Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm: Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children

Peter Wendel
INHERITANCE RIGHTS
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ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

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Kate Hudson is the biological daughter of Goldie Hawn and Bill Hudson. Goldie and Bill divorced when Kate was young, and Kate was raised by Goldie and Kurt Russell, Goldie’s longtime partner. If Kurt, a step-partner, had adopted Kate, and thereafter Bill died intestate, would/should Kate still be entitled to inherit from and through Bill?

I. INTRODUCTION

Due to changing social norms and evolving reproductive technology, the issue of what constitutes a family, and more specifically, what constitutes a legally recognized parent-child relationship, is one of the more complex and hotly debated issues in the legal academy. 2

1. Some states permit an adopted child to continue to inherit from and through his or her natural parents, but the great majority do not, unless the child qualifies for the stepparent adoption exception. See infra notes 54, 59-60 and accompanying text. Under the stepparent adoption exception, the adopted child retains the right to inherit from and through both natural parents, but only if the adoptive parent is married to one of the natural parents. See infra Part IV.


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Because inheritance rights attach themselves to a legally recognized parent-child relationship, the discussion has spilled over into the law of wills and trusts.\(^3\) Traditionally, inheritance rights have been based on family paradigms that assumed a traditional nuclear family.\(^4\) Increasingly, however, the traditional nuclear family is no longer the norm.\(^5\) The law of wills and trusts has failed to keep pace with these societal changes,\(^6\) a failing for which it has been harshly criticized.\(^7\) As

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5. Statistics from the 2000 U.S. Census show that for the first time less than twenty-five percent of all households in the United States are "traditional" families consisting of a married couple and children. Unmarried households increased fifty percent from 1990 to 2000, and the number of nonfamily households grew twice as fast as family households during that period.

In addition to an increase in unmarried cohabitants heading households, there has also been an increase in the number of families consisting of children with no biological ties to at least one parent. According to the Census, there were approximately 2.1 million adopted children and 4.4 million stepchildren in the country as of the year 2000.

Courts and legislators have been increasingly confronted with the challenge of providing a family law system that reflects the changing and diverse American family.


6. There have been some limited statutory efforts at increasing the number of legally recognized parent-child paradigms for inheritance purposes. For example, the Uniform Probate Code grants full inheritance rights to non-marital children. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998). It grants children adopted by a stepparent greater inheritance rights. See § 2-114(b). The Uniform Probate Code denies inheritance rights to a natural parent who has not openly treated the child as his or her own or who has refused to support the child. § 2-114(c). The Code includes non-marital children and adopted individuals in class gifts if, at a minimum, they qualify as intestate takers. § 2-705 (amended 1991). A handful of states grant a surviving domestic partner inheritance rights comparable to those of a spouse, but the details of how to qualify and the extent of the rights vary by jurisdiction. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 560:2-102, 2-201 to 2-214 (LexisNexis 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.5(c) (West 2005); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401 (Deering 2004). A number of states permit a child adopted after the death of either or both natural parents to continue to inherit from and through each of the natural parents. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451(a)(2) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.175(2) (2001).

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applied to the emerging phenomenon of step-partner adoptions, the failure to keep pace with family law developments is not only inequitable, it is also unconstitutional.

Step-partner adoption is cutting edge family law. It can involve either an unmarried same-sex couple or an unmarried heterosexual couple. Increasingly, states are recognizing the right of an unmarried

7. Many commentators have decried the failure of the law of wills and trusts to adopt a more functional approach to what constitutes a parent-child relationship. For a list of articles proposing revisions to the notions of what constitutes a family and what constitutes a legally recognized parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes, "based on function rather than form," see Foster, supra note 4, at 201-04; Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77, 79-81 (1998); Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 646 n.10 (2002) [hereinafter Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship]. This Article, however, does not go that far, proposing instead an expansion of an existing statutory provision under the prevailing paradigm approach.

8. Step-partner adoptions are a subset of third-parent adoptions. The third-parent adoption scenario assumes that the child has two legally recognized parents, that the adoption is by a single individual, and that the adoption is intended to legally displace only one of the natural parents. See infra Part V. The classic example of a third-parent adoption is a stepparent adoption. The adoptive party is married to the custodial parent, and the adoptive parent is intended to legally displace the non-custodial parent. See infra Part IV. Increasingly, however, courts are permitting adoptions by a third party who is not married to either of the natural parents. For a discussion of which jurisdictions permit such adoption, which do not, and which have not addressed the issue yet, see infra note 128. Typically the adoption is by the partner of one of the natural parents. The partner may be of the opposite sex or the same sex as the custodial parent. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06. The third-party adoption scenario assumes that, at the time of the adoption, the child already has two legally recognized parents (either of the opposite sex or of the same sex). This last assumption contrasts the third-parent adoption scenario from the second-parent adoption scenario. See infra note 117. For a discussion of the latter, see Alona R. Croteau, Comment, Voices in the Dark: Second Parent Adoptions When the Law is Silent, 50 LOY. L. REV. 675 (2004); Eleanor Michael, Note, Approaching Same-Sex Marriage: How Second Parent Adoption Cases Can Help Courts Achieve the "Best Interests of the Same-Sex Family," 36 CONN. L. REV. 1439, 1446 (2004); Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933 (2000); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (1999).


10. It is so new that there is no consensus on what it should be called. See infra notes 117, 137. This Article hereby denominates it "step-partner" adoption, an admittedly new term, because it is functionally indistinguishable from a stepparent adoption except for the fact that the adoptive parent is not married to the custodial parent. See infra note 137 and text accompanying notes 137-47. In light of the fact that increasingly family law no longer draws a distinction based on whether the adoptive parent is married to the custodial parent, the issue is whether it is right and/or legal for the law of wills and trusts to do so.

11. See infra notes 114-36 and accompanying text.
individual to adopt his or her partner's child. As applied to same-sex couples, this scenario is commonly referred to as a "second-parent" adoption. But inevitably second-parent adoptions will lead to third-parent adoptions. As same-sex couples break up, and the custodial parent enters into a new relationship with a new partner, that partner may want to adopt the custodial parent's child. Inasmuch as courts are recognizing second parent adoptions, there is no reason to believe the courts will not recognize such third-parent adoptions between same-sex couples.

Moreover, the step-partner adoption scenario is not limited to same-sex couples. The second parent adoption rule implicitly repudiates the traditional approach that an unmarried partner is unqualified to adopt a partner's child. There is no reason to limit such repudiation to same-sex couples. The courts that have addressed this issue have allowed unmarried heterosexuals to adopt their partner's child. Such adoptions constitute step-partner adoptions. While there are no statistics available on how many same-sex or heterosexual step-partner adoptions have occurred, they are becoming increasingly common, and with time they will only become more common in light of evolving social, demographic, and legal developments.

While family law has evolved to recognize the growing trend towards step-partner adoptions, the law of wills and trusts has not. In the classic "stranger" adoption paradigm, the general rule is: (1) the adoption severs the parent-child relationship between the adopted child and his or her parents (including severance of all inheritance rights), and (2) the adoption creates a parent-child relationship between the adopted child and his or her adoptive parent(s) (including full inheritance rights). When a child is adopted by a stepparent, however, the Uniform Probate Code and many states recognize a special stepparent adoption rule. Under it, (1) the adoption creates a parent-child relationship between the adopted child and the adoptive stepparent (with full inheritance rights); (2) the adoption does not affect the parent-child

12. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the reasons why a partner may want to adopt the other partner's child, see infra note 113.
14. For a discussion of family law recognizing that unmarried heterosexual couples have the right to adopt, see infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the classic adoption paradigm, see infra Part III.
18. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
relationship between the child and the custodial natural parent (full inheritance rights remain intact); and (3) the adoption partially severs the parent-child relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent (the child can inherit from and through the non-custodial parent, but the non-custodial parent cannot inherit from or through the child). Under the stepparent adoption rule, a child adopted by a stepparent effectively has three parents from whom he or she can inherit.

But the stepparent adoption exception applies only if the adoptive parent and the custodial parent are married. If the adoptive parent and the custodial parent live together but are not married, the general adoption rule applies. Under the general adoption rule, the parent-child relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent who is legally displaced by the adoptive step-partner is completely severed. The child can no longer inherit from and through the legally displaced parent, and the legally displaced parent can no longer inherit from and through the child. The result is that a child adopted by a step-partner,

20. See infra notes 66-100 and accompanying text.
21. The Uniform Probate Code expressly requires that the adoption be by a "spouse of either natural parent." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998). The Restatement Third of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) provides that the adoption must be by a "stepparent." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(2)-(4) (1999). The Restatement does not define the term, but it is assumed that it is using the term as that term is commonly used. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines stepparent as "the husband or wife of one's mother or father by a subsequent marriage." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2237 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986). Accord UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 1-101(17) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 21 (1999) (defining "stepparent" as "an individual who is the spouse or surviving spouse of a parent of a child but who is not a parent of the child").

The stepparent adoption norm is for the adoptive parent to marry the custodial natural parent—the natural parent who has been awarded primary custody of the children. To facilitate identification of the parties, this Article will assume that the adoptive parent is married to the custodial natural parent, though that is not a legal requirement. See Lisa A. Fuller, Note, Intestate Succession Rights of Adopted Children: Should the Stepparent Exception Be Extended?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1188, 1219 (1992).

22. This assumes the jurisdiction permits step-partner adoptions—or as some call them, "non-conventional adoptions." See, e.g., Casey Martin, Equal Opportunity Adoption & Declaratory Judgments: Acting in a Child's Best Interest, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 570 n.11 (2003). For a discussion of how many jurisdictions permit non-stepparent adoptions, see infra note 128 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that, in the step-partner adoption scenario, the adoptive parent lives with the custodial parent. This arguably is the norm, and it is unclear if a court would permit a step-partner adoption if the partner was not living with the custodial parent.

23. The great majority completely severs the parent-child relationship, including all inheritance rights. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. A minority of states permit the child to retain the right to inherit from and through the natural parents even after the adoption. See infra note 59.

24. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
though functionally indistinguishable from a child adopted by a stepparent, is worse off. While the child adopted by a stepparent effectively has three parents from whom he or she can inherit, the child adopted by a step-partner has only two parents from whom he or she can inherit.\textsuperscript{25}

In the step-partner adoption scenario, the adopted child is effectively punished because the adoptive parent and the custodial parent commit the socially unacceptable sin of living together without being married. But the child has no control over whether the parties marry. To punish the child because of the “sins” of the parents\textsuperscript{26} is illogical, unjust, and constitutes shades of the discrimination the law used to practice against illegitimate children.\textsuperscript{27}

II. INHERITANCE RIGHTS BASED ON THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP

When an individual dies without a will, a state’s intestate scheme sets forth who takes the decedent’s probate property, in what order, and how much each taker receives.\textsuperscript{28} While the details of each intestate

\textsuperscript{25} This statement also assumes a heterosexual non-stepparent adoption scenario. Where the adoption scenario is a same-sex partner (the second-parent adoption scenario), see infra text accompanying notes 117-18, strict application of the classic adoption rule means that the child adopted by a same-sex step-partner has only one parent from whom he or she can inherit. See infra text accompanying notes 120-21.

\textsuperscript{26} This is the current practice of the Uniform Probate Code, the Restatement Third of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers), and many jurisdictions. See supra note 21; infra text accompanying notes 75-76.

Some might assume that the obvious inequities of applying the stepparent adoption rule against a child adopted by a step-partner would compel a court to grant a child adopted by a step-partner the same rights as a child adopted by a stepparent. In light of the clear and unambiguous language in the stepparent adoption statutes requiring the adoptive parent to be “married to” a natural parent or “a stepparent,” the more likely outcome is that a court would not construe such language to include a step-partner. See supra note 21; see also Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 661-62. Rather than leaving the matter ambiguous, legislators should ensure the appropriate inheritance rights by revising the intestate statutes. Laura M. Padilla, Flesh of My Flesh But Not My Heir: Unintended Disinheritance, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 219, 235 (1997-98).

\textsuperscript{27} See, e.g., Lane v. Philips, 6 S.W. 610, 611 (Tex. 1887). The failure of the Uniform Probate Code, the Restatement Third of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers), and the states to extend the stepparent adoption rule to the non-stepparent adoption paradigm is also indicative of the broader failure of the law of inheritance rights to keep up with judicial and statutory changes in family law and adoption law with respect to what constitutes a valid family for adoption purposes.

\textsuperscript{28} For a general discussion of the role of intestacy, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 59-140 (7th ed. 2005); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 33-79 (3d ed. 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
scheme vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the hierarchical order of takers is basically the same. The decedent's surviving spouse, if there is one, takes first. If the decedent has surviving issue, they either take along with the surviving spouse or they take second after the surviving spouse. Either way, qualifying as a surviving issue of a decedent has significant property ramifications under every state's intestate inheritance scheme.

§§ 2.1-2.7 (1999). Any property not passing pursuant to a non-probate instrument falls to the decedent's probate estate where it is distributed pursuant to the decedent's will, if there is one. Any probate property not passing pursuant to the decedent's will, or if the decedent has no will, passes through the state's intestate scheme. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra, at 71-72.

