Creation of an International Anti-Prohibitionist League in the Field of Drugs

Marie-Andree Bertrand
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I. INTRODUCTION

On March 31, 1989, forty-five legal experts, sociologists, psychiatrists, criminologists, magistrates and journalists, from fifteen different countries and three continents, gathered in Rome and founded the International Anti-prohibitionist League (IAL). The IAL's objective, as its name indicates, is to work toward the repeal of criminal laws prohibiting drugs. In the present socio-penal climate, characterized by the use of repressive policies and an acceleration of the drug war, the creation of such an organization is not improvised.

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1. Several commentators have characterized the drug prohibition effort as a “war”. For example, in referring to the prohibitory policy of the United States, with respect to illicit drugs, a recent U.S. Senate Committee report declared: “the United States is engaged in a war directed at our citizens . . . .” S. REP. NO. 165, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter S. REP.]. However, this “war” may simply be a manifestation of prejudice toward certain groups. As one commentator has stated:

the [American] “war on drugs” is no more than another variation of humanity's age-old passion to “purge” itself of its “impurities” by staging vast dramas of scapegoat persecutions. In the past, we have witnessed religious or holy wars waged against people who professed the wrong faith; more recently, we witnessed racial and eugenic wars, waged against people who possessed the wrong genetic make-up; we are presently witnessing a medical or therapeutic war, waged against people who use the wrong drugs.

The foundation of the League had been prepared during an international conference on the subject of anti-prohibitionism, held in Brussels, Belgium in October 1988. There, about thirty experts on drug policy worked out alternative solutions to the prohibitive laws, with some advocating the legalization of one or two drugs (marijuana, for example), and the imposition of taxes in proportion to the harmful effects of the substance involved. Others proposed putting an end to prohibition altogether since it strikes certain substances arbitrarily; also, legalizing by stages would only cause the traffic to turn to the drugs that are still illegal.

Thus, all the participants at the Brussels conference arrived at the conclusion that an end must be put to prohibition as we know it today, because the cost has become morally, institutionally, humanely and financially intolerable. Hence the proceedings of the Brussels conference bear the title: The Cost of Prohibition.

The foundation of the IAL was prepared by three groups: 1. The Radical Antiprohibitionist Coordination (R.A. CO) created by the Italian Radical Party; 2. The European Movement for the normalization of Drug Policies, adopted at the initiative of Dutch legal experts, psychiatrists and social workers; 3. and the American Foun-
creation for a New Drug Policy (The Drug Policy Foundation), an organization that took up and extended the work of the National Organization for the Repeal of Marihuana Laws (NORML).8

The founders and promoters of these three movements met in Rome in March 1989 as well as sympathizers from all over the world who had declared themselves in favor of the abolition of prohibitionist laws.9 They all unanimously endorsed the policy program of the new League.10

II. THE INANITY OF THE DRUG WAR

Readers of the daily newspapers and those who listen to the broadcast news are perhaps delighted to hear about the “arrests” of drug traffickers11 and sensational seizures of drugs made by the police.12 In view of such news the public may believe that, in the unequal fight of the police and criminal justice against the monster criminal organizations that dominate the drug trade, the “good” are making progress. Unfortunately, the opposite is true.

The police forces admit that penal control (if one can speak here of control without being ironic) leaves approximately eighty-five percent of the drug trafficking untouched.13 Repression affects 1 user in 100 or 1000, depending on the substances and the countries concerned.14

