a “historic new civil rights Act . . . the world’s first comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disabilities.”2 Others called it “a watershed in the history of disability rights, . . . the most far-reaching legislation ever enacted against discrimination of people with disabilities.”3 A substantial body of disability discrimination laws—including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,4 the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (now known as the IDEA),5 the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,6 and

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numerous state anti-discrimination disability statutes\(^7\)—were already in place, but the ADA seemed to promise a dramatic change in the status of people with disabilities in American society. The ADA was broader in scope than existing federal laws, prohibiting discrimination not just in employment and public programs, but also in public accommodations.\(^8\) The ADA covers private employers and service providers, not just public and publicly-funded ones.\(^9\) The ADA emerged from Congress with bi-partisan support, carrying an explicit promise to people with disabilities of “equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self sufficiency.”\(^10\) The statute would, it was predicted, significantly affect “not just persons with disabilities and persons charged with respecting and enforcing human rights, but virtually every segment of our society—\textit{all} Americans.”\(^11\) Many lawyers and advocates for people with disabilities think the employment section of the ADA—Title I—has failed to meet expectations. As support for this assertion, they point to the narrow reading of the statute by federal judges, and the minuscule rate of court decisions in favor of plaintiffs. They cite data that seems to indicate that the ADA may actually have\textit{lowered} the employment rate of people with disabilities. This is an understandable reaction to several years of unrelenting bad news from the courts, but measuring the impact of a major civil rights statute is difficult.\(^12\) The impact of a statute depends upon the complex process of implementation by the courts, but also by other enforcement agencies and employers.\(^13\) "Impact" can take a

\(^{12}\) See generally John J. Donahue III & James Heckman, \textit{Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks}, 29 \textit{J. Econ. Literature} 1603 (1991) (discussing the difficulty in measuring civil rights progress as a result of changes in federal policy, because standard econometric tests fail to measure social change that is brought about by its own right).

variety of forms, from increases in wages and employment rates, to significant changes in social or organizational norms. The causal role of a civil rights statute is difficult to disaggregate from other social and economic factors such as labor market conditions generally, and government interventions on a number of interrelated fronts. In the case of Title I, assessment is further complicated by the differences between the population defined as disabled in the data sources on U.S. employment, and the narrower group of people whose employment rights are actually protected by the law.

This paper summarizes the empirical data on the effects of Title I, including how the law has been operationalized, and how the employment experience of people with disabilities has changed since the ADA's passage. It begins with a brief overview of the ADA's provisions. The next section reviews the evidence of three kinds of effects: impact on wages and employment rates, changes in employer attitudes and practices, and the law's empowering effect on people with disabilities.

Our review of employment data finds little support for the claim that Title I has hurt the people it was passed to protect, but there is also no evidence that the statute has substantially improved their employment opportunities as a group. Many studies have found a decline in employment rates among people with disabilities in the wake of the ADA, but the evidence that these declines were caused by Title I is weak. While Title I protects people who require no more than a "reasonable accommodation" to perform a job in question, the employment data includes a much broader range of people, many, if not most, of whom could not meet Title I's qualification standard. Studies that "correct" for this difference find no, or even a slightly positive, impact on employment.

17. See Blanck, Time, supra note 15, at 301.
Part of the work of any antidiscrimination regime is to encourage cultural change in the workplace. Title I's effect can also be measured by workplace attitudes and behaviors. Negative employer attitudes towards individuals with disabilities persist, but studies have found that most employers know about, and have taken steps to implement, the law. These steps include integrating ADA standards into their Equal Employment Opportunity polices, changing hiring procedures, and providing reasonable accommodations. A small but interesting body of evidence has found that people with disabilities themselves have been empowered by the ADA, which can change their views of what they are entitled to, and give them a tool to use in their negotiations with employers.

In Part III of this paper, we look at how the legal system has implemented the ADA. If people protected by the statute are like other potential litigants, only a small minority of them file administrative charges when they have the opportunity. Still, more than 200,000 people filed claims in the first ten years that the law was in effect, and they represent an important measure of what it means to be protected from discrimination. There is no denying that courts have interpreted the ADA narrowly. Changes in the text of the law may be necessary to restore protection to the people Congress apparently intended to protect. But narrow interpretation is only one part of the problem. The empirical data shows, convincingly, that state and federal administrative agencies, and the federal courts, are providing poor service to plaintiffs, and that even a broadly interpreted ADA will fail in its promise if the flaws in the enforcement system are not addressed.

In computing the balance sheet for the ADA we should not forget that, for all the problems of narrow construction and poor implementation, tens of thousands of individuals with disabilities have directly benefited from filing claims under the law. We conclude with advice to lawmakers based on the empirical data. The time has come for Congress to revisit the ADA and the promises it made in 1990. For people whose disabilities make it difficult to work, even with an accommodation, anti-discrimination law cannot have much of an effect on employment rates except as part of a comprehensive

21. See id. at 305.
policy encompassing social security, health care, training programs, and tax incentives. Only Congress can rewrite the statute to protect people who can work but whose disabilities have been excluded from coverage under the statute by the courts. Furthermore, as important as it is to rewrite the law, it is at least as important that Congress, state legislatures, and the bar take steps to repair our broken enforcement system for resolving employment discrimination disputes; more funds, greater use of mediation, and better legal services are essential to making the ADA a real remedy for employment discrimination.

I. THE ADA AND ITS EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities.\(^{22}\) It is based on, and supplements, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and other earlier laws.\(^{23}\) The ADA has five sections, referred to in the law as "Titles."\(^{24}\) Title I contains its employment provisions, the other titles deal with matters including state and local government services and access to public accommodations.\(^{25}\)

The ADA’s definition of “disability” is a crucial factor in the effort to understand its effects. In general, people are considered disabled for the purposes of the ADA if they satisfy at least one of three criteria: they must have: 1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities,” 2) “a record of such an impairment,” or 3) are “regarded as having such an impairment.”\(^{26}\) Title I prohibits employment discrimination only against “qualified individuals with disabilities.”\(^{27}\) A qualified individual with a disability is one who meets the skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of a position, and who can perform the essential functions of the job under the same conditions as any other worker or with what is known as a “reasonable accommodation” to the disability.\(^{28}\) "Reasonable accommodations” are defined in Title I as changes to the

\(^{23}\) See id. § 12133.
\(^{25}\) Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 24.
\(^{27}\) Id. § 12112(a).
work environment, or process, that allow a person with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunity; they include making facilities accessible, restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules, reassigning the worker to a more suitable position if one is available, and modifying equipment or devices. An accommodation is not considered reasonable if it creates an undue burden for the employer. "Undue burden" includes financial hardship, but also accommodations that are disruptive or that would change the nature or operation of a business.