The principal rationale underlying an intestate scheme is that it constitutes a decedent's presumed intent based upon traditional familial paradigms. See id.; WAGGONER ET AL., supra, at 37-38; Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 651, 653-54; Foster, supra note 4, at 200-01, 257. The modern trend is to criticize the paradigm approach. For a comprehensive list of recent articles proposing alternatives to the paradigm approach, see supra note 7; Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 646 n.10. Even assuming, arguendo, that one favors the paradigm approach, the current distinction between stepparent and step-partner adoptions is indefensible under the prevailing approach.

Precisely who takes, and how much is taken, depends on the familial paradigm that fits the decedent at the time of his or her death. There is a strong preference for family members as defined from a traditional nuclear family perspective—spouse, issue, parents, issue of parents, grandparents, issue of grandparents and so on. See Foster, supra note 4, at 200-01; Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 653-54; UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 to 2-103 (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 81-83 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 2.2-2.4 (1999).


30. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 73; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 46; Guzman, supra note 29, at 222-23; Steeb, supra note 29, at 161. For a detailed listing of those states where the issue share with the spouse versus those approaches where the surviving spouse may be the lone taker, see Brassher, supra note 3, at 95 n.4.

To qualify as an issue, the individual must establish a legally recognized parent-child relationship. Historically, there were two ways to establish a parent-child relationship: naturally or artificially. As used in this Article, the natural way of establishing a parent-child relationship refers to a parent-child relationship created by contributing the genetic material that makes up the child. Whoever contributes the egg is the natural mother, and whoever contributes the sperm is the natural father.

As used in this Article, the artificial way of establishing a parent-child relationship refers to a parent-child relationship created by operation of

32. The issue need not be a child of the decedent, but the issue must establish a parent-child relationship that connects to the decedent; i.e., child, grandchild, great-grandchild, etc. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 118; Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 654-55; Nicholas Bala & Rebecca Jaremo Bromwich, Context and Inclusivity in Canada’s Evolving Definition of the Family, 16 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 145, 146 (2002). An individual’s issue includes not only one’s children, but also all of one’s descendants. For a general discussion of the different ways that one’s descendants can take by representation, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.3(b) & cmt. e (1999); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 73-77; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 46-52. But one’s descendants are nothing more than a series of parent-child relationships with the decedent at the top. As long as the individual can establish a parent-child relationship with any of the decedent’s descendants, the individual qualifies as an issue of the decedent. The first issue who are eligible to take under the intestate scheme are the decedent’s children. For analytical purposes, this Article will assume that the question is whether a child qualifies as an issue, though the individual need not be a child.


35. See Wilder, supra note 34, at 181. Modern reproductive technology has greatly complicated the issue of how one can biologically establish a parent-child relationship, but the complications are under and affect the natural method of establishing a parent-child relationship. For a general discussion of some of the issues inherent in modern reproductive technology, see DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 101-14; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 137-43. For more in-depth analysis of technological advancements in reproductive medical technology and the legal challenges they present, see Wilder, supra note 34; Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 497 (1996); Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 655 & n.51; Martin, supra note 22, at 579-84. For purposes of this Article, the analysis will assume that a parent-child relationship has been established between the child and his or her natural parents. Issues inherent in how that analysis should be performed under different modern reproductive technology scenarios are beyond the scope of this Article.
law, through adoption, independent of who contributes the egg or sperm.

The traditional and predominant method of establishing a parent-child relationship is the natural method. The moment a child is born, the assumption is that the child has a natural mother and a natural father, and that full inheritance rights exist between the child and the child’s natural parents regardless of their marital status. The child can inherit from and through each of his or her natural parents, and each natural parent can inherit from and through the child.


37. In 2005, over 97% of all parent-child relationships (as applied to children who were under the age of 18) were established naturally; only 2.5% were established through adoption (there were 1.6 million adopted children under the age of 18 in 2005). See Alvin W. Cohn, Juvenile Focus, FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 43, 45, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/June_2004/juvenile.html. In 2002, over 45,000 babies were born in the United States as a result of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) procedures—just over 1% of all live births in America. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2002 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 11, 13 & fig.1 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2002/PDF/ART2002.pdf. ART includes infertility treatment procedures in which both egg and sperm are handled in the laboratory. The most common procedure is in vitro fertilization. See id. at 1, 3.


A child who is conceived by a single woman as a result of medically performed artificial insemination using sperm from an anonymous donor or a sperm bank generally has a natural mother, but no natural father. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 22; Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 436 n.32 (2004); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001) (denying parental status to a party who donates an egg or sperm). A child who is conceived as a result of rape may also have no natural father. See Jeanette Mills, Comment, Unwed Birthfathers and Infant Adoption: Balancing a Father’s Rights with the States Need for a Timely Surrender Process, 62 LA. L. REV. 615, 635 n.106 (2002).

39. Generally, if the natural parents are married to each other, inheritance rights automatically attach themselves in both directions. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-114 (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 2.3, 2.5(1) & cmt. c (1999). However, the Uniform Probate Code and some jurisdictions require the natural parent to acknowledge and support the child before the natural parent and his or her kindred are entitled to
Likewise, the moment a child is adopted, traditionally by a married couple, by operation of law the adoption creates a parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parents, a relationship which includes inheritance rights. The child can inherit from and inherit from and through the child. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(5) (1999) (barring inheritance to a parent who has refused to acknowledge or who has abandoned his or her child). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2114 (1995). If the natural parents are not married to each other, for the child to inherit from and through the natural father, the child generally has to establish paternity. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 cmts. a-c (1999); see also Melinda L. Etizen & Matthew T. Slimp, Five Easy Steps to Paternity, 63 TEX. B.J. 988 (2000); Cacioppo, supra note 34, at 500.

40. See infra text accompanying notes 46, 49.

through each of the adoptive parents,\textsuperscript{42} and each adoptive parent can inherit from and through the child.\textsuperscript{43}

Legal tension arises, however, when the two methods of establishing a parent-child relationship overlap. When a child is adopted, a plethora of legal issues arise concerning inheritance rights.\textsuperscript{44} One issue in particular is whether the adopted child should still be entitled to inherit from and through his or her natural parents.\textsuperscript{45} The answer to that issue depends in large part on how one defines what constitutes a "family," and on what one believes to be the purpose of the inheritance scheme.

III. INHERITANCE RIGHTS AND THE CLASSIC ADOPTION PARADIGM

The classic "stranger" adoption paradigm and the inheritance rights that flow from the adoption are based upon a set of factual assumptions and corresponding public policy considerations. Factually, the classic adoption paradigm assumes the following:

(1) a parent-child relationship exists between the child and both of his or her natural parents, including full inheritance rights;\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{42} A handful of states permit the child to inherit from the adoptive parents, but not through them. Brashier, \textit{supra} note 3, at 150 n.190 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989) ("[T]here shall be no right of inheritance between the person adopted and his issue on the one hand and predecessors in line of descent and collateral kin of the person or persons making the adoption on the other hand."); Schaefer v. Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 160 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Iowa 1968) ("Where an instrument has been executed before an adoption by a stranger to the adoption, 'children' does not include an adopted child except when the contrary appears from other language or circumstances.").


\textsuperscript{44} See Jan Ellen Rein, \textit{Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts)}, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 728-30 (1984) (noting at least ten different legal issues with respect to inheritance that arise between the relevant parties following an adoption).

\textsuperscript{45} Id.; Brown, \textit{supra} note 34, at 145-46; see also Gary, \textit{The Parent-Child Relationship, supra} note 7, at 656.

\textsuperscript{46} See \textit{supra} note 38 and accompanying text. This assumes that the natural parents are married. Where the natural parents are not married, full inheritance rights can be established, but it may take additional steps on behalf of one or more of the parties. The child may have to establish paternity to inherit from and through the natural father, and the natural parent or a relative of the natural parent may have to acknowledge and support the child before the natural parent or relative
the child is adopted shortly after birth by strangers; \(^{(4)}\) because the child is adopted shortly after birth, the child has no meaningful relationship with either of his or her natural parents; \(^{(4)}\) and (4) the child is adopted by a married couple. \(^{(4)}\)

Consistent with these assumptions, the general rule is that the adoption creates a new family, with a new parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parents, \(^{(5)}\) including full inheritance rights. The adopted child can inherit from and through each of the adoptive parents, \(^{(5)}\) and each of the adoptive parents can inherit from and through the adopted child. \(^{(5)}\) The issue that logically arises is what effect, if any, the adoption should have on the relationship between the adopted child and his or her natural parents. \(^{(5)}\)

of the natural parent can inherit from and through the child. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

47. The adoption can be by either a couple or a single individual. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 2.5(2)(A) & cmt. e (1999); Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 656; Susan Ayres, The Hand That Rocks the Cradle: How Children's Literature Reflects Motherhood, Identity, and International Adoption, 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 315, 322-23 (2004) (discussing Valentina P. Wasson, The Chosen Baby (Glo Coalson illus., rev. ed. 1977)), which describes how a married, childless couple adopted a baby boy, as a “classic adoption” book; Catherine J. Jones, Teaching Bioethics in the Law School Classroom: Recent History, Rapid Advances, the Challenges of the Future, 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 417, 420 (1994); Croteau, supra note 8, at 681; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1191.


50. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936-37; Lester Wallman & Lawrence J. Schwarz, Handbook of Family Law 108 (1989); cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text.

51. A few states permit the adopted child to inherit from, but not through, the adoptive parents. See supra note 42.

52. See supra notes 43, 50 and accompanying text.

53. Technically, from a doctrinal perspective, this statement is inaccurate. Doctrinally, the general rule is that the parent-child relationship between the child and the natural parents has to be severed before the child can be adopted. See Kurt E. Scheuerman, Recent Development, Eder v. West, Oregon's New Standard for Neglect in Contested Adoptions, 71 Or. L. Rev. 507, 509 (1992); Ellen K. Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, 36 Sw. J. 155, 180 (1982); Dawn Allison, Note, The Importance of Estate Planning Within the Gay and Lesbian Community, 23 T. Marshall L. Rev. 445, 467 (1998). But the law requires this as a precondition to adoption because of the traditional, knee-jerk assumption that a child should not have more than two parents. Viewed analytically then, as opposed to doctrinally, the issue is what effect, if any, the adoption should have.
Under the classic adoption paradigm, the general rule is that the adoption completely severs the parent-child relationship between the child and the natural parents. This rule is based upon several public policy considerations. First and foremost is the "best interests of the child" consideration—the well-known and dominant public policy consideration in family law issues. The traditional assumption is that it is in the child's best interest to be the child of but one family, and that the child's assimilation into his or her new family is facilitated by completely severing the child's relationship with his or her old family, thereby also ensuring that the child has a "fresh start" with the new upon the parent-child relationship between the child and his or her natural parents. For purposes of this Article, the analytical phrasing and approach makes more sense than the traditional doctrinal approach and will be used.


55. See Rein, supra note 44, at 729-30; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1212.


57. See Hughes, supra note 36, at 321.
family.\textsuperscript{58} Severance of the parent-child relationship between the child and the natural parents includes, as a general rule, complete severance of the inheritance rights between the child and the natural parents.\textsuperscript{59} The child can no longer inherit from or through either natural parent, and neither natural parent can inherit from or through the child. The adopted child can inherit from and through his or her adoptive parents only, and only the adoptive parents can inherit from and through the adopted child.

IV. INHERITANCE RIGHTS AND THE STEPPARENT ADOPTION EXCEPTION

While the general rule is that the adoption completely severs the parent-child relationship between the child and his or her natural parents, the Uniform Probate Code and almost a third of the states recognize an exception for the stepparent adoption paradigm.\textsuperscript{60} Like the classic

\textsuperscript{58} See Brown, supra note 34, at 147; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1193-94; see also R. Alta Charo, And Baby Makes Three—or Four, or Five, or Six: Redefining the Family After the Reprotech Revolution, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 231, 238-39 (2000).

\textsuperscript{59} See Hughes, supra note 36, at 340; see also supra text accompanying note 43. Not all jurisdictions, however, follow this approach. A minority of jurisdictions permit the adopted child to still inherit from and/or through his or her natural parents under certain circumstances. See Brasher, supra note 3, at 152 n.195 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103(6) (West 1995); In re Estate of Cregar, 333 N.E.2d 540, 542-43 (Ill. App. Cl. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2118(b) (1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 214 (1993) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1) (1994); Alack v. Phelps, 230 So. 2d 789, 793 (Miss. 1970); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16(B) (West 1996); In re Estate of Marriott, 515 P.2d 571, 574 (Okla. 1973); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (West 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-17 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114(b)(2) (1995); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-107(a)(i) (1977)); see also Brown, supra note 34, at 146; Reif, supra note 44, at 723 & n.50; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1207-08.

