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INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: THE PRESSURE ON IRAN TO ABANDON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Jamie Lang*

INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 2007, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved stringent sanctions intended to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. These sanctions were issued in response to Iran’s failure to comply with previous sanctions issued by the Security Council in December 2006. Despite the efforts of the Security Council, Iran has vowed to continue nuclear development. The Iranian government has asserted that Iran’s nuclear development is intended only for peaceful use. However, Iran has failed to be candid about its nuclear activities. A February 2006 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) revealed that Iran has expanded its nuclear program more quickly than expected. Experts predict that Iran could potentially produce a nuclear bomb within the next few years.

Iran’s nuclear development is a cause for international concern. Recently, tensions have further escalated in the Middle East. The U.S. has accused Iran of providing weapons to insurgents battling against the U.S. military in Iraq. Adding to the turmoil, Iran captured 15 British sailors off the coast of Iran and accused them of espionage. Iran has a turbulent history of providing funding and weapons to terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas. There are significant dangers of a nuclear Iran. If Iran were to attain a nuclear bomb, the country might be able to support terrorism more aggressively, because Iran would be less worried about retaliation from the U.S. and other nations. Other Middle Eastern nations might also develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent, contributing to unstable conditions in an area of the world where tension already exists.

U.N. sanctions have failed to impede Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program expansion. During the negotiations which led

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to the pre-2007 sanctions, Russia and China opposed strict penalties supported by the U.S. and its European allies. The current trade relationships between members of the Security Council and Iran could explain the positions taken by each member with regard to penalizing Iran. Realizing that U.N. sanctions are not enough to stop Iran’s nuclear proliferation, the U.S. has sought to prevent international financial funding to Iran by pressing foreign countries to refuse to deal with Iran. An analysis of the social climate in Iran reveals that President Ahmadinejad’s policies are losing both political and popular support. Continued international pressure is necessary to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.

Part I of this note will discuss the U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed in December 2006 and March 2007, as well as Iran’s response to these sanctions. Part II will explore Iran’s evasiveness regarding current nuclear development and assess reports of Iran’s recent nuclear milestones. Part III will review the history of Iran’s relationship with the U.S. Part IV will examine the reluctance of China and Russia to impose strict sanctions on Iran because of each country’s significant economic ties with Iran. Part V will explain new tactics employed by the U.S. to prevent international financial funding to Iran’s illicit activities. Part VI will analyze the effects of increasing international pressure on Iran’s social and political climate. Finally, Part VII will evaluate the likelihood of war with Iran.

I. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS FAIL TO IMPEDE IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

On December 23, 2006, the Security Council unanimously approved sanctions designed to curtail Iran’s nuclear development.1 The resolution, prepared by Germany and the Security Council’s five permanent members—the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China—represented the culmination of months of negotiations to determine the proper sanctions to impose in response to Iran’s failure to adhere to the Security Council’s demand that nuclear activities be suspended by August 31, 2006.2

Sanctions included a ban on the import and export of materials and technology used in uranium enrichment and ballistic missiles.3 The resolution also froze the assets of 12 individuals and 10 entities involved in Iran’s nuclear

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2 Id.
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and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the Director General of the IAEA was required to report to the Security Council within 60 days on whether Iran had complied with sanctions and suspended its enrichment program. Also included in the resolution was a warning to Iran that failure to comply would result in further sanctions. The resolution, however, restricted further measures to nonmilitary actions.

The U.N. has come under attack for delaying the imposition of sanctions on Iran. Critics argue that "nothing of any seriousness comes out of the U.N." The U.N. is "supposed to embody... 'collective security[...]'" but critics argue that "[t]he illusion[...]" Instead, member nations avoid resolutions that could potentially conflict with their own interests. For example, the U.N. has been criticized for failing to effectively deal with the situation in Darfur. The U.S. defined genocide as the "displacement, starvation, rape and mass slaughter" of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Darfur by the government of Sudan and its allied Janjaweed militias. The Security Council has passed resolutions which call for the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed, and the Security Council has also authorized a U.N. peacekeeping force. However, these efforts have proven ineffective, and experts have called for further action by the Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping force with orders to protect civilians by force if necessary. China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has presented a stumbling block to international efforts to end the genocide in Darfur. China’s dependence on the area for oil has led its government to oppose "forceful intervention in Sudan’s sovereign affairs." As a result of member nations’ individual interests, the U.N. has continued to play the role of a passive bystander when confronted with pressing international issues, and Iran’s nuclear

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4 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id.
7 Gootman, supra note 1.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 UN: A Chance for a Safer World, supra note 12.
17 Id.

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program is no exception. The U.N. has been criticized for postponing sanctions on Iran because of Russian and Chinese economic interests.

The December 2006 resolution, considerably weaker than earlier proposed resolutions, did little to compel Iran to discontinue its nuclear activities. Russia, which has strong economic ties with Iran, objected to previously proposed resolutions. China, also economically linked to Iran, often supported objections made by Russia during negotiations. During negotiations Russian Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin objected to language in the sanctions that would threaten Russia’s current business deals. In order to facilitate a solution, the U.S. and its European allies agreed to eliminate a travel ban on Iranians suspected of involvement in nuclear activities. Previous drafts of the resolution directed “that all states ‘prevent entry’ of such people, [but] the final version of the resolution simply ‘calls upon’ states to ‘exercise vigilance’ over their borders.”