8. Bertrand, supra note 2, at 1-2.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
11. For example, in what is the most historic and controversial drug arrest to date, Panama’s ruler, General Manuel Noriega, surrendered to United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Panama and was extradited to the U.S. to stand trial on drug-trafficking charges. See Berke, Noriega Arraigned in Miami in a Drug-Trafficking Case; He Refuses to Enter a Plea, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at A1, col. 4.
12. See, e.g., McKinley, Seizure of Cocaine is Called Largest in New York City, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, at A1, col. 3 (reporting that the seizure of 4 tons of cocaine in New York by federal agents was the largest in that city’s history); Mydans, Agents Seize 20 Tons of Cocaine in Raid on Los Angeles Warehouse, N.Y. Times, Sep. 30, 1989, at A1, col. 3 (reporting that the “seizure of at least 20 tons of cocaine and more than $10 million in cash” by U.S. federal agents was said to be “the biggest drug haul in history.”).
13. See NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM., THE SUPPLY OF ILLEGAL DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1988) [hereinafter NNICC REPORT] (stating that “at best, interdiction results in the seizures of only 15 percent of the illegal narcotics coming into the [United States].”).
14. In Canada, for example, while recently compiled police statistics show the number of cannabis users to be 4.75 million, and the number of heroin and cocaine addicts to be 20,000 and 250,000 respectively, police activities in 1983 led to convictions of approximately 22,000 persons for cannabis possession, and 800 persons for heroin and cocaine possession. See Bertrand, Permanence des Effets Pervers et Resistance au Changement des Lois sur les Drogues,
The intention to wage total war against drugs has led the signatory countries of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs\(^\text{15}\) to enact laws prohibiting or controlling an astonishing range of conduct\(^\text{16}\)—including, of course, possession\(^\text{17}\) or sale\(^\text{18}\) of controlled substances—and a vast array of substances.\(^\text{19}\) This policy of repression is usually matched with exemplary sentences and exceptional proseccutions that threaten the rights and liberties of individuals\(^\text{20}\) and national communities. Huge bureaucracies have been gradually created in *L'Usage des Drogues et la Toxicomanie* 142-43 (G. Morin ed. 1988) (text originally published in 10 Deviance et Societe 177 (1986)) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).


16. Under Article 36, the Convention provides: "[E]ach Party shall adopt such measures as will ensure that cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary to the provisions of this Convention . . . shall be punishable . . . ." *Id.* art. 36, para. 1, 18 U.S.T. 1425, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 252; *see* Sengers, *United Nations' Drug Abuse Control: Premises, Commentary and Proposals*, in *Cost of Prohibition*, supra note 1, at 83 (stating that "[t]he most important characteristic of drug policy in all the countries which ratified the U.N. Conventions is the decision to rely heavily on the criminal law system approach as a solution to drug-related problems.").

17. *See* *Id.* art. 33, 18 U.S.T. 1424, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 248. Article 33 provides: "The Parties shall not permit the possession of drugs except under legal authority." *Id.*

18. *See* *Id.* art. 30, 18 U.S.T. 1421, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 240. Article 30 provides, in pertinent part: "(b) The Parties shall: (i) Control all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged in the trade in or distribution of drugs". *Id.* *See also* *Id.* art. 35, 18 U.S.T. 1425, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 250. Article 35 provides, in pertinent part: "Having due regard to their constitutional, legal and administrative systems, the Parties shall: (a) Make arrangements at the national level for co-ordination of preventive and repressive action against the illicit traffic . . . ." *Id.*


20. *See* Special Comm. on Crim. Just. in a Free Society, *American Bar Ass'n, Criminal Justice in Crisis* 46 (1988) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (stating there "is evidence that certain disregard for the Fourth Amendment, specifically in drug cases, may be an unavoidable by-product of a drug problem so pervasive that the police feel they sometimes must violate constitutional restraints in order to regain control of the streets."); Zeese, *Drug War Forever?*, in *Drug Policy 1989-1990: A Reformer's Catalogue* 54 (A. Trebach & K. Zeese eds. 1989) (stating that "[a]s the war on drugs fails and becomes more intense, courts and legislatures are weakening the civil liberties of all Americans."); *see also* Grinspoon, *supra* note 3, at 228 (stating that "[t]he threat to civil liberties grows as the [drug] warriors, already by necessity using entrapment and informers, now contemplate bringing in the military and random drug testing."); Mydans, *Powerful Arms of Drug War Arousing Concerns for Rights*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1989, at A1, col. 1 (noting that in the U.S., "evictions, raids, curfews, random searches and the summary forfeiture of property [in connection with suspected drug violations] have become increasingly common and appear to enjoy broad public and legislative support.").
to manage this prohibition and apply the repressive laws.\(^{21}\)