\textsuperscript{60} See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.52(C) & cmt. h; see also Brasher, supra note 3, at 151 n.193 (citing ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(1) (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114(2) (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2114(B) (1995); CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 6451 (West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560-2-114 (1993); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-4(a) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124(2) (1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(e)(2) (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09(1) (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114(b)(1) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-114 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1-1(1) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-102 (2002); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1), 8 U.L.A. 66 (1983) (pre-1990 UPC providing adoption by stepparent does not affect adopted child's inheritance rights from either natural parent); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-103(b)(3) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 2005) (containing important exception permitting adoptee and her descendants to inherit from or through former parent when adoptive parent is stepparent of adoptee); In re Estate of Seaman, 583 N.E.2d 294, 300 (N.Y. 1991) (providing good discussion of development of New York adoption law and noting that drafters concluded that complete severance of natural family was not necessary in intrafamily (including stepparent) adoptions and that multiple inheritances in such situations were logical consequences));
adoption paradigm, the stepparent adoption paradigm is also based upon a series of factual assumptions and public policy considerations. Factually, the stepparent adoption paradigm assumes the following:

(1) a natural parent-child relationship exists between the child and both of his or her parents, including full inheritance rights;  
(2) the child lives with and/or has a meaningful relationship with both parents;  
(3) the parents divorce, one dies, or they separate (if never married);  
(4) the custodial parent remarries, and  
(5) the stepparent adopts the child.

see also supra note 43 and accompanying text; Brown, supra note 34, at 146; Rein, supra note 44, at 730-31; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1210.

The prevailing inheritance rules with respect to an adopted child arose out of and were based upon the classic adopted-child paradigm discussed above. Over the years, however, family law and the law of adoptions have come to recognize adoption paradigms other than the classic adoption scenario.

One of the first variations on the classic adopted-child paradigm is the single-parent adoption scenario. See Strauss, supra note 49, at 597. Factually, the single-parent adoption paradigm is similar to the classic adopted-child paradigm, except the child is adopted by only a single parent, as opposed to a married couple. Nevertheless, the logic and public policy considerations underlying the classic adoption paradigm and rule apply with equal validity to the single-parent adoption paradigm. The single adoptive parent is intended to legally displace both natural parents. The single adoptive parent has no relationship with either natural parent, and the child’s assimilation into his or her new single-parent family is facilitated by complete severance of the parent-child relationship between the child and his or her biological family.

Accordingly, the single-parent adoption paradigm is treated legally the same as the classic adopted-child paradigm. The parent-child relationship between the adopted child and each of the natural parents is completely severed, and a new parent-child relationship is established between the adopted child and the single adoptive parent. The adoption severs all inheritance rights between the adopted child and each of the natural parents and establishes full inheritance rights between the adopted child and the adoptive parent. The purpose and legal consequences of the classic adoption paradigm apply with equal validity to the single-parent adoption paradigm.

From a historical evolution perspective, the stepparent adoption paradigm is the second major variation on the classic adoption paradigm.

61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

62. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of Visitation Orders for Former Parents Under Uniform Adoption Act § 4-113, 51 FLA. L. REV. 89, 102 (1999); Fuller, supra note 21, at 1195-97; Hughes, supra note 36, at 341-42.

63. For purposes of discussion, it is easiest to assume (and it is probably the norm) that the natural parents were (1) married at the time the child was born, and (2) thereafter divorced. Neither of these, however, are requirements. The marriage may have ended due to the death of one of the natural parents, or the natural parents may never have married but the relationship nevertheless ended (either by separation or death). Hallie E. Still-Caris, Note, Legislative Reform: Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in Cases of Adoption, 71 IOWA L. REV. 265, 275-76 (1985); Rein, supra note 44, at 728; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1209. The assumption that the natural parents are married is not critical to the stepparent adoption paradigm, but it simplifies the discussion. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

64. See Rein, supra note 44, at 728; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1209; Still-Caris, supra note 63, at 275-76.
The stepparent adoption creates a parent-child relationship between the stepparent and the adopted child. The parent-child relationship brings with it full inheritance rights. Under the stepparent adoption rule, the adopted child can inherit from and through the stepparent, and the stepparent can inherit from and through the adopted child. The issue that logically arises is what effect, if any, the adoption should have on the parent-child relationship between the child and his or her natural parents.

If the classic adoption rule were to apply, the adoption would sever the child’s relationship with both natural parents. To encourage and facilitate stepparent adoptions, however, the Uniform Adoption Act and

65. See Rein, supra note 44, at 728; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1209; Still-Caris, supra note 63, at 275-76. If the child is a minor, which is probably a norm, the general rule is that both natural parents have to consent to the adoption. See Mahoney, supra note 62, at 92; see also In re Adoption of A.M.B., 514 N.W.2d 670, 672 (N.D. 1994). There are, however, exceptions where consent of the non-custodial natural parent is not necessary. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 62, at 92 (discussing how the legal status of the other biological parent can also be terminated if “the court determines that the parent is unfit or that other statutory grounds exist”); In re C.N.W., 560 S.E.2d 1, 8 (Ga. 2002) (holding that a stepfather married to the biological and legal mother of the child could adopt the child, even though the biological father of the child was still living; and finding that, because the biological father had not achieved legal father status and was not considered a parent for the purpose of stepparent adoption statutes, consent of the biological father was not required for adoption). This discussion will assume that both natural parents have consented to the stepparent adoption.

The stepparent adoption scenario also assumes that the adoptive parent is not the child’s natural parent. If the natural parents were not married when the child was born, and thereafter the couple married, the marriage would legitimize the child without the need for an adoption. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2) (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 88; In re Estate of Bartolini, 674 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that a child born out of wedlock, whose parents subsequently entered into an invalid marriage, was legitimated for the purpose of determining heirship); Bates v. Meade, 192 S.W. 666 (Ky. 1917); In re Ruff's Estate, 32 So. 2d 840, 843 (Fla. 1947).

66. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

67. See supra note 43, 50 and accompanying text; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) & cmt. b (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 92 (1998).

68. See Brown, supra note 34, at 146. This, however, has not always been the law. Because early adoption law and inheritance rights were based upon the premise that the adoption was a contract between only the adoptive parents and the child, the child could only inherit from, but not through, the adoptive parents. See id.; Rein, supra note 44, at 721; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1203-04.

69. See supra notes 44, 53 and accompanying text (noting that adoption raises a plethora of interesting legal issues, and noting that this is the analytical approach to the issue, not the doctrinal approach).

70. Historically, that was the rule. See Mark Strasser, Marriage, Parental Rights, and Public Policy: On the FMA, Its Purported Justification, and Its Likely Effects on Families, 2 U. St. Thomas L.J. 118, 128 (2004). But with the increase in divorces and remarriages, stepparent adoption has come to be the most common form of adoption today. Id. Pressures have built for the law to change to recognize that the stepparent adoption scenario is different from the classic adoption scenario. See id.
many states have adopted a special stepparent adoption rule.\textsuperscript{71} Under the stepparent exception to the classic adoption rule, the adoption does not affect the parent-child relationship between the child and the custodial natural parent (the parent who is married to the adoptive stepparent).\textsuperscript{72} Even in jurisdictions which technically apply the classic adoption rule, thereby severing the parent-child relationship between the child and the custodial natural parent, the custodial natural parent invariably joins in the adoption petition.\textsuperscript{73} When the court grants the adoption petition, the parent-child relationship between the child and the custodial natural parent is reestablished.\textsuperscript{74} For all practical purposes, the general rule is that a stepparent adoption has no effect upon the parent-child relationship between the child and the custodial parent.

The jurisdictions are split, however, with respect to how a stepparent adoption affects the parent-child relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent (the natural parent of the same gender as the adoptive stepparent). In many jurisdictions, the adoption completely severs the parent-child relationship between the adopted child and the non-custodial parent, including severance of all inheritance rights.\textsuperscript{75} In these jurisdictions, the effect of a stepparent adoption as applied to the non-custodial parent is consistent with the classic adoption approach. The adoptive stepparent steps into the shoes of the natural parent of the same gender and, from a legal perspective, completely displaces the natural parent of the same gender.\textsuperscript{76}

But the Uniform Probate Code and approximately a third of the states recognize that the stepparent adoption paradigm differs from the classic adoption paradigm, both factually and from a public policy perspective.事实上，在经典收养法典中，孩子被
adopted is typically a newborn.\textsuperscript{77} Since the child has not lived with either natural parent,\textsuperscript{78} it is assumed that no meaningful parent-child relationship exists between the natural parents and the child at the time of adoption.\textsuperscript{79} By putting the child up for adoption before the natural parent-child relationship can take hold, there are strong public policy considerations for completely severing the adopted child's parent-child relationship with his or her natural parents and replacing it with a parent-child relationship with his or her adoptive parents.\textsuperscript{80}

In contrast, in the stepparent adoption paradigm there are strong public policy considerations for not completely severing the child's parent-child relationship with both natural parents.\textsuperscript{81} In fact, the stepparent adoption paradigm assumes that the child has lived with and formed a meaningful parent-child relationship with both natural parents.\textsuperscript{82} While the relationship between the natural parents may be broken (or ended), as evidenced by the assumed divorce/death/separation,\textsuperscript{83} there is no reason to assume that the actual\textsuperscript{84} parent-child relationship between the child and the respective natural parents and their families is also broken (or ended). Even when the natural parents divorce, which is the most common precondition to the stepparent adoption,\textsuperscript{85} it is assumed that: (1) both natural parents had a parent-child relationship with the child,\textsuperscript{86} and (2) the parent-child relationship between the child and each natural parent should continue. The fact that the parents do not want to maintain a spousal relationship with each other does not mean that the parents do not want to maintain a

\textsuperscript{77} See supra text accompanying note 47.
\textsuperscript{78} See supra text accompanying note 48.
\textsuperscript{79} Under the classic adopted-child paradigm assumption, the natural parent-child relationship is exclusively biological as opposed to emotional and interactive. See supra note 48.
\textsuperscript{80} See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
\textsuperscript{81} The same can be said, in large degree, for post-death adoptions and other in-family adoption scenarios. See Rein, supra note 44, at 728-29; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1208-09; Still-Caris, supra note 63, at 275-76. Some states permit an adopted child to continue to inherit from and through his or her natural parents when the adoption is after the death of either or both of the natural parents. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451 (West 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 & cmt. g (1999). The details of these statutes and the propriety of permitting the adopted child to retain the right to inherit from both natural parents when the adoption is after the death of one or both of the natural parents, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
\textsuperscript{82} See supra text accompanying note 62.
\textsuperscript{83} See supra text accompanying note 63.
\textsuperscript{84} As opposed to legal, "actual" refers to the emotional and interactive nature of the relationship.
\textsuperscript{85} See Mahoney, supra note 62, at 103-04 & n.50.
\textsuperscript{86} See supra text accompanying note 61.
parent-child relationship with the child. Although divorce is becoming increasingly common in today's society, the courts increasingly award either joint custody of the child to the parents or extensive visitation rights to the non-custodial parent, recognizing the importance of maintaining an ongoing parent-child relationship between the child and both natural parents after the divorce/separation.

The stepparent adoption paradigm also assumes, and requires, that after the natural parents divorce, one of the natural parents remarries. Remarriage following divorce is becoming increasingly common in today's society. As a matter of public policy, society wants to, and should, encourage a good relationship between the child and the stepparent. As a practical matter, the child will spend days, months, or maybe even years with the stepparent. The stepparent may come to play many of the roles in the child's life that the natural parent of the same gender would have played. On a day-to-day basis, the child may

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88. Although experts dispute the rate of divorce, the most commonly used figures indicate that the divorce rate in America is somewhere between 40-50% of all marriages, depending on how they are calculated. See Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It's Not as High as You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at F7.

89. See Brian J. Melton, Note, Solomon's Wisdom or Solomon's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody in North Dakota—A Presumption That Joint Custody is in the Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes, 73 N.D. L. REV. 263, 274 & n.68 (1997) ("[J]oint custody provides the child with [the] love, attention, training, and influence of both parents.") (quoting Miller, supra note 87, at 362); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 455 & n.2 (1984) (pointing out that a substantial body of literature favors joint custody and that there appears to be accelerating momentum toward joint custody).

90. See supra text accompanying note 21.

91. The U.S. Census Bureau no longer reports statistics on the rate of remarriage, but the last reported figures indicate that, between 1988 and 1990, approximately 43% of all marriages constituted a remarriage for at least one of the parties, and, in 65% of those marriages, one of the parties had at least one child, thereby producing a stepfamily. See STEPFAMILY ASS'N OF AM., Stepfamily Facts, http://www.saafamilies.org/faqs/.


93. See Nancy G. Maxwell & Caroline J. Forder, The Inadequacies in U.S. and Dutch Adoption Law to Establish Same-Sex Couples as Legal Parents: A Call for Recognizing Intentional Parenthood, 38 FAM. L.Q. 623, 626 (2004); Mason & Simon, supra note 92, at 467.

94. See Mahoney, supra note 9, at 917-18; Croteau, supra note 8, at 681; Bryce Levine, Note, Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 316, 324 (1996). Again, this assumes a heterosexual couple. In states permitting domestic partnerships, this
spend much more time with the stepparent than with the non-custodial natural parent. It is therefore in the best interests of the child to establish and maintain a good relationship between the child and the stepparent.\(^9\)

If the child and the stepparent establish a good relationship, the stepparent may want to adopt the child to complete this new, hybrid family.\(^9\)

As a matter of public policy, society may want to recognize the special relationship that has arisen between the child and the stepparent without legally declaring that the child's relationship with the non-custodial natural parent is completely severed. In fact, even if the child is adopted by the stepparent, it is likely that the child will maintain some type of a relationship with the non-custodial natural parent and his or her family.\(^9\)

From both a factual and a public policy perspective, the stepparent adoption paradigm is different from the classic adoption paradigm. In the classic adoption paradigm, the purpose of the adoption is to legally replace the child's natural parents with two "new" parents through adoption. In contrast, in the stepparent adoption paradigm, the purpose of the adoption is to recognize legally that a "third" parent has become an important part of the child's life—the purpose is not to completely sever the adopted child's relationship with his or her non-custodial natural parent.