Title I applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees, both private and public, as well as to employment agencies, labor organizations, and joint labor-management committees. It prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with a disability in any aspect of employment. The prohibition embraces discrimination in job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, fringe benefits, and job training. Inquiries about the existence, nature, or severity of a disability before hiring an individual are prohibited, though an employer may require a medical examination after a job offer has been made if it is required of all new employees, is job related, and is consistent with business necessity.

The enforcement of the ADA differs from Title to Title. Under Title I, individuals who believe they have been subject to employment discrimination due to a disability may file an administrative charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or an equivalent state or local human rights agency. Later, they may file a lawsuit, but only after receiving a "right-to-sue letter" from one of the aforementioned agencies. Federal law provides that winning plaintiffs

30. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
31. Id. § 12111(10).
32. Id. § 12111(2), (5)(A).
33. Id. § 12112(a).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 12112(d).
36. Compare 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170-35.190 (2006) (setting up enforcement mechanisms for Title II, by private suit or federal agencies, provided such agencies meet jurisdictional requirements), with id. §§ 36.501-36.506 (laying out enforcement mechanisms for Title III, including private suits by the parties, and possible intervention of the U.S. Attorney General), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.27-1601.29 (2006) (detailing the manner in which complaining parties and the EEOC work together to prosecute civil cases under Title I).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e) (2006).
can recover attorney's fees from the defendant under Title I,\textsuperscript{39} but offers no guarantee of legal services in the prosecution of the suit.\textsuperscript{40}

II. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF TITLE I

Congress intended the elimination of disability-based employment discrimination to increase the ability of people with disabilities to participate in the labor market on the same basis as others.\textsuperscript{41} Here, we will consider several indicators that may be used to measure Title I's success: 1) employment rates and wages; 2) employer attitudes and practices; and 3) "empowerment" effects among people with disabilities themselves.

A. Employment Rates and Wage Disparities

Studies differ both on what happened to the wage and employment rates of people with disabilities in the decade following the passage of the ADA, and whether the ADA was the cause of the various changes they identified.\textsuperscript{42} There is a consensus that the employment rate declined in the 1990s for people reporting they had conditions limiting their ability to work, but whether this trend extended to wages, or to people more likely to be protected by Title I, is still debated.\textsuperscript{43} Disagreement starts with whether the most commonly used data sets properly define disability, and extends to more arcane points of study methodology.\textsuperscript{44} Analysis is complicated by the changing judicial interpretation of "disability" over time,\textsuperscript{45} and by the fact that in many states people with disabilities had substantial protection from discrimination even before the ADA was passed.\textsuperscript{46} These issues are

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item 40. See id. §§ 12117, 2000e-5(f)(1).
\item 41. See JULIE HOTCHKISS, THE LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES: THE ADA AND BEYOND 6 (2003).
\item 42. See, e.g., id. at 70-71; Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton, Introduction to THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE, 16-18, 20 (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003).
\item 43. See HOTCHKISS, supra note 41, at 70-71; Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton, supra note 15, at 16-18, 20.
\item 44. See Blanck, Time, supra note 15, at 301-02.
\item 46. See Jolls & Prescott, supra note 7, at 3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
fully discussed elsewhere. In this section, we will briefly summarize the findings and most significant methodological issues.

Most studies of employment rates use one of three nationally representative data sets: the Current Population Survey (CPS), the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), all of which define “disability” primarily in terms of a self-reported health condition that limits, or entirely prevents, work. Researchers analyzing these data sets generally agree that the rate of employment for working aged adults with disabilities declined during the 1990s, not only absolutely, but also relative to the rate for those without disabilities.

Fewer studies have looked at changes in wages over time. DeLeire analyzed SIPP data on men between 1986 and 1995 and found no significant declines. Acemogolu and Angrist, using similar methods as DeLeire, analyzed CPS data on men and women between the ages of 21 and 58 over the same time period and reached the same conclusion. Moon and Shin, using SIPP data on men between 1990 and 1992, found that the real wages of people with disabilities had declined relative to men without disabilities.

Title I’s definition of disability excludes people who cannot work (or who require more than a “reasonable” accommodation to do so), and covers people who have no serious impairment or work limitations, but are mistakenly treated as if they had such an impairment or limitation. Thus, the employment rate of people with serious work limitations is a flawed indicator of the statute’s effect on those it was designed to help.

A set of questions on the SIPP about functional and activity limitations that do not prevent work allowed Kruse and Schur to investigate changes in a segment of the disabled population that more closely approximates the population covered by the Title I. They found that employment rates did decrease, in the 1990s, for individuals reporting a work disability, but that employment rates actually increased for those with functional and activity limitations that do not prevent those individuals from working. Disagreement about the validity of studies based on a work-limitation definition of disability persists, even as the Bureau of Labor Statistics works to craft new questions that are more compatible with the ADA’s definition of disability for use in the CPS.