To appease Russia, the other Security Council members agreed to exclude any sanctions against a nuclear power plant that Russia is building in Bushehr, Iran. In addition, prior to approving the resolution, Russia demanded the removal of Aerospace Industries Organization from the list of companies involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

In response to the Security Council’s sanctions, Iranian officials defiantly vowed to continue nuclear development. Iran insists that it is entitled to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Immediately following the announcement of Security Council sanctions, President Ahmadinejad declared that “nuclear technology is our right, and no one can take it away from us.” Ahmadinejad also warned that the U.S. would

18 Krauthammer, supra note 8.
19 Id.
21 Gootman, supra note 1.
22 Id.
24 Id.
25 Gootman, supra note 1.
27 Id.
28 Nazila Fathi, Iran is Defiant, Vowing to U.N. It Will Continue Nuclear Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2006, at A14.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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regret the imposition of these sanctions.31 Ali Larijani, Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator, was unfazed by the Security Council sanctions, and said that Iran’s response to the resolution would be to “begin activities at Natanz—site of 3,000 centrifuges—and we will drive with full speed.”32

However, a milder reaction from members of the Iranian Parliament demonstrated the willingness of some members to cooperate with the U.N.33 Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, said, “Our efforts should be reasonable and moderate[, which] means we should be after getting our rights and also show that we are not after a fight[,] if they are willing to recognize our rights, we will cooperate.”34 Kazem Jalali, a member of Parliament and its foreign policy committee, said that “it did not appear to be the right time to bar United Nations’ inspectors or withdraw from the treaty[.]”35 Muhammad Saeedi, the deputy leader of the country’s Atomic Energy Organization, “doubted a majority in Parliament wanted to pull out” of the IAEA.36

On March 24, 2007, in response to Iran’s failure to comply with December 2006 sanctions, the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution containing more stringent sanctions.37 The new resolution froze the foreign assets of 15 individuals and 13 entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities or the Revolutionary Guard in addition to those already listed in the December 2006 sanctions.38 The resolution instructed the Director General of the IAEA to issue a report within 60 days about whether Iran had complied with the new sanctions and suspended its nuclear activities.39 The sanctions did not include a travel ban for Iranians suspected of nuclear activity, as had been previously proposed by the U.S. and its allies, but instead called upon member states “to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding entry into or transit through their territories” of individuals engaged in nuclear activities.40

Iran appeared unmoved by the adoption of more stringent sanctions,

31 Id.
32 Id.
34 Fathi, supra note 28.
35 Fathi, supra note 33.
36 Id.
39 Id. at 3.
and asserted that its nuclear program would not be suspended. Following the unanimous approval of sanctions, Iran Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told the Security Council that its sanctions were “unlawful, unnecessary, and unjustifiable.” Iran also announced that it would limit cooperation with the IAEA and will no longer provide information to the IAEA prior to developing new facilities capable of producing atomic fuel.

II. RECENT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

Although President Ahmadinejad claims that the nuclear fuel cycle is needed only to run fuel reactors and generate electricity, the international community has questioned his true intentions where nuclear development is concerned. Experts speculate that Iran is adamant in its quest for a nuclear weapon because Iran fears that the U.S. wants to destroy the Islamic Republic and a nuclear weapon would help ensure the regime’s security. Iran also likely desires a nuclear weapon to increase Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Possession of a nuclear weapon is a status symbol and Iran wants to show that it is a major power in the Middle East.

Iran has asserted that it has the right to continue nuclear development under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1970. The Treaty permitted Iran “to pursue peaceful nuclear development under the watchful eyes of the IAEA.” However, on July 31, 2006, amid continuing reports that Iran was not fully cooperating with the IAEA, the Security Council adopted a resolution that mandated suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment and processing by August 31, 2006. In December 2006, sanctions were issued in response to Iran’s failure to suspend nuclear enrichment by the Security Council.

41 Id.
42 Id.
45 Daniel Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Stud., The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Latest Developments and Next Steps, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia (Mar. 15, 2007).
46 Id.
47 Id.
49 Id.
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Council’s deadline.\textsuperscript{51}

The IAEA, although unable to prove that Iran’s nuclear fuel is being used for nuclear weapons, revealed in its June 2006 report that Iran continued to evade questions about its atomic program.\textsuperscript{52} The report noted that “Iran [had] failed to provide full access to records needed to confirm its claims in June of having enriched uranium to a level of 5 percent, which is suitable for reactors.”\textsuperscript{53} In addition, “inspectors [had not resolved] the origin of previously discovered traces of highly enriched uranium[].”\textsuperscript{54} The report also disclosed that “inspectors [had] recently found traces of yet another unexplained particle—plutonium—on samples from containers at Karaj.”\textsuperscript{55} Plutonium and uranium are both used to fuel atomic bombs.\textsuperscript{56}

Significant dangers would be presented by a nuclear Iran.\textsuperscript{57} Experts fear that if Iran produces a nuclear bomb, it might begin to support terrorism more aggressively, because retaliation by the U.S. and other nations would be less likely.\textsuperscript{58} A nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranian government might also cause other Middle Eastern countries, fearful about Iran’s intentions, to develop a nuclear weapon as a deterrent.\textsuperscript{59} Nations observing the situation in Iran might also conclude that they could also acquire a nuclear weapon without risking serious repercussions, which could further aggravate existing international conflicts.\textsuperscript{60}

Increasing international pressure has not deterred Iran; instead, it may have motivated the Iranian government to press on with its nuclear program. In February 2007, the IAEA reported that Iran was operating or close to operating 1,000 centrifuges that are capable of enriching uranium at its nuclear facility in Natanz.\textsuperscript{61} David Albright, a former inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, stated that “[t]hey are installing faster than was commonly expected.”\textsuperscript{62} This report came as a surprise to many experts who did not believe Iran was capable of expanding its nuclear program so

\textsuperscript{51} Lynch, \textit{supra} note 26.
\textsuperscript{52} Broad & Fathi, \textit{supra} note 44.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{57} Byman, \textit{supra} note 45.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Id}.
However, the report also confirmed that Iran had not met its nuclear goals. In February of 2006, Iran claimed that it would have 3,000 centrifuges running by February of 2007. Unfortunately, inspectors believe that Iran will be able to make up the shortfall and have 3,000 centrifuges operational by May 2007.