These differences between the classic adoption paradigm and the stepparent adoption paradigm call for different legal treatment, both inter vivos—in terms of the relationship between the child and the non-custodial natural parent—\(^9\) and testamentary—in terms of the inheritance rights between the adopted child and the non-custodial natural parent. In the stepparent adoption paradigm, because the non-custodial parent had a meaningful relationship with the child prior to the

\(^9\) See supra text accompanying note 92.


\(^9\) See Brown, supra note 34, at 147; Margorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club—Examining the Financial (In)security of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 309, 377 (1999); Fuller, supra note 21, at 1198; Still-Caris, supra note 63, at 278; see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-113 (1994), 9 U.L.A. 110-12 (1999) (which authorizes courts to create and enforce post-adoption visitation rights for natural parents (and others) who are legally displaced following stepparent adoptions).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss2/4
adoption, there is a good chance that the legally displaced non-custodial parent (and his or her relatives) may still want to recognize the child as his or her child, at least for inheritance purposes. Moreover, extending such enhanced inheritance rights to the adopted child is in the best interests of the child—it permits the child to continue to inherit from and through the non-custodial natural parent.99 Accordingly, the adoption completely severs the right of the non-custodial natural parent to inherit from and through the child, but the child retains his or her right to inherit from and through the non-custodial natural parent.100

But if that is the logic underlying the stepparent exception to the classic adoption rule, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why the law does not extend the same exception to the step-partner adoption scenario.

V. INHERITANCE RIGHTS AND THE THIRD-PARENT ADOPTION PARADIGM

Although the phrase “third-parent adoption”101 is not widely recognized, the concept is. The classic example of a third-parent adoption is the stepparent adoption. The stepparent adoption paradigm assumes that (1) a child has two legally recognized parents,102 and that

99. See Rein, supra note 44, at 728-30; Fuller, supra note 21, at 1213-14; Still-Caris, supra note 63, at 275-76. There is also the consideration that, by consenting to the adoption, the non-custodial parent has waived his or her right to inherit from and through the child; but the child has no say in the adoption, so it would be inequitable to terminate the child’s right to inherit from and through the non-custodial parent. Cf. Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).

100. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) & cmt. b (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 92 (1998); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5(2)(C) & cmt. h (1999); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-114 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 920(c) (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-114 (LexisNexis 2004); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-8 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-218 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2114 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-124 (2004).


102. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
(2) the child is adopted by a single adoptive parent who is married to one of the child’s legal parents—typically the custodial parent. Historically, the only form of third-parent adoption permitted was the stepparent adoption. Thus, the adoptive third parent had to be married to one of the child’s legally recognized parents. Heterosexual couples who were not married could not adopt, nor could same-sex couples. But recent changes in family law indicate that step-partner adoptions—where one unmarried partner adopts the other partner’s child, whether the partners are same-sex couples or heterosexual couples—are becoming increasingly common. The Uniform Adoption Act and at least 21 jurisdictions recognize step-partner adoptions.

Changing demographics indicate that step-partner adoptions will only increase with time. During the decade from 1990-2000, the number of households resembling the traditional nuclear family declined. During the same decade, the number of households where children lived with a step-partner increased dramatically. In fact, the unmarried step-
partner household is the fastest growing form of household composition. During the 1990s, the number of householders living with an unmarried partner and one natural child or more increased almost ninety percent. With more and more single-parent families, and more couples opting to live together as opposed to getting married, these demographic changes will inevitably lead to more third-parent adoptions by unmarried couples. Just as the stepparent adoption scenario has come to outnumber the classic adoption scenario, changing demographics indicate that where legally permitted, the step-partner adoption scenario could come to outnumber the classic adoption scenario.

Historically, the law favored adoption by a married couple on the theory that such adoptions best duplicated the traditional nuclear family model. With time, the law came to recognize single-parent adoptions as well, but the assumption was that the single adoptive parent had no spouse or partner. The legal recognition of single-parent adoptions...
opened the door for gay and lesbian adoptions. Where gays and lesbians are granted the right to adopt, the assumption is that such adoptions should be treated the same as any other adoption: the adoption creates a parent-child relationship with the adoptive parent or parents, and the adoption severs the relationship with the child’s biological parent or parents. Application of the classic adoption rule works well for same-sex adoptions, except for one scenario: the “second-parent adoption” scenario.

In the second-parent adoption scenario, an individual adopts his or her partner’s biological or adopted child. The classic second-parent adoption scenario is one where a lesbian has a child through artificial insemination, and so there is no natural father. Thereafter, the


117. For a general discussion of the development and legal consequences of the second-parent adoption doctrine, see Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175 (1995); Shapiro, supra note 8; Croteau, supra note 8. Gay-rights advocates generally use the term “second-parent adoptions” to describe the scenario where a lesbian woman has a child by artificial insemination and then her same-sex partner adopts the child. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 22, 26 n.46. Some use the term “second-parent adoption” to include a whole host of non-traditional adoption scenarios, but that term does not apply to the third-parent adoption scenario envisioned in this Article. The second-parent adoption scenario assumes (1) the child had only one legally recognized parent, and (2) thereafter, the child is adopted by a single adoptive parent who has a non-marital relationship with the child’s parent. The intent of the adoption is to add a second parent into the child’s life, not to legally displace the only parent the child has. See infra text accompanying note 125. On the other hand, the phrase “third-parent adoption” assumes (1) the child has two legally recognized parents, and (2) the child is adopted by a single adoptive parent who has a non-marital relationship with one of the child’s legal parents—typically the custodial parent. See supra note 8 and text accompanying notes 60-72. Assuming third-parent adoptions are permitted, the issue that naturally arises is the same as in the stepparent adoption scenario: whether the adoption should completely sever the child’s relationship with the legally recognized parent of the same gender who is being legally displaced by the adoption or whether the child should be permitted to retain the right to inherit from and through the parent who is being legally displaced.

118. See David, supra note 115, at 927-28; Katie A. Fougeron, Note, Equitable Considerations for Families with Same-Sex Parents: Russell v. Bridgens, 264 Neb. 217, 647 N.W.2d 56 (2002), and the Use of the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis by Nebraska Courts, 83 NEB. L. REV. 915, 917 (2005); Morgan, supra note 112, at 1500.

119. If a woman’s husband consents to her undergoing artificial insemination, he is deemed the legal, natural father of a child thereby conceived, regardless of who donates the sperm. See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 165
mother's lesbian partner seeks to adopt the child. Under traditional adoption rules, in order for a single parent to adopt a child, usually both natural parents must relinquish their parent-child relationship with the child, and, following the single-parent adoption, both parents are legally displaced. At the very least, the parent-child relationship between the child and the natural parent of the same gender as the adoptive parent is legally displaced. As applied to the lesbian partner adoption scenario, however, either of these approaches would defeat the purpose of the adoption: to create a two-parent family for the child. Application of traditional adoption principles would be contrary to this purpose because it would legally displace the birth mother. Gay-rights advocates have attempted to avoid this legal consequence by (1) having the natural parent (who was being legally displaced) adopt along with her partner (thereby reestablishing the parent-child relationship between the child

(2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979). From the donor's perspective, he has no parent-child relationship with the child as long as the woman is married and the husband consents. The donor's situation is not so clear where the woman is unmarried. A number of states have modified the Uniform Parentage Act to remove the word "married." DeLair, supra, at 166; see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1999); Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 884 (2000); Shapiro, supra note 8, at 26; Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1020-21 (1999); Nicole M. Shkedi, Comment, When Harry Met Lawrence: Allowing Gays and Lesbians to Adopt, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 873, 879, 882 (2005).


121. See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 26; Robert G. Spector, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's Statute Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples from Other States, 40 TULSA L. REV. 467, 469 (2005); Maxwell & Forder, supra note 93, at 626-27; Davies, supra note 113, at 1067.

and the natural parent through the adoption), and/or (2) urging the jurisdiction to adopt the second-parent adoption rule.

The second-parent adoption rule provides that, where a child who is being adopted has only one legally recognized parent, adoption by that parent's unmarried partner does not legally displace the natural parent but rather establishes a "second" parent-child relationship which complements the existing parent-child relationship. The parent-child relationship between the child and natural parent is therefore unaffected. This approach is based on and modeled after the analogous stepparent adoption approach. The Uniform Adoption Act and a majority of the jurisdictions which have addressed the issue have adopted the second-parent adoption rule.

123. See Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship, supra note 7, at 660; Peltz, supra note 117, at 186-87; Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood, supra note 101, at 522. 124. See Shkedi, supra note 120, at 883; Michael, supra note 8, at 1453; Peltz, supra note 117, at 187; Padilla, supra note 26, at 220. 125. See Peltz, supra note 117, at 180. 126. See Croteau, supra note 8, at 676; Shapiro, supra note 8, at 26-27; Suzanne Bryant, Second Parent Adoption: A Model Brief, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 233, 233 (1995); Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93, 93-94 (2000); see also infra note 137. 127. See Croteau, supra note 8, at 682; Michael, supra note 8, at 1446. 128. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102(b) & cmt. (1994), 9 U.L.A. 105 (1999). The official comment to the section provides as follows:

In addition to permitting individuals who are within the formal definition of "stepparent" to adopt a minor stepchild under this Article, Section 4-102 allows an individual who is a de facto stepparent, but is not, or is no longer, married to the custodial parent, to adopt as if he or she were a de jure stepparent. To file a petition under this Article, the de facto stepparent or "second parent" has to . . .

Id. at cmt. Second-parent adoptions have been recognized by state appellate courts in New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Vermont, and California. Croteau, supra note 8, at 682-83, 687. Second-parent adoptions have been recognized by legislative action in California, Connecticut, and Vermont. Id. at 691. Second-parent adoptions have been denied by appellate court decisions in Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin, and they have been expressly denied by statutory language in Florida, Mississippi, and Utah. Id. at 692-94. The rest of the states are silent on second-parent adoptions, although many claim that such adoptions are being permitted in many, if not most, of those jurisdictions at the trial court level. Id. at 696; see also Sanja Zgonjanin, Note, What Does It Take to Be a (Lesbian) Parent? On Intent and Genetics, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 257 n.28 (2005) (citing Human Rights Campaign, Second-Parent/Stepparent Adoption Laws in the U.S., http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_Community&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=133 83, which claims that trial courts are permitting second-parent adoptions in Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington). The American Bar Association has also passed a resolution supporting second-parent adoption:

RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association supports state and territorial laws and court decisions that permit the establishment of legal parent-child relationships through joint adoptions and second-parent adoptions by unmarried persons who are functioning as a child's parents when such adoptions are in the best interests of the child.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss2/4
Just as recognition of single-parent adoptions opened the door to gay and lesbian adoptions, recognition of second-parent adoptions has opened the door to unmarried heterosexual couple adoptions. The second-parent adoption rule inherently rejects the traditional rule that an unmarried couple cannot adopt a child. In light of the fact that all but one state bars gay marriage, by permitting gay couples to adopt, either jointly or through second-parent adoptions, the courts have implicitly recognized that unmarried couples can adopt. There is no reason to believe that this rule should not apply to unmarried heterosexual couples. While some commentators have hinted that this doctrine should not be extended to heterosexual unmarried couples because they have the option of marrying, there appears to be little support for this position. The courts that have adopted the second-parent adoption rule have done so because they concluded it was in the best interests of the child, not because same-sex couples cannot marry. If it is in the best interests of the child to permit an unmarried lesbian’s partner to adopt her partner’s child, one can only assume that it would likewise be in the best interests of the child to permit an unmarried heterosexual’s partner to adopt the other partner’s child.


130. For a discussion of the traditional emphasis put on the adopting couple being married, see supra text accompanying notes 105-06, 114 (showing that, by permitting a same-sex couple who cannot marry to adopt, the second-parent adoption rule rejects the traditional approach that unmarried couples were per se unqualified to adopt); see also Strasser, supra note 70, at 130; Croteau, supra note 8, at 682.

131. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that it was inconsistent with the state constitution to “deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry”); Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 50 (2005).


133. See Strasser, supra note 120, at 1019, 1028-29; see also Gatos, supra note 101, at 214; Hedges, supra note 120, at 888; Starr, supra note 129, at 1507-09.

134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
specifically addressed this issue have expressly indicated that it does not matter whether the unmarried couple is a homosexual couple or a heterosexual couple. In addition, the Uniform Adoption Act, which implicitly recognizes the second-parent adoption rule in its “de facto” stepparent doctrine, fails to distinguish unmarried same-sex couples from unmarried heterosexual couples.

Where, however, the adoption is by the partner of an unmarried heterosexual couple, it is more appropriate to call the adoption a third-parent adoption as opposed to a second-parent adoption. Stepparent adoptions and step-partner adoptions are both subsets of third-parent adoptions. In its purest form, the step-partner adoption paradigm mirrors the stepparent adoption paradigm in all respects except one: the adoptive parent does not marry the custodial parent. The step-partner adoption paradigm assumes:

135. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (referring to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1991) and ruling that “the right of a single homosexual to adopt” is as clear as the right of any single person to adopt under New York law and that the unmarried partner of the child’s biological mother, whether homosexual or heterosexual, may become the child’s second-parent through adoption); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 582 (Cal. 2003) (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995) (“[P]aramount statutory purpose—the ‘best interests’ of the adoptee—will be best served, and that no other affected interests protected by the statute will be ill served, by a liberal, inclusive interpretation of [the D.C. adoption statute] that says: unmarried couples, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, who are living together in a committed personal relationship, are eligible to file petitions for adoption . . .”).

136. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102(b) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 105 (1999). Defined broadly, a de facto stepparent adoption is an adoption by a single adopting parent who has a non-marital relationship with one of the child’s legally recognized parents—typically the custodial natural parent. Several different relational paradigms come within the scope of the de facto stepparent adoption concept, including the third-parent adoption.

137. Many authorities include the “third-parent adoption” scenario within the term second-parent adoption. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 53-54 (8th ed. 2004); see also Croteau, supra note 8, at 682; Gesing, supra note 129, at 854-55. Apparently, the reason is because in both cases the adoption should not sever the adopted child’s relationship with the custodial parent—the partner of the adopting parent. In that sense, the second-parent adoption is simply a variation of the stepparent adoption scenario where the adoption by a stepparent does not affect the parent-child relationship between the child and the parent married to the adopting stepparent. See Michael, supra note 8, at 1446; Shapiro, supra note 8, at 27-28; Peltz, supra note 117, at 185. But the two scenarios are distinguishable in that the second-parent adoption scenario starts with only one parent so the end result is two parents. The adoption does not challenge the classic assumption that a child should have no more than two parents (though it does challenge the classic assumption that a child should have no more than one parent of each gender). See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 26; see also Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (1994). In the classic third-parent adoption scenario, the scenario starts with two parents, so the adoption will add a third parent. Therefore, there is the added issue of what effect, if any, the adoption should have on the non-custodial parent—the parent who is not the partner of the adoptive parent. Should the adopted child have only two legally recognized parents, or three, at least for inheritance purposes?
(1) a natural parent-child relationship between the child and both of his or her natural parents, including full inheritance rights;

(2) the natural parents divorce, one dies, or they separate (if not married);

(3) the custodial parent enters into a relationship with a new partner and moves in with the new partner but they do not marry; and

(4) the non-stepparent partner adopts the child.

Under the Uniform Adoption Act and in the jurisdictions which permit such adoptions, the effect of the step-partner adoption is to create a parent-child relationship between the adoptive step-partner and the child, including full inheritance rights. The child can inherit from and through the step-partner, and the step-partner can inherit from and through the adopted child. In addition, the adoption has no effect upon the parent-child relationship between the child and the custodial natural parent who is living with the adoptive step-partner. The issue is what effect, if any, the adoption should have upon the parent-child relationship between the child and the non-custodial natural parent. In particular, should the adoption completely sever the child’s relationship with the natural parent of the same gender who is legally displaced by the adoption, or should the child be permitted to retain the right to inherit from and through that parent?

Despite the parallels between the stepparent adoption paradigm and the step-partner adoption paradigm, the Uniform Probate Code and every jurisdiction that has adopted the stepparent exception apply the

138. The parent-child relationships need not be the result of the birth of the child. They could also be the result of a traditional adoption or even a second-parent adoption. The key, however, is that the child has two legally recognized parent-child relationships before the adoption in question.

139. The general rule is that all legally recognized parent-child relationships have full inheritance rights. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.

140. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. For purposes of discussion, it is easiest to assume (and it is probably the norm) that the natural parents were married at the time the child was born but thereafter divorced. This is not a requirement, however. The same issue can arise where the child is born out of wedlock but the child has established paternity, or where there is a traditional adoption or second-parent adoption. See supra notes 38-43, 125-28 and accompanying text.

141. If the adoptive parent married one of the natural parents, the subsequent adoption would be covered by the stepparent adoption rule. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.

142. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.

143. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.

144. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.

145. See supra notes 125-26, 137 and accompanying text.

146. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

147. The issue is the same one that arises in the stepparent adoption scenario. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
classic adoption rule to the step-partner adoption paradigm. The Uniform Probate Code and all of the statutes that grant the adopted child the right to continue to inherit from and through the non-custodial parent do so only if the adoptive parent is married to the adoptive parent. Otherwise, the statutes apply the classic adoption approach—the adopted child’s parent-child relationship with the non-custodial parent is completely severed, thereby also completely severing the inheritance rights between the non-custodial parent and the adopted child. The non-custodial parent can no longer inherit from and through the adopted child, and the adopted child can no longer inherit from and through the non-custodial parent. Inasmuch as the only distinction between the step-partner adoption paradigm and the stepparent adoption paradigm is whether the adoptive parent is married to the custodial parent, the law’s failure to treat the child adopted by a step-partner the same as a child adopted by a stepparent constitutes shades of the discrimination the law used to practice with respect to the inheritance rights of illegitimate children.

VI. INHERITANCE RIGHTS AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN: TRIMBLE V. GORDON

At common law, an illegitimate child was treated legally as the child of no one: “[A]n illegitimate child was filius nullius and incapable of inheriting from anyone.” Many states, in an attempt to ameliorate the harshness of the common law approach, adopted statutes which permitted the child to inherit from and through the natural mother but prohibited the child from inheriting from and through the natural father. As recently as 1977, these statutes were widely adopted and

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148. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
152. See infra Part VI.
STEP-PARTNER ADOPTION PARADIGM

accepted. In *Trimble v. Gordon*, however, the U.S. Supreme Court declared these statutes unconstitutional because they invidiously discriminated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of illegitimacy.

The *Trimble* case arose out of an Illinois probate court decision that declared an illegitimate daughter ineligible to inherit from her natural father who had died intestate. While alive, he had been declared the natural father of the child in a paternity hearing. He had voluntarily paid child support and had openly acknowledged the child as his daughter. The father was killed at the age of 28, and he died intestate. Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code provided that an illegitimate child is the heir of his or her natural mother; but that child is not the heir of his or her natural father, unless the parents intermarry and the father acknowledges the child. The probate court had ruled that the daughter, as an illegitimate child, did not qualify as an heir with respect to her father’s intestate estate. The daughter and her natural mother appealed, asserting that section 12 was unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court sustained section 12. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to consider whether section 12 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by invidiously discriminating against illegitimate children.

In addressing whether the different inheritance rights accorded to legitimate and illegitimate children under section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code were constitutional, the Supreme Court acknowledged that

155. See, e.g., *Trimble*, 430 U.S. at 763 (analyzing a state statute that allowed “illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers”).

156. Id.

157. Id. at 765-66.

158. The decision was issued by the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. For purposes of simplicity, the court will be referred to as the probate court.

159. See *Trimble*, 430 U.S. at 764-65.

160. Id. at 764.

161. Id.

162. Id.

163. Id. at 764-65. Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act provided in relevant part:

An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents intermarry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father’s child is legitimate.

Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973)).

164. Id.

165. Id. at 765.


the question of who takes a decedent’s property is “a matter particularly within the competence of the individual States.” Moreover, the Court acknowledged that “substantial deference” should be accorded to a state’s statutory inheritance scheme. Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that, in addressing the sensitive issues involved in creating a statutory framework of intestate rights, a state cannot invidiously discriminate. The statutory differentiations inherent in a state’s intestate scheme are subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In analyzing whether the Illinois statute that barred illegitimate children from inheriting from their natural father was constitutional, the threshold issue was which level of judicial scrutiny to apply. The appellants in Trimble argued that statutory differentiations based on illegitimacy constitute “suspect” classifications subject to “strict scrutiny.” The Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ arguments, stating that differentiations based on illegitimacy did not require the

168. Id. at 771.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 765.
171. Id. at 765, 776.
172. The Equal Protection Clause requires a state to treat similarly situated individuals similarly. See id. at 780 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Laws that intentionally differentiate between individuals or groups of individuals are subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the basis of the differentiation. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40. Laws that intentionally differentiate based on a suspect classification are considered the most questionable and are subject to a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. The classic example of a law that differentiates on the basis of a suspect classification is a law that discriminates on the basis of race. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Laws that differentiate based on a quasi-suspect classification raise concerns that warrant an intermediate level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to quasi-suspect gender classifications in Oklahoma statutes prohibiting the sale of 3.2% alcohol by volume beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen). A quasi-suspect classification is one where the distinguishing characteristic “generally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. For example, gender classifications are usually considered quasi-suspect because, “[r]ather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens [based on gender] very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.” Id. at 441. Under this middle level of scrutiny, the state must show that the classification is substantially related to an important state interest. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Social and economic legislation that does not differentiate individuals or groups on the basis of suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, and which do not involve fundamental rights, are subject to the lowest level of judicial review—the rational basis test. Under the rational basis test, the law is presumed to be valid and will be upheld as long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id.
173. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767.
Court’s “most exacting scrutiny.” Instead, the Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny.

In scrutinizing the Illinois inheritance classification based on illegitimacy, the Court began by noting the legislative history behind

174. Id.
175. The Court made no express reference to the intermediate level of scrutiny. At the time of the Court’s opinion in Trimble, however, the Court was still developing its articulation of the intermediate level of judicial review. The Court in Trimble was very careful in how it phrased the level of scrutiny it was applying. It rejected the argument that it should apply strict scrutiny, but the Court never expressly said that it was applying the rational basis test either. Instead, the Court intimated that it was applying something in between:

Appellants urge us to hold that classifications based on illegitimacy are “suspect,” so that any justifications must survive “strict scrutiny.” We considered and rejected a similar argument last Term in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). As we recognized in Lucas, illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect when used as the basis of statutory differentiations. Id., at 505. We nevertheless concluded that the analogy was not sufficient to require “our most exacting scrutiny.” Id., at 506. Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a “realm of less than strictest scrutiny,” Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny “is not a toothless one,” id, at 510, a proposition clearly demonstrated by our previous decisions in this area.

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767. The Court’s heavy reliance on Mathews v. Lucas is particularly telling, because in Clark v. Jeter, the Supreme Court (1) expressly acknowledged the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, and (2) cited Mathews v. Lucas for the proposition that the intermediate level of scrutiny has generally been applied to discriminatory classifications based on illegitimacy. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. Inasmuch as the Court in Trimble stated it was applying the same standard as it applied in Mathews v. Lucas, and in Clark v. Jeter, the Court said the level of scrutiny applied in Mathews v. Lucas was the intermediate level; the Court apparently applied the intermediate level of judicial scrutiny in Trimble v. Gordon.

It should be noted that in Lalli v. Lalli, while citing to Mathews v. Lucas and Trimble v. Gordon, the Court stated that classifications based on illegitimacy are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests. 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). The language used by the Lalli Court is different from the language used for gender classifications, which require a substantial relation to important governmental objectives. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. Some have argued that the Court’s application of the two terms “important governmental objectives” and “permissible state interests” reveals a difference between the two standards—the Court formulated a weak intermediate scrutiny for birth status classifications while the standard for gender classifications is somewhat more stringent. See Karen A. Hauser, Comment, Inheritance Rights for Extramarital Children: New Science Plus Old Intermediate Scrutiny Add Up to the Need for Change, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 914-15 (1997) (“‘important’ means ‘significant,’ whereas ‘permissible’ means ‘allowable.’ An ‘objective’ is a ‘goal,’ whereas an ‘interest’ is something in which a claim is held. Thus, the ‘important objective’ of the gender test is a ‘significant goal,’ whereas the ‘permissible interest’ of the birth status test is a mere ‘allowable claim.’ A significant goal is weighty and focused; an allowable claim in something is not. Therefore, the important objective of the gender test would seem to be a more active and forceful concept than the permissible interest of the birth status test.”).

This claimed distinction is beyond the scope of this Article. It is assumed that classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the statutory classification “be substantially related to an important governmental objective.” Clark, 486 U.S. at 461. This was the precise language used by the court in Clark v. Jeter, which was decided after Lalli v. Lalli.
such statutes. The Court acknowledged that the purpose of such statutes was to ameliorate the harshness of the common law *filius nullius* approach. The constitutional question was whether the differentiation based on illegitimacy was sufficiently related to a legitimate state interest. The Illinois Supreme Court had upheld section 12 on the grounds that the state had a legitimate interest “in encouraging family relationships and in establishing an accurate and efficient method of disposing of property at death.” The Supreme Court separately analyzed the two grounds invoked by the Illinois Supreme Court.

**A. Encourage Traditional Family Values**

First, the Supreme Court reviewed the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion that the differentiation in inheritance rights based on illegitimacy was justified because it promoted legitimate family relationships. The Court acknowledged that the promotion of legitimate family relationships can be a proper state purpose. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that “the Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper state purpose.” In analyzing whether a law based on illegitimacy is sufficiently related to a legitimate state interest, the Court emphasized that a state may not try to “influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.” The Court emphasized the point:

> The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.

Applying that logic to section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code, the Court had no trouble concluding that the statute bore at best a “most

177. *Id.* at 766.
178. *See id.* at 768.
179. *See id.*
180. *Id.* at 769.
181. *Id.*
attenuated relationship to the asserted goal” of promoting legitimate family relationships. The nexus between the asserted state interest of promoting legitimate family relationships and the statutory differentiation on the basis of illegitimacy was insufficient to withstand the demands of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Promotion of Efficient Distribution of Decedent’s Property

The Supreme Court turned next to the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion that section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code was constitutional because it furthered the legitimate state interest of establishing a fair and efficient method of distributing property at death. The Illinois Supreme Court had considered and rejected the argument that the state must be open to a case-by-case determination of paternity because of “the difficulty of proving paternity and the related danger of spurious claims.” The Illinois Supreme Court had concluded that (1) the just and efficient method of distributing an intestate’s property at death was a legitimate state interest and (2) section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code was sufficiently related to that state interest.