This war effort, however, is facing a resounding failure. The United States was in an excellent position to foresee the failure of prohibition—it had attempted this type of solution without success in the case of alcohol prohibition.\(^{22}\)

III. THE FAILURE OF PROHIBITION AND ITS PERVERSE EFFECTS

There are numerous signs of the flagrant failure of prohibition, and the harmful effects of this policy become more evident every day.

1. Drug Use and Accessibility.— The first and most flagrant sign of the failure of prohibition is surely the fact that illicit drugs are more and more widespread and largely accessible.\(^{23}\) The circles of consumers are ever-increasing and varied—the use of illegal drugs is no longer limited to certain ethnic groups or socio-economic levels of society, as was the case in previous decades.\(^{24}\)

2. Criminal Activity.— One of the perverse effects of prohibition is the fact that it is directly responsible for the formation of

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22. The eighteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (1919, repealed 1933). The eighteenth Amendment was subsequently repealed by the twenty-first amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 1. Statistics regarding alcohol consumption before and after imposition of the eighteenth Amendment indicate that alcohol prohibition in the U.S. was a failure. For example, an estimate by the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment in 1926 showed that consumption of “spirits” rose from approximately 142 million gallons per year in the period before prohibition to 285 million gallons by 1926. S. Cashman, *Prohibition* 253 (1988). During the same periods, it was estimated that consumption of wine rose from approximately 56 million gallons to 75 million gallons. Id.

23. See *International Anti-Prohibitionist League, Policy Resolution Founding Congress* [hereinafter POLICY RESOLUTION] (pamphlet on file at Hofstra Law Review); see also NNICC REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-3 (noting that in 1988 the amount of marijuana available in the U.S. increased and that cocaine and heroin were readily available); *Dealing With Drugs*, Tribune, Jun. 20, 1988, reprint at 10 (stating that “drugs are . . . available to almost anyone who wants them.”).

24. See *President’s Comm’n on Organized Crime, Report to the President and Attorney General*, *America’s Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime* 23 (1986) (noting that in the U.S., while a 1983 survey of callers to a cocaine hotline indicated that the average caller was caucasian, a 1985 survey showed an increased number of minority callers. This report also noted that “[s]urveys of cocaine users demonstrated there is no ‘typical’ cocaine user,” and that cocaine use in the U.S. “has spread geographically and to different socio-economic groups.”).
groups of organized criminals who profit immeasurably from the secrecy in which prohibition places all their operations and from the absence of quality control and taxes (both income and sales). Although drug money is often laundered and recycled in legitimate businesses, it also is used in the clandestine trading of arms and support of other criminal activities. Certain military regimes do not even hide the fact that they are in the pay of major drug traffickers.

3. Organized Crime.— Another perverse effect of prohibition is that the organizations that dominate the traffic of drugs, the “cartels”, the “triads”, and the mafia families, threaten the peace of the ordinary citizens with their violent behavior. They destabilize the States politically by either dominating or buying the parties in power, or by corrupting certain politicians. There are few governments throughout the world that are completely immune to temptation at election time.

25. See Hamowy, Introdution: Illicit Drugs and Government Control, in DEALING WITH DRUGS 3 (R. Hamowy ed. 1987) [hereinafter DEALING WITH DRUGS] (stating that “[t]hough the laws aim to wipe out the market for illicit drugs, they only change its behavior. They drive up prices and profits far beyond normal levels, thus ensuring an inexhaustible supply of dealers and smugglers.”); POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 23 (stating that “[p]rohibitionism has produced the illegal drug trade and the groups that profit from it.”); Grinspoon, supra note 3, at 228 (noting that drug prohibition “inflate[s] prices and keep[s] the drug dealer’s franchises lucrative.”).