Researchers have tested many explanations for the employment outcomes they have found. They have studied the importance of demographic factors and education; changes in the nature of work or in the job market; the changing size and composition of the disabled population; changes in the costs of health care and modes of health care finance, and expansions of the Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs, including both lowering eligibility requirements and increasing benefits for some recipients. Reviewing this data, several leading researchers concluded

55. Id. at 61.
58. David C. Stapleton et al., Have Changes in the Nature of Work or the Labor Market Reduced Employment Prospects of Workers with Disabilities?, in THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE, supra note 15, at 125, 125.
61. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 48, at 935-36; Richard V. Burkhauser, Mary C. Daly & Andrew J. Houtenville, How Working Age People with Disabilities Fared Over the 1990s Business Cycle, EMP. & DISABILITY INST. COLLECTION (Employment & Disability Inst., Sch. of Indus. &
that SSDI and SSI expansion played a more significant role than any other factor, including the ADA, in the decline of employment rates among individuals with disabilities.62

Table 1 lists the studies that have focused on the effect of the ADA on employment among people with disabilities. Most studies used the work-limitation definition of disability and depended primarily on the temporal association between the passage (1990), or effective date (1992), of Title I of the ADA and employment changes to prove causation.63 Using both simple pre-post and year-by-year analyses,


63. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 49, at 917; DeLeire, supra note 49, at 701; Houtenville
Moon and Shin, DeLeire, and Acemoglu and Angrist all found robust declines in employment rates—Moon and Shin on the order of 6%, and DeLeire of 7%. Acemoglu and Angrist reported sharp drops in annual weeks of employment for men with disabilities aged 21-58 and women with disabilities under the age of 40. Moon and Shin also found a decline, in the log-real wages of men with disabilities, of 5.3% relative to men without disabilities, though it was significant only at the 0.1 level. Econometric modeling led both DeLeire and Acemoglu and Angrist to specifically attribute these declines to the reasonable accommodation requirement of Title I; Acemoglu and Angrist thought that the reduction in disabled employment also reflected employers’ expectations of increased lawsuit costs.

Table 1:
Studies of the Effect of the ADA on Employment Rates and Wages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Study population</th>
<th>Definition of Disability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

& Burkhauser, supra note 48, at 5; Jolls & Prescott, supra note 7, at 8.
64. Moon & Shin, supra note 49, at 269.
68. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 49, at 929.
70. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 49, at 950; DeLeire, supra note 49, at 711.
71. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 49, at 950.
72. Respondents reported having a health problem or disability that prevents or limits work.
Using different definitions of disability, and different time periods, leads to different results. Kruse and Schur used fourteen different measures of disability from the SIPP, representing permutations along three dimensions (activity limitations, receipt of disability income, and reported ability to work), to facilitate comparisons between people more and less likely to be covered by the ADA. They found that the subgroup of people most likely to be covered by Title I saw an improvement in employment rates, while employment rates declined for others.

73. Classification was based on fourteen different SIPP disability measures representing three dimensions: activity limitations, receipt of disability income, and reported ability to work. Kruse & Schur, supra note 15, at 41-42.

74. Moon & Shin, supra note 49, at 271-72. Classification was based on responses concerning use of a wheelchair or long term use of a cane, crutches, or a walker; activity limitations; reporting one or more disability conditions; and receiving federal benefits based on inability to work. Id.

75. Kruse & Schur, supra note 15, at 41.

76. Id. at 41, 53, 61.
Houtenville and Burkhauser replicated Acemoglu and Angrist’s study testing the sensitivity of different definitions of disability, as well as the effects of different periods of time. They confirmed that the employment rate for people with a work limitation did indeed decline when measured by annual weeks worked during one calendar year. Using a two-year time period, however, suggested that employment began to decline in the mid 1980s and actually improved sharply in 1992 for some age-sex categories. They concluded there was “little evidence of a negative effect of the ADA on the population with longer term disabilities and some evidence of a positive effect of the ADA.”

All the studies that attempt to test the impact of the ADA by temporal association with national trends in employment and wages suffer from the same flaw: many states had laws against discrimination before the ADA came into effect, so we cannot assume that Title I represented a change in the rules for all employers and employees. Two studies specified state-law variables, making it possible to compare the employment and wages of people with disabilities in states with and without various ADA-like disability protections at the same points in time.

Beegle and Stock compared state-level employment conditions for people with disabilities at three points: in 1970, 1980, and 1990. Since all three time points were before the ADA took effect, the study should be understood as using similar state laws as a proxy for the federal statute. They found that disability discrimination laws were associated with lower relative earnings for people with disabilities and slightly lower relative disabled labor force participation rates. However, once they controlled for differential time trends in disabled and non-disabled employment, they found no systematic negative relationship between the laws and relative employment rates of the disabled. Of course, this also suggests that there was no substantial positive impact of state disability discrimination laws.

Jolls and Prescott studied states with three different legal conditions

77. Houtenville & Burkhauser, supra note 48, at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6.
82. Beegle & Stock, supra note 81, at 843.
83. Id. at 807.
84. Id.
between 1990-1993: states with no protections comparable to the ADA, in which the ADA would represent an entirely new influence; “protection without accommodation” states, whose laws prohibited employment discrimination against people with disabilities but did not require reasonable accommodation; and “ADA-like” states whose protections for the employment rights of people with disabilities both prohibited discrimination and required reasonable accommodation.\textsuperscript{8} They found that employment rates for people with disabilities began to decline in 1993, relative to pre-ADA levels, in all three categories of states.\textsuperscript{86} The extent to which the ADA was new law made no significant difference, making it difficult as a general matter to attribute the declines to employers’ reactions to new legal requirements.\textsuperscript{87}

Jolls and Prescott’s design allowed them to test the effects of specific ADA mandates.\textsuperscript{88} They found that the employment rates of individuals with disabilities fell ten percent in the early days of the ADA in “protection without accommodation” states, compared to states that already had full “ADA-like” statutes, indicating that the reasonable accommodation requirement had an independent negative effect on employment rates.\textsuperscript{89} Yet, they also found little or no change in post-ADA employment rates among people with disabilities in states that had no protection before, indicating that the ADA did not have a significant impact where it brought entirely new mandates.\textsuperscript{90} Considering other important and confounding variables (e.g., the size of the employer covered, the differences between the states in eligibility for disability benefits and the amounts of disability benefits, the states’ economic environments, and the preexisting state-group specific trends in disabled employment), Jolls and Prescott concluded that, apart from the short term effect of the new reasonable accommodation requirement, there was no link between the ADA and the employment declines experienced by people with disabilities starting in 1993 and continuing forward.\textsuperscript{91}