In addition to its nuclear activities, Iran has also demonstrated its defiant attitude toward U.N. sanctions by test firing missiles. In January 2007, Revolutionary Guards tested fire missiles in a three-day military exercise. The Guards fired Zelzal and Fajr-5 missiles near the city of Garmsar, which is 60 miles outside the capital of Iran.

III. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES’ TRADE SANCTIONS WITH IRAN

In 1951, when Iran’s parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, Great Britain and the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed a plan to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadeq and install a new leader. The Prime Minister was successfully overthrown and replaced with the Shah. The Shah ruled Iran for 26 years as monarch, during which time the U.S. and Britain exercised great influence over him to satisfy their economic interests. However, the Shah’s excessive spending contributed to the disillusionment of the Iranian people as the country’s economy suffered. At the same time, the Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled Islamic leader, gained a large following. On January 16, 1979, revolutionaries forced the Shah into exile and Ayatollah Khomeini became leader. In the midst of the revolution, university students climbed the wall of the United States Embassy and took 52 hostages on November 4, 1979. Ten days later, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,170 in response to the hostage situation, which declared a
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national emergency with respect to Iran. The Executive Order "blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 

In 1984, Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism after it was determined that Iran was responsible for the bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The United States "blocked Iran from receiving U.S. foreign aid, sales of items on the U.S. munitions list, Eximbank credits, and U.S. support for foreign loans, and require[d] strict licensing requirements for any U.S. exports of controlled goods or technology." 

On March 15, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,957, entitled "Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources." Executive Order 12,957 was issued after the President had learned that the U.S. firm Conoco, Inc. had inked a deal with Iran to develop oil fields on Iran's Sirri Island. The order prohibited any "United States person" from making "a contract that includes overall supervision and management responsibility for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran" or making "a contract for the financing of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran." Following the issuance of Executive Order 12,957, Conoco withdrew from its contract with Iran. 

On May 6, 1995, President Clinton extended the scope of sanctions with Iran by signing Executive Order 12,959, entitled "Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to Iran." Executive Order 12,959 prohibited "the importation into the United States, or the financing of such importation, of any goods or services of Iranian origin" as well as "the exportation from the United States to Iran, the Government of Iran, or to any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, or the financing of such exportation, of any goods, technology, or services[.]" The order also prohibited the re-exportation by a

77 Id.
79 Id.
85 Id.
third country of any goods or technology exported from the United States to Iran. Executive Order 12,959 forbade foreign affiliates of U.S. oil companies from purchasing Iran’s oil exports for overseas trade. Prior to this order, such foreign affiliates had been procuring 25% of Iran’s oil exports. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff said, “The President’s decision to sever American trade and investment with Iran signaled our commitment to exert the maximum efforts of this country to deny Iran financial resources.” By forbidding American investment, President Clinton hoped to cut off the flow of money from the U.S. to Iran.

Although President Clinton’s Executive Orders were meant to isolate Iran, they had little impact on the interaction of U.S. allies with Iran. Allies of the U.S. failed to follow President Clinton’s lead by initiating any trade or investment bans against Iran. On July 13, 1995, Total SA, a French company, signed a contract with Iran to develop oil fields on the Sirri Islands following the withdrawal of the U.S. company Conoco. Iran also appeared unaffected by the sanctions. The country found new purchasers for its oil resources that had previously been purchased by U.S. companies and their affiliates. It also began negotiating ten multi-million dollar petroleum projects with foreign investors. These developments convinced Congress and the President that “[further] steps were needed to choke off foreign investment in Iran’s oil industry.”

On August 5, 1996, President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (the “Act”). The Act was aimed at furthering the U.S. policy of limiting Iran’s revenues and petroleum resources. It reinforced the opposition of the U.S. to Iran’s support of international terrorism, and continued

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86 Id.
88 Id.
90 Id.
92 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Testifying before the Senate, Mr. Tarnoff stated that "[a] straight line [linked] Iran’s oil income and its ability to sponsor terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and acquire sophisticated armaments." The Act sought to prevent Iran from further developing its petroleum resources by imposing sanctions on foreign investment. The policy sanctions were expected to "deny Iran the revenues and resources to develop weapons of mass destruction and fund groups that commit[ted] international terrorism and acts designed to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process." The U.S. recognized Iran’s need for foreign investment, and believed that Iran would abandon its policies under economic pressure.

The Act imposed sanctions on anyone who invested more than $20 million in one year for the purpose of "directly and significantly contribut[ing] to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop [its] petroleum resources." A violation of the Act would give the President the ability to impose two of six possible sanctions, including:

denial of Eximbank assistance for any exports to the sanctioned person; denial of specific licenses for exports of controlled technology to the sanctioned person and prohibition on imports from that company; a prohibition on a sanctioned financial institution from serving as a primary dealer in U.S. Government bonds or as a repository for U.S. Government funds; a prohibition on any U.S. financial institution from making any loan to a sanctioned person over $10 million per year; and a ban on any U.S. Government procurement of any goods or services from a sanctioned person.

Under the Act, the President could also waive sanctions under certain criteria. The Act also provided for the withdrawal of sanctions if Iran stopped manufacturing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction and if Iran stopped supporting international terrorism.

The enactment of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act was immediately met with opposition from allies of the U.S. U.S. allies did not oppose the

100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
104 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
government’s goal of fighting terrorism, but were outraged by U.S. efforts to control the extent of their foreign investments in Iran. Yves Doutriaux, spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, commented that the United States “[was] one nation telling the rest on the earth what they can and can’t do.” Many countries believed that the law was unlikely to curb Iran’s objectionable behavior. U.S. allies wondered whether the passage of the Iran sanctions bill, as well as a similar bill dealing with Cuba, were merely a tactic employed to bolster support for President Clinton’s re-election campaign, since he had previously opposed both bills.