26. See, e.g., LeMoyne, Military Officers in Honduras Are Linked to the Drug Trade, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1988, at Al, col. 4 (noting that Honduran drug traffickers were “buying businesses and land to launder drug profits.”).

27. See Dealing With Drugs, supra note 23, at 4 (stating that “[d]rug profits have financed guerrillas from Afghanistan to Lebanon.”); see also S. REP., supra note 1, at 2 (noting the drug cartels’ involvement with terrorist groups).

28. See, e.g., BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5 (1989) (stating that in Laos “the extensive involvement of Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic (LPDR) military and civilian government officials in the narcotics trade suggests that such activity is a matter of de facto government policy,” and that “there are indications that some [drug] traffic is sanctioned or facilitated by Cuba.”).

29. See POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 23 (stating that “[t]he predominant organizations—the so-called Cartels, Triads, and Mafias—threaten the individual person’s peace . . . .”); see also Grinspoon, supra note 3, at 228 (stating that “[a]nother consequence [of drug prohibition] is drug-related crime and violence, a product of the black market in drugs . . . .”); see, e.g., Dealing With Drugs, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that “[i]n Colombia, drug syndicates have killed a supreme court justice, an attorney general, police commanders and journalists.”); Treaster, Columbian ‘Day of Love’ Broken By a Long Night of Drug Violence, N.Y. Times, Sep. 17, 1989, at A1, col. 4 (noting that the Colombian version of Valentine’s Day recently was “disrupted by an avalanche of telephoned death threats and a rash of attacks that kept Colombians in their homes.”).

30. See POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 23 (stating that the drug Cartels, Triads, and
CREATION OF THE IAL

4. Violence.— With time, prohibition has turned the large cities of several countries into battlefields. The penal laws on drugs protect neither the consumer who is threatened with imprisonment, nor the drug addict who indulges secretly and is in danger of contagion, AIDS, etc., nor the habitues, because regular use under the system, or rocketing prices resulting from prohibition, force him sooner or later to resort to illegal activities and trafficking in order to satisfy his habit. Non-consumers see their own security threatened by consumers in need of a "fix" and by armed gangs who are involved in trafficking.

5. The Educational Failure.— The failure of prohibition and prohibition itself so far have been major obstacles to enlightened education in the field of drugs and treatment. The act of consuming certain substances, instead of being a matter of personal choice and

Mañas "threaten . . . the whole world's political stability."); see also Zeese, supra note 20, at 54-55 (stating that "[t]he immense profits of the drug trade have made some drug lords more powerful than the governments of the countries in which they operate."); S. REP., supra note 1, at 2 (stating that "[t]he drug cartels are so large and powerful that they have undermined some governments and taken over others in our hemisphere,") and the cartels have "demonstrated the power to corrupt military and civilian institutions alike.").

31. See, e.g., S. REP., supra note 1, at 3 (noting Panama leader General Manuel Noriega's emergence as a key player on behalf of Colombia's Medellin Cartel).

32. See POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 23 (stating that "[i]n its modern version, prohibitionism has changed our great cities into battlefields . . . ."); see also Moore, Dead Zones, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1989, at 20 (stating that in the U.S., "city after city now tolerates its own Beirut, a no man's land where drug dealers shoot it out to command street corners, where children grow up under a reign of 'narcoterror' and civil authority has basically broken down."). As a result of drug "turf wars" in the U.S., "police confirm that identifiable geographical areas with combat like conditions exist in more than a dozen major cities . . . ."

33. See id. (noting that "[t]he person who is tempted by hard drugs falls into crime and disease, with AIDS being the worst one."); see also Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1988, at 6 (stating that in the United States the vast majority of AIDS-infected heterosexuals throughout the country, have contracted the disease directly or indirectly through illegal intravenous drug use.").