B. Employer Practices and Attitudes

The ADA requires employers to eliminate discriminatory practices

\textsuperscript{85.} Jolls & Prescott, \textit{supra} note 7, at 3, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{86.} \textit{Id.} at 17-18.
\textsuperscript{87.} \textit{Id.} at 18.
\textsuperscript{88.} \textit{See id.} at 3.
\textsuperscript{89.} \textit{Id.} at 4.
\textsuperscript{90.} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{91.} Jolls & Prescott, \textit{supra} note 7, at 28.
and promote equal opportunity by making reasonable accommodations for workers with disabilities.\textsuperscript{92} We can assess the impact of the ADA on employment by asking what employers have done to comply with the law, and whether there is evidence that the attitudes of employers towards people with disabilities have improved. These data show a high level of awareness of the law and substantial compliance activity.\textsuperscript{93} They do not shed much light on the sincerity of the effectiveness of employer efforts, and suggest that negative attitudes towards the disabled persists.\textsuperscript{94}

At the time of enactment, many employers were uninformed about the ADA and had significant concerns about the costs it was going to impose.\textsuperscript{95} This trend seems to have changed rather quickly. More durable has been the tendency to differentiate among workers with disabilities according to the type of impairment.\textsuperscript{96} Employers feel more positively about people with physical or sensory disabilities than they do about people with psychiatric or cognitive disabilities.\textsuperscript{97} There is less acceptance of people whose disabilities are perceived as having been caused by factors under their control than for "innocent" victims (for example, a person paralyzed in an accident caused by her own drinking, versus a person paralyzed by the actions of a drunken stranger).\textsuperscript{98} Concern about the costs of accommodating a person with disabilities has been a major driver of attitudes, but interacts with attributions and fairness concerns.\textsuperscript{99}

Given the poor empirical correlation between attitudes about employing people with disabilities and actual employer behavior,\textsuperscript{100} attitude studies may be more suggestive of the complexity of workplace decision-making, and the need for further research than conclusive about

\textsuperscript{92} 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000).
\textsuperscript{93} See Bruyere et al., supra note 18 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{94} See id. at 195-96.
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 195.
\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 195-96; Reed Greenwood & Virginia Anne Johnson, Employer Perspectives on Workers with Disabilities, 53 J. REHABILITATION 37, 38-39 (1987).
\textsuperscript{97} Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 195.
\textsuperscript{98} Id. at 195-96; Tara L. Mitchell & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Attribution of Responsibility and Work History on Perceptions of Reasonable Accommodations, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 733, 735-40 (2006).
\textsuperscript{100} Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 196.
the employer response to the ADA. Organizations have historically made changes in policies, procedures, and organizational structure in response to new national civil rights laws. Organizational compliance actions create the environment in which managers make decisions about hiring, promotion, and accommodation. Perceptions about organizational adherence to the ADA have been found to be a better predictor of how managers translate the ADA into practice than their personal attitudes about people with disabilities. Larger employers typically respond to antidiscrimination laws by creating policies and internal equal employment opportunity (EEO) offices to help the organization draw the line between legal and illegal behavior, and to minimize and resolve discrimination disputes. In a 1998 survey of human resource managers, 72% reported their company had formal procedures for requesting reasonable accommodations and presenting grievances. Employers too small to support a separate human resources or equal employment opportunity staff may respond to antidiscrimination laws in less formal, but still important, ways.

Aside from a number of small surveys, qualitative studies, and dissertations, the best evidence on the organizational response to the ADA comes from a series of large probability surveys of human

101. Legal scholars in discrimination have argued that discrimination is (more) often a result of unintentional errors of judgment than of conscious animus. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1165, 1241-42 (1995) (arguing that discrimination is more often a result of unintentional errors of judgment than of conscious animus). According to this view, the most important "negative" attitudes are not, for example, fear of people with disabilities, but mistaken judgments about their needs, abilities and preferences, and in this context, discrimination law and policy have important educative functions. See id. But see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO STATE L.J. 1023, 1023 (2006) (challenging the empirical foundations and, therefore, the policy prescriptions, of this "implicit prejudice" view).

102. See Edelman, supra note 13, at 1531-32.


104. See Edelman, supra note 13, at 1549.


General awareness of the law was high, with large majorities (80-90%) of both federal and private respondents reporting that they had received training in specific elements of the law, particularly reasonable accommodation and non-discrimination in hiring.\textsuperscript{109} Title I puts considerable emphasis on reasonable accommodations as an instrument for workplace inclusion, making the extent to which employers provide accommodations a good measure of compliance. Bruyere’s surveys tracked ten types of accommodations, including changes in accessibility, transportation, supervisory methods, and job requirements.\textsuperscript{110} Overall, the studies found that most employers were making accommodations of all types, but there were important variations.\textsuperscript{111} Federal government employers were substantially more likely to report accommodations of virtually every kind than private employers,\textsuperscript{112} and large employers reported a greater use of accommodations than smaller ones.\textsuperscript{113} The differences between federal and private, and small and large employers were largely accounted for by the number of employers that reported never having been asked for an accommodation, but might also reflect a greater emphasis on compliance within the federal government.\textsuperscript{114} A lack of requests for accommodations could indicate an unsupportive environment, employees’ unfamiliarity with their rights, or the use of informal, undocumented accommodations in smaller workplaces.\textsuperscript{115} For all employers, physical accessibility, workplace or device re-configuration, and policy change accommodations were more common than changes in training, supervisory methods, or job structure.\textsuperscript{116}

Most federal (95%) and private (82%) employers reported making facilities more accessible.\textsuperscript{117} There were sharper differences in other areas. Government employers were twice as likely to report providing communication access to people with hearing impairments (91% vs. 43%) or visual impairments (77% vs. 37%) than non-governmental

\textsuperscript{108} Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 194.  
\textsuperscript{109} Bruyere, supra note 105, at 23.  
\textsuperscript{110} Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 199 tbl.2.  
\textsuperscript{111} Id.  
\textsuperscript{112} Bruyere, supra note 105, at 11 fig.3.  
\textsuperscript{113} Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 199.  
\textsuperscript{114} See Bruyere, supra note 105, at 12; Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 199.  
\textsuperscript{115} See Bruyere et al., supra note 18, at 204.  
\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 199 tbl.2.  
\textsuperscript{117} Bruyere, supra note 105, at 17.
Fewer than half of employers, either federal or private, provided flexible test-taking procedures or a scent-free environment (for people with chemical sensitivities), but most employers who did not provide these accommodations reported that such accommodations were never requested. A similar pattern, and explanation, emerged in studies comparing large and small private employers, with smaller employers consistently less likely to report various compliance activities.