Sir Leon Brittan, the European Commission’s chief trade negotiator, brought the issue before the World Trade Organization. President Clinton was subsequently forced to waive European sanctions to avoid conflict. Other nations condemned the Act following its passage. A week after President Clinton had signed the Act, Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan went ahead with a planned trip to Iran. The Prime Minister ignored Mr. Tarnoff’s warning that Turkey would be contradicting U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran. The Turkish government claimed that it was “not investing in Iran[,] but simply buying its gas[,]”

The Iran Libya Sanctions Act was also opposed by U.S. corporations. In April 1997, USA-Engage was formed by 500 companies to lobby against the overuse of unilateral trade sanctions by the U.S. American businesses are often the ones to suffer as a result of unilateral sanctions, since foreign companies are likely to replace them. U.S. unilateral sanctions cost the U.S. economy an estimated $15 to $19 billion and 260,000 jobs in 1995.

Many corporate executives complained that the U.S. government’s policy of

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Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.

William Echikson, Europe Shows Muscle in this Tussle, BUSINESSWEEK, May 26, 1997, at 76.


Nelan, supra note 109.

Id.

Id.

Id.

Id.


Id.

Id.

Oমestad, supra note 115.

Id.
unilateral sanctions gave American companies a reputation for being unreliable.\textsuperscript{123}

The U.S. has never sanctioned any entity for a violation of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act.\textsuperscript{124} Due to the European Union’s opposition to the Act, the U.S. and the E.U. agreed to avoid confrontation over the Act.\textsuperscript{125} The E.U. “pledged to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.”\textsuperscript{126} As a result, President Clinton waived sanctions for France’s Total SA project—as well as for its partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia—with respect to development of the South Pars gas field, after such development had been deemed a violation of the Act.\textsuperscript{127}

Various projects have been investigated for violations of the Act, but no sanctions were ever pronounced by President Clinton or President Bush.\textsuperscript{128} These projects include: Elf Aquitaine (France) and ENI’s (Italy) project to develop the Doroud oil field, worth approximately $1 billion; a contract with Elf Aquitaine and Bow Valley (Canada) to develop the Balal oil field, estimated at $300 million; a contract with Royal Dutch (U.K.) and Shell (the Netherlands) to develop the Soroush and Nowruz oil fields, worth approximately $800 million; and a contract with GVA Consultants (Sweden) to explore for oil under the Caspian Sea.\textsuperscript{129}

IV. SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS RUSSIA AND CHINA RESIST STRINGENT SANCTIONS

The five permanent Security Council member nations negotiated proposed sanctions for Iran for months before agreeing to a final solution in December 2006.\textsuperscript{130} While the U.S. called for strict sanctions to punish Iran for its defiance of the Security Council’s demands to suspend nuclear enrichment, Russia and China were reluctant to impose more stringent sanctions.\textsuperscript{131} Although a final resolution was unanimously approved by all permanent members of the Security Council, including Russia and China, the final

\textsuperscript{123} Id.
\textsuperscript{125} Id.
\textsuperscript{126} Id.
\textsuperscript{127} Id.
\textsuperscript{128} Id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{129} Id.
\textsuperscript{130} Gootman, \textit{supra} note 1.
\textsuperscript{131} Id.
resolution proved to be much weaker than earlier proposed solutions.\textsuperscript{132} A close look at China and Russia's economic relations with Iran reveals why each country has resisted implementing tough sanctions.\textsuperscript{133} Since both Russia and China have strong economic ties to Iran, stricter sanctions could have a significant financial impact on them, whereas the U.S. would have little to lose because of its limited economic relationship with Iran.

Statistics reveal that the U.S. has a more limited economic relationship with Iran than other Security Council members. Iran's trade with Security Council members, excluding the U.S., was estimated to have topped $22 billion in 2006, up from $18 billion in 2005.\textsuperscript{134} During the first half of 2006, the U.S. imported only $99 million worth of goods from Iran, and exported only $55 million of goods to Iran.\textsuperscript{135} The U.S. primarily imports rugs, nuts, and juice from Iran, and exports cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, and wood pulp to Iran.\textsuperscript{136}

Although Russia and China have denied that their economic ties to Iran control their stance on sanctions, it appears that their financial relationships with Iran have indeed influenced the positions they have taken.\textsuperscript{137} China is largely dependent on the Middle East for oil.\textsuperscript{138} An estimated 45% of China's oil imports in 2006 were from the Middle East.\textsuperscript{139} China gets an estimated 18% of its crude oil from Iran.\textsuperscript{140} In 2006, Iran was China's third-biggest supplier of oil, providing 12% of the total amount of oil China receives.\textsuperscript{141} China imported $5.16 billion of oil from Iran in 2006, which amounted to a 56% increase on the importation of oil from Iran in 2005.\textsuperscript{142} China has also inked a 25-year deal with Iran, worth up to $100 billion, to develop a key oil field at Yadavaran, and also to buy oil and gas from Iran.\textsuperscript{143}

China's exports to Iran have significantly risen in the last four years.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{132} Id.
\textsuperscript{134} Id.
\textsuperscript{135} Id.
\textsuperscript{136} Id.
\textsuperscript{137} Id.
\textsuperscript{139} Id.
\textsuperscript{140} Id.
\textsuperscript{141} Chinese Foreign Policy: A Quintet, Anyone?, supra note 138.
\textsuperscript{142} King & Champion, supra note 133.
\textsuperscript{143} Thomas Omestad, \textit{Plan B For Iran: Sanctions that Bite}, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 1, 2006, at 29.
\textsuperscript{144} Id.
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During the first half of 2006, Chinese exports to Iran increased by 25%.\(^{145}\) Chinese companies ship over $700 million dollars worth of goods to Iran, including air conditioners, engines, washing machines, and trucks.\(^{146}\) China, a large international arms supplier, also supplies weapons to Iran.\(^{147}\) Currently, Chinese construction companies are also employed in Tehran’s transit system, power plants and merchant ships.\(^{148}\)