Again though, upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois Supreme Court had failed to sufficiently scrutinize the relationship between the asserted state interest and the statutory differentiation based on illegitimacy. The U.S. Supreme Court criticized the Illinois Supreme Court for failing “to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion [under section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code] and case-by-case determination of paternity.” The Supreme Court found that the statute had failed to take into consideration “significant categories of illegitimate children...[where] inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.” Because the Illinois Probate Code unnecessarily excluded these categories of illegitimate children, the Supreme Court ruled that section

183. *Id.* at 768.
184. See *id.* at 769.
185. *Id.* at 770.
186. *Id.*
187. See *id.*
188. *Id.*
189. *Id.* at 770-71.
190. *Id.* at 771.
12 was unconstitutional. Despite the state’s valid and important interest in establishing an orderly and effective method of distributing intestate property, section 12 was overly broad and not “carefully tuned to alternative considerations.”

The Supreme Court’s analysis and holding in *Trimble* applies with equal validity to the issue of the constitutionality of the stepparent adoption rule.

VII. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STEPPARENT ADOPTION RULE

A. Applicability of *Trimble v. Gordon*

In analyzing the constitutionality of the stepparent adoption rule, the first issue is whether *Trimble v. Gordon* is applicable. At first blush, one might think that the stepparent adoption rule is distinguishable. The *Trimble* case concerned the constitutionality of a statute that differentiated inheritance rights on the basis of illegitimacy. The stepparent adoption paradigm assumes a legitimate child, a child born to parents who are married, or an illegitimate child who can establish paternity. The stepparent adoption rule appears to

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191. See id. at 772. Although those were the principal grounds asserted in support of the constitutionality of section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code, the U.S. Supreme Court also considered several other arguments advanced in support of the statute. First, the Court examined the argument that “the decedents whose estates were involved in the consolidated appeals could have left substantial parts of their estates to their illegitimate children by writing a will,” and thus “no insurmountable barrier prevented the illegitimate child [in *Trimble v. Gordon*] from sharing in her father’s estate.” Id. at 773. The Court ruled, however, that the presence or absence of other means by which the individual could have overcome the state’s statutory discrimination against the illegitimate child was not relevant to the issue of whether the statute was constitutional. See id. at 774. In addition, the Court addressed the argument that a state’s intestate scheme is nothing more than the presumed intent of the decedent, and a majority of decedents would disinherit their illegitimate children. See id. First, the Court questioned whether the history and logic of section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code supported the claim that the legislature adopted section 12 because it believed that a majority of decedents would want to disinherit their illegitimate child. Id. at 775. More importantly, the Court distinguished between the private act of an individual who disinherit his or her illegitimate child and the public act of a state adopting an intestate scheme which statutorily and categorically disinherits illegitimate children. Id. at 775 n.16. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the former, but it does to the latter. See id. The Court concluded, however, that the claim that section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code was based on and supported by the presumed intent of the decedent was spurious because the Illinois Supreme Court failed to raise or address the argument. The failure of the Illinois Supreme Court to raise or address the argument showed that it was not a motivating factor in the statute’s adoption. See id. at 775-76.


193. Id. at 763.

194. See supra note 46 and text accompanying note 61.
have nothing to do with illegitimate children. But upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the stepparent adoption rule does discriminate on the basis of legitimacy—legitimacy with respect to the "legal rebirth" of the child through adoption.

An illegitimate child is one born out of wedlock. 195 If the natural parents are not married when the mother gives birth, traditionally the child was considered an illegitimate child. 196 The parents had committed the socially unacceptable sin of physiologically, naturally having a child out of wedlock. But there is more than one way to establish a parent-child relationship. A parent-child relationship can also be established artificially through adoption. 197 Through adoption, the child is "legally reborn," by operation of law, to the adoptive parent(s), thereby establishing a new parent-child relationship. 198 Under the classic adoption paradigm, the norm is for the child to be adopted by a married couple. 199 Inasmuch as the adoptive parents are married, the adopted child is a legitimate child relative to the child’s legal rebirth.

Likewise, in the stepparent adoption scenario, the adoptive parent and his or her partner duplicate, to the extent possible, the traditional, “legitimate” way of having a child: they marry first, and then they "have" or adopt the child. The stepparent adoption inheritance rule applies the traditional expectation—that the parents should marry before having a child—to the adoption process. If the adoptive third parent and the custodial parent act in the socially responsible and expected manner, by getting married and then 200 adopting the child, the stepparent

195. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.1, at 151 (2d ed. Hornbook Series Student ed. 1988); Hauser, supra note 175, at 891 n.1. The definition may, however, include children born to a married woman and fathered by a man other than her husband. See State v. Coliton, 17 N.W.2d 546, 549 (N.D. 1945) (reasoning that a married woman can have an illegitimate child); JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 177 (1982) (showing that a married woman can have an illegitimate child); Annotation, Effect of Marriage of Woman to One Other Than Defendant Upon Her Right to Institute or Maintain Bastardy Proceeding, 98 A.L.R.2d 256, 267 (1964) (showing that the statute controls whether a married woman can bring a paternity suit against a man other than her husband).

196. The modern trend, and better view, is to refer to such a child as a "child born out of wedlock" to remove some of the stigma attached with the term "illegitimate." See Hauser, supra note 175, at 891 n.1; Carlotta P. Wells, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings: Barring an "Illegitimate’s" Right to Support, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 567 (1983) ("[T]here are no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents.") (alteration in original) (quoting In re Miller, 605 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), off'd sub nom. In re J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982)).

197. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.

198. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.

199. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

200. The relevance of the social expectation that the adoptive parent and the natural parent should be married before the adoption takes place is also demonstrated by contrasting the natural illegitimate child with the adoptive illegitimate child. In the case of a natural illegitimate child, in
adoption rule grants the adopted child special treatment to recognize the new, hybrid family that has been formed. 201

In the step-partner adoption scenario, however, the adoptive parent and the custodial parent do not behave in the "socially responsible" and expected behavior.

Because the adoptive parent is living with, but not married to, the custodial parent, the "legally reborn" child is an "illegitimate" child relative to the adoption. As a "legally" illegitimate child, the stepparent adoption rule does not apply, and the child does not have the same inheritance rights as a child adopted in the socially responsible manner. 202 As a "legally" illegitimate child, a child adopted by a step-partner is analogous to the "naturally" illegitimate child in Trimble v. Gordon. 203 The Court's analysis in Trimble of the traditional discrimination against "naturally" illegitimate children serves as a perfect blueprint for analyzing whether the stepparent adoption rule invidiously discriminates against children adopted by a step-partner in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

B. The Ameliorative Purpose of the Stepparent Adoption Inheritance Rule Does Not Insulate It from Constitutional Scrutiny

In Trimble, one of the first points the Supreme Court made was that, although the purpose and effect of section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code was ameliorative, it was not insulate from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 204 The principal purpose of section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code was to counter the harsh effect of

201. The adopted child has three parents from whom he or she can inherit. See supra notes 66-74, 98-101 and accompanying text.

202. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.

203. For the meaning of "legally" and "naturally" as used in this context, see supra notes 33-36, 197-98 and accompanying text.

204. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 766-68.
the common law treatment of illegitimate children with regard to inheritance rights. Although section 12 did improve the plight of illegitimate children by permitting an illegitimate child to inherit from and through his or her natural mother, it granted only partial relief. It still discriminated against illegitimate children when it came to the child's right to inherit from and through the natural father. As such, it was subject to the Equal Protection Clause.

Likewise, the apparent purpose of the stepparent adoption rule is to ameliorate the harshness of the classic adoption rule. Application of the classic adoption rule would cut off an adopted child's right to inherit from and through the non-custodial natural parent even though the child did not consent to the adoption and even though the child may still have a relationship with the non-custodial natural parent and his or her family. Juxtaposed with the classic adoption rule, the stepparent adoption rule arguably is a fairer and more equitable way to treat a child adopted by a parent's spouse. But just like section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code, the stepparent adoption rule grants only partial relief to the child adopted by the custodial parent's step-partner. The stepparent adoption rule grants the adopted child the right to inherit from and through both of his or her natural parents if the adoptive parent is married to a natural parent, but it discriminates against a child adopted by a step-partner by not granting the child the same right. Because the stepparent adoption rule discriminates on the basis of legitimacy relative to the adoption, it is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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205. Id. at 768. Under the common law approach, illegitimate children were the children of no one. They could inherit from no one. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code, and other state statutes like it, tried to reduce the harshness of the common law approach by permitting illegitimate children to inherit from and through the natural mother, but not necessarily the natural father. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. Juxtaposed with the common law approach to illegitimate children, section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code was a fairer and more equitable way to treat illegitimate children. But as the Court noted, while section 12 did improve the plight of illegitimate children, it granted only partial relief. It still discriminated against illegitimate children when it came to the child's right to inherit from and through the natural father, and as such it was subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768.

206. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768.

207. See id. at 763, 768.

208. See supra notes 54, 59 and accompanying text.

209. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.

210. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
C. Encourage Traditional Family Values

Inasmuch as the only distinction between the stepparent adoption paradigm and the step-partner adoption paradigm is whether the adoptive parent is married to the custodial parent, the most logical state interest that can be invoked to justify the stepparent exception is that it is "pro-marriage/pro-family." A rule of law is pro-marriage or pro-family to the extent it encourages and/or creates an incentive for a couple to marry—or punishes or burdens a couple for failing to marry. The argument appears to be that by granting the additional inheritance rights in the stepparent adoption scenario, but not in the step-partner adoption scenario, the stepparent adoption exception creates an incentive for a couple to marry before the custodial parent's new partner adopts the child. Assuming, arguendo, the distinction in inheritance rights is intended to promote traditional family values, the issue is whether this claimed state interest passes the intermediate level of scrutiny.

States have a right to adopt laws that are pro-marriage and pro-family. In Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court expressly stated that

211. See supra notes 61-65, 138-42 and accompanying text.

212. While the legislative history behind the stepparent adoption rule does not expressly indicate that it was intended to be pro-marriage/pro-family, it clearly manifests the traditional mindset that only a new partner who marries the custodial parent should be eligible to, and/or would want to, adopt a child of the custodial parent, and only a new partner who marries the custodial parent should be rewarded for adopting the child. The stepparent adoption rule arguably is based more on an antiquated view of who constitutes an acceptable family, particularly with respect to who could adopt (that is inherently pro-marriage), than it is a conscious attempt to influence the actions of the adoptive parent by punishing the child. The stepparent adoption rule was accepted before step-partners could adopt. But the failure to change the stepparent adoption rule in light of the changes in adoption law with respect to who can adopt constitutes invidious discrimination. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that gender classifications are usually considered quasi-suspect because, "[r]ather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens [based on gender]... very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women." Id. at 441. Likewise one could say that the stepparent adoption rule, with its legitimacy-based classification scheme, very likely reflects an outmoded notion of who can adopt. On its face the stepparent adoption rule appears both in statutory language and in effect as an attempt to promote marriage and a traditional notion of what constitutes an acceptable family by punishing the adopted child where the adoptive parent and the custodial natural parent do not marry. The Supreme Court has repeatedly and unambiguously held that "a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of their parents' misconduct." Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854 (1986). That logic and principle applies to the stepparent adoption rule.

213. In analyzing the claim that the stepparent adoption exception to the classic adopted-child rule is constitutional because it is pro-marriage and pro-family, the first point to note is that the term "pro-family" as used in this context assumes a traditional notion of a family—one where the parents are married. Increasingly, however, couples are rejecting this traditional notion of a family. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text. Increasingly couples are living together, and having children, without bothering to get married. But even assuming, arguendo, that it is better for parents
"the family [unit is] perhaps the most fundamental social institution of our society." 214 State laws that promote legitimate family relationships are, therefore, a legitimate state interest. 215 But the mere incantation of a legitimate state interest is not enough. 216 The intermediate level of judicial scrutiny requires that the important governmental objective be "substantially related" to the statutory classification. 217 And as the Court held in *Trimble v. Gordon*, the claimed legitimate state interest of promoting legitimate family relationships cannot be achieved by putting the burden on an innocent child. 218 As applied to the stepparent adoption rule, to the extent it promotes traditional family values at all, it does so at the expense of the innocent children adopted by step-partners.

The stepparent adoption rule creates no incentive for either the adoptive parent or the custodial parent to act in a way which is consistent with traditional family values. First, as applied to the adoptive parent, the adoption creates a parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parent, with full inheritance rights, regardless of whether the adoptive parent marries the natural parent. 219 The adoptive parent can inherit from and through the child, and the child can inherit from and through the adoptive parent. 220 The adoptive parent receives no greater or lesser inheritance rights based on whether he or she is married to the custodial parent. Because the statutory distinction between the stepparent adoption scenario and the step-partner adoption scenario has no effect upon the inheritance rights of the adoptive parent, it creates no incentive for the adoptive parent to marry the custodial parent.