The ADA requires a large number of changes in routine procedures that can also be used to mark employer compliance. Brueyere tracked ten indicators in the hiring process, ranging from changing where recruiting was conducted, through overcoming communication barriers with technology or interpreters, to modifying tests and medical exams. As with post-hire reasonable accommodations, employers were much more likely to make what they reported to be “easy” changes, like ensuring physical accessibility of the interview site, than to take on communication barriers. Again, federal employers were much more likely to report providing these accommodations than private employers, apparently because private employers were less aware of how to overcome communication barriers.

A survey focusing on the private-sector use of adaptive information technologies found that fewer than half of the respondents reported that their organizations had experience in modifying a computer to make it accessible to an employee with a disability. Respondents employed by large organizations were more likely than those employed by small organizations to report familiarity with assistive technology and accessible Web designs, and to report that their organizations had made modifications to computers and adaptations to work stations. In general, however, there was a low level of familiarity with assistive technology. Almost half (46%) were familiar with screen magnifiers, approximately 33% with speech recognition software, about 25% with

118. Id. at 17 fig.10.
119. Id.
120. Brueyere et al., supra note 18, at 203-04.
121. Id. at 17 fig.10.
122. Id. at 17 fig.10.
124. See id. at 9.
125. Id. at 9-10.
126. See id. at 9.
video captioning, about 20% with Braille readers/displays, about 16% with screen readers, and only 13% with accessible Web design.\textsuperscript{127}

These studies leave little doubt that employers are generally aware of the ADA and have taken steps to meet its requirements. They show that employers are making accommodations in hiring processes as well as in the workplace. The studies do not allow confident conclusions about how well these measures are being implemented, or the extent to which people with disabilities have benefited or perceived any benefits. However, Bruyere's respondents report that negative attitudes and lack of information still stand as barriers to the hiring and retention of workers with disabilities, and that smaller employers may need more help to understand and implement the law's requirements.\textsuperscript{128} Not surprisingly, Bruyere recommends more research.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{C. Empowerment Effects}

The ADA could have a positive impact by empowering workers with more tools for achieving their goals or vindicating their rights. Filing an ADA complaint is one way people could use the law to defend their rights. More than 200,000 individuals filed ADA discrimination claims in the decade after the statute was passed,\textsuperscript{130} but research on how people "use" the law predicts that only a small minority of people with disabilities will invoke the ADA to deal with discrimination.\textsuperscript{131} People often use a language of rights to define their social goals and positions,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{127} Id.
\bibitem{129} Bruyere, \textit{supra} note 105, at 29.
\bibitem{130} Moss et al., \textit{supra} note 37, at 2.
\bibitem{131} Moss et al., \textit{supra} note 20, at 308.
\end{thebibliography}
and disadvantaged groups and their advocates often see the defining of rights as a policy solution to social problems. At the same time, research has consistently shown that Americans are loath to sue, and that civil rights laws are among the least often invoked. Research on the ADA suggests that people with disabilities conform to this pattern of law avoidance, not simply because they are unaware of the law or unable to get a lawyer, but because filing a complaint implicates a variety of deep social and psychological issues.

Just as organizations may comply with the law without active enforcement, individuals may “rely” on the law in their own strategies for daily living without formally invoking it. An important study by Engel and Munger explored this concept in the ADA context. Detailed life-history interviews with sixty individuals with a variety of disabilities found at least three ways in which the ADA was changing their lives, apart from litigation:

First, rights can change the self-perceptions of individuals with disabilities, enabling them to envision more ambitious career paths by incorporating in their plans the reasonable accommodations and the nondiscriminatory treatment guaranteed by the ADA. Second, ADA rights become active through cultural and discursive shifts even when rights do not directly transform an individual’s self-perceptions. By becoming part of everyday speech, thought, and action, ADA rights affect the way others perceive individuals with disabilities as employees. Third, ADA rights may become active through institutional transformations that are not directed at any particular individual. [R]ights are sometimes implemented unilaterally by employers, rather than through advocacy by the rights-bearers themselves.
While difficult to quantify, these “empowerment effects” must be seen as among the most important forms of impact that a civil rights statute can have. The Engel and Munger study, although qualitative, offers intriguing suggestions that the ADA may be working through these mechanisms. Bruyere’s work, along with some unpublished studies, has found signs that people with disabilities are reluctant to ask for accommodations. Further research along these lines would be valuable.

III. RETHINKING THE “CAUSE” OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TITLE I

Relating changes in the employment situations of people with disabilities to Title I is not a straightforward matter. We can, however, reduce uncertainty, and guide reasonable inferences about cause and effect, by clearly specifying how the ADA has been applied and identifying factors that might confound its intended effects. In this section we will discuss two key factors: judicial interpretation of the statute’s terms, and how the law has been implemented in courts and administrative enforcement agencies. The former has been the subject of much debate. The latter has been given far too little attention.

A. Title I in the Courts: Narrowing the Protected Class

Title I did not purport to protect everyone with a disability, but only those who met its definition of a “qualified person with a disability.” Many proponents of the ADA have argued that Congress intended the definition to be liberally applied, as it had been under the Rehabilitation Act, so that even substantial accommodations would be deemed “reasonable” to encourage the inclusion of low-functioning people with disabilities, and so that “impairment” and “major life activity” would be liberally construed to ensure that qualified individuals did not suffer employment discrimination simply because of prejudice, fear, or

138. See id. at 244-45.
outdated stereotypes.\textsuperscript{141} Over the last fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has led the federal courts in interpreting Title I narrowly.\textsuperscript{142} In the following subsections, we will summarize the Court’s main rulings and review the data on case outcomes.

1. Supreme Court Decisions: Narrowing the Protected Class

Membership in the protected class, a virtual non-issue under other discrimination statutes where a plaintiff’s status is obvious (for example, race or gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965,\textsuperscript{143} or age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act),\textsuperscript{144} has been the single most litigated issue in ADA cases. Even under prior law, the status of a plaintiff as “disabled” was required to be determined in an “individualized inquiry,” but as the ADA case law developed, the notion that disability determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis took on a decisive importance.\textsuperscript{145} Under this approach, a person is found to be disabled; conditions are not categorical disabilities.\textsuperscript{146} Thus, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that she has a condition, such as epilepsy or carpal tunnel syndrome, that is commonly considered a disability. Rather, she must prove to the court exactly how this condition constitutes a substantial limitation of a major activity in her own life, and yet does not prevent her from doing the job at issue.\textsuperscript{147}

Many conditions—such as diabetes, hypertension, and depression—have been found to meet the definition of impairment under the law, but are controllable through medication so that, at least most of the time, their effects on daily life are minimal.\textsuperscript{148} In a trio of important

\textsuperscript{142} See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 127.
\textsuperscript{145} See Feldblum, supra note 45, at 140; Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999).
\textsuperscript{146} See Albertson’s, Inc., 527 U.S. at 566-67.
\textsuperscript{147} See id.
cases involving nearsightedness, hypertension, and monocular vision, the Supreme Court held that mitigating, or corrective, measures should be considered in determining whether an individual has a disability under the ADA. Under this interpretation, an employer may discriminate against someone because he has, for example, diabetes, but as long as the victim is successfully controlling his condition with medication he has no recourse under the ADA. Of course, if the employee is not controlling the condition he not only suffers symptoms but also may find himself excluded from coverage under the ADA because he is too impaired to do the job, even with a reasonable accommodation.

The Court also took a narrow view of the "regarded as" prong of the definition. In older cases under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court attributed this prong to Congress' concern with protecting people with disabilities against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from "archaic attitudes and laws" and "the fact that the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps." In Sutton and Murphy, however, the Court introduced what amounts to a rather difficult "intent" element into the inquiry. The Court required the employee to show not only that the employer regarded the employee as unable to do the job at issue because of disability, but also that the employer had essentially thought out its decision in terms of the primary definition of disability. In Sutton, the Court ruled against plaintiffs that were barred from serving as pilots for failing to meet vision requirements that they argued were more stringent than necessary:

Petitioners have failed to allege adequately that their poor eyesight is regarded as an impairment that substantially limits them in the major life activity of working. They allege only that the respondent regards their poor vision as precluding them from holding positions as a "global airline pilot." . . . . Because the position of global airline pilot

150. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518, 521.
151. See Albertson's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 559, 565 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482).
152. See id. at 565 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482); Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
153. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488.
155. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521-22; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
156. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
is a single job, this allegation does not support the claim that respondent regards petitioners as having a substantially limiting impairment.\footnote{Id. at 492-93 (citation omitted) (citing 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2006)).}

The mechanic in \textit{Murphy} had been doing his job with excellent performance ratings for years, but was fired because his hypertension barred him from getting a Department of Transportation truck-driver's license that his employer generally required mechanics to possess.\footnote{Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519-20 (citing 49 C.F.R § 391.41(a), (b)(6) (2006)).} Murphy showed that he did not actually need to drive in his work, but failed to show the employer "regarded him" as disabled because there was no evidence the employer thought he was too disabled to do any job other than the one that required the license.\footnote{Id. at 524-25.} In both cases, people were fired because of impairments that the employer believed precluded them from the job they had but were not protected by the ADA because they could not prove that the employer thought about their fitness for a wide range of other similar jobs.\footnote{Id. at 520, 525; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76, 490.}

The Supreme Court's rulings have restricted the definition of a "qualified person with a disability" in other significant ways. In \textit{Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams},\footnote{534 U.S. 184 (2002).} there was no dispute that the plaintiff had suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome for many years, had to change job assignments several times because of it, and had trouble with basic manual tasks like gardening, dressing herself, and housework.\footnote{Id. at 187-88, 202.} In holding that her impairment did not substantially limit a major life activity, the Court ruled that the word "substantially" excluded "impairments that interfere in only a minor way" with such an activity, and narrowed "major life activity" to mean one that is "of central importance to daily life."\footnote{Id. at 197 (emphasis added) (citing Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999); \textit{WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY} 1363 (1976)).} Despite her undisputed impairment, and the demonstrable limitations it created, the plaintiff failed to qualify as disabled because "she could still brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the house."\footnote{Id. at 202 (citation omitted).}

For many people with disabilities, medication, devices, adaptability, and sheer grit can mean that they are not in fact...
substantially limited in the activities of daily life. For them, the real barrier to participation in employment may be prejudice or stereotype, meaning that when they suffer discrimination the only “major life activity” their impairment has limited is work itself, and then only because of the attitudes or actions of others. Under prior law, and in the early days of the ADA, “working” seemed to be well accepted as a major life activity, but in *Sutton*, *Murphy*, and *Williams*, the Supreme Court cast serious doubt on this acceptance, suggesting that if the only activity that is impaired is working, the plaintiff will need to show that she is “unable to work in a broad class of jobs.” In the words of the National Council on Disability (NCD),

> [t]here are extensive examples of situations in the case law in which plaintiffs have been fired, refused employment, or otherwise disadvantaged in the workplace because of their actual or perceived impairments but have been unable to bring ADA actions because they could not meet what one federal court of appeals called [that] “weighty showing.”

2. Lower Court Decisions: Few Plaintiff Victories

The effect of narrowing Supreme Court and courts of appeals rulings can clearly be seen in the outcomes of reported ADA cases. A series of annual studies conducted by the editors of the *Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter* analyzed Title I final case decisions in federal courts. The studies have highlighted how rarely plaintiffs secure a favorable court judgment or jury verdict in published ADA cases.

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166. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 2, at 51.
decisions.\textsuperscript{168} Taking into account reversals on appeal, the plaintiff success rate in these cases ranged from just under 8% between 1992 and 1997, to as low as 3% in 2002-2004.\textsuperscript{169} Professor Colker’s study of published appellate decisions found that courts ruled in favor of defendants 94\% of the time.\textsuperscript{170} Courts of appeals reversed pro-defendant outcomes in trial courts only 21\% of the time in Title I cases, compared to rates of 26\% to 48\% in other types of cases Colker reviewed.\textsuperscript{171} There was a similar gap in appellate reversals of trial court decisions in favor of plaintiffs: in ADA cases, plaintiff trial court victories were reversed 60\% of the time, compared to a range of 33\% to 52\% in other types of cases.\textsuperscript{172} Only prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement were more likely than Title I plaintiffs to have a win reversed (69\%).\textsuperscript{173}

3. Case Outcomes Through Settlements: Benefits for Many Plaintiffs

While the studies of published Title I decisions demonstrate the impact of the narrow judicial interpretation of the law, reported case decisions are not a reliable indicator of overall outcomes because most lawsuits are settled without a reported decision. Since settlements are voluntary, we presume that most of them entail some sort of payment or other benefit to the plaintiff. Moss and her colleagues collected data from federal court files, on a nationally representative sample of 4114 lawsuits filed between 1993 and March 31, 2001, and linked the cases with administrative data obtained from the EEOC.\textsuperscript{174} Of the 3624 federal court cases with identifiable outcomes, 2219 (61\%) were classified as settlements.\textsuperscript{175} These findings are consistent with an earlier

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{Id.} at 253.
  \item \textsuperscript{172} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Id.} at 254 tbl.5.
  \item \textsuperscript{174} Moss et al., \textit{supra} note 20, at 303-04.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} \textit{Id.} at 305. This included 1397 cases (38.5\%) in which the docket explicitly mentioned settlement and 822 (22\%) where settlement was inferred from the docket file information as a whole. \textit{Id.} Combining court rulings and settlements, the researchers found that up to 62\% (n= 2266) of the sample lawsuits may have brought some benefit to the plaintiffs. \textit{Id.} For more of the details of the analysis, see \textit{id.}
\end{itemize}
study of ADA cases in one judicial district.\textsuperscript{176} The study confirmed that plaintiffs lose most cases that are decided by a judge on motions to dismiss or on motions for summary judgment.\textsuperscript{177} Its finding that ADA plaintiffs whose cases go to trial do as well as other civil rights plaintiffs supports the view that the narrow definition of disability is the main doctrinal factor driving the low success rate for plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{178}

The Moss et al. study also indicated that the vast majority of people who were eligible to file a Title I lawsuit in federal court did not invoke this right.\textsuperscript{179} During the period covered by the study, 201,371 Title I charges filed with the EEOC or a state or local Fair Employment Practice Agency (FEPA) were not resolved to the charging parties' satisfaction and were, therefore, eligible to be filed as lawsuits.\textsuperscript{180} The researchers estimated that only 27,725 lawsuits were actually filed, meaning that up to 87\% of employment claims filed with state and federal agencies were abandoned without a resolution.\textsuperscript{181} The administrative process does serve a screening function, sparing the courts the labor of dealing with unsupported allegations, but the sheer volume of abandoned cases points to another important set of problems in the implementation of Title I, which we turn to next.

\textbf{B. The Title I Enforcement System: Implementation Problems}

Title I is enforced by the same agencies, and under the same procedures, as the nation's other employment discrimination laws.\textsuperscript{182} People who believe they have been discriminated against in employment on the basis of a disability may file an administrative charge with the EEOC, or a state or local Fair Employment Practice Agency that contracts with the EEOC, which initiates an administrative dispute resolution process.\textsuperscript{183} If the administrative process fails to produce a satisfactory result, the worker can file an ADA lawsuit in state or federal

\textsuperscript{176} Louis S. Rulli, \textit{Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the Next Decade?}, 9 TEM. POL. & CIV. R. L. REV. 345, 363 (2000).
\textsuperscript{177} See id.
\textsuperscript{178} See id. at 363-64.
\textsuperscript{179} See Moss et al., supra note 20, at 304-05.
\textsuperscript{180} See id. at 305.
\textsuperscript{181} Id.
\textsuperscript{182} Rulli, supra note 176, at 385.
\textsuperscript{183} Moss et al., supra note 37, at 29 n.147 (citing JOYCE E. TUCKER, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE AGENCIES (1995)).
Chronic under-funding of the EEOC, in the face of ever-growing workloads, has weakened the effectiveness of this enforcement system.

1. The Administrative Charge Process

The EEOC has primary enforcement authority for Title I. It contracts with state and local Fair Employment Practice Agencies to help in receiving and investigating employment discrimination charges. In theory, each case is investigated by the agency until it is settled, or a determination is made as to whether the charge is supported by "reasonable cause" to believe that discrimination has occurred. Individuals who want to get to court as quickly as possible can short-circuit the administrative process by asking for a "right to sue" letter. The EEOC can take unresolved cases to court on its own initiative either alone or in collaboration with a complainant's attorney.

In fact, the EEOC has never been able to investigate all, or even most, complaints. It has had a backlog of cases since its earliest days, a backlog that by 1993, one year after Title I took effect, had reached 96,945 cases. Shortly after the ADA was enacted, the EEOC tried to deal with its backlog with a new system of intake triage. Based on the complainant's initial submission, new cases were separated into three categories: clearly meritorious ("A") cases, clearly unsupported ("C") cases, or cases whose merits could only be determined after further investigation ("B"). The agency made substantial progress in reducing case-processing time, decreasing the inventory of charges awaiting resolution, focusing investigative resources onto cases it believed to be strong, increasing its rate of "reasonable cause"
determinations, and increasing the monetary benefits received by charging parties. By September 2000, 149,123 charges had been filed and resolved with the EEOC under the ADA, with median benefits of $6000 per closure.  

The new system is efficient, but has never been validated for accuracy. The C categorization is probably the most reliable because it depends upon objective factors like whether the employer has enough workers to be covered by the ADA. Approximately 25% of cases are classified as C and quickly dismissed. Categorization as an A case requires a greater “feel” for the facts that make for a strong case. About 17% of cases are put in the A group. The problem with the B category is that inclusion in this category rests on the classifier’s inability to assess the case’s merits without further fact-finding; most cases (57%) are rated B. Due to insufficient staff resources, most B cases, and even some A cases, are never seriously investigated, so the fate of a complaint hangs on a subjective rating based only on the information the complainant is able to articulate. Not surprisingly, good outcomes—settlements with benefits and reasonable cause findings—are highly correlated with the original classification decision. In spite of a very successful mediation program targeted at B cases, the majority of possibly meritorious ADA claims filed with the EEOC and FEPAs are never investigated or resolved.

2. Access to Legal Services

People do not need to retain an attorney to file a claim with the

194. See Moss et al., supra note 37, at 42 tbl.1.
195. The EEOC has done some evaluation of the “face validity” of the categorization system, by reviewing randomly selected files against two criteria: “(1) appropriate charge categorization and file documentation to support actions and (2) charge resolution.” EEOC, FY 2005 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 4, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2005/achieving_results.html#obj1_1 Given that categorization determines investigation, the EEOC’s approach does not test the most important measure: whether a case would still be categorized B or C on a more fully developed factual record.
196. See Moss et al., supra note 37, at 22.
197. Id. at 32-33.
198. See id. at 22.
199. Id. at 33.
200. See id. at 33, 102.
201. See id. at 34.
202. Id. at 59.
204. Moss et al., supra note 37, at 34, 59, 68.
EEOC or a FEPA, nor does having an attorney during the administrative process raise the chances of resolving the case. The overall benefit rate for individuals with attorneys (17.2%) was nearly identical to the overall benefit rate for individuals without attorneys (17.1%). Having an attorney does have a significant effect on the size of monetary settlements. Median actual monetary benefits for individuals with attorneys were significantly higher ($19,750) than for individuals without attorneys ($4482). Median projected monetary benefits (mainly “front pay” or wage increases) were $19,500 for represented parties, compared to $16,200 for individuals without attorneys.

An inability to get legal help is probably one of the most important factors in the huge rate of claim abandonment between the administrative and judicial systems. People with attorneys during the EEOC/FEPA stage had significantly higher right-to-sue resolutions (31.4%) than individuals without attorneys (7.4%). Most (85%) Title I plaintiffs in suits brought in federal court had attorneys, and those with attorneys had much better court results: the proportion of cases that were settled or decided for the plaintiff were approximately three times higher among plaintiffs who were represented by an attorney than among those representing themselves (68% vs. 23%, p<0.0001).

3. ADA Complainants with Psychiatric Disabilities

Among the most troubling findings of ADA implementation research has been the difference in experiences and outcomes for people with psychiatric disabilities. People with psychiatric disabilities were less likely than people with other disabilities to have a case classified as “A” by the EEOC, and less likely than others to have a case resolved with benefits, even when controlling for categorization. They were slightly, but significantly, less likely to be referred by the EEOC to mediation, and employers were significantly less likely to agree to take part in mediation.
Once in court, people with psychiatric disabilities were significantly less likely than people with other disabilities to feel that they were “treated with respect,” that the judge was “fair to both sides,” and that they were satisfied, overall, with their experience of filing a lawsuit. These differences in perception corresponded to the actual differences in outcomes of the lawsuits filed by the two groups of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities were only half as likely as those with other disabilities to receive a settlement or favorable court decision, even when controlling for important co-factors such as health status, education, and having a lawyer. These data raise the possibility of “justice disparities” in the ADA enforcement system, which are durable differences in outcomes between cases brought by people with psychiatric disabilities and those brought by people with other disabilities that are not attributable to differences in the legal and factual merits of the cases.

CONCLUSION

The time has come for Congress to revisit the ADA and evaluate how well the law has kept the promises it made in 1990. Title I has not substantially improved employment rates among people with disabilities. In part, this is because Congress promised more than it could deliver, or was prepared to pay for. Although the preamble spoke of improving economic opportunity for tens of millions of Americans with a wide range of disabilities, Title I actually extended protection only to those who needed the least help. Substantially increasing employment opportunities for people with more substantial disabilities will require a more comprehensive effort to integrate non-discrimination policies with a wide range of others, including income supplements, health insurance, health care services, and employer tax benefits. Even for those the statute protected, Congress dropped the ball by failing to give the EEOC the funds to handle the new cases Title I brought forth.

The broken promises of the ADA also reflect the federal courts’

215. Id. at 108, 110.
216. See generally Baldwin & Marcus, supra note 62 (reporting differences in wages and employment for people with psychiatric disabilities versus those without disabilities, and attributing at least some of this to stigma).
217. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
narrow construction of the definition of disability and other key elements of the law. The protected class under Title I never included people who could not work, even with a reasonable accommodation. The courts, through a narrow construction of the statute, have now excluded a large proportion of people with disabilities who can work, and who suffer discrimination due to a physical or mental impairment, on the ground that they are not disabled enough to be protected by the ADA. Only Congressional action can redress this problem, and any new law on the books, without greater funding and capacity for enforcement, will be another hollow promise.

In the face of these findings, it is useful to heed the reminder that "[l]egal protections from discriminatory practice are probably indispensable, but such guarantees cannot be the only strategy toward ending the discrimination and social exclusion faced by Americans with disabilities."219 The ADA stands as a long-term commitment to integrating people with disabilities into the main stream of American life. The agencies, courts, lawyers, and employers responsible for fulfilling Congress’ promise can do better, and more, but only in the context of a broader social change in attitudes about, and behavior towards, people with disabilities.