China’s position on international issues demonstrates the government’s reluctance to support Security Council measures that could potentially interrupt its oil supply.\(^{149}\) For example, China has been unwilling to take punitive action against Sudan for its involvement with the genocide taking place in Darfur.\(^{150}\) Sudan supplies China with 3% of its crude oil and China is averse to disrupting its investment in Sudan’s oil infrastructure.\(^{151}\) Similarly, during Security Council negotiations, China objected to proposals for strict sanctions in Iran, in an apparent effort to protect its own economic interests there.\(^{152}\)

However, China has also demonstrated increasing support of international efforts to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. China’s endorsement of the December 2006 Security Council sanctions was “an important symbolic act.”\(^{153}\) Experts believe that since China is heavily dependent on the Middle East for oil, the Chinese government realizes that it has “little choice but to support efforts to stabilize the region.”\(^{154}\) China’s U.N. Ambassador, Wang Guangya, has recently attempted to persuade the government of Sudan to agree to accept U.N. intervention in Darfur.\(^{155}\) China, although at odds with American tactics to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, it “share[s] the same broad objectives.”\(^{156}\) Russia, which has significantly influenced China’s position on Iran, has also been increasingly supportive of nuclear containment. China may be following Russia’s lead.\(^{157}\)

A meeting between Mr. Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, and Mr. Hu, China’s President, to discuss the Security Council

\(^{145}\) King & Champion, supra note 133.

\(^{146}\) Id.

\(^{147}\) Omestad, supra note 143.

\(^{148}\) King & Champion, supra note 133.

\(^{149}\) Chinese Foreign Policy: A Quintet, Anyone?, supra note 138.

\(^{150}\) Id.

\(^{151}\) Id.

\(^{152}\) Gootman, supra note 1.

\(^{153}\) Chinese Foreign Policy: A Quintet Anyone?, supra note 138.

\(^{154}\) Id.

\(^{155}\) Id.

\(^{156}\) Id.

\(^{157}\) Id.
sanctions highlighted China’s diverging interests.\textsuperscript{158} China recommended that Iran take the U.N. Security Council resolution seriously.\textsuperscript{159} Demonstrating China’s support for the imposition of sanctions, Mr. Hu relayed that sanctions were “the shared concerns of the international community over the Iranian nuclear issue.”\textsuperscript{160} However, President Hu subsequently backed down from that position, claiming that “China continue[d] to believe the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved through diplomatic negotiation[,]” which illustrated China’s aversion to military action to deal with Iran.\textsuperscript{161} Mr. Larijani, in turn, blamed China’s support of the Security Council’s sanctions on the U.S., and announced that commercial ties between China and Iran would not be affected by China’s vote.\textsuperscript{162}

Although Russia’s trade relations with Iran are more limited than Iran’s trade relations with the E.U. and China, strict sanctions could disrupt Russia’s financial investment in Iran.\textsuperscript{163} Currently, Russia is building a nuclear power plant in Bushehr worth $800 million dollars. Additionally, Russia also has construction contracts worth $5 billion dollars and arms contracts worth $1.5 billion dollars.\textsuperscript{164} In January 2007, despite the imposition of the December 2006 sanctions, Russia sold Iran $700 million worth of TOR-MI antiaircraft batteries.\textsuperscript{165}

Russia played a major role in delaying approval of the Security Council’s imposition of sanctions on Iran.\textsuperscript{166} Permanent members were forced to appease Russia’s demands in order to secure Russia’s vote in favor of sanctions.\textsuperscript{167} Mr. Churkin, Russia’s Ambassador to the U.N., expressed concerns during negotiations that certain language in the resolution would threaten Russia’s current business deals.\textsuperscript{168} In order to facilitate a solution, Security Council members eliminated a mandatory travel ban on Iranians allegedly involved in Iran’s nuclear program.\textsuperscript{169} Russia objected to a draft of the resolution which directed that states “prevent entry” of Iranians involved in

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[{159}] Id.
\item[{160}] Id.
\item[{161}] Id.
\item[{162}] Id.
\item[{163}] King & Champion, supra note 133.
\item[{164}] Omestad, supra note 143.
\item[{165}] Steven Lee Myers, No Cold War, Perhaps, but Surely a Lukewarm Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at 43.
\item[{166}] Lynch, supra note 26.
\item[{167}] Id.
\item[{168}] Gootman, supra note 1.
\item[{169}] Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotes}
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nuclear activities. Instead, the final version of the resolution left it to individual countries to "exercise vigilance" over their borders. The final version also excluded sanctions against a nuclear power plant that Russia is building in Bushehr, and excluded Aerospace Industries Organization from the list of companies involved in Iran's ballistic missile program, in accordance with Russia's demands during the negotiation stage.

Recently Russia has demonstrated a greater commitment to containing Iran's nuclear ambitions. In March 2007, Russia told Iran that it would not deliver nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant unless Iran complies with U.N. sanctions. Russia is also said to be pulling technicians, engineers and other specialists from the power plant, which could cause serious delays in production. Experts believe that although Russia wants to protect its economic interests in Iran, Russia does not want to see Iran acquire a nuclear weapon.