Likewise, the stepparent adoption rule has no effect on the inheritance rights between the child and the custodial natural parent. 221

who are raising a child to be married, granting additional inheritance rights to the adopted child under the stepparent adoption scenario is neither pro-family nor pro-marriage.

216. *See id.* at 769.
218. *See supra* notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
219. *See supra* notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
220. *See supra* note 68 and accompanying text.
221. Historically, adoption by a single adoptive parent severed the parent-child relationship with both natural parents. *See supra* note 120 and accompanying text. But that approach was based on the classic adoption paradigm. The stepparent adoption paradigm has different factual assumptions underlying it, which came to justify different legal treatment. *See supra* Part IV. In the stepparent adoption scenario, only the parent-child relationship of the natural parent of the same gender as the adoptive parent should be affected by the adoption. *See supra* notes 75-100. This debate is still reflected in the laws of some states, but it is clear that the Uniform Probate Code and the states which follow it provide that the stepparent adoption affects only the rights of the natural parent of the same gender as the adoptive parent.
The custodial natural parent maintains a full parent-child relationship with the child, including full inheritance rights.\(^2\) Regardless of whether the custodial parent marries the adoptive parent, the custodial parent can still inherit from and through the adopted child, and the adopted child can still inherit from and through the custodial parent.\(^2\) Because the statutory distinction between the stepparent adoption scenario and the step-partner adoption scenario has no effect upon the inheritance rights of the custodial parent, it creates no incentive for the custodial parent to marry the adoptive parent.

The stepparent adoption inheritance exception does, however, affect the parent-child relationship and inheritance rights between the non-custodial natural parent and the adopted child—but it should be noted from the outset that these parties have minimal influence, if any, over whether the adoptive parent and the custodial parent get married. If the adoptive parent and the custodial parent are not married, the classic adoption rule applies and the parent-child relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent is completely severed, including inheritance rights.\(^2\) If, on the other hand, the adoptive parent and the custodial natural parent are married, the stepparent adoption rule applies. The non-custodial parent loses his or her right to inherit from and through the child, but the adopted child retains the right to inherit from and through the non-custodial parent.\(^2\) Either way, the principal effect of the adoption on the non-custodial natural parent is the same. The non-custodial natural parent loses his or her right to inherit from and through the adopted child.\(^2\) Because the statutory distinction between the

\(^2\) See supra notes 38, 72-74 and accompanying text. Some states apply the classic adoption rule to the stepparent adoption scenario, thereby severing the parent-child relationship with both natural parents, but the natural parent who is married to the adopting parent can avoid the full effect of the rule by adopting the child along with the adoptive stepparent. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. The same can apply to same-sex adoptions. Other states, acknowledging that the intent of the parties is not to sever the parent-child relationship with both natural parents and recognizing the ease with which the parties can nullify the effect of the classic adoption rule, have modified the law so that only the parent-child relationship between the child and the natural non-custodial parent not married to the adoptive parent is affected by the stepparent adoption. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

\(^2\) See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.

\(^2\) See supra notes 54, 59, 64, 75-76, 148-50 and accompanying text.

\(^2\) See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

\(^2\) The apparent logic is that, because the non-custodial parent generally must consent to the adoption, the consenting parent is deemed to have waived his or her right to inherit from and through the child—though consent is not always required. See supra notes 65, 99. While that logic arguably applies to the classic adoption scenario, its application to the stepparent and non-stepparent adoption scenario is more questionable. In the classic adoption scenario, the norm is for there to have been little to no meaningful parent-child relationship between the child and his or her natural
stepparent adoption scenario and the step-partner adoption scenario has no effect upon the principal inheritance right of the non-custodial parent, it creates no incentive for the non-custodial parent to try to influence the adoptive parent and the custodial parent to marry (and that statement is based upon the highly questionable assumption that the non-custodial would want to, and/or would, have any influence over the adoptive parent and the custodial parent on this issue).

parents to start with, and the adoption constitutes a complete break in the child's relationship with both of the natural parents. See supra notes 46-49, 79 and accompanying text. It makes more sense under these conditions to say that the consenting parents have "waived" their parent-child relationship, including the right to inherit. In the stepparent and step-partner adoption paradigms, however, the argument that the consenting natural parent has "waived" his or her parent-child relationship makes less sense. Both the stepparent and step-partner relationship assume that a meaningful parent-child relationship existed for a period of time between both of the natural parents and the child. See supra notes 82-89, 137-44 and accompanying text. A natural parent's willingness to consent to a stepparent or step-partner adoption does not necessarily mean that the natural parent is waiving his or her relationship with the adoptive parent and the custodial parent to marry (and that statement is based upon the highly questionable assumption that the non-custodial would want to, and/or would, have any influence over the adoptive parent and the custodial parent on this issue).

227. One can make the argument that the non-custodial natural parent does have some influence over whether the adoptive parent marries the custodial natural parent in that generally the non-custodial natural parent must consent to the adoption. See supra note 65. The non-custodial natural parent could withhold consent unless the adoptive parent and the custodial natural parent marry. But asking the non-custodial natural parent to act as an agent of the state in promoting pro-marriage/pro-family policies by withholding consent to a proposed adoption unless the parties marry appears so farfetched that it is unlikely that the drafters of the stepparent adoption rule based it on this logic. And if that was the logic, arguably it is inappropriate. Nor do the means serve the claimed end. If the purpose was to create an incentive for the non-custodial natural parent to withhold consent unless the adoptive parent married the custodial natural parent, the statute should grant the non-custodial natural parent the right to inherit from and through the child if the adoptive parent marries the custodial natural parent, and it should sever the non-custodial natural parent's right to inherit from and through the child if the adoptive parent does not marry the custodial natural parent. But the statute does not. The only difference between the stepparent adoption scenario and the step-partner adoption scenario is that the child retains the right to inherit from both natural parents in the stepparent adoption scenario and the child does not in the non-stepparent adoption
The only party for whom the stepparent adoption rule creates any meaningful pro-marriage/pro-family incentive is the adopted child. If the adoptive parent and the custodial natural parent are married, the adopted child retains his or her right to inherit from both natural parents and the adopted child gains the right to inherit from and through the adoptive stepparent. The child adopted by a stepparent can therefore inherit from and through three parents. On the other hand, if the adoptive parent and the custodial parent are not married, although the adopted child gains the right to inherit from and through the adoptive step-partner, the adopted child loses the right to inherit from and through his or her non-custodial parent. Thus, the child adopted by a step-partner can inherit from and through only two parents. From an economic perspective, the adopted child would want the adoptive parent to be married to the custodial parent so that the adopted child could keep his or her right to inherit from and through both natural parents. But the adopted child has no control over whether the adoptive parent and the custodial parent marry. Any pro-marriage/pro-family incentive that might exist in the difference between how the law treats the inheritance rights in the stepparent adoption scenario as opposed to the step-partner adoption scenario is lost on the child.

The Uniform Probate Code and the state statutes that fail to apply the stepparent adoption exception to the step-partner adoption hurt only the adopted child, yet the adopted child has absolutely no control over whether the adoptive step-partner is married to the cohabiting parent. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly and unambiguously held that it is unconstitutional to punish the children as a means of trying to influence the conduct of the parents. The Court has "invalidated classifications that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit relations of their parents, because 'visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.'" Thus, the stepparent scenario. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text. The only party who is meaningfully affected by the statutory distinction is the adopted child.

228. See supra notes 66-68, 100 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
231. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); accord Reed, 476 U.S. at 854 ("[T]he answer is governed by a rather clear distinction that has emerged from our cases considering the constitutionality of statutory provisions that impose special burdens on illegitimate children. In these cases, we have unambiguously concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order to express its disapproval of their parents' misconduct."); Weber, 406 U.S. at 173 (ruling that a statutory classification based on illegitimacy could not be upheld on the ground that "persons will shun illicit relations because the
adoption rule cannot be upheld on the grounds that it is pro-marriage/pro-family. 232

D. Promotion of the Fair and Efficient Disposition of the Decedent’s Property

Although the Supreme Court has been very skeptical of claims that classifications based on legitimacy are constitutional because they are pro-marriage/pro-family, the Court has been much more deferential to claims that classifications based on legitimacy are constitutional because they serve a legitimate state administrative interest. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that states have a legitimate interest in developing statutory classifications that promote an “accurate and efficient method of disposing of property at death.” 233 But even where there is a legitimate state interest, the precise terms of the statutory classification system must be substantially related to the state interest. For example, in *Trimble v. Gordon*, the Supreme Court found that the Illinois statute was not substantially related to the claimed legitimate administrative interest. 234 The Court ruled:

232. Related to the argument that the stepparent adoption rule is pro-marriage and/or pro-family is the argument that the stepparent adoption exception is appropriate because it recognizes that, unlike the classic adoption paradigm, in the stepparent adoption scenario the non-custodial natural parent does not necessarily step out of the child’s life. See *supra* notes 82-89 and accompanying text. To the extent that this is the justification, however, there is no basis for distinguishing the stepparent adoption scenario from the step-partner adoption scenario. In both adoption scenarios, there is no reason to assume that the non-custodial natural parent will step out of the child’s life—either before the adoption or after the adoption. In fact, the more logical assumption, and the one that society should promote, is the opposite—that the parent-child relationship will continue between the child and the non-custodial natural parent after the adoption, whether the adoption is by a stepparent or step-partner. In both scenarios, it is in the best interests of the child to grant the adopted child the continued right to inherit from and through the non-custodial parent on the assumption that the meaningful parent-child relationship that exists between the child and the non-custodial parent may continue after the adoption. Permitting the child adopted by a stepparent to continue to inherit from and through the non-custodial natural parent is pro-family relative to the original family unit, but it is equally pro-family relative to the original family unit to permit the child adopted by a step-partner to continue inheriting from and through the non-custodial natural parent. If the claimed state interest is the recognition that, in the stepparent adoption scenario the adopted child may continue to have a meaningful relationship with the non-custodial natural parent, the differentiation between the stepparent adoption scenario and the step-partner adoption scenario makes no sense, and it is not substantially related to an important state interest.


234. See *Trimble*, 430 U.S. at 770.
By insisting upon not only an acknowledgment by the father, but also the marriage of the parents, [section 12 of the Illinois Probate Code] excluded "at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men [whose] inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws."235

But the Court has upheld some statutory inheritance classifications based on illegitimacy.

In Lalli v. Lalli,236 the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York statute that required a court of competent jurisdiction to enter an order of filiation declaring paternity during the lifetime of the natural father before an illegitimate child could inherit from and through the father.237 The Court upheld the statute on the grounds that it was substantially related to a legitimate state administrative interest—the just and orderly disposition of property at death.238

In Lalli, an illegitimate child claimed the right to inherit from his father's intestate estate even though the child also admitted that "he had not obtained an order of filiation during his putative father's lifetime."239 The child invoked Trimble v. Gordon to argue that the statutory requirement unconstitutionally discriminated against the inheritance rights of illegitimate children. In commenting on Trimble, the Supreme Court noted that, while inheritance rights based on illegitimacy are "not defensible as an incentive to enter legitimate family relationships,"240 such classifications are more relevant to a state's interest in "safeguarding the orderly disposition of property at death."241 In analyzing whether the New York statutory classification based on legitimacy was constitutional, the Supreme Court distinguished the New York statutory provision from the Illinois statutory provision at issue in Trimble.

235. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266 (second alteration in original) (discussing and quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771).
237. See id. at 261-62. Section 4-1.2 of New York's Estate, Powers, and Trusts Law provided as follows:

An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.

Id.
238. See id. at 268-76.
239. See id. at 262.
240. See id. at 265.
241. See id.
First, the Court distinguished the two statutory schemes by focusing on the precise test for inheritance under the respective statutes. The Illinois statute focused on the legal relationship between the natural parents, making intermarriage of the natural parents an absolute requirement and the exclusive method by which an illegitimate child could qualify to inherit from the natural father.\textsuperscript{242} In contrast, under the New York statutory provision, the marital status of the natural parents was irrelevant to the illegitimate child's right to inherit.\textsuperscript{243} The New York statute focused on the issue of proving paternity, an evidentiary issue involved in an inheritance claim by a putative illegitimate child; it is a procedural matter which directly affects the just and orderly distribution of a decedent's property.\textsuperscript{244}

Second, the Court distinguished the New York statutory provision from the Illinois statutory provision based on the state interests purportedly and actually served by them. The Court noted that the Illinois statute was defended primarily on the ground that it was pro-marriage/pro-family.\textsuperscript{245} The purported administrative state interest in the Illinois statute was at best overly broad and not "carefully tuned to alternative considerations."\textsuperscript{246} In contrast, the Court concluded that the primary goal of the New York statute was not to encourage legitimate family relationships but rather to promote the just and orderly disposition of property at death—a legitimate administrative state interest.\textsuperscript{247}

Having concluded that the New York statute was enacted to serve a legitimate state interest, the Court turned to the constitutional requirement that the differentiation based on legitimacy substantially serve the state interest—the just and orderly disposition of property at death. The Court agreed with the State of New York that requiring the illegitimate child to bring his or her paternity action during the purported father's lifetime enhanced the accuracy of the proceeding.\textsuperscript{248} The Court also found that the "[t]he administration of an estate will be facilitated, and the possibility of delay and uncertainty minimized, where the entitlement of an illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{242} See id. at 266.
\item \textsuperscript{243} Id. at 267.
\item \textsuperscript{244} See id. at 267-68.
\item \textsuperscript{245} Id. at 267.
\item \textsuperscript{246} Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)).
\item \textsuperscript{247} Lalli, 439 U.S. at 267-68.
\item \textsuperscript{248} See id. at 271.
\end{enumerate}
of judicial record before the administration commences." Inter vivos determination of paternity also reduced both the probability of fraudulent paternity claims being asserted and the probability that such fraudulent claims would succeed. The Court concluded that the New York statutory classification based on illegitimacy was substantially related to the state's legitimate administrative interest in that it promoted the accurate and efficient distribution of property at death.