34. See id. (noting that "[t]he person who is tempted by hard drugs falls into crime and disease, with AIDS being the worst one."); see also Zees, supra note 20, at 54 (stating that "addicts who crave illegal drugs and who pay black market prices often have to steal to get enough money for their habit. Many of those that do not steal sell drugs . . . ."); Dealing With Drugs, supra note 23, at 3 (stating that "addicts often steal to afford drugs whose price reflects not the cost of production but the risks of marketing . . . . The more police drive up the price, the more addicts steal.").

35. See Zees, supra note 20, at 54 (stating that "[t]urf wars between rival gangs have caused homicide rates to soar throughout the United States."); Raab, Brutal Drug Gangs Wage War of Terror in Upper Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1988, at B1, col. 5.
one that confirms the responsibility of the individual for his own health and social vocation—as in the case of alcohol and nicotine, for example—has become a world-wide tragedy.37

6. The Cost of Prohibition.— The cost of prohibition is enormous.38 The bureaucracies that this policy has engendered are exploiting a scandalous share of their country’s budget,39 a share all the more scandalous in that the prohibitionist policy is resulting in failure, and that corruption is becoming firmly established in the bureaucracies themselves as well as in the services charged with repression.40

7. Harm to the Penal System.— Prohibitionist claims have seriously damaged the credibility and dignity of the penal system not only because of the obvious failure of control, but also because the arbitrary nature of the designated targets is more and more evident.41 When compared with the known ill-effects of nicotine and alcohol, nobody should dare to claim that cannabis is so harmful that its prohibition and the sentences attached to its possession are justified. Nobody should dare claim that the principles of proportionality of punishment and equity of sentences are adhered to in drug cases when some courts impose heavy sentences of imprisonment for simple possession of drugs while other release traffickers

37. See Policy Resolution, supra note 23 (stating that “[t]he failure of Prohibitionism has transformed a question of personal choice and health into a world-wide tragedy.”).
38. In the U.S., for example, President Bush recently announced a $7.9 billion federal drug program, about 70 percent of which was slated for law enforcement efforts. Weinraub, President Offers Strategy for U.S. on Drug Control, N.Y. Times, Sep. 6, 1989, at A1, col. 6.
39. This exploitation was noted by Mr. Hamowy, who notes: There are large numbers of people, principally employees of law enforcement agencies, who have a vested interest in seeing to it that ever increasing amounts are expended to stamp out the distribution and sale of illicit drugs. These groups are economically dependent on the existence of restrictive drug legislation . . . . Any serious reform of the nations drug laws is bound to meet powerful resistance from . . . groups within the American bureaucracy . . . who have capitalized on our current policy and who have a great deal to gain from its maintenance.
Hamowy, supra note 25, at 7. See also Turf Wars in the Federal Bureaucracy, Newsweek, Apr. 10, 1989, at 24 (noting that “the anti-drug effort has been a boon for those leading it. Bureaucratic empires have grown, congressional careers have blossomed—while drugs hit the streets faster and cheaper each day.”).
40. See ABA Report, supra note 20, at 47 (stating that “[d]rugs and the money associated with their traffic have the additional deleterious effect of public corruption,” and that “[b]ribery, even complicity, in trafficking by law enforcement officials or lawyers and judges is inevitable.”); Dealing With Drugs, supra note 23, at 5 (stating that “[b]y corrupting the police, judges, prosecutors and military officers who fight them, fabulously rich drug traffickers turn officials into criminals and threaten to leave the public defenseless against crime.”).
41. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
unconditionally.

Those seven points are precisely the substance of the political resolution adopted during the Foundation Congress of the League.