V. U.S. POLICY INCREASES INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PRESSURE ON IRAN

The U.S. and its European allies have acknowledged that the Security Council sanctions are too weak to compel Iran to suspend its nuclear activities. The U.S. and its allies have since implemented a new tactic to increase international financial pressure on Iran by persuading foreign governments and banks to cut ties with Iran. The Treasury Department has been working to persuade Western banks to refrain from doing business with Iran. During IMF and World Bank meetings in September 2006, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. warned financial institutions and government officials about the potential costs of doing business with Iran. Paulson, Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levy,

170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Bay Fang, Optimism Detected on Nuke Issue Russia Takes Tougher Stance Against Iran, CHI. TRIB., March 22, 2007, at 8.
174 Id.
176 Fang, supra note 173.
177 Cooper & Weisman, supra note 20.
178 Id.
180 Id.

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and Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt have all held meetings with banks to explain Iran’s use of deceptive practices to finance illicit business activities.\textsuperscript{181}

The U.S. announced in January 2007 that American financial institutions are barred from doing business with Bank Sepah, an Iranian bank.\textsuperscript{182} The ban “applies to domestic and foreign branches of American banks, as well as to American citizens working at overseas banks that deal with Bank Sepah anywhere in the world.”\textsuperscript{183} American banks must refrain from transferring dollars to Bank Sepah or its branches and subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{184} Bank Sepah has subsidiaries in Rome, London, Frankfurt and Paris.\textsuperscript{185} In September 2006, the United States barred American financial institutions from dealing with another Iranian bank, Bank Saerat, after determining that the bank had been involved in financing terrorist acts.\textsuperscript{186} Bank Sepah is thought to be “the financial linchpin of Iran’s missile procurement network, and has actively assisted Iran’s pursuit of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction[.]”\textsuperscript{187} Bank Sepah has provided financing to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and two Iranian missile companies.\textsuperscript{188} Bank Sepah is also believed to have been used to facilitate business between Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and a North Korean group that exports missile technologies.\textsuperscript{189}

The U.S. and its allies hope that increased international financial pressure will finally persuade Iran to cooperate with the Security Council. The new strategy has already resulted in some early success.\textsuperscript{190} In the past, European countries have opposed U.S. policies which affect them without their consent, as evidenced by the international protest following the adoption of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.\textsuperscript{191} However, the Bush administration has not backed down, and financial institutions in Europe and Asia have begun cutting

\textsuperscript{181} Id.
\textsuperscript{183} Id.
\textsuperscript{184} Id.
\textsuperscript{185} Id.
\textsuperscript{188} Id.
\textsuperscript{190} Wright, \textit{supra} note 179.
\textsuperscript{191} Weisman, \textit{supra} note 182.
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back business with Iran.\textsuperscript{192} The Treasury Department reported that 40 international banks and financial institutions have either limited or severed economic ties with Iran.\textsuperscript{193} UBS, HSBC, Standard Chartered, and Commerzbank have reported that they are limiting business with Iran.\textsuperscript{194} The March 2007 sanctions also added Bank Sepah to the list of entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile activities.\textsuperscript{195} Security Council members will now be prevented from doing business with the bank.\textsuperscript{196}

As a result of the U.S. government’s efforts, the Japanese government has also expressed their willingness to limit business dealings with Iran.\textsuperscript{197} Japan is not a member of the Security Council, but the country is heavily dependent on the Middle East for oil.\textsuperscript{198} Therefore, Japan’s support will be crucial to the success of this strategy.\textsuperscript{199} Citing concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, Japan has reduced its stake in a $2 billion deal to develop Iran’s largest onshore oil field at Azadegan to 10%, down from 75%.\textsuperscript{200} In December 2006, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation announced that it would refrain from issuing any new loans for Iranian projects until Iran cooperated with the international community’s demands to stop nuclear development.\textsuperscript{201}

Another tactic being used by the U.S. and Europe is to “undermin[e] the self-assurance of Iranian officials, especially those who travel abroad.”\textsuperscript{202} American troops in Iraq recently arrested four Iranian diplomats, two of whom were thought to be members of the Revolutionary Guard.\textsuperscript{203} The diplomats were suspected of providing explosives to Iraq to be used against U.S. military.\textsuperscript{204} Even though the diplomats were released, this strategy is intended to “chip away at their confidence.”\textsuperscript{205} These arrests were met with protest from Iran.\textsuperscript{206}

The U.S. and Great Britain are increasing their combined military
presence in the Middle East to deal with Iran.\textsuperscript{207} The U.S. has deployed a second aircraft carrier (the USS John C. Stennis) and accompanying ships to the Persian Gulf. This decision by the U.S. government doubles the U.S. military presence in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{208} Great Britain will also add two mine-hunting vessels to its ships stationed in the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{209} Although officials deny that the United States is preparing for an offensive strike, "they acknowledged that the ability to hit Iran would be increased."\textsuperscript{210} The increased military presence is intended "to make clear that the focus on ground troops in Iraq has not made it impossible for the United States and its allies to maintain a military watch on Iran."\textsuperscript{211} The strengthened naval presence will also be able to enforce any subsequent sanctions that the U.N. may impose on Iran.\textsuperscript{212} Officials also hope that naval presence will prevent Iran from "block[ing] oil shipments from the gulf in retaliation for United Nations sanctions."\textsuperscript{213}