The illegitimate child in Lalli also argued, based on the Court's opinion in Trimble, that the New York statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it excluded significant categories of illegitimate children who could be allowed to inherit without jeopardizing the state interest in promoting the timely and orderly distribution of their natural fathers' intestate property. While the Court acknowledged that there was some truth to the appellant's assertion, the Court ruled that the question was not whether the statutory classification scheme adopted by the state was "fair" as an abstract matter. The Court emphasized that the scope of its constitutional scrutiny was limited to "whether the statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment." Again, the Court distinguished the New York statutory classification from the Illinois statutory provisions that were declared unconstitutional in Trimble v. Gordon. The Court emphasized that the Illinois statutory scheme "was constitutionally unacceptable because it effected a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The reach of the statute was far in excess of its justifiable purposes." The New York statutory scheme, on the other hand, was more carefully tuned so that it did not inevitably disqualify "an unnecessarily large number of children born out of wedlock." As Reed v. Campbell summarized, the Court concluded that the New York statutory classification based on illegitimacy bore "an evident and substantial relation to the State's interest in providing for the orderly and just distribution of a decedent's property at death."

249. Id.
250. See id. at 271.
251. Id. at 272.
252. Id. at 272-73.
253. Id. at 273.
254. Id.
255. Id.
E. Application of the Equal Protection Clause to the Stepparent Adoption Rule

Applying the factors the Court took into consideration in Trimble v. Gordon and Lalli v. Lalli, the stepparent adoption rule does not bear an evident and substantial relation to the legitimate state interest of promoting the orderly and just distribution of a decedent’s property.

The first step analytically, as performed by the Court in Lalli, is to focus on the precise statutory test for inheritance. Just like the constitutionally unacceptable Illinois statute in Trimble v. Gordon, the stepparent adoption rule focuses on the legal relationship between the custodial parent and the adoptive parent. It makes intermarriage of the custodial parent and the adoptive parent an absolute requirement and exclusive method by which a child adopted by the new partner of the custodial parent could qualify to retain the right to inherit from the non-custodial natural parent. The marriage requirement argues against the constitutionality of the stepparent adoption rule.

The second step, as performed by the Court in Lalli, is to analyze the particular administrative state interest said to be served by the statutory classification. Where a child is adopted by a third parent, the issue that naturally arises is whether the child should retain the right to inherit from the legally displaced parent. The argument is that the child should be permitted to retain the right to inherit from the legally displaced parent where the child had a sufficiently meaningful parent-child relationship with said parent. The courts could undertake a costly, case-by-case analysis of the parent-child relationship between the adopted child and the deceased non-custodial parent, with all the potential for increased administrative costs and fraudulent claims, or the state could simply adopt a bright line rule with respect to the issue either permitting or denying the right in all cases. The stepparent adoption rule represents the legislative determination that a bright line approach is better. Rather than conducting a case-by-case, fact-sensitive hearing to determine when a child adopted by a stepparent should be granted the right to inherit from the legally displaced parent, all children adopted by a stepparent are granted such a right. The stepparent adoption rule promotes the orderly distribution of a decedent’s property by assuming

257. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
258. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266.
259. See id. at 267-68.
260. Such a bright line approach could either grant the child adopted by a stepparent the continued right to inherit from the legally displaced parent in all cases, or it could deny the child adopted by a stepparent the right to inherit from said parent in all cases.
in all cases that the adopted child had a sufficiently meaningful relationship with the legally displaced parent to justify permitting the child to retain the right to inherit from and through said parent.261

The issue arguably is the same with respect to a child adopted by a step-partner. Where a child is adopted by a step-partner, the issue that naturally arises is whether the child should retain the right to inherit from the legally displaced parent. The courts could undertake a costly, case-by-case analysis of the parent-child relationship between the adopted child and the deceased non-custodial parent, with all the potential for increased administrative costs and fraudulent claims, or the state could simply adopt a bright line rule with respect to the issue. The failure to include step-partner adoptions within the scope of the stepparent adoption rule constitutes a bright line approach to the issue. It promotes the orderly distribution of a decedent’s property by assuming in all cases that the adopted child did not have a sufficiently meaningful relationship with the legally displaced parent to justify permitting the child to retain the right to inherit from and through said parent.262

This approach, however, is constitutionally flawed as applied to the step-partner adoption scenario. First, there is no defensible distinction between a child adopted by a stepparent and a child adopted by a step-partner with respect to the issues of potential for increased administrative costs and fraudulent claims. With respect to both categories of children, there is a good chance that the child may have had a meaningful relationship with the non-custodial parent, one which may or may not continue after the adoption. But no doubt for some children, such will not have been the case. Any attempt to claim that the potential for increased administrative costs and fraudulent claims is different

261. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.

262. There is, however, nothing in the legislative history behind the stepparent adoption scenario to support the argument that this administrative function was the principal state interest behind the statutory scheme. In Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court refused to entertain a claimed state interest that might have justified the statutory classification under scrutiny when the claimed state interest was not reflected in the legislative history of the statute. 430 U.S. 762, 774-75 (1977). The Court concluded “that the statutory provisions at issue were shaped by forces other than” the claimed state interest not reflected in statute’s legislative history. Id. at 775. The same can be said about the stepparent adoption rule. Step-partner adoptions were not permitted when the stepparent adoption rule was developed. The first second-parent adoption did not occur until the mid-1980s. See David, supra note 115, at 927 n.40. The stepparent adoption rule was first adopted several years before that. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-109(1), 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982). The stepparent adoption rule was “shaped by [other] forces”—the desire to facilitate and encourage stepparent adoptions—and not any determination that children adopted by step-partners posed any greater administrative costs or threat of fraud. The legislative history behind the stepparent adoption rule does not support the argument that children adopted by step-partners were excluded to promote the orderly distribution of a decedent’s estate. See id.
depending upon whether the child is adopted by a stepparent or a step-partner is indefensible.

Second, the issue of whether a child adopted by a third parent should retain the right to inherit from the non-custodial parent should turn on the parent-child relationship between the two. Any classification scheme which grants some children adopted by a third parent the right to inherit from the non-custodial parent, and denies the right to other adopted children, must be substantially related to the claimed state interest. The stepparent adoption rule grants children adopted by a stepparent the right to inherit from the non-custodial parent and denies the right to children adopted by a step-partner. The focus of the stepparent adoption rule is not on the parent-child relationship or any evidentiary or administrative costs inherent in proving such a relationship. Instead, the focus is solely on whether the adoptive parent is married to the custodial parent. The test employed by the stepparent adoption rule is not related to the parent-child relationship between the adopted child and the legally displaced non-custodial parent. The reach of the stepparent adoption rule is far in excess of its claimed justifiable purpose and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

Similar to the Illinois statutory provision in *Trimble v. Gordon*, the stepparent adoption rule broadly discriminates between legitimate and illegitimate children relative to the status of the adopted child. Permitting a child adopted by a step-partner to retain the right to inherit from both natural parents would not compromise any claimed state interest in the accurate and efficient distribution of a decedent’s property any more than permitting a child adopted by a stepparent does. The stepparent adoption rule discriminates against children adopted by step-partners without any offsetting administrative benefit. Just as with the Illinois statutory scheme at issue in *Trimble v. Gordon*, because the stepparent adoption rule categorically excludes all children adopted by step-partners, it is constitutionally flawed.

263. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. While some might want to assume that, in the step-partner scenario, a meaningful parent-child relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent is less likely, such an assumption is (1) factually indefensible, and (2) irrelevant under the stepparent adoption rule. The sole test is whether the adoptive parent and the custodial parent are married at the time of the adoption. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
266. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266 (1978) (distinguishing the statute at issue in *Trimble*, 430 U.S. 762). Yet another possible explanation for why step-partner adoption inheritance rights are treated differently from the stepparent adoption inheritance rights is that they are an added deterrent to same-sex couple adoptions. By granting the exception to the general adopted-child rule only in cases of stepparent adoptions, heterosexual adoptions are treated differently, and more
VIII. CONCLUSION

Just as inheritance laws that excluded illegitimate children "sent a signal that childbearing ought to occur within the marital context," the prevailing stepparent adoption inheritance laws that exclude children adopted by a step-partner send a signal that adoption ought to occur within the marital text. The stepparent adoption rule discriminates against children adopted by step-partners with respect to inheritance laws. From a public policy perspective, this distinction is illogical and unjust. One would expect that, as the asymmetry in inheritance rights is made public, there should be support for granting a child adopted by a step-partner the right to inherit from both natural parents. Liberals should support such an approach because it broadens what constitutes a legally recognized parent-child relationship. Conservatives should support such an approach because it is in the best interests of the child. From a public policy perspective, the failure to extend the stepparent adoption rule to the step-partner adoption scenario is as illogical as the rule itself.

In addition, while there is no constitutional requirement that states permit step-partner adoptions or that states adopt the stepparent adoption rule, if a state has the stepparent adoption rule and it recognizes step-partner adoptions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to extend the stepparent adoption rule to children adopted by step-partners. Similarly situated children should be treated the same. At a minimum, the Uniform Probate Code's stepparent adoption rule should be amended to grant a child adopted by a step-partner the same inheritance rights as a child adopted by a stepparent so that family law, as embodied in the Uniform Adoption Act, and wills favorably, than adoptions by same-sex couples. This argument is specious, however, for several reasons. First, if that were the logic underlying the distinction, the approach is overly broad. Not only are same-sex couple adoptions affected by the rule, but so too are unmarried heterosexual couple adoptions. Even assuming, arguendo, that as a matter of public policy a jurisdiction opposes same-sex adoptions, that opposition should be stated and taken upfront as a complete bar on same-sex adoptions, not indirectly by restricting inheritance rights in step-partner adoptions scenarios as opposed to stepparent adoption scenarios. In fact, the nexus between the treatment of the inheritance rights under the step-partner adoption scenario and the assumed goal of deterring same-sex adoptions is so tenuous, that it seems preposterous to even raise the argument but for the passion the issue engenders among its opponents.

and trusts law, as embodied in the Uniform Probate Code, speak with one voice on this important emerging social and legal issue.\(^{268}\)

268. There are official movements towards just such an approach. Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Restatement Third of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) (on file with author), approved by the American Law Institute at the May 2004 annual meeting, provides:

\[\text{§ 14.6 Adopted Child as Child of Genetic Parent}\]

Unless the language or circumstances establish that the transferor had a different intention, an adopted child is not treated for class-gift purposes as a child of either genetic parent, except that:

1. If the adoption is by the spouse or domestic partner of a genetic parent, the child remains a child of the genetic parent who is married to or the domestic partner of the adopting parent.

2. If the adoption is by a relative of either genetic parent, or by the spouse or surviving spouse or domestic partner or surviving domestic partner of such a relative, the child remains a child of both genetic parents.

3. If the adoption occurs after the death or incapacity of either genetic parent, the child remains a child of both genetic parents if (i) the adoption is by someone nominated by a genetic parent to be the child's guardian, or (ii) the child does not subsequently become estranged from the genetic families.

Although Tentative Draft No. 4 of section 14.6 of the Restatement Third of Property expands the stepparent adoption rule to include domestic partners, this expansion arguably is not enough for the reasons set forth in this Article.

In addition, a draft of this Article was sent to a representative of the Uniform Law Commission. The Uniform Law Commission responded by acknowledging the merits of the article and that it is in the process of reviewing the issue. It offered the following as a draft revision of Uniform Probate Code § 2-115 on which it is working:

\[\text{SECTION 2-115. PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP; ADOPTED INDIVIDUAL.}\]

(a) This section applies for purposes of determining the status of an adopted individual under [this Part] [the laws of intestate succession].

(b) An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parent or parents.

(c) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), an adopted individual is not the child of his [or her] genetic parents.

(d) An individual who is adopted by the spouse or by the [legally recognized] unmarried partner of either genetic parent continues to be the child of:

1. that genetic parent; and

2. the other genetic parent, but only for purposes of intestate succession from or through that other genetic parent.

(e) An individual who, after the death or incapacity of either genetic parent, is adopted by any of the following continues to be the child of both genetic parents:

1. a relative of either genetic parent or the spouse or surviving spouse of such a relative;

2. an individual nominated by either genetic parent to be the child's guardian; or

3. [an individual who is acquainted with either genetic parent] [need a better formulation here, such as maintained a continuing family relationship or something like that].

(f) If a child was adopted more than once, the term "previous adoptive parent" is substituted for "genetic parent" in subsections (d) and (e).

This new Uniform Probate Code section had not been finalized or adopted by the Uniform Law Commission by the time this Article was published nor adopted by any state.