IV. CONCLUSION

There is no dearth of arguments against prohibition. However, we find some parents who are in favor of maintaining this policy, which is marred by so many undesirable effects, because they fear that legalizing drugs would result in still more flagrant abuse. In response to this fear, it must be noted that the countries and American states that have tried the experiment of decriminalization, or some legalization, have not seen an increase in use or abuse—quite the contrary. Above all, however, the question must be put squarely: "Do we want the drugs controlled by the mafia or drugs controlled by the State?" From now on, it is in these terms that responsible citizens must put the question of a responsible policy in the field of drugs. They will not disappear during our lifetime, whatever we do. As our American colleagues put it, the heading of the program of the next symposium of the Drug Policy Foundation reads: "If you cannot answer 'yes' to each of the three following questions, you should subscribe to our organization and our bulletin: 'Do you believe we have won the war on drugs? Do you believe that the strategies used today by our countries are capable of letting us win this war? Do you think that doing more of the same will win the war on drugs?'"
What the League proposes is not anarchy but the legalization of drugs—of all drugs—and control of the quality, pricing, sale, and distribution of drugs by the State or an organization responsible to the State.\textsuperscript{45}

To the arguments in favor of legalization and state control, we must not forget to add the tax benefits (sales tax and tax on profits) that the states would receive from the regulated sale of these newly licit drugs—exactly as it does for alcohol and cigarettes.\textsuperscript{46} The American delegates to the Conference for the foundation of the League, acknowledging the preponderant influence of the United States in the adoption of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs\textsuperscript{47} and in the strategy of the war on drugs, recommended to their colleagues from other countries that we all get out of this useless and dangerous war, just as the United States had to get out of the war in Vietnam. As noted by Wesley A. Pomeroy, former Assistant Director of Drug Abuse Policy under President Carter, “the police forces are very often themselves victims of this war on drugs just as the American soldiers were victims of the war in Vietnam”.\textsuperscript{48}

The founding members of the league set themselves four objectives:

1. to coordinate scientists and scientific and political organizations that support antiprohibitionism in the matter of drugs;
2. to work at the publication of information and the development of public awareness concerning drugs and the harm that the present policies do because they represent an incitement to crime;
3. to combat arguments and policies that support prohibition, such

\textsuperscript{45} See Bertrand, The Immorality of Prohibition, in COST OF PROHIBITION, supra note 1, at 179 (stating that “[i]t is absolutely essential that prohibition . . . be substituted by a State licensing system for the regulation of the supply, quality and distribution of those drugs which are today prohibited.”).

\textsuperscript{46} As urged by one commentator: “Drug legalization should include taxes on illicit drugs.” Zeese, supra note 20, at 55. Mr. Zeese goes on to state that the level of such taxes “should be consistent with the costs of the drug to society and should include money for research on addiction, health hazards and prevention.” Id. at 59; see also Savater, The Socio-Political Aspects of the Drug Question, in COST OF PROHIBITION, supra note 1, at 184-85 (stating that “adequate taxes imposed on products which today are included in the black market and thus unregulated, could cover [societal] costs [stemming from drug use] through a redistribution of the profits lining the pockets of the very few.”). Furthermore, “[b]y taxing more dangerous drugs more heavily we could use tax policy to encourage the use of safer drugs.” Zeese, supra note 20, at 59; see also Grinspoon, supra note 3 (discussing taxes on decriminalized drugs); supra note 4 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{47} See supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing the Convention).

\textsuperscript{48} Riding, Europe Favors Lifting Ban on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
as those put forward by the United Nations and their Agreements in the matter of drugs; and
4. -to encourage all forms of action at the national and international level that will defeat prohibition.\textsuperscript{49}

They invite all those who share their views to join them.

\textsuperscript{49} See POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 23. The Resolution states:
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, CONVENED AT THE FOUNDING CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-PROHIBITIONIST LEAGUE, PLEDGE TO ACCOMPLISH THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES:
A. To set up an organization for the coordination of persons and of bodies in scientific, social and political fields, who propose to take up the same objectives as the Anti-Prohibitionist League.
B. To disseminate information and understanding on policies concerning drugs and on the harm caused by the present system of prohibition and its consequences for criminality.
C. To challenge the arguments and policies favoring the Prohibitionism currently followed by the United Nations and their agencies, as well as the international legislation of the conventions on narcotic drugs.
D. To initiate and support all actions at international and national level [sic] to dismantle the prohibitionist system.
\textit{Id.} (emphasis in original).