Increasing international financial pressure has significantly affected Iran's economy. Iran's economic health is largely dependent on its foreign capital ties, especially with Western countries.\textsuperscript{214} Experts argue that "Iran's economy is in desperate need of reform."\textsuperscript{215} Iran needs $70 billion dollars to restore its decaying oil industry.\textsuperscript{216} In early 2006, as tensions over Iran's nuclear program mounted and the threat of sanctions seemed imminent, trade and investment in Iran were negatively impacted.\textsuperscript{217} Amir Cyrus Razzaghi, a Tehran consultant dealing with foreign investors, acknowledged that "exports to Iran dipped, and tens of billions of dollars of capital [were] moved out of Iran."\textsuperscript{218} The stock market and real estate market have both suffered as a result.\textsuperscript{219} Mr. Razzaghi also acknowledged that many foreign investors were hesitant to invest because of the fear of impending sanctions.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{207} U.S. Ships Headed to Mideast Called a Warning to Iran, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, at 6.
\textsuperscript{208} Id.
\textsuperscript{209} Thom Shanker, U.S. and Britain to Add Ships To Persian Gulf in Alert to Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at A24.
\textsuperscript{210} Id.
\textsuperscript{211} Id.
\textsuperscript{212} Id.
\textsuperscript{213} Id.
\textsuperscript{215} Id.
\textsuperscript{216} Id.
\textsuperscript{217} King & Champion, supra note 133.
\textsuperscript{218} Id.
\textsuperscript{219} Id.
\textsuperscript{220} Id.
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The implementation of the U.S. policy to encourage foreign banks and financial institutions to restrict ties with Iran has weakened the Iranian economy. President Ahmadinejad, responding to the threat of international financial pressure, announced a budget which would take a lower price for oil into account. Since Iran’s budget is heavily dependent on oil revenues, President Ahmadinejad anticipates that the U.S. and its allies will reduce the price of oil in order to pressure Iran into cooperating. Last year, Iran’s budget was based on $44 a barrel for oil. The new budget is based on a price of $33 a barrel. President Ahmadinejad does not appear to be yielding to economic pressure. He announced, “We are ready, and we will manage the country even if you lower the oil prices.”

The economic effect of reduced international financial investment in Iran is apparent, notwithstanding the strength of President Ahmadinejad’s conviction to the contrary. Gal Luft, Executive Director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, revealed that “the Iranian economy is suffering a great deal as a result of the economic punishment.” Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh, the Iranian oil minister, has admitted that Iran has “encounter[ed] obstacles in financing oil projects.” Mr. Vaziri-Hamaneh further acknowledged that “overseas banks and financiers have decreased their cooperation.” International business withdrawal has led Iran to attempt “to secure gasoline imports from its allies, including Venezuela, and [to shift] some dependency from gasoline to natural gas.” Iranian importers have also been affected by the major banks’ decisions to cut ties with the private sector. As a result, “many [importers are] having to pay for commodities totally in advance when a year ago they could rely on a revolving line of credit.”

VI. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE IN IRAN

Members of the Iranian Parliament have become increasingly critical of President Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy. The Iranian political system consists of four political groups: reformists, pragmatic technocrats, radical

21 Fathi, supra note 67.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Cooper & Weisman, supra note 20.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Wright, supra note 179.
hardliners, and mainstream conservatives. The reformist party has little desire for a nuclear weapon, but instead advocates economic and social reform as well good relations with the West. The pragmatic technocrats are concerned with “rebuilding Iran’s economy[,] and recognize that this is impossible without vastly improved relations with the West in order to encourage greater trade and investment in Iran.” They would like to see Iran acquire a nuclear weapon, but are willing to sacrifice a nuclear program for improved relations with the West. The radical hardliners, led by President Ahmadinejad, are known to “pay little heed to Iran’s economic woes, believing that the Iranian people are willing to make further sacrifices in the pursuit of the Islamic revolution.” President Ahmadinejad and the radical hardliners “are determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, because they believe it is necessary to their larger struggles with the United States, which they see as the principal threat to Iran[.]” The mainstream conservative political group includes National Security Council Chairman Ali Larijani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei has taken the “middle path, never curbing Iranian nuclear and terrorist activity enough to satisfy the Americans, but keeping things in check enough to allow the European and Japanese governments to continue to trade and invest in Iran.”

Some experts believe that Iran’s leadership was surprised when sanctions were passed, and that members of Iran’s parliament have been discussing a course of action to deal with U.N. sanctions. Reactions by Parliament members reveal dissatisfaction with President Ahmadinejad’s nuclear policy. For example, Mohammed Atrianfar, a political commentator allied with former President Rafsanjani, has argued that “[i]f [Ahmadinejad] wants to start a new war, from where does he think he’s going to produce the army? We are not agreeing with his radical, extreme policies. It is because of the propagandist speech of Ahmadinejad all over the world that we’re in the situation we’re in.” Another member of Iran’s parliament, reformist Akbar Alami, said that “[Ahmadinejad is] making some adventures in foreign

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231 Pollack, supra note 214.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 3.
238 Id.
240 Id.
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relationships that don’t benefit our country. The nuclear issue and the right of Iran to have nuclear power is a matter of national pride. But we cannot limit this issue to one person like Mr. Ahmadinejad. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, a strong supporter of the nuclear program, has not done much to quiet critics of Ahmadinejad’s policies, revealing that Khamenei may no longer support Ahmadinejad’s tactics.

The Iranian press, formally barred from criticizing Iran’s nuclear policy, has nevertheless expressed disapproval of the government’s policies. Over the past few years, more than a hundred newspapers that have condemned government policies have been shut down, and dozens of journalists have been jailed. Immediately following the Security Council’s December decision, most newspapers either refrained from expressing an opinion about the Security Council’s sanctions or criticized the imposition of sanctions on Iran. However, in the week following the announcement of the sanctions, several moderate newspapers discussed the potential for the sanctions to have a larger impact than the government had previously acknowledged. An editorial in the newspaper Aftab-e-Yazd explained that an “unreasonable and emotional” reaction to the sanctions could be very dangerous. Newspapers affiliated with the reformist party similarly cautioned that the sanctions could have serious consequences for Iran. Fear of government censure is still apparent, however, and the authors of newspaper articles on the subject did not conclude that the government should suspend nuclear development.

A new radio program called Goftegoo Radio has recently used the Iranian airwaves to promote scholarly debate of Iran’s current nuclear position. Heated discussions about whether Iran should continue its nuclear program have been heard regularly on the program since its inception in May 2006. Guests of the radio program have candidly confronted the nuclear issue. The program’s guests have spoken boldly, criticizing the government

241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
245 Fathi, supra note 28.
246 Fathi, supra note 33.
247 Id.
248 Fathi, supra note 244.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
for putting the nuclear program before the country’s other more important interests.253 Their opinions suggest that many Iranians do not support the nuclear program and would rather see the government’s budget be used to fund more vital needs.254 Sadeq Zibakalam, a professor of political science at Tehran University who has appeared on the show several times, expressed outrage over the government’s attempt to link Iran’s development with the nuclear program.255 Professor Zibakalam demanded, “Who says that we will lose our national identity if we give up our nuclear program?”256 Instead of pouring large amounts of money into the nuclear program, he argued that Iran should invest in hospitals and schools.257 He also criticized the government’s failure to address “the costs of sanctions or a military confrontation—[neither of which would] contribute to the country’s development.”258

The results of recent municipal elections in Iran reveal that President Ahmadinejad’s policies are losing popularity among Iranian citizens.259 Politicians aligned with President Ahmadinejad faired poorly in recent elections.260 Election winners came from two very different political groups: the conservative party and the reform party.261 Analysts have theorized that the election winners, unlike President Ahmadinejad, “understand that [Iran’s] future requires good relations with foreign investors, trade partners and educational institutions.”262 Voters have been dismayed that Mr. Ahmadinejad has been ruining relations with foreign investors “by defying the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations[.].”263

Iranian university students have also protested President Ahmadinejad’s policies.264 At one university where President Ahmadinejad was speaking, students interrupted his speech, calling him a dictator.265 University students have taken to protesting because they are angry that the Iranian government has removed professors because of their political affiliation,
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and limited their own basic personal freedoms. Students also argue that the Iranian government has damaged possibilities for their future by mismanaging the economy and adversely affecting diplomatic relations. Although many students still believe that a nuclear program is their right, many fear that the government’s nuclear program is harming the country.

VII. IS WAR LIKELY?

Tensions continue to escalate between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. has accused Iran of providing weapons to Iraqi insurgents battling American soldiers. An undisclosed Iranian official has acknowledged that Iran could do more to prevent weapons from crossing over its borders. Some experts believe that the U.S. administration is preparing to attack Iran, although U.S. officials deny that military action is imminent. If an attack were to be initiated by the American military, the U.S. government should be careful not to underestimate Iran’s capabilities. In such a situation, the U.S. would likely use military air strikes to target Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Pentagon has contingency plans for a war with Iran which would include targeting “Iran’s air-defense systems, its nuclear- and chemical-weapons facilities, ballistic missile sites, naval and Revolutionary Guard bases in the gulf, and intelligence headquarters.” However, military officials argue that an attack on Iran will only delay Iran’s eventual nuclear independence. Officials claim that the only way to eliminate the threat of Iran gaining a nuclear weapon would be to topple the Iranian government—and this is not a feasible solution, considering the U.S. military’s current weakened condition. Although a U.S. air attack could destroy many nuclear facilities, such an attack is unlikely to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear facilities because many sites are unknown. Experts believe that Iran would incite insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq to attack U.S. troops. Iran could also disrupt oil shipments from the

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266 Saner Voices in Iran, supra note 259.
267 Id.
268 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
273 Hirsh & Bahari, supra note 269.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
The imposition of U.N. Security Council sanctions in December 2006 and March 2007 has not impeded Iran’s nuclear proliferation. The possibility of a nuclear Iran is a cause for international concern. If Iran develops a nuclear bomb, it is likely that Iran could support terrorism more aggressively, without fear of retaliation. In addition, other Middle Eastern nations might be encouraged to develop their own nuclear weapons. The Middle East is an area of the world where much turmoil already exists and the possibility of more countries gaining nuclear weapons would undoubtedly cause more tension.

Increased international cooperation is necessary to compel Iran to suspend its nuclear activities. Economic ties binding both Russia and China to Iran once seemed to explain the reluctance of both countries to implement strict sanctions against Iran. However, in recent months, both Russia and China have demonstrated an encouraging degree of commitment to containing Iran. Further support from Russia and China as well as other superpowers like Japan will be needed to pressure Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.

The U.S. and its European allies have acknowledged the limitations of U.N. sanctions, and have since instituted new strategies to isolate Iran by persuading foreign governments and banks to sever their financial ties with Iran. This initiative has already enjoyed some success. The economy of Iran is showing the effects of decreased financial investment. Iranian citizens are increasingly concerned about the state of the country’s economy. President Ahmadinejad rose to power because of promises relating to economic reform, but he has done little to improve the situation. His focus on nuclear development and failure to fix the economy has further disillusioned his constituents. President Ahmadinejad’s policies have also caused conflict in Iran’s parliament. The international community should take advantage of the current economic, social and political climates in Iran by continuing to condemn Iran’s nuclear activities, while simultaneously withdrawing foreign investment in order to further isolate Iran.

The U.S. and Great Britain have increased their naval presence in the Persian Gulf, leading some to believe that military action might be imminent. Military action should be a last resort. An air strike would be unlikely to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear facilities and might further encourage Iran to in fact develop a nuclear weapon. A military action could also threaten troops

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278 Id.
279 Pollack, supra note 214.
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currently battling insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, since Iran possesses the capability to supply those insurgents with weapons. A military action might also encourage Iran to support terrorist activities, including the bombing of U.S. embassies abroad. Finally, a military action would likely lead to the deaths of innocent Iranian civilians, many of whom do not support the President’s nuclear policy.

If Iran fails to abandon its nuclear program within 60 days of the U.N.’s sanctions, the Security Council must act quickly to pass another set of more stringent sanctions in order to demonstrate its commitment to addressing the situation in Iran. Increasingly strict U.N. sanctions, along with international financial pressure, will be necessary to significantly compel Iran to cooperate and suspend its nuclear activities.

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280 Byman, supra note 45.
281 